JUDGMENT- Dr. B.P. SARAF, J.:---This is an appeal from the judgment of the learned Single Judge dismissing the arbitration petition of the appellants for setting aside the award. 2.The relevant facts of the case, briefly stated, are as follows. The appellants, Oil Natural Gas Commission, ("ONGC") invited tenders for carrying out the construction of 304 Nos. 'B' type prefab Housing Units at Panvel Phase I. In pursuance of the above tender invitation, the respondents, New India Civil Erectors Pvt. Ltd. ("Contractors"), submitted their tender. The respondents, being the successful bidders, were accordingly allotted the work. A written contract was executed between the appellants and the respondents on 14th January, 1985 for carrying out the said work. The work of construction was duly commenced by the respondents. The appellants too made certain interim payments to the respondents. According to the appellants, after receiving payment of Rs. 3,09,052.57, the respondents abandoned the work. As a result, the appellants had to get the balance construction work carried out through other contractors at the risk and cost of the respondents, which costed them approximately to Rs. 114.07 Crores. The case of the respondents on the other hand is that the work could not be completed by them because of the refusal of the appellants to extend the time for completion of the construction work which was necessitated on account of the acts and omissions of the appellants. 3.Since disputes and differences arose between the appellants and the respondents before completion of the construction work, the appellants took over possession of the construction work and materials and machinery at site. The respondents thereupon invoked the arbitration clause contained in the letter dated 5th March, 1984 which formed part of the written agreement. Accordingly, the dispute was referred to arbitration. One arbitrator was appointed by each of the parties. The said arbitrators appointed Dr. R.K. Katti as umpire. Before the arbitrators respondents were the claimants and appellants the respondents. The respondents submitted their statement of claims and copies of supporting documents to the arbitrators. The appellants submitted written statement which also included their counter-claims together with copies of supporting documents. The arbitrators considered the evidence placed before them by the parties, gave hearing to the parties and ultimately awarded a sum of Rs. 1,09,04,789/- in favour of the respondents-contractors and against the appellants and a sum of Rs. The appellants submitted written statement which also included their counter-claims together with copies of supporting documents. The arbitrators considered the evidence placed before them by the parties, gave hearing to the parties and ultimately awarded a sum of Rs. 1,09,04,789/- in favour of the respondents-contractors and against the appellants and a sum of Rs. 41,22,178/- in favour of appellants, ONGC and against the respondents-contractors and directed the appellants-ONGC to pay the balance amount of Rs. 67,82,620/- to the respondent-contractors within 30 days from the date of receipt of the award and in the event of failure to make the payment within that period, to pay interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum from the date of the award till the date of payment or decree whichever was earlier. 4.The appellants, Oil and Natural Gas commission, challenged the above award before the learned Single Judge of this Court on the ground, inter alia, that the award was a non-speaking award. It was also contended by the appellants that the award was based on wrong assumptions and was contrary to the terms of the written agreement between the parties. It was urged that the arbitrators misconducted themselves in allowing the claim of the respondent-contractors to the extent of Rs. 1,09,04,798/- and in allowing only a sum of Rs. 41,22,178/- to the appellants-ONGC as against their claim at Rs. 5,97,00,697/-. The case of the appellants before the learned Single Judge was that there was an error apparent on the face of the award which vitiated the award. According to the appellants, the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction in making the impugned award and as a result, the award was liable to be set aside on that count itself. Though in the arbitration petition, the award as a whole was challenged, in course of hearing, the challenge was confined to the award in so far as it pertained to claim Nos. 1,4,6,9,13,14,15 and 17 only. 5.The learned Single Judge considered the challenge of the appellants to the award on each of the above counts. He, however, did not find any merit in any of the grounds of challenge and hence dismissed the arbitration petition of the appellants for setting aside the award. While doing so, the learned Single Judge held that the award was not liable to be set aside merely because it was an unreasoned award. He, however, did not find any merit in any of the grounds of challenge and hence dismissed the arbitration petition of the appellants for setting aside the award. While doing so, the learned Single Judge held that the award was not liable to be set aside merely because it was an unreasoned award. The learned Single Judge also considered the various claims of the respondents and the award of the arbitrator and held that there was no error of law in the award which could be corrected by the Court. While arriving at this conclusion, the learned Single Judge observed that to constitute an error of law on the face of the award, there must be a wrong proposition of law laid down in the award as the basis of the award. The learned Single Judge found that there was no error of law on the face of the award to justify interference with the same. The learned Single Judge, therefore, dismissed the arbitration petition of the appellants. Aggrieved by the above decision of the learned Single Judge, the appellants are in appeal before us. 6.We have heard Mr. Zaiwala, the learned Counsel for the appellants. We have also heard Mr. Doctor, the learned Counsel for the respondents who supports the order of the learned Single Judge. Before we deal with their rival submissions in regard to the individual claims and the award of the arbitrators, we deem it expedient to observe that we find no merit whatsoever in the first ground of challenge to the award on the ground that the arbitrators have not given reasons for the award though requested by the appellants to do so. Law is well-settled by now by the decision of the Five-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in (Raipur Development Authority v. M/s. Chokhmal Contractors)1, A.I.R. 1990, S.C. 1426 that an award is not liable to be remitted or set aside merely on the ground that no reasons have been given in its support except where the arbitration agreement or the deed of submission or an order made by the Court such as one under section 20 or section 34 of the Act or the statute governing the arbitration (e.g. sub-section (3) of section 31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996) requires that the arbitrators should give reasons for the award. If the parties to the dispute feel that reasons should be given by the arbitrator for the award, it is within their power to insist upon such reasons being given at the time when they enter into the arbitration agreement or sign the deed of submission. In the instant case, neither the agreement nor the deed of submission requires the arbitrators to give reasons, nor is there any order of the Court requiring them to give reasons for the award. That being so, the impugned order cannot be set aside on the ground that it is a non-speaking award. 7.We may now turn to the challenge of the appellants to the award of the arbitrators against different claims of the respondents. Though in the appeal, the appellants had challenged the award in so far it relates to the allowance of claims of the respondents under claim Nos. 1,4,6,9,13,14,15 and 17 in course of hearing, the challenge was confined to only in so far as it pertains to claim Nos. 1,4,6,9 and 13. We shall, therefore, deal with the challenge to award against above claims only. 8.Under claim No. 1, the respondents had claimed a sum of Rs. 15,57,709.06 for the cost of water supply and electricity incurred by them. This claim was based on terms No. 5 contained in letter dated 5th March, 1984 which formed part of the agreement. Under the said clause water and electricity was to be arranged by the appellants-ONGC and the respondent-contractors were to pay the meter charges for the consumption. Later, by letter dated 14/18th July, 1984, it was agreed between the parties that water and electricity would be supplied by the appellant ONGC and for that the respondents' bills would be loaded to the extent of 1% for water supply and ½% for electricity. The case of the respondents was that though they paid for water and electricity at the agreed rate of 1% and ½% by giving credit for the same in the R.A. bills submitted by them, ONGC failed to arrange for adequate water and electricity. Consequently, the respondents themselves had to arrange for water and electricity. For that purpose, the respondents incurred an expenditure of Rs. 15,57,709.06. The above amount was claimed by the respondents under claim No. 1. The arbitrators allowed this claim but restricted the amount of the claim to Rs. 13,53,186.00. Consequently, the respondents themselves had to arrange for water and electricity. For that purpose, the respondents incurred an expenditure of Rs. 15,57,709.06. The above amount was claimed by the respondents under claim No. 1. The arbitrators allowed this claim but restricted the amount of the claim to Rs. 13,53,186.00. The appellants challenged the award of the above amount on the ground that it was in violation of the agreement and against the terms and conditions of the contract. According to the appellants, the cost of supply of water and electricity was to be borne by the respondents and, in that view of the matter, the respondents were not entitled to claim the above amount. According to the appellants, the arbitrators acted beyond the purview of the agreement in allowing the above claim. The case of the respondents on the other hand was that it was the obligation of the appellants to arrange water and electricity and the respondents were to pay at the agreed rate for the same which they paid. The amount claimed by respondents was on account of the cost incurred by them for arranging for water and electricity on the failure of the appellant to perform their contractual obligation to supply the same and the arbitrators rightly allowed the same. The learned Single Judge upheld the award of the arbitrator on this count on the ground that the claim of the respondents-contractors under this head was for reimbursement of expenses incurred for arrangement of water and electricity which was the obligation of the appellants-ONGC which they did not fulfil. The learned Single Judge held that by allowing the claim under the above head to the extent of Rs. 13,53,186/- the arbitrators did not violate any of the terms or conditions of the written agreement between the parties which included the letter dated 5th March, 1994. 9.We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants who reiterated that in allowing the above claim the arbitrators acted contrary to the terms of the agreement and thereby committed an error apparent on the face of the award. We have perused the terms and conditions of the agreement in the light of the above submission of the learned Counsel. On a careful consideration of the same, we do not find any merit in the same. The award of Rs. We have perused the terms and conditions of the agreement in the light of the above submission of the learned Counsel. On a careful consideration of the same, we do not find any merit in the same. The award of Rs. 13,53,196/- against claim No. 1, in our view, is not contrary to any of the terms and conditions of the agreement. On the other hand, it is in consonnance with the spirit of the agreement, in particular, the clause dealing with the obligation of the appellants to make all arrangements for supply of water and electricity on payment of 1% and 1/2% of the bill amount by the respondents. If the appellant failed to fulfil their obligation and on their failure, the respondents had to make arrangements for the same by operating generators and incur expenditure on that account, they were entitled to be reimbursed in respect thereof and such reimbursement is not prohibited by any of the terms and conditions of the agreement. In that situation, it is not open to the Court to interfere with the award of the arbitrator under that head. So far as the reasons for awarding the above amount is concerned, it may be observed that though the arbitrators have not recorded the reasons for the same, the award is not vitiated on that account. It is well-settled that an award made by an arbitrator is conclusive as a judgment between the parties and the Court is entitled to set aside the same only if the arbitrator has misconducted himself in the proceedings or there is an error on the face of the award. The Court in dealing with an application for setting aside an award has to consider whether the view of the arbitrator on the evidence is justified. The arbitrator's adjudication is generally considered binding between the parties, for he is a tribunal selected by the parties and the power of the Court to set aside the award is restricted to cases set out in section 30 of the Act. It is not open to the Court to speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at the conclusion. On the assumption that the arbitrator must have arrived at his conclusion by a certain process of reasoning, the Court cannot proceed to determine whether the conclusion is right or wrong. It is not open to the Court to speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at the conclusion. On the assumption that the arbitrator must have arrived at his conclusion by a certain process of reasoning, the Court cannot proceed to determine whether the conclusion is right or wrong. As held by the Supreme Court in (Jivarajbhai v. Chintamanrao)2, A.I.R. 1965, S.C. 214, it is not open to the Court to probe the mental process by which the arbitrator has reached his conclusion where it is not disclosed by the terms of his award. To the same effect are the decisions of the Supreme Court in (M/s.Sudarshan Trading Co. v. Govt. of Kerala)3, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 890 and (Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. v. C. Rajasekhar Rao)4, (1987)4 S.C.C. 93 ; where it was held that it is not open to the Court to probe the mental process of the arbitrator and speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion. It is only in a speaking award that the Court can look into the reasoning of the award. Otherwise also, as observed by the Supreme Court in M/s. Sudarshan Trading Co. v. Govt. of Kerala (supra), reasonableness of the reasons given the arbitrator cannot be challenged. Appraisement of evidence by the arbitrator is never a matter which the Court questions and considers. The arbitrator is the sole Judge of the quality as well as the quantity of evidence and it is not for the Court to take upon itself the task of being a Judge on the evidence before the arbitrator. 10.We also do not find any force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants that there is no provision in the agreement to provide for reimbursement to the contractors on account of expenses incurred by them for arranging water and electricity even in the event of the failure of the appellants to make adequate supply of the same. It is well-settled that whether a particular amount was liable to be paid or damages liable to be sustained is a decision within the competency of the arbitrator. By purporting to construe the contract the Court cannot take upon itself the burden of saying that this was contrary to the contract and, as such, beyond jurisdiction. It is well-settled that whether a particular amount was liable to be paid or damages liable to be sustained is a decision within the competency of the arbitrator. By purporting to construe the contract the Court cannot take upon itself the burden of saying that this was contrary to the contract and, as such, beyond jurisdiction. See M/s. Sudarshan Trading Co. v. Govt. of Kerala, (supra). The Court cannot substitute its own decision for that of the arbitrator. 11.In the instant case, the arbitrators have merely set out claim No. 1, the amount claimed and awarded the amount of Rs. 13,53,186/-. They have not spoken their minds indicating why they allowed the claim or how they arrived at the particular amount. While doing so, the arbitrators, did not travel outside the terms of the contract. Obviously, the awarded claim is not opposed to the provisions of any of the terms of the contract. In such a situation, it is not open to the Court to interfere with the award in so far as it pertains to award of Rs. 13,53,186/- against claim No. 1. 12.Claim No. 4 : So far as claim No. 4 of the respondents is concerned, the said claim pertains to shortage of cement in bags supplied by the appellant-ONGC. The case of the respondents before the arbitrators was that though the cement was supplied to them by the appellants at the rate of Rs. 830/- per metric tonne (in 50 kg. bags) and the respondents paid to the appellants on the basis that 20 bags were equal to one metric tonne of cement, the cement actually received by them in each bag fell short of 50 kg. According to the respondents, the appellants were also informed of such shortage. The respondents claimed a sum of Rs. 3,96,984.50 on that account. The arbitrators allowed Rs. 3,70,221,50 against this claim. The learned Single Judge refused to interfere with the same. ONGC now challenges the award of the above amount before us on the ground that this claim is contrary to the clear stipulations in the contract. According to the appellants-ONGC, the arbitrators misconducted themselves in disregarding the bounds of the agreement and awarding the above claim which is opposed to the provisions of the agreement. ONGC now challenges the award of the above amount before us on the ground that this claim is contrary to the clear stipulations in the contract. According to the appellants-ONGC, the arbitrators misconducted themselves in disregarding the bounds of the agreement and awarding the above claim which is opposed to the provisions of the agreement. Counsel for the appellants, drew our attention to Schedule 'A' to the contract where the rate for supply of ordinary portland construction cement is set out, in particular to the note appended thereto. Schedule 'A' being relevant for the determination of the legality of the award of Rs. 3,71,221.50 against claim No. 4 for shortage of cement is set out below. SCHEDULE 'A' "Schedule showing (approximately) the materials to be supplied from the ONGC'S Stores for Work contracted to be executed and the rates at which they are to be charged for. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ParticularsRate at which the materials will be charged to thePlace of contractorDelivery ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- UnitRs. Ps. Ordinary Portland Construction cementM.T.830/-Ex Commission's Godown, Greater Bombay Note :---20 (Twenty bags) bags of cement shall mean one metric tonne for the purpose of recovery irrespective of variation in standard weight of cement of filled in bag. xxx" The above note clearly stipulates that 20 bags of cement shall mean one metric tonne for the purpose of recovery "irrespective of variation in the standard weight of cement in filled in bag". It is clearly stated in the contract that the rate for supply of cement was Rs. 830/- for twenty 50 kg. bags of cement. It is categorically provided that 20 bags of cement shall mean one metric tonne for the purpose of recovery or price irrespective of variation in standard weight of cement of filled in bag. Claim No. 4, which is for recovery of the amount for variation in standard weight of filled in bags of cement, is thus totally opposed to the clear stipulation in the contract which prohibits such a claim. By granting this claim, in our view, the arbitrators outstepped the confines of the contract and ignored the limits and the clear provisions of the contract. Obviously, this claim being not payable under the contract, the arbitrator, in our opinion, exceeded his jurisdiction in awarding a sum of Rs. 3,70,221.50 against this claim. We are supported in our above conclusion by the decision of the Supreme Court in (Associated Engineering Co. Obviously, this claim being not payable under the contract, the arbitrator, in our opinion, exceeded his jurisdiction in awarding a sum of Rs. 3,70,221.50 against this claim. We are supported in our above conclusion by the decision of the Supreme Court in (Associated Engineering Co. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh)5, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 232 where dealing with certain claims granted by the arbitrator, it was observed : "These four claims are not payable under the contract. The contract does not postulate in fact it prohibits payment of any escalation .... otherwise than in terms of the format prescribed by the contract. This conclusion is reached not by construction of the contract but by merely looking at the contract. The umpire travelled totally outside the permissible territory and thus exceeded his jurisdiction in making the award under those claims. This is an error going to the root of his jurisdiction. .... " 12.We also get support for our above conclusion from the following observations of the Supreme Court in (State of U.P. v. Ram Nath International Construction (P) Ltd.)6, (1996) S.C.C. 18 at pg. 22. "......At the same time the arbitrator is a creature of the agreement itself and therefore is duty bound to enforce the terms of the agreement and cannot adjudicate a matter beyond the agreement itself. If the arbitrator adjudicates a claim of a contractor with reference to the clauses of the agreement itself whereby the agreement gets engrafted into the award, it will be open to the Court to examine those clauses of the agreement and find out the correctness of the conclusion of the arbitrator with reference to those clauses." 13. Claim No. 6 : We shall now deal with claim No. 6. This claim is for Rs. 53,11,735.60. It is based on the dispute regarding the mode of measurement of the built-up area. The contract was not a lump sum contract but a built-up area rate contract. In the letter dated 10th January, 1985 (letter of acceptance) awarding the construction work to the respondents, the estimated cost of the said construction work was estimated at Rs. 3,47,23,152/-, the measurement of the built-up area 2,04,350 sq.ft. at the rate of Rs. 169.92 per sq.ft. When the work was completed the respondents claimed that the built-up area was much higher than 2,04,350 sq.ft. 3,47,23,152/-, the measurement of the built-up area 2,04,350 sq.ft. at the rate of Rs. 169.92 per sq.ft. When the work was completed the respondents claimed that the built-up area was much higher than 2,04,350 sq.ft. This claim was based on the measurement arrived at by including the balconies in the built-up area. The respondents-contractors claimed an extra amount of Rs. 53,11,735.60 on that account. The arbitrators awarded a sum of Rs. 49,91,327.00 against this claim. The award of the above amount under this claim was challenged by the appellants-ONGC before the Single Judge. The learned Single Judge held that the question whether the balconies could be included in the built-up area for arriving at the cost of construction depended upon the construction of the terms of the written agreement between the parties read with the letter of acceptance and other documents and/or literature produced before the arbitrators and the arbitrators having interpreted the same and taken a decision, which is a possible view, the Court had no jurisdiction to substitute its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come to the conclusion that the arbitrators have acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. The learned Judge also observed that the arbitrators did not violate any of the terms of the written contract while allowing the above claim of the respondents. The appellants are aggrieved by the above finding of the learned Judge. The case of the appellants is that in the letter dated 5th March, 1984, which was a part of the agreement, it was clearly agreed between the parties that the built-up area would be measured excluding the balcony area. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that contrary to the clear stipulation in the agreement, the respondents have included the area of balconies in the built-up area and claimed the above amount on the measurement of the built-up area so arrived by including the balconies. The appellants contend that the measurement, being manifestly contrary to the clear terms of the contract, the arbitrators misconducted themselves in granting this claim and awarding a sum of Rs. 49,91,327.00 on that account and the learned Single Judge erred in refusing to interfere with the same on the ground that the allowance of the said claim by the arbitrators was based on the construction of the terms of the agreement. 49,91,327.00 on that account and the learned Single Judge erred in refusing to interfere with the same on the ground that the allowance of the said claim by the arbitrators was based on the construction of the terms of the agreement. The case of the respondents on the other hand is that on reference to a National Building Code it is clear that what has been described as "balconies" was, in fact, not balcony but constructed area. According to the respondents, balcony is a projected portion open from three sides. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the decision of the arbitrators allowing this claim of the respondents was a question of fact arrived at on construction of the agreement and other documents and it is not open to the Court to interfere with the same. In reply, Counsel for the appellants drew our attention to the drawings annexed to the tender documents where the areas, which are sought to be treated as built-up areas by the respondents by reference to some National Building Code, have been described as "balcony" and submitted that in view of the above, what is balcony for the purpose of this contract is clear from merely looking at the contract and there is no scope at all for interpreting the same otherwise. 14.We have carefully considered the rival submissions. We have perused the agreement, letter dated 5th March, 1984, which forms part of the agreement, the drawings of the flats, which form part of the agreement, and all connected documents which were relied upon by the parties before the arbitrators. Clause 10 of the tender letter dated 5th March, 1984, which deals with the mode of measurement of the built-up area, reads as follows : "(1) Mode of Measurement :--- We have based our price in the total built up area of one floor (4 flats) including staircase and common corridors, but excluding balconies only. Hence work should be measured on the built up area excluding balcony areas."(Emphasis supplied) 15.It is clear from the above clause that in measuring the built-up area for payment of price balconies are excluded. What was meant by the parties by "balconies" or which part of the building was treated as "balconies" is clear from the drawings annexed to the tender documents. What was meant by the parties by "balconies" or which part of the building was treated as "balconies" is clear from the drawings annexed to the tender documents. 16.We have perused the drawings annexed to the tender documents wherein two portions, which the respondents now claim are not balconies, are shown by the respondents themselves as balconies. It may be pertinent to mention here that in addition to the two balconies, which the respondents contend are not balconies, there was one more portion in each flat which was described as "drawing balcony". There is no dispute about that area. The appellants themselves have not treated the same as "balcony" for the purpose of exclusion from measurement of the built-up area. The areas of the same have been included in the built-up area. 16A.We have given our careful consideration to the controversy. On the face of clause 10 of the tender letter and the description of the area under dispute as "balcony" in the accompanying plan submitted by the respondents themselves, in our view, the claim of the respondents for inclusion of the balconies in measuring built-up area is totally opposed to the provisions of the contract and runs counter to the very basis of fixation of the per square foot price of the built-up area. On the face of these provisions of the contract and clear understanding between the parties in the contract itself, there is scope for construction of the contract. The arbitrators in this case travelled outside the bounds of the contract and acted without jurisdiction in including the balconies in the total built-up area for the purpose of measurements and payment of price in total disregard of the clear stipulations in the contract. The arbitrators have, in fact, done something which is not stipulated by the contract or rather prohibited by the contract. In doing so, the arbitrators, in our judgment, overstepped the confines of the contract and exceeded their jurisdiction. This is not a case where the arbitrators misconstrued or misunderstood the contract, but acted in excess of what was agreed between the parties in the guise of construing the meaning of word "balcony" whereas for the purposes of this contract what was balcony was clear from the agreement and the plan itself, which they should not have done. This is not a case where the arbitrators misconstrued or misunderstood the contract, but acted in excess of what was agreed between the parties in the guise of construing the meaning of word "balcony" whereas for the purposes of this contract what was balcony was clear from the agreement and the plan itself, which they should not have done. In the instant case, it is apparent merely by looking at the contract that the balconies are not to be taken into account in measuring the total built-up area for payment of price of the construction to the respondents. What is "balcony" for the purpose of this contract is equally apparent from the contract and the plan. In such a situation, it is not open to the arbitrators to hold that the areas specifically agreed upon between the parties to be regarded as "balconies" should not be regarded as "balconies" by taking resort to some building Codes or building Rules. In doing so, the arbitrators acted beyond their jurisdiction. The arbitrators were, therefore, not justified in allowing the claim of the appellants for inclusion of the balconies in the built-up areas. The award of Rs. 49,91,327.00 by the arbitrators under claim No. 5, therefore, cannot be sustained. 17.Claim No. 9 : The next challenge pertains to award of Rs. 16,31,425.00 under claim No. 9. The respondents claimed escalation of Rs. 32,21,099.89 for the period after expiry of the original contract period. The arbitrator awarded a sum of Rs. 16,31,425.00 against this claim. The appellant challenged the grant of this claim before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge held that the escalation was claimed for the extended period which was necessitated on account of the acts and omissions of the appellants. The learned Judge observed that since no extension of time was contemplated at the time of execution of the agreement, the clause stating that no escalation should be allowed should not be over-stretched to deny escalation. The learned Judge held that the arbitrators, on interpretation of the terms of the contract having taken a view that the respondents were entitled to escalation for the period after the expiry of the original period of the contract and having awarded a sum of Rs. The learned Judge held that the arbitrators, on interpretation of the terms of the contract having taken a view that the respondents were entitled to escalation for the period after the expiry of the original period of the contract and having awarded a sum of Rs. 16,31,425/- on that count, it was not open to the Court to substitute its own decision for that of the arbitrators even if held a different view in the matter. The appellants are aggrieved by the above decision of the learned Single Judge, which according to them, is erroneous. Counsel for the appellants submits that the respondents having agreed to a firm price with a clear stipulation that there would be no escalation under whatever grounds till the completion of the work, it was not open to them to claim any escalation. Our attention was drawn in this connection to the letter dated 10th January, 1985, which forms part of the agreement, whereby the parties agreed for a firm price. It may be expedient to set out the relevant part of the above letter which reads as follows: "The above price is firm and is not subject to any escalation under whatsoever ground till the completion of the work." On the face of the above stipulation in the contract between the parties, in our view, it was not open to the arbitrators to grant escalation to the respondents. In allowing this claim, the arbitrators acted completely beyond the scope of their jurisdiction by ignoring the clear stipulation of the contract prohibiting any escalation in the price under whatever ground till the completion of the work. The expressions "under whatever ground" and "till the completion of the work" are very significant. On the face of these expressions, it is difficult to contend that escalation could be granted if the work could not be completed by the respondents within the stipulated time due to the acts or omissions of the respondents or that the said prohibition applies only for the period stipulated in the contract for completion of the work and not for the extended period during which the work was completed. Admittedly, the extension was granted in this case on the request of the respondents without penalty. Admittedly, the extension was granted in this case on the request of the respondents without penalty. That does not by itself entitle the respondents to claim escalation in disregard to the clear prohibition contained in the agreement because, as observed by the Supreme Court in (Thawaldas v. Union of India)7, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 468, if it was expressly stipulated to which the contractor agreed that the ONGC was not liable for any loss as remote as that set out on the agreement, then that is the express term of the contract and the contractor must be fixed down to it. If he chose to contract in absolute terms that was his affair. But having contracted he cannot go back on his agreement because it does not suit him to abide by it. In that view of the matter, that part of the award which pertains to allowance of claim No. 9, cannot be sustained. 18.Claim No. 13 : Under claim No. 13, the respondents claimed a sum of Rs. 6,75,300/- on account of increase in minimum wages which was allowed by the arbitrators. The learned Single Judge refused to interfere with the same. The appellants have now challenged the award of this amount before us. The learned Counsel for the appellants challenged the grant of this claim on account of increase in minimum wages on the very same ground, on which he has challenged claim No. 9. According to him, on the face of prohibition contained in the letter dated 10th January, 1985 against any escalation on whatsoever ground, the respondents are not entitled to escalation on account of rise in the labour cost by increase of minimum wages also. Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand submits that the clause No. 16 of the letter dated 5th March, 1984 specifically provides for allowance of such claim. Clause 16 of the said letter, which forms part of the agreement, provides : "Any Government statutory increase in wages of construction workers will be reimbursed to us (contractors)". This clause binds both the appellants and the respondents. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. Clause 16 of the said letter, which forms part of the agreement, provides : "Any Government statutory increase in wages of construction workers will be reimbursed to us (contractors)". This clause binds both the appellants and the respondents. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. In our opinion, in view of the above clause which specifically provides for reimbursement in respect of statutory increase in construction workers' wages, the arbitrators rightly allowed the claim of the respondents under this head and the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the arbitrators did not violate or contravene any of the terms of the written agreement read with letter dated 5th March, 1984 and refusing to interfere with the same. We are in agreement with the learned Single Judge in this regard. 19.Challenge to allowance of other claims has not been pressed before us by the appellants. 20.In the result, this appeal of the ONGC is partly allowed. The impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge shall stand modified accordingly in so far as it pertains to claim Nos. 4,6 and 9 of the respondents. 21.In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal partly allowed. ***** 19