JUDGMENT P.A. Mohammed, J. 1. The first defendant in a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale, is the appellant. The plaintiff and second defendant are respondents 1 and 2 respectively in the appeal. The appeal is against the judgment and decree of the court below directing the appellant to execute the sale deed in performance of the agreement for sale. 2. The facts involved in this appeal are condensed thus: An agreement for sale (Ext. A-1) was executed by the appellant in favour of the first respondent on 20th March 1985 agreeing to sell the plaint schedule property. The consideration for sale of the property was fixed at Rs. 50,000, out of which a sum of Rs. 16,000 was paid in advance. It was agreed that the sale deed would be executed within a period of three years. The property involved in the agreement is described as 79 cents of nilam comprised in Rs. 339/1 in Kunhimangalam Amsom Desom. It was part of the property which was purchased by the appellant under Ext. A-2 assignment deed. She had obtained purchase certificate in respect of the said property in O.A. No. 848 of 1976 of the Land Tribunal, Kannur. On 16th February 1987 the first respondent issued Ext. B-3 notice to the appellant calling upon her to execute the sale deed on 25th February 1987 on receiving balance consideration. However, the appellant sent Ext. A-4 reply on 13th March 1987 contending that Ext. A-1 agreement for sale was not really intended to be performed as such but it was executed only as security for the loan amount advanced. Thereafter, the first respondent filed a suit, O.S. No. 53/87 before the Munsiff's Court, Payyannur, seeking permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the appellant from alienating the property. That suit was decreed in view of Ext. A-1 agreement. On 17th March 1985 second respondent, the husband of the appellant, issued a notice to the first respondent contending that the property involved in Ext. A-l agreement really belonged to him and the balance consideration of Rs. 34,000 should be paid to him. Since the appellant refused to execute the sale deed even after the issue of Ext. B-3 notice the present suit O.S. No. 51 of 1991 was filed before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Payyannur. After the trial the court below passed a decree directing the first respondent to deposit Rs. 34,000 should be paid to him. Since the appellant refused to execute the sale deed even after the issue of Ext. B-3 notice the present suit O.S. No. 51 of 1991 was filed before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Payyannur. After the trial the court below passed a decree directing the first respondent to deposit Rs. 34,000 within two months from the date of the judgment and the appellant was directed to execute the sale deed on such deposit. The court below further ordered that in case the appellant fails to execute sale deed within the time stipulated, it would be open to the first respondent to execute the sale deed through the process of court. Hence this appeal is filed by the appellant. 3. On behalf of the appellant, the following contentions were advanced: (i) That the suit for specific performance as framed by the first respondent is not maintainable. (ii) That the suit is bad for non compliance of the provision contained in S.16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. (iii) That the court below has committed grievous error in exercising the discretion under S.20 of the Specific Relief Act in granting a decree for specific performance in favour of the first respondent, Contention No. i 4. In order to channelize the contention that the suit as framed is not maintainable, counsel for the appellant pointed out that Ext. A-l agreement was not intended to be acted upon and it remained as a sham document. It was executed as security for the amount advanced and the parties had never intended that the sale should take place. Since the appellant was faced with financial stress in that he required money in order to meet the expenses of the marriage of his daughter, she approached the first respondent for a loan. The counsel maintains that it was in those circumstances the appellant was compelled to execute Ext. A-1 agreement. In support of the above plea, counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Khader Rowther v. P. K. Sara Bai and others AIR 1990 SC 682 wherein it was observed: "It is thus clear that this is a case where the plaintiff seeks specific performance of a contract stated to be evidenced by an allegedly sham document which did not come into effect. His plaint does not contain the requisite pleadings necessary to obtain a decree for specific performance. This equitable remedy recognised by the Specific Relief Act cannot be had on the basis of such pleadings and evidence. (Italics supplied) In the above decision the Supreme Court agreed with the finding of the High Court that the plaintiff is not entitled to get a decree for specific performance in the absence of required pleading. The suit in that case was for a decree for specific performance of the covenant for re-conveyance. The question therefore is whether Ext. A-1 agreement for sale in this case can be treated to be sham document not intended to be acted upon. Lord Devlin in Davies v. Elsby Brothers Ltd. (1961) 1 W.L.R. 170 said: "It is a general principle of English law, not merely applicable to cases of misnomer, that the intention which the framer of the document has in mind when he brings it into existence is not material. In that we differ from many continental systems. In English law as a general principle the question is not what the writer of the document intended or meant but what a reasonable man reading the document would understand it to mean;......" The Supreme Court in Chunchun Jha v. Ebadat Ali and another AIR 1954 SC 345 held: "The real question in such a case is not what the parties intended or meant but what is the legal effect of the words which they used. If however there is ambiguity in the language employed, then it is permissible to look to the surrounding circumstances to determine what was intended." (Italics supplied) 5. While construing whether a particular document is sham or true or otherwise it to be acted upon or not, the court must in the first place discern any such intention is visible from the express terms contained in it. If the words are express and clear, effect must be given to them. In the absence of that the court must apply the test what a reasonable man reading the document would understand them to mean and not what the parties would have intended or meant. It is always the duty of the court to uphold and not to ignore the legal effect of the recital contained in a document. In the absence of that the court must apply the test what a reasonable man reading the document would understand them to mean and not what the parties would have intended or meant. It is always the duty of the court to uphold and not to ignore the legal effect of the recital contained in a document. No extraneous enquiry shall be held to find out what the parties would have intended or meant. Such an enquiry may sometimes culminate in the obliteration of the document itself. A cursory reading of Ext. A-1 would be sufficient to say that the parties had never intended it to be a sham one or one not to be acted upon. No indication any where in the document pointing it to be a security for the loan alleged to have obtained. The Ext. A-1 is a document executed by the appellant in favour of the first respondent. If it was executed to augment finance for the marriage expenditure as alleged, normally such reason should have seen in the recitals. The appellant for the first time contended in Ext. B-4 reply notice sent to the first respondent that Ext. A-1 was executed only as a security for repayment of loan advanced by the first respondent. It is appropriate to note here that if it was the real case she should not have failed to raise this plea at the earliest opportunity available to her, particularly she was distressed with an agreement for sale, a sham document according to her. O.S. No. 53 of 1987 was a suit filed by the first respondent against the appellant on 31st March 1987 before the Munsiff's Court, Payyannur seeking permanent injunction restraining the appellant from alienating the plaint schedule property to others till the expiry of the period mentioned in the agreement dated 20th March 1985 (Ext. A-1). An ex parte decree (Ext. P-5) was passed in that suit by the Munsiff's Court on 16th July 1987 and that decree was in force throughout. In fact it was passed on the basis of Ext. A-1 agreement for sale. When the appellant having failed to challenge Ext. A-l in the above suit, she is estopped from raising the contention in the present suit. 6. It was argued that the appellant was bound to execute only the agreement entered into between the parties as per Ext. In fact it was passed on the basis of Ext. A-1 agreement for sale. When the appellant having failed to challenge Ext. A-l in the above suit, she is estopped from raising the contention in the present suit. 6. It was argued that the appellant was bound to execute only the agreement entered into between the parties as per Ext. A-l. In this case, relief fought for is not the performance of the agreement but the execution of the sale deed, after identifying the real owner of the property between defendants 1 and 2. The first respondent further seeks that a direction to execute the sale deed shall be given to such real owner of the property. This, according to the appellant, is a vague and uncertain relief, which cannot be granted in a suit for specific performance. The decision in Md. Ziaul Hague v. Calcutta Vyaper Pratisthan AIR 1966 Cal. 605 has been relied on by the counsel in support of the above position. In the said decision the court observed: "These three decisions are really in aid of the broad proposition that readiness and willingness to perform the agreement must be readiness and willingness to perform not as the plaintiff wished it nor in the way that the plaintiff evinced it prior to the institution of the suit, nor in the way the plaintiff wanted to fashion it at the trial but whether the plaintiff was really ready and willing to perform the real agreement between the parties. The words 'real agreement' would mean either the agreement that the plaintiff and the defendant had between the parties or it would mean the real agreement which the Court finds it to be real agreement." Where a question arises as to whether a plaintiff has asked for a particular relief, the whole of the plaint must be considered. This is the principle to be applied while examining whether the plaintiff has stated the relief in the plaint as envisaged under O.7 R.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court in L. Janakirama Iyer and others v. P.M. Nilakanta Iyer and others AIR 1962 SC 633 held that in construing the plaint the court must have regard to all the relevant allegations made in the plaint and must look at the substance of the matter and not its form. The Supreme Court in L. Janakirama Iyer and others v. P.M. Nilakanta Iyer and others AIR 1962 SC 633 held that in construing the plaint the court must have regard to all the relevant allegations made in the plaint and must look at the substance of the matter and not its form. When the entire plaint is examined in this background, I do not see any difficulty in understanding the relief sought in the plaint. After the execution of Ext. A-l agreement a claim had been advanced by the second respondent that the balance consideration should be paid to him. In fact there are averments in the plaint in that regard. The 'real agreement' between the parties can also be gathered from the plaint. Therefore it cannot be said that the suit is bad for the reason alleged by the appellant. 7. The counsel for the appellant submits that in a suit for specific performance, parties to the suit shall be the parties to the contract alone. In this case, the agreement is between the appellant and the first respondent, but the second respondent who is the husband of the first respondent has been impleaded as second defendant in the suit. Such impleadment in the present suit for specific performance is bad according to the counsel. Reliance was placed on the decision in Panne Khushali and another v. Jeewanlal Mathoo Khatik and another AIR 1976 M.P. 138 where in it was held thus: "Strangers to the contract making a claim adverse to the title of the defendant (vendor) contending that they are the co-owners of the contracted property are neither necessary nor proper party and are, therefore, not entitled to be joined as parties to the suit". That was a case where intervener made an application for being joined as a party to the suit contending that the suit property is a coparcenary property and they as coparceners are the co-owners of it. Therefore, the court apprehended; "If these applicants are added as parties to the suit, it would tantamount to the conversion of the suit, into a title suit, deciding the title inter se the non applicant No. 2 and the applicants." This cannot be allowed in view of the following principle laid down by the Calcutta High Court in Prem Sukh Gulgulia v. Habib Ullah AIR 1945 Cal. 355. 355. "This is on the principle that the Scope of a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale ought not to be enlarged and the suit turned also into a title suit between one of either of the parties to the contract and stranger of the contract." There is no scope for the present suit being converted into a title suit for the reason of the impleadment of second respondent who is the husband of the appellant as second defendant in the suit. This is not a case where the second defendant sought impleadment asserting totally a rival title. 8. The counsel for the first respondent on the other hand has cited three decisions for justifying the impleadment of second defendant in the suit. The first among them is a decision of this court in Abraham v. Chandi Rosamma 1988 (2) KLT 659 where the learned single judge (Radhakrishna Menon, J.) dissented from the Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Panne Khushali's case AIR 1976 M.P. 148 supra, and held: "The parties whose interests will not be affected by the decree sought, although they may have an interest in the subject matter, are not ordinarily necessary parties, although, they may sometimes be proper parties under general rule, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits, (see Gorpm Juris Secondum, Vol. XXX S.142 and 146 to 148 referred to in the Full Bench ruling of the Madhya Pradesh High Court). At least to avoid multiplicity of suits, the second defendant is a necessary party to the suit." The other two decisions cited by the counsel are, (i) Mokarala Pitchayya v. Boggavarapu Venkatakrishnayya AIR 1943 Mad. 497 and (ii) Bai Devkabai and others v. Shah Shamji Mulji AIR 1995 SC 945 Contention No. ii 9. Under S.16(c) of the Act, specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The case of the appellant is that there is no definite averment and pleading as regards the continued readiness and willingness to pay the balance consideration. The case of the appellant is that there is no definite averment and pleading as regards the continued readiness and willingness to pay the balance consideration. In other words, the first respondent has failed to prove the requirement prescribed under S.16(c) of the Act. In a recent decision, Jugraj Singh and another v. Labh Singh and others AIR 1995 SC 945 the Supreme Court held that the continuous readiness and willingness at all stages from the date of the agreement till the date of the hearing of the suit must be proved by the plaintiff. It further held that the substance of the matter and surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the plaintiff must be taken into consideration in adjudging readiness and willingness to perform the plaintiff's part of the contract. I have recently held in A.S. No. 98 of 1993 (judgment dated 2nd February 1996) that in a suit for specific performance, what is required to be established is the continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform the essential terms of the contract for sale and that it does not mean the plaintiff must establish that he had always in his possession the required funds from the date of agreement for sale till the execution of the sale deed or till the date of the decree, if the dispute is pending adjudication in a court of law. The availability of required funds may be a piece of material to establish the readiness on the part of the plaintiff in certain cases. In view of my above decision on this question, T think it is not necessary to recapitulate the whole issue despite the catena of authorities cited by the counsel on both sides. 10. In Para.3 of the plaint, it is averred that the first respondent was ready to pay the balance consideration as per the agreement to the appellant and that a lawyer's notice was issued on 16th February 1987 to him stating such readiness. In Para.2 of the plaint, he further stated that he was ready to execute the sale deed and to pay the balance consideration as per the agreement. When the first respondent was examined as D.W.1, he deposed that he was ready and willing to get the sale deed executed after payment of the balance consideration. In Para.2 of the plaint, he further stated that he was ready to execute the sale deed and to pay the balance consideration as per the agreement. When the first respondent was examined as D.W.1, he deposed that he was ready and willing to get the sale deed executed after payment of the balance consideration. Thus the evidence in this case would sufficiently indicate that there was continuous readiness and willingness to execute the document. It is also apt to notice that the appellant who was examined as P.W. 1 admitted in the witness box that first respondent had sufficient financial stability. In this background, the point under discussion can well be answered in favour of the first respondent. Contention No. in iii 11. S.20 of the Specific Relief Act deals with discretion as to decreeing specific performance. Sub-s.(1) of the said section mandates that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Sub-s.(2) deals with cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. Those cases are enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) which are retyped hereunder: (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering in to the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, where as its non performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; or (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. There are two Explanations to sub-s.(2). Explanation.1 will apply in the case of unfair advantage or hardship contemplated under clauses (a) and (b). Explanation.2 will apply in the case which involves hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b). There are two Explanations to sub-s.(2). Explanation.1 will apply in the case of unfair advantage or hardship contemplated under clauses (a) and (b). Explanation.2 will apply in the case which involves hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b). Explanation.1 says that mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). Explanation.2 says that the question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract. Sub-s.(3) prescribes that the court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. Sub-s.(4) prescribes that the court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party. 12. The anatomy of provisions of S.20 summarised above indubitably discloses that the legislature has in all force preserved the judicial discretion to the courts in the matter of decreeing specific performance of contracts. Sub-section (2) of the said section empowers the court to refuse specific performance of contracts even though it has jurisdiction to render a decree and the contracts are capable of being specifically enforced. But the refusal of relief is not absolute. It is however conditioned by the circumstances specified in Explanation.1 and 2 to sub-s.(2). That would necessarily indicate that the court must carefully consider the entire circumstances in favour of or against decreeing the specific performance of contracts. The Supreme Court in Mathew v. Kuruvila 1988 (1) KLT 7 observed: "Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion to courts as to decreeing specific performance. The court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The court should take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff." In Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal and others AIR 1979 SC 1241 it further held: "The ordinary rule is that specific performance should be granted. It ought to be denied only when equitable considerations point to its refusal and the circumstances show that damages would constitute an adequate relief. In the present case, the conduct of the appellant has not been such as to disentitle him to the relief of specific performance. He has acted fairly throughout, and there is nothing to show that by any act of omission or commission he encouraged Mohsinali and Qurban Hussain to enter into the sale with the first and second respondents." This decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in Ameena Ummal v. Narayana Pillai 1989 (1) KLT SN 45. 13. The appellant points out that Ext. A-l agreement gives the first respondent an unfair advantage over her because the said agreement was executed at a time when she was hard-pressed for money in connection with the marriage of her daughter. In other words, the contention is that Ext. A-l was only a security for the amount obtained from the first respondent as loan. It has come out in evidence that the appellant had sufficient tangible assets to raise more than Rs. 1,1,000 on the date of execution of Ext. A-1. There is cogent evidence in the case to hold that Ext. A-l was executed really for the purpose of sale. The first respondent when examined as P.W. 1 had denied the allegation that Ext. A-l was executed as a security for loan amount advanced. However, counsel for appellant has cited the decision of this court in Prasanna v. Sreedharan and others 1995 (2) KLJ 287 where the Division Bench took the view to the following effect: "Taking advantage of the situation in which the defendants as judgment debtors were placed, the plaintiffs tried to secure for themselves the properties, not negotiating for them on equal terms. There can be no dispute that the price obtained at the court auction was not the fair market price of the properties. Thus the plaintiffs obtained a measure of unfair advantage over the judgment debtors (defendants) by the terms of the contract and therefore specific performance should be refused." That was a case where the plaintiffs have clearly deposed that they never intended to purchase the property and it was due to the persuasion by the first respondent that they reluctantly agreed to purchase the same. The facts of the present case are totally different from the facts of the case decided by the Division Bench. 14. Though the nature of exercise of discretion is widely specified in S.20 of the Act, the maxims that a plaintiff in equity must approach the court with clean hands and that he who seeks equity must do equity are often applied in the suits for specific performance. "Equity implies a system of law which is more consonant than the ordinary law with opinions current for the time being as to a just regulation of the mutual rights and duties of men living in a civilised society." (Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edn., Vol. 14, page 464). Spry observes in "Equitable Remedies" that the above said maxims "are often used in a purely rhetorical manner in cases where the refusal of relief may better be justified on more precise grounds. Thus many cases where the absence of clean hands is referred to may be explained by the presence of fraud, or misrepresentation, or an illegality, or a breach of contract leading to a lack of readiness or willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his obligations." Snell in "Principles of Equity", however, says: "Even if there is no fraud or misrepresentation sufficient to justify the decision of the contract, the court may still refuse the equitable remedy of specific performance if the conduct of the plaintiff has been tricky or unfair, for "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands," and the court is not bound to decree specific performance in every case in which it will not set aside the contract." 15. In S. K. Panchaksharam Mudaliar v. T.V. Kanniah Naidu and others AIR 1986 Madras 156 the court said: "By reason of the fact that he had come forward with a false case and unclean hands, he had denied himself the equitable relief of specific performance." It cannot be said in the facts and circumstances of this case that the first respondent approached the court below with 'unclean hands' or with a 'false case'. The appellant had no case in the written statement that first respondent is not entitled to any equitable relief for such reasons. She also did not claim any discretionary relief apart from the contentions in defence. Even though the appellant has executed Ext. A-1 sale agreement, she tried to deny the same. First respondent has obtained Ext. A-5 ex parte order of injunction against the appellant in view of Ext. A-1. She did not raise any objection to the said order. That suit was filed by the first respondent as there was some attempt by the appellant to alienate the property covered by Ext. A-1 agreement to strangers. The claim that Ext. A-1 agreement was executed as security for the loan advanced by the first respondent was found to be false. That means the appellant has advanced false claims in the written statement. In this connection, it is apt to recall the decision of this court in Simon v. Thitheerumma ILR 1990 (3) Ker. 896) supra wherein it is observed thus: "Equally so, false defence contentions disentitle the defendants to plead that discretion may be exercised in their behalf. As the contentions of the defendants are found to be mendacious, the Sub Judge ought not have denied the plaintiff the decree of specific performance." 16. The main objection in this case appears to be with regard to the value of the plaint schedule property. Even assuming that the consideration of the plaint schedule property is inadequate it cannot be said to be a reason for denying decree for specific performance in view of Explanation.1 to sub-s.(2) of S.20, as observed in Simon's case ILR 1990 (3) Ker. 896) supra. 17. The counsel for the appellant argued that there was no explanation by the first respondent for the delay in filing the suit. Ext. A-1 agreement is dated 20th March 1985 and the period fixed for the execution of sale deed is three years. 896) supra. 17. The counsel for the appellant argued that there was no explanation by the first respondent for the delay in filing the suit. Ext. A-1 agreement is dated 20th March 1985 and the period fixed for the execution of sale deed is three years. That means the sale deed should have been executed on or before 20th March 1988. The suit was filed only on 11th March 1991. In Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Telloji Rao AIR 1965 SC 1405 the Supreme Court observed: "In England the relief of specific performance pertains to the domain of equity; in India, to that of statutory law. In England there is no period of limitation for instituting a suit for the said relief, and, therefore more delay, the time lag depending upon circumstances-may itself be sufficient to refuse the relief; but in India mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of limitation. If the suit is in time, delay is sanctioned by law, if it is beyond time; in either case, no question of equity arises." In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decision, it cannot be said that the explanation for the delay is imperative in this case. It has to be observed that there is no delay in filing the present suit inasmuch as it was filed within the period of three years from date fixed for the performance of the contract in view of Art.54 of the limitation Act 1963. Therefore, appellant is not entitled to claim that the discretionary relief cannot be granted in favour of the first respondent in view of non explanation of the delay in filing the suit. As observed by the Supreme Court, delay is sanctioned by law and hence the explanation is uncalled for. That being so, this court cannot place reliance on the decision in Ahammed v. Mammad Kunhi and others AIR 1987 Ker. 228 as canvassed by the counsel for the appellant. 18. The appellant has no case of hardship in executing the sale deed pursuant Ext. A-1 contract entered into between the appellant and the first respondent. It has to be noticed that the land proposed to be sold is a paddy land and not a residential plot. This land is situated far away from the residence of the appellant. 18. The appellant has no case of hardship in executing the sale deed pursuant Ext. A-1 contract entered into between the appellant and the first respondent. It has to be noticed that the land proposed to be sold is a paddy land and not a residential plot. This land is situated far away from the residence of the appellant. It has also come out in evidence that she has sold away six or seven other items of properties, subsequent to the execution of the present agreement for sale on 19th March 1985. The appellant has sold away another item of property under Ext. B-1 dated 25th August 1986. These circumstances would sufficiently indicate that no hardship would be caused to the appellant by refusing to exercise discretion in her favour by the court below. 19. The counsel for the appellant finally argued that in view of the provision contained in sub-s.(1) of S.20 of the Act, discretion of the court is not arbitrary, but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by court of appeal. What is contended by the counsel is that the correctness or otherwise of the order under S.20 shall be subjected to correction by the appellate court. The question may arise as to the scope of this provision vis-a-vis S.100 C.P.C where an appeal is provided to the High Court against the order of the subordinate court if the case involves a substantial question of law. I do not propose to examine this question here inasmuch as a decision on that point is inessential for the disposal of this first appeal. 20. The totality of the evidence available in this case would sufficiently brings forth that the court below has exercised the discretion under S.20 of the Act in a just and proper manner. It cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.