M. S. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India challenges the order dated September 9, 1991 passed by the administrative Officer, INFLIBNET programme, respondent No. 2 herein terminating the services of the petitioner from the post of clerk-cum-typist. ( 2 ) THE brief facts leading to the filing of the present petition, broadly stated, are as under: ( 3 ) INFORMATION and Library Network programme (hereinafter referred to as the inflibnet) has been launched by the university Grant Commission to improve academic, library and information services and to establish a mechanism for information transfer and to bring all the libraries in the country under computer communication net work. It is proposed to be registered under the Societies registration Act and since the said registration has not been done it works under the auspicies of Inter University center for Astronomy and Astrophysics (hereinafter referred to as (IUCAA) set up by the University Grant Commission. Respondent No. 3 is the Administrative officer in charge of the said Programme. ( 4 ) THE petitioner was offered appointment on the post of clerk-cum-typist vide letter dated September 9, 1991 (Annexure A to the petition) from respondent No. 2. By her letter dated 11-9- 1991 (Annexure B to the petition) the petitioner accepted the said offer including the terms and conditions stipulated in the offer of appointment. Consequently, appointment order dated September 18, 1991 (Annexure C to the petition) was issued by respondent No. 2 in favour of the petitioner, specifically mentioning that the appointment would be covered by the terms and conditions as stipulated in the offer of appointment dated September 9, 1991 (Annexure A ). Some of the relevant terms and conditions contained in the aforesaid offer of appointment are set out hereunder :" (3 ). The appointment is made initially for a period of two years from the date you join the post which is likely to continue idefinitely. (4 ). Your appointment will be further subject to passing of Typing test with a minimum speed of 30 WPM within one year from the date of joining the duties, failing which your services will be terminated without any notice. (5 ). You will be On probation for a period of one year from the date of your appointment, which may be extended or curtailed at the discretion of the competent authority. (5 ). You will be On probation for a period of one year from the date of your appointment, which may be extended or curtailed at the discretion of the competent authority. " ( 5 ) PURSUANT to the aforesaid appointment order the petitioner joined the INFLIBNET and the petitioner was posted under respondent No. 2 from September 18, 1991. The petitioner was informed vide communication dated August 27, 1992 (Annexure D to the petition) that she had cleared the skill test in English Typing. The initial period of two years, for which the petitioner was appointed, was to expire on september 10, 1993 and on that very day an order was passed by respondent No. 2 extending the appointment of the petitioner for a further period of one year from september 11, 1991 to September 10, 1994 (page 91 of the paper-book ). It was further mentioned in the said order that the other terms and conditions governing her appointment would remain the same. ( 6 ) THEREAFTER a committee consisting of the following officers was constituted for examining the suitablility or otherwise of the employees for granting them extension of appointment as per order dated July 20, 1004 (page 94 of the paper-book) issued by the Director, IUCAA-INFLIBNET programme :1. Mr. T. Sahay, Sr. Admn. Officer, iucaa. 2. Mr. L. D. Natrajan, Rtd. Internal financial Advisor. 3. Mr. K. Venu Gopal, Admn. Officer, ipr, (Indian Plasma Research ). 4. Mr. C. K. Shah, Admn. Officer, inflibnet Programme, (respondent No. 2.) at the meeting held on 19-8-1994, the aforesaid committee recommended that it would not be in the interest of INFLIBNET to give extension to the petitioner beyond her present tenure which was to expire on september 10, 1994. The minutes of the said Committee are produced at Annexure a to the affidavit-in-reply filed by respondent No. 2 (page 59 of the paper- book ). The above recommendation was made after the committee scrutinized the annual confidential reports, interim report upto August 1994, service book and personal file of the petitioner. The committee made the following observations in respect of the petitioner, as reflected in the above minutes : "1. In the case of Mrs. Y. J. Dave (i. e. petitioner) : (a) She has attended the office only for 29 days during 1994. The committee made the following observations in respect of the petitioner, as reflected in the above minutes : "1. In the case of Mrs. Y. J. Dave (i. e. petitioner) : (a) She has attended the office only for 29 days during 1994. (b) She has been casual and careless and in spite of oral reprimand there has not been any improvement during the period of present extension. This aspect is also reflected in her CR for the year 1994. " the statement regarding the number of days on which the petitioner remained on leave is produced at Annexure B to the affidavit-in-reply of respondent No. 2 (page 60 ). Respondent No. 2 thereafter issued Memorandum dated September 9, 1994 (Annexure G to the petition) informing the petitioner that the petitioner was not to be given any further extension beyond September 10, 1994 and that therefore, the petitioner would cease to be in the service of IUCAA-INFLIBNET programme with effect from 10th september 1994 A. N. ( 7 ) IT is the aforesaid order dated september 9, 1994. (Annexure G), which is challenged in the present petition. Respondent No. 2 has filed affidavit-in- reply on September 21, 1994 which has been followed by affidavit-in-rejoinder of the petitioner and affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder by respondent No. 2. ( 8 ) TO-DAY, when the present petition came up for final hearing before this Court, mr. Pandit, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, raised the following contentions :i. The petitioner had become a permanent employee of the respondents and therefore, the respondents could not have terminated the services of the petitioner without holding a departmental inquiry or at least without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. II. The impugned order was discriminatory and in violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner under articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of india inasmuch as persons appointed alongwith the petitioner have been continued in service, whereas the petitioner has been singled out for termination of her services. III. The respondents also acted arbitrarily in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution in terminating the petitioners services without giving her an opportunity of being heard. The petitioner was entitled to be heard before termination of her services. IV. III. The respondents also acted arbitrarily in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution in terminating the petitioners services without giving her an opportunity of being heard. The petitioner was entitled to be heard before termination of her services. IV. Assuming that the petitioner was a temporary employee or an employee on probation, the services of the petitioner could not have been terminated without one months notice or notice pay as required by rule 2 of "service Conditions" comprised in the byelaws and Service Conditions of iucaa. V. The impugned order was passed mala fide by respondent No. 2 to accommodate persons of his choice. VI. The order is even otherwise bad and arbitrary, being harsh and disproportionate, as respondent No. 2 ought not to have terminated the services of the petitioner depriving her of employment merely on the grounds of irregularity in attendance. ( 9 ) MR. M. R. Bhatt, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary contention that the respondents are not the authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore, this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. On demurrer Mr. Bhatt also opposed the aforesaid contentions on merits and submitted that non-extension of the services of the petitioner after September 10, 1994 was fully justified, legal and valid. ( 10 ) IN view of the fact that this Court has found no substance in the petitioners contentions on merits, the Court has thought it fit not to go into the question as to whether the respondents are authority or not within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The petition is decided on the assumption that the respondents are authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, without prejudice to the respondents rights and contentions on the above issue. Contention I ( 11 ) AS far as the first contention of the petitioner regarding the nature of her employment is concerned, Mr. Pandit has contended that the petitioner acquired permanency upon completion of two years services in September 1993. Mr. Pandit, tried to substantiate the said contention on the following basis : (i) The initial appointment of the petitioner was for a period of two years from the date of joining the post and post has thereafter continued. Pandit has contended that the petitioner acquired permanency upon completion of two years services in September 1993. Mr. Pandit, tried to substantiate the said contention on the following basis : (i) The initial appointment of the petitioner was for a period of two years from the date of joining the post and post has thereafter continued. (ii) The petitioner had already passed the skill test in English (typing) within, one year from the date of joining her duties, as required. (iii) The petitioner was initially placed on probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment and that period of probation was not extended but the petitioner was continued in service. (iv ). The petitioner had pot in more than 240 days service. (v ). The petitioner was being paid salary in the regular pay scale of Rs. 950-1500 and not consolidated pay. ( 12 ) AS against the above contention of mr. Pandit. Mr. Bhatt, learned Advocate for the respondents contended that the petitioner was not a permanent employee but the petitioner was appointed for a specified period on contractual basis. In support of his contention, Mr. Bhatt placed reliance on the correspondence between the director, IUCAA and respondent No. 2 (produced on record at pages 75 to 96 of the Paper-Book ). Regarding INFLIBNET programme it was stated in the minutes of the meeting held at the University Grant commission on 8th December 1992 as under:"as INFLIBNET is not yet registered as a society, sanction of permanent posts is not possible at this stage. However, Chairman suggested that staff on project appointment for 1 or 2 years and consultants on honorarium upto Rs. 4,000 p. m. can be appointed to carry on the activities in the initial stage. " ( 13 ) MR. Bhatt pointed out that there were two types, of employees, viz. " (i) those persons who were employees of IUCAA and were placed at the disposal of INFLIBNET, they are permanent employees of ICUAA covered by bye-law no. 5 of the Bye-laws and (ii) the second set of employees consisted of those who were employed in the inflibnet Project at Ahmedabad, governed by Bye-law No. 8. 2 of the Bye- laws and Service Conditions of IUCAA. The relevant portions of Bye-laws Nos. 5 of the Bye-laws and (ii) the second set of employees consisted of those who were employed in the inflibnet Project at Ahmedabad, governed by Bye-law No. 8. 2 of the Bye- laws and Service Conditions of IUCAA. The relevant portions of Bye-laws Nos. 5 and 8 read as under : 5, THE EMPLOYEES OF THE centre: the employees of ICUAA, other than the director, are divided into three categories : (I) Academic Staff. . . . (II) Scientific Staff (III) Administrative and supporting staff : this includes persons employed by IUCAA for running and maintaining its infrastructure. It does not include persons hired on contractual basis for whom separate Bye-law 8 operates. 8. EXECUTION OF CONTRACTS ON behalf OF IUCAA8. 1. CONTRACTS WITH OUTSIDERS. XXX XXX XXX8. 2 CONTRACTUAL SERVICES. The Director will contract out infrastructual services of IUCAA as and when needed. Persons hired for these services will be governed by the rules of their respective contracts. " ( 14 ) IT is clear that the petitioner was not employed by the Director IUCAA but was appointed by the Administrative Officer specifically for the INFLIBNET programme. A perusal of the aforesaid correspondence on the one hand and the provisions of bye-laws Nos. 5 and 8 clearly indicate that the petitioner was not employed on the administrative set up of iucaa but was appointed on contractual basis for INFLIBNET programme. It is true that in contractual service generally condition regarding putting an employee on probation is not put but as the initial appointment was for a period of two years, the condition of putting an employee on probation for a period of one year subject to extension or curtailment cannot take the appointment out of the sphere of bye-law no. 8. Be that as it may, even if the petitioner is treated as an employee not falling under the provision of bye-law No. 8, the petitioner never acquired any permanency right. Merely on passing of typing test or on completion of probation period of one year or on completion of 240 days service the petitioner cannot claim permanency right. In this connection the honble Supreme Court has already held in the case of Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. Merely on passing of typing test or on completion of probation period of one year or on completion of 240 days service the petitioner cannot claim permanency right. In this connection the honble Supreme Court has already held in the case of Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. Judgments Today 1995 (1) SC 198 as under :"in the case of appointment on temporary basis a servant who is so appointed does not acquire any substantive right to the post even though the post itself may be permanent and it is an implied term of such appointment that it may be terminable at any time and without notice. A temporary Government servant does not become a permanent Government servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. "admittedly no order appointing the petitioner as a permanent employee was issued by the respondents nor is any rule pointed out conferring the status of permanent employee on completion of a specified period. The petitioner was at the most a temporary employee appointed for a specified period in view of the above discussion, the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner deserves to be rejected. Contentions II and III re. Arts. 14 and 18 ( 15 ) MR. Pandit submitted that termination of the services of the petitioner while continuing the services of other employees appointed alongwith the petitioner is violative of fundamental rights of the petitioner under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Pandit further submitted that the project was not temporary in nature and that even after termination of the services of the petitioner, two more persons have been employed on the post of Data Entry Operator-cum-clerk and that therefore, the impugned termination order suffers from the vice of discrimination. ( 16 ) THE above submission made by Mr. Pandit appears to be misconceived in view of the fact that the respondents have not justified non-extension of the services of the petitioner beyond 10-8-1994 on any ground like non-availability or work or abolition of the post. ( 16 ) THE above submission made by Mr. Pandit appears to be misconceived in view of the fact that the respondents have not justified non-extension of the services of the petitioner beyond 10-8-1994 on any ground like non-availability or work or abolition of the post. The respondents have justified their decision not to extend the petitioners services beyond 10-9-1994 on the ground that the petitioner had attended the office only for 29 days in the year 1994 and that she was casual and careless and did not show any improvement in spite of oral reprimand during the period of extension. A bare perusal of Annexure B to the affidavit- in-reply of the respondent No. 2 fully justifies the aforesaid decision of the respondents. The following particulars would show that the number of days, on which the petitioner was on leave, was so substantial that an inference could easily be drawn that the administration suffered on account of such intermittent absence for long period. Period during which petitioner was on leave. No. of days. 4-5-1992 to 25-5-1992 22 14-12-1992 to 15-12-1992 2 19-1-1993 to 12-2-1993 33 13-2-1993 to 19-2-1993 20-4-1993 to 4-5-1993 15 7-6-1993 to 9-6-1993 10-6-1993 to 12-6-1993 13-6-1993 to 30-6-1993 40 1-7-1993 to 13-7-1993 14-7-1993 to 16-7-1993 19-10-1993 to 22-10-1993 4 19-11-1993 to 13-1-1994 55 1-3-1994 to 9-3-1994 10-3-1994 to 19-3-1994 20-3-1994 to 30-4-1994 61 Duty joined on 2-5-1994 1st being Sunday 3-5-1994 to 31-7-1994 90 (maternity leave ). Date of confinment 9-7-1994 1-8-1994 to 31-8-1994 31 (leave for child-care) the petitioner had also applied for leave for the period from 1-9-1994 to 30-9-1994. Of course the tenure of her appointment was to expire on 10-9-1994. The petitioner resumed work from 1-9-1994 to 1994. Mr. Pandit submitted that the petitioner was entitled to avail of the maternity leave as well as leave for the subsequent period to look after the newly born child. It is true that the petitioner was entitled to avail of the maternity leave. Not only the petitioner was granted the maternity leave but thereafter also leave was sanctioned for one more month. It is true that the petitioner was entitled to avail of the maternity leave. Not only the petitioner was granted the maternity leave but thereafter also leave was sanctioned for one more month. However, the conduct of the petitioner in remaining on leave on a number of previous occasion clearly shows that petitioners intermittent absence frequently or rather occasional presence of the petitioner in the office in the years 1993 and 1994 could never justify even any expectation for extension of service beyond september 10, 1994. A person is appointed by the employer for rendering services to the organization. Merely because the employee may have some personal ground or justification for proceeding on leave for whatever reason, does not mean that even though intermittent absence of a temporary employee damages the efficiency of the administration, the temporary employee employed for a specified period is entitled to get extension beyond the specified period. Admittedly, the petitioner was initially appointed for a specified period, i. e. from September 10, 1991 to September 9, 1993. Thereafter the petitioner was given extension for one more year. Hence by efflux of time her employment was to come to an end on September 10, 1994. The petitioner cannot claim any right of extension when the period of her absence from duty, even if authorised, is so substantial that she is more on leave than on duty during the extended period of one year. The petitioner does not dispute the aforesaid dates given in the statement at annexure B to the affidavit-in-reply of the respondent No. 2 (page 60 ). In view of the aforesaid undisputed factual position, it cannot be said that the respondents have acted arbitrarily in not extending the period of employment in respect of the petitioner beyond September 10, 1994. A person who is not given the benefit of extension of employment on the ground of intermittent absence and of his\her unsuitability or inefficiency, cannot claim protection of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution merely because other employees are continued in service. ( 17 ) MR. Pandit learned Advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Brojo Nath ganguly and Anr. ( 17 ) MR. Pandit learned Advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Brojo Nath ganguly and Anr. , AIR 1986 SC 1571 and the decision of this Court in the case of K. P. Patel v. Gujarat Small Industries corporation Ltd. and Ors. 21 (2) GLR 202. However, both these cases were in respect of permanent employees and not in respect of employees appointed for a specific period. Since the appointment of the petitioner was for a specified period, which was not further extended by the respondents, the ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases does not apply to the facts of the present case. As far as the reliance placed by Mr. Pandit on the observations of this Court in the case of Ghanshyam M. Pandya v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 1985 glh (UJ) 51 is concerned, the said case was in respect of artificial breaks given by the employer to break the continuity in service of the employee. However, in the present case there is no question of even a single artificial break. The petitioner was specifically appointed for specified period upto September 10, 1994 and the said employment was not thereafter extended. The ratio of the aforesaid decision of this court is, therefore, not applicable to the facts of the present case. ( 18 ) ON the other hand Mr. Bhatt, learned advocate for the respondents has rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of the honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Another v. Kaushal kishore Shukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691 wherein it has been held that a temporary government servant has no right to hold the post and the competent authority can terminate his services by an innocuous order of termination without casting any stigma on him. It has been observed that such order can be passed in accordance with the terms and conditions of his service and such an order can be passed without holding any departmental inquiry although the employer may make ex parte preliminary inquiry to judge the suitability of the person. It has been observed that such order can be passed in accordance with the terms and conditions of his service and such an order can be passed without holding any departmental inquiry although the employer may make ex parte preliminary inquiry to judge the suitability of the person. Similar view is taken by the apex Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. (supra) that a temporary employee is not entitled to be heard before an order of his\her termination is passed. In the present case, the respondents case is on a stronger footing because the petitioners appointment was limited upto 10th September 1994. Recently a Division Bench of this Court has also held in the case of Bhanumati T. Muliya v. State of Gujarat 1995 (2) GLH 228 that when a person is appointed for a fixed term. On expiry of the term, the employee has no right to continue on the post and even a formal order terminating the appointment would not be necessary, much less a prior notice. ( 19 ) IN view of the above settled legal position, the petitioner was not entitled to any notice or opportunity of being heard before the respondent took the decision not to extend the services of the petitioner beyond September 10, 1994. Contention IV ( 20 ) AS far as the petitioners contention regarding violation of Rule 2. 5. 1 of the bye-laws and Service Conditions is concerned the said Rule 2. 5. 1. reads as under:2. 5. 1 NOTICE OF TERMINATION : In addition to the provisions containing in service Condition 3. 10. the service of any member of staff may be terminated by either party giving to the other not less than three months notice in writing to terminate it, except during the period of probation, when the period of notice shall be one month. "since in the instant case the petitioners employment came to an end on September 10, 1994 by efflux of time, the question of giving the petitioner notice or notice pay did not arise. Contention . ( 21 ) AS regards the allegation of mala fides, the petitioner has alleged that respondent No. 2 passed the impugned order in order to accommodate the persons of his choice. The allegations were absolutely vague. Contention . ( 21 ) AS regards the allegation of mala fides, the petitioner has alleged that respondent No. 2 passed the impugned order in order to accommodate the persons of his choice. The allegations were absolutely vague. No details were given in the petition filed on September 15, 1994 or even in the Rejoinder dated 4-4-1995 to the affidavit-in-reply. However, today after the matter was argued in the Court by Mr. Pandit for quite some time and the Court had put certain queries to him before recess. Mr. Pandit requested the Court to keep the matter back for some time for bringing the authorities cited by him. Instead of reading those authorities, Mr. Pandit first insisted that the Court should take up Civil application No. 2110 of 1995 for joining ms. Reena Vakil as respondent No. 3 in the aforesaid petition, as she was appointed as data Entry Operator-cum-clerk in March 1995 after non-extension of the petitioners services in September 1994. The petitioner has also made some allegations regarding mr. Ankur B. Parikh, who was appointed on 6-4-1994. The petitioner in the aforesaid application has contended that said Mr. Ankur B. Parikh is a nephew of respondent no. 2 and that he was appointed as clerk- cum-typist in April 1994 though he was not fulfilling the requisite qualifications which criteria were fulfilled by him in 1995. ( 22 ) AS far as the aforesaid Civil application is concerned, no attempt seems to have been made till to-day to see that the civil Application is circulated and taken up for orders. Even otherwise the presence of ms. Reena Vakil is not necessary to adjudicate the controversy which is the subject-matter of the present petition. The respondents have not contended that the petitioner should not be ordered to be reinstated on the ground that some other employee is employed after non- continuance of the services of the petitioner nor has the petitioner made any allegations regarding any relationship or eligibility criteria of Ms. Reena Vakil. Moreover, presence of Ms. Reena Vakil is not necessary as the petition is being decided on merits and not on the ground that the person subsequently employed is not joined as a party to the petition or for non-joinder of parties. It is also required to be noted that it was after the appointment of Ms. Reena Vakil. Moreover, presence of Ms. Reena Vakil is not necessary as the petition is being decided on merits and not on the ground that the person subsequently employed is not joined as a party to the petition or for non-joinder of parties. It is also required to be noted that it was after the appointment of Ms. Reena vakil in March 1995 that the petitioner moved this Court for certain interim directions to restrain the respondents from appointing any other person and it was only on 15-7-1995 that an order was passed by this Court that the appointment to the post in question or any other clercial post would be subject to the result of this petition. ( 23 ) ASSUMING that there was any infirmity in the appointment of Mr. Ankur b. Parikh in April 1994, it has nothing to do with the non-extension of services of the petitioner beyond September 10, 1994 which was on account of the petitioners intermittent absence and unsatisfactory performance. As observed earlier, the decision of the respondents not to extend the petitioners appointment beyond September 10, 1994 cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. Contention VI ( 24 ) AS far as the last contention of Mr. Pandit is concerned, the facts on record clearly show that for one reason or the other the petitioner had been remaining away from work. Merely because her leave applications were granted in the past or merely because the petitioner considered that her proceeding on leave was for valid reasons cannot detract from the fact that the employer whose work suffers on account of the continued absence of the temporary employee or one who is appointed for specific period cannot be expected to go on renewing the period of employment of such employee. The petitioner got married in january 1993. She proceeded on maternity leave from 3-5-1994. However, even during this intervening period between January 1993 and May 1994 the petitioner remained on leave on a number of occasions running into weeks, if not months, as per the details already mentioned while considering contentions Nos. II and III. In response to a quary from the Court, Mr. Pandit stated that the petitioners husband is a businessman. Even on humanitarian ground there is nothing which could have persuaded any employer to extend the employment of the petitioner beyond the specific period expiring on September 10, 1994. II and III. In response to a quary from the Court, Mr. Pandit stated that the petitioners husband is a businessman. Even on humanitarian ground there is nothing which could have persuaded any employer to extend the employment of the petitioner beyond the specific period expiring on September 10, 1994. The petitioners last contention is also ill-conceived and deserves to be rejected. ( 25 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no substance in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and the petition deserves to be dismissed. In view of the discussion with respect to Contention No. V, no orders are required to be passed on Civil Application no. 2110 of 1995 and it accordingly stands disposed of. ( 26 ) IN the result, the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. The interim relief is vacated. Rule discharged. .