S. K. PHAUJDAR, J. The appeal was ad mitted on 22-10-1984 on four substantial questions of law as follows: (1) When a suit for possession stands dismissed for default and an application under Order IX, Rule 9 also stands dis missed, whether a subsequent suit for the same relief in respect of the same property was maintainable; (2) Whether a partition deed which is not duly stamped and is not registered could be read as evidence; (3) When a question of title is decided in respect of a property in a former suit between the father of the plaintiff and others, whether in a subsequent suit a court can again decide the question of title in respect of the same property contrary to the judgment in the former suit; and (4) Whether a suit for possession on the ground of trespass is maintainable at the instance of one co- owner without impleading the other co-owner as a party. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, pressed the points of bar of sub sequent suit under Order IX, Rule 9 and of the admissibility of the partition paper. 2. A suit, numbered 54 of 1975, was initiated by Hari Babu (Present respondent No. 1) against Harbhajan Singh (present appellant) and others. 3. The prayer in the suit was for posses sion of the suit premises after evicting the defendants and for damages for their illegal occupation thereof. The suit-property, ac cording to the plaint, belonged to Mangat Ram, father of Hari Babu, Mangat Ram made a partition of his properties amongst his sons and the suit- property fell in the share of Hari Babu. One Tek Chand was inducted in the suit property as a tenant by Mangat Ram and this Tek Chand had al lowed the present appellant, Harbhajan Singh, to stay there as a sub-tenant. Mangat Ram filed a suit against Tek Chand in O. S. No. 578 of 1977. The defendant Harbhajan contested the suit claiming to be a trespasser in the house. The suit was dis missed for default. Subsequently, this suit was filed impleading Harbhajan as a trespasser and claiming damages at the rate of Rs. 100 per month for his illegal occupa tion. 4. The suit was contested by Harbhajan Singh but the ownership of Mangat Ram or Hari Bhu on the suit property was denied. The suit was dis missed for default. Subsequently, this suit was filed impleading Harbhajan as a trespasser and claiming damages at the rate of Rs. 100 per month for his illegal occupa tion. 4. The suit was contested by Harbhajan Singh but the ownership of Mangat Ram or Hari Bhu on the suit property was denied. It was stated that the suit No. 578 of 1977 was filed in collusion between Tek Chand and Mangat Ram. The plaintiff intentionally failed to appear in that suit and it was dis missed for default. Accordingly, the present suit was said to be barred under Order IX, Rule 9, C. P. C. It was further stated that in Civil Appeal No. 241 of 1965 it was decided that Laja Mangat Ram was not the owner of the suit-property and the present suit, therefore, was not maintainable wherein a claim of ownership of Mangat Ram was ad vanced. 5. The trial court received evidence and heard the parties and decided that the suit property was owned by the plaintiffs and the present suit was not barred under Order IX, Rule 9 and he decreed the suit of the plaintiff in toto on 21-3-1980. 6. In the First Appeal No. 102 of 1980 the decree of the trial court was maintained by the judgment dated 2-8-1984. It was held by the first appellate court that the plaintiff could succeed to prove his ownership on the property. It was reasoned by him that even if )r the sake of argument the partition papers were not to be acted upon for lack of registration, that would not help the defen dants as a co- owner could alone maintain a suit for eviction of a trespasser. It was held that the assessment of damages at the rate of Rs. 100 was proper. In the appeal, the defen dants laid stress on the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 241 of 1965 but the court found that in that judgment Lala Mangat Ram was found to be the pattedar (settlee) for the suit-property. On the question of applica tion of Order IX, Rule 9, CPC to bar the present suit, the court found that the former suit was filed by Mangat Ram against Tek Chand for realisation of arrears of rent and for dispossession. On the question of applica tion of Order IX, Rule 9, CPC to bar the present suit, the court found that the former suit was filed by Mangat Ram against Tek Chand for realisation of arrears of rent and for dispossession. In that suit, the present appellant was described as a trespasser and, accordingly, the court of first appeal was of the view that the causes of action in the suits were different and the bar of Order IX, Rule 9 would not be applicable here. 7. Pressing the appeal for the appel lant, Sri K. K. Dubey stated that the earlier suit was for possession and the present suit is also for the same relief and Order IX, Rule 9 would positively apply in the present set of facts. For application of Order IX, Rule 9, CPC, there must be a dismissal under Order IX, Rule 8, i. e. the dismissal order is to be passed for absence of the plaintiff, but where the defendant had ap peared. Order IX, Rule 9 . peaks that where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under the Rule 8 the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. The words that require elaborate discussion are "same cause of ac tion". 8. What is a cause of action? Section 20 of the CPC says that a suit may be instituted in a court within local limits of whose juris diction the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. The meaning of the words "cause of action" makes it clear that a cause of action is made up by a number of facts which are necessary to be pleaded and which, if estab lished, would enable the plaintiff to ob tain from the court a remedy against the defendant. A cause of action has no relation with the defence set up. A cause of action need not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to prove is to be indicated while describing the cause of action. In other words, every fact which may be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment in his favour by the court is a cause of action. In other words, every fact which may be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment in his favour by the court is a cause of action. It is a bundle of essential facts and refers entirely to mediate upon which the plain tiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. 9. It is necessary at this stage to indi cate that no papers concerning the earlier suit No. 578 of 1970 were brought on record by the defendants at the trial or at the first appellate stage. The defendant- appellant filed an application under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the CPC at this second appeal stage to introduce and bring on record a copy of the plaint in that suit, the order of dismissal and the order in appeal against the order of dismissal. It was urged that these papers be accepted as additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27 (3) CPC. Normally, the parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence in the appel late court but Order XLI, Rule 27 provides three exceptional circumstances under which such additional evidence may be ac cepted. The appellant does not rely on the first two clauses, i. e. (a) and (aa ). He relied on the clause (b) which authorises accep tance of additional evidence if the appellate court requires the same to be produced to enable it to pronounce a judgment or for any substantial cause. It is stated that the pleadings were there regarding the dismiss al of the earlier suit and the two courts below had engaged themselves to decide the question of maintainability of the suit under Order IX, Rule 9, CPC and, accordingly, it was necessary to have this evidence on record so *hat a definite conclusion be ar rived at. On this question, learned counsel for the respondent relied on a decision of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1968 SC 406 . Certain documents were in posses sion of a party but were not produced in the court of first instance. A plea was taken that the party did not realise the importance of the document during trial and the Supreme Court held that this plea would not bring the case within the expression "other substan tial cause". Certain documents were in posses sion of a party but were not produced in the court of first instance. A plea was taken that the party did not realise the importance of the document during trial and the Supreme Court held that this plea would not bring the case within the expression "other substan tial cause". The expression, other substan tial cause, is one of the conditions in clause (b) of Order XLI, Rule 27, the other condi tion being the appellate court requiring the document to enable it to pronounce a judg ment. When the question of maintainability of the suit under Order IX Rule 9 is the sheet-anchor of the appeal and when this plea is being harped from the initial stage, it is felt that the copy of the plaint and the dismissal order are documents which are to be seen for pronouncing the judgment on the question of applicability of Order IX, Rule 9, CPC and on the question of main tainability of the suit. The application under Order XLI, Rule 27, CPC is, therefore, ac cepted and the documents filed along with the application are admitted in evidence. 10. That the suit No. 578 of 1970 be tween Mangat Ram v. Tek Chand and others stood dismissed under Order IX Rule 8, CPC is not disputed. It is also not ques tioned that an appeal against that order also stood dismissed. The plaint of this suit is relevant, to know as to what was the cause of action. It appears from the reading of the plaint that Tek Chand was described as the tenant and Harbhajan Singh was described as a sub-tenant. Notice was sent under Sec tion 106 of the T. P. Act to Tek Chand and a copy thereof was sent to Har Bhajan Singh Tek Chand was directed to deposit the arrears of rent. His tenancy was also ter minated. He did not comply with the notice. So far Har Bhajan was concerned, in response to the notice sent to him, he had sent a reply indicating that he was not in possession, rather his brother Iqbal Singh was in possession of the suit-property. Ac cordingly, Iqbal Singh was also named as a defendant in the suit-property. He did not comply with the notice. So far Har Bhajan was concerned, in response to the notice sent to him, he had sent a reply indicating that he was not in possession, rather his brother Iqbal Singh was in possession of the suit-property. Ac cordingly, Iqbal Singh was also named as a defendant in the suit-property. The present appellant did not produce even at this stage the copy of the written statement to show that this averment in the plaint of Suit No. 578 of 1970 was wrong, that in his reply to the notice he had indicated that he was not in possession of the suit-property. On his own showing, it is found, therefore, that before the earlier suit Har Bhajan had taken a plea that he was not in possession and, according to the plaint in the present suit, Har Bhajan had taken a plea in his written statement in the earlier suit that he was a trespasser. The plea of the defence would not determine the cause of action. The ear lier suit was one out and out between a landlord and a tenant and it was dismissed for default of the plaintiff. The present suit is not for removal of the tenant or for realisation of the rent due but for eviction of a trespasser and it cannot, therefore, be said that the two suits are based on the same cause of action, although the final relief in both the suits were getting back possession of the suit property. The first objection raised by the appellant accordingly fails. 11. On the above point reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in A. I. R. 1980 SC 1655 (Parasram Harnand Rao v. M/s Shanti Narinder Kumar Jain and another ). There was a suit by a tenant for a declaration of his status. This suit was dismissed for default. An applica tion for setting aside that order also stood rejected and warrant of possession was is sued in pursuance to the decree. A subsequent application under Section 25 of the Delhi Rent Control Act for recalling the warrant of possession was held barred on the principles contained in Order IX, Rule 9, C. P. C. and reliance was placed on an ear lier decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1965 SC 295 . A subsequent application under Section 25 of the Delhi Rent Control Act for recalling the warrant of possession was held barred on the principles contained in Order IX, Rule 9, C. P. C. and reliance was placed on an ear lier decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1965 SC 295 . In the latter mentioned decision, it was observed that the ban im posed by Order IX, Rule 9 was not merely a personal bar or estoppel against the par ticular plaintiffs suing on the same cause of action, rather the bar would apply to per sons claiming under him. In the case before the Supreme Court in Parasram Harnand Raos matter this earlier decision was con sidered because a situation had arisen where, after the decree for eviction of the tenant, the respondent in the matter before the Supreme Court had taken possession of the premises by virtue of a transfer made by the official liquidator. The court held that the identity of the subject-matter being sub stantially the same the case clearly fell within the ambit of the ratio of the case of Suraj Ratan Thirani ( AIR 1965 SC 295 ). In the case at our hand, however, materials have been analysed to indicate how the causes of action did actually differ and the case-law is open to distinction on facts from the case at out hand. 12. The next point urge on behalf of the appellant was that the partition deed could not have been acted upon and read in evidence as it was neither duly stamped nor registered. It was contended that the parti tion was effected by this document. The partition allegedly took place by a family arrangement on 1-4-1970 but in the earlier suit dated 14-5-1970 this partition was not acted upon. This suggests according to the appellant that there was no family arrange ment in 1. 4-1970. Reliance was placed in this regard on a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in ALR 1977 (3) at page 696. It was held herein that there was a distinction between a document of family arrangement creating or extinguishing rights in immovable property and a document containing the terms and conditions of the family arrangement which may have been made already. It was held herein that there was a distinction between a document of family arrangement creating or extinguishing rights in immovable property and a document containing the terms and conditions of the family arrangement which may have been made already. In the latter case, the document itself does not create or extinguish any right or title in immovable property and it was not compulsorily registrable. The docu ments falling in the former category, how ever, must be registered if the valuation of the immovable property exceeded Rs. 100. 1 believe, in this regard the reasonings ad vanced by the first appellate court are quite sound. Whether the partition was effected by the present document of partition or it was a mere record of an earlier partition is of little importance in the present set of facts. As it is a suit against a trespasser, and even though the theory of partition be not ac cepted, a co-owner can always evict the trespasser unless the trespassei raise a plea of possession with the consent of the other co-owner. This disposes not only the objec tion regarding partition but also the fourth point raised by the appellant regarding the maintainability of the suit by one co-owner only. 13. The third question agitated in the appeal was regarding a judgment in Civil Appeal No. 241 of 1965. The defendant-ap pellants pressed that in that judgment Man-gat Ram s title was disproved over the suit-property. The learned first appellate court found, however, that Lala Mangat Ram was found in that judgment to be the pattedar for the suit-property. Thus, there was no find ing by the trial court or the first appellate court contrary to the earlier judgment and this point does not help the appellant in the present appeal. 14. All the point raised by the appel lant having failed, the appeal should also fail. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and decree of the courts below stand confirmed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed. .