Honble MADAN, J. – Heard the learned counsel for the appellant at length and also perused the impugned judgments of the Courts below. The facts giving rise to the filing of this appeal, briefly stated, are that the plaintiff-respondent No.1 Kalyan is a landlord of the suit premises while the appellant-defendant No.1 is a tenant in the shop premises located at Karauli, against the appellant and respondent-defendant No.2 Niranjan and claimed ejectment on two grounds; (1) default in payment of rent and; (2) sub-letting of the suit premises. It was alleged in the plaint that the disputed shop was left out to the appellant on the monthly rent of Rs. 100/- per month whereas he was paying the rent at the rate of Rs. 90/-. It was further alleged that the appellant had sub-letted the shop in dispute to defendant No.2 and had parted with the possession of the shop premises to the said defendant No.2 Both the defendant filed their written statements separately before the trial Court denying the allegation made against them in the plaint. It was pleaded on behalf of the defendants that the possession of the shop remained with the appellant and that he did not part with the possession of the shop in dispute to defendant No.2 and that he had not sub-letted the shop to the said defendant. It was also stated that earlier the appellant was doing the business which infact was done as per appellants own contention by inducting Niranjan defendant No.2 (alleged sub-lettee the disputed shop premises) since his earlier business of timber was not successful and had to be closed. (2). It has been further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that although the partnership agreement was in writing and was executed on 9th March, 1988 but no consent of the landlord was obtained in writing before inducting defendant No.2 in the suit premises and it was only verbal consent of the landlord in this regard. In my considered opinion the verbal consent by itself does not entitle a tenant to induct some third party into the suit premises particularly when there is no evidence on the record and that nothing prevented the appellant from taking consent in writing of the landlord. In my considered opinion the verbal consent by itself does not entitle a tenant to induct some third party into the suit premises particularly when there is no evidence on the record and that nothing prevented the appellant from taking consent in writing of the landlord. No iota of evidence has been placed on the record to prove this fact that even verbal consent of the landlord was taken before inducting respondent No.2 in the suit premises and that the landlord had consented to the alleged sub-tenancy. The partnership which was in subsistence 9th March, 1988 was dissolved on 29th May, 1990. The suit for ejectment of the appellant was filed on 20th April, 1988. This obviously means that the partnership was in subsistence as on the date of the institution of the suit and in my considered opinion nothing prevented the appellant from taking express consent of the landlord before execution of the partnership agreement which was basically with a view to induct respondent No.2 in the suit premises unauthorisedly without the consent of the landlord. (3). I am further of the opinion that the trial Court has not taken not of this important fact and had erroneously dismissed the plaint. In first appeal preferred by the appellant against the judgment of the trial Court, the first appellate Court has taken note of all the important aspects of the case and has recorded the positive findings which in my opinion are in conformity with the requirements of Section 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred as `the Act), which reads as under :– ``13. Eviction of tenants. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and wiling to pay rent therefore to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied. (a) to (d) . . . . . . (e) that the tenant has assigned sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of, the whole or any part of the premises without the permission of the landlord; (4). (a) to (d) . . . . . . (e) that the tenant has assigned sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of, the whole or any part of the premises without the permission of the landlord; (4). The first Appellate Court has recorded a finding to the effect that anybody with a view to escape the consequences of eviction may enter into partnership which fact is also borne out from the partnership agreement dated 9th March, 1988 (Ex.A-6) and the Dissolution Deed dated 29th May, 1990 (Ex. A-7). The First Appellate Court has further recorded a finding in its judgment to the effect that keeping in view the nature of business being carried on in the suit premises i.e. the sale and repair of the electrical items by the appellant in partnership with respondent No.2 is proved from the independent evidence of 3 witnesses, namely, Kalyan, Kailash and Murari and there is no reason or justification to disbelieve their evidence. It is on the basis of the said evidence as well as the other material on the record that the First Appellate Court has recorded a positive finding to the effect that the parting with the possession of the suit premises without the consent of the landlord is proved on the record. (5). Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the D.B. judgment of the Court in the matter of Amir Ahmed vs. Yusuf (1), wherein the learned D.B. of this Court was of the view that what factors should be proved by the tenant on the question of sub-letting. It was held that the conversion of exclusive possession of premises by the tenant into a joint possession of the premises and a third person does not constitute parting with possession under Sec. 13(1) (e) of the Act. In my considered opinion the above judgment is distinguishable and the ratio of the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case since from the plain reading of Sec 13(1) (e) of th Act, it is explicitly clear once the landlord is able to satisfy the Court in respect of grounds taken by him for eviction of the tenant from the suit premises, if he has lead sufficient evidence on the record then he would be entitled to a decree for eviction. I am further of the opinion that initial burden of proof that there sub-letting or parting with the possession is always on the landlord and once parting with the possession is proved, the burden shifts on the tenant to show that the alleged sub-lettee is not a sub-tenant and in my considered opinion the tenant has failed to discharge this burden cast upon him. In answer to the quarry by the Court, learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to satisfy as to whether any permission in writing had been obtained from the landlord even with regard to the carrying out of the partnership agreement in the suit premises with respondent No.2 since right from the very inception of the tenancy the appellant alone was in possession of the premises as a sole tenant and it was at a later stage, after more than a decade, he thought of entering into a partnership agreement on account of alleged failure of his earlier business in the suit premises. (6). Keeping in view the fact and circumstances of the case and after having examined the findings recorded by the Courts below, I am of the opinion that no interference is called for in the impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court dated 3.11.95 of A.D.J., Karauli. This appeal is consequently dismissed at the admission stage itself being devoid of merit. (7). At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant may be given 6 months time to vacate the premises and that he will give peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises to the landlord-plaintiff within 6 months from today. The appellant is directed to give peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises to the landlord-plaintiff or to his duty authorised agent/representative within 6 months from today subject to his payment of usual rent of the premises and filing an undertaking in this Court in this regard within 2 weeks from today failing which the decree shall stand executable forthwith.