JUDGMENT - R.M. LODHA, J.:---By this writ petition, challenge is made to the order passed by the Appellate Authority, Rent Controller, Nagpur, on 4-6-1989 whereby the Appellate Authority set aside the order passed by the Rent Controller on 16-11-1988 in Revenue Case No. 92/A-71(2)/83-84 and sent the matter back to the Rent Controller for deciding the application filed by the petitioner under C.P. Berar, Letting of Premises and Rent Control, Order, 1949. 2. Girdharilal Mangtani since deceased now represented by his legal representatives (for short, the 'original landlord') made an application before the Rent Controller, Nagpur, seeking permission to terminate the tenancy under Clause 13(3)(ii), (iii) and (iv) of C.P. Berar Letting of Premises and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short, 'the Rent Control Order). The said application was filed against two non-applicants, namely Mohd. Younus and Upasrao Chichghare Dalal. It is averred that non-applicant No. 1 was the tenant in respect of the disputed premises comprising of ground floor portion of Block No. 65, situated in Handloom Market, Gandhibagh, Nagpur, on a monthly rent of Rs. 110/- and he sub-let the premises to Upasrao Dalal, who was impleaded as non-applicant No. 2. In the application it was averred that the tenant never paid the rent regularly every month and he was irregular in payment of rent and thus was habitual defaulter. According to the landlord, the tenant had sub-let the premises to Upasrao Dalal and therefore the landlord was entitled to the permission under Clause 13(3)(iii) of the Rent Control Order. Permission was also sought on the ground that the premises in question were required bona fide by the landlord for his own occupation for doing the business in the city of Nagpur. The application was contested by both the non-applicants namely Mohd. Younus as well as Upasrao and both of them filed separate written statements. In the written statements, both the non-applicants denied that non-applicant No. 2 in the application was the sub-tenant and the plea set out was that non-applicant No. 2 Upasrao was Adatiya and in his capacity as such, he used to sit in the premises in question for four to six hours a day. It appears that an application for amendment of written statement was filed by non-applicant No. 2 Upasrao and the said application came to be rejected right up to this Court. It appears that an application for amendment of written statement was filed by non-applicant No. 2 Upasrao and the said application came to be rejected right up to this Court. Thereafter by the order dated 16-11-1988 the Rent Controller held that non-applicant No. 1 had committed default in payment of rent and was defaulter and that he had sub-let the disputed premises without written consent of the landlord to the non-applicant No. 2 and that the premises in question were needed by the landlord for his own business and accordingly permission was granted by the Rent Controller under Clauses of 13(3)(ii), (iii) and (vi) of Rent Control Order. 3. The non-applicant No. 2, who was alleged to be the sub-tenant in the premises, filed appeal before the Additional District Magistrate, Nagpur and the Appellate Authority by the order dated 4-6-1989 set aside the order passed by the Rent Controller and remanded the matter to the Rent Controller directing him to permit the appellant, who was non-applicant No. 2 in the application, to adduce evidence and then decide the matter afresh in accordance with law. 4. Before this Court, the landlord moved C.A. No. 202 of 1996 and this Court on 30-1-1996 permitted deletion of respondent No. 2 from the array of parties at the risk and peril of the petitioner and consequently name of respondent No. 2, who was non-applicant No. 2, has been deleted. The order which is sought to be challenged in the present writ petition is dated 4-6-1989 passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Nagpur, and the said order was passed in appeal filed by Upasrao, who was originally impleaded as respondent No. 2 in the present writ petition. Now the first question which falls for determination in the writ petition is, whether in the absence of a party in the writ petition at whose instance the impugned order in the appeal came to be passed by the Appellate Authority, the landlord-petitioner could be granted any relief? Now the first question which falls for determination in the writ petition is, whether in the absence of a party in the writ petition at whose instance the impugned order in the appeal came to be passed by the Appellate Authority, the landlord-petitioner could be granted any relief? In other words, the question is the party at whose instance the impugned order came to be passed by the Appellate Authority having been deleted from the array of parties whether the writ petition could be maintained or was liable to be dismissed because no relief could be granted to the petitioner at the back of the party in whose favour the impugned order came to be passed on 4-6-1989 by the Appellate Authority. For deciding the said question, it is not material that permission of Rent Controller is not required under the Rent Control Order against the sub-tenant nor it is material whether the sub-tenant was necessary party in the application filed by the landlord seeking permission under Clause 13(3)(ii), (iii) and (vi) of the Rent Control Order. The important fact is that the landlord petitioner made an application under Clause 13(3)(ii), (iii) and (vi) against the tenant-in-chief as well as the alleged sub-tenant and the said application filed by the landlord was allowed by the Rent Controller. The order of Rent Controller granting permission was carried in appeal by the alleged sub-tenant and the appeal was allowed and the order of Rent Controller was set aside and the matter was sent back to the Rent Controller for permitting the non-applicant No. 2, the so-alleged sub-tenant to adduce evidence and then decide the application in accordance with law. In this view of the matter when the order was passed in favour of the alleged-sub-tenant by the Appellate Authority how can it be set aside in the present writ petition at his back when his name has been deleted at the instance of the petitioner. The order passed in favour of a party cannot be set aside at his back since it would be simply violative of fundamental principle of natural justice. The order passed in favour of a party cannot be set aside at his back since it would be simply violative of fundamental principle of natural justice. Initially the alleged sub-tenant in whose appeal favourable order came to be passed by Appellate Authority was impleaded as respondent No. 2 in the writ petition, but later on the petitioner moved an application for deletion of his name from array of parties in the application moved by the landlord before the Rent Controller as well as in the writ petition and this Court disposed of said application on 30-1-1996 permitting the petitioner-landlord to delete the name of alleged sub-tenant at his risk. Thus at the time of hearing of the writ petition, the alleged sub-tenant does not remain arraigned. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be granted any relief against the order passed by the Appellate Authority on 4-6-1989 in favour of alleged sub-tenant. The legal position is that if the landlord initiates eviction proceedings against the tenant-in-chief as well as the sub-tenant, either of the parties has independent right to challenge the said order in appeal and it cannot be said that merely because the tenant-in-chief has not preferred any appeal against the order, the sub-tenant could not prefer the appeal independently. In (Karamsingh and another v. Sri Pratapchand and another)1, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1305, the Apex Court while considering the question whether sub-tenant could prefer appeal against the judgment and decree in eviction proceeding in the absence of the appeal having been made by the tenant-in-chief, held that once a decree of ejectment is passed against the tenant as well as the sub-tenant, the sub-tenant alone can appeal in his own right against the decree even though the tenant decides not to file the appeal. The writ petition is accordingly liable to be dismissed in the absence of the alleged sub-tenant in whose favour the impugned order dated 4-6-1989 was passed. 5. Even otherwise on merits, it would be seen that the Appellate Authority found that proper opportunity was not accorded to non-applicant No. 2 in the application on the question whether he was direct tenant of the suit premises or the sub-tenant and therefore did not find the order passed by the Rent Controller proper. I find, thus, that the order passed by the Appellate Authority in remanding the matter back to the Rent Controller does not suffer from any infirmity. I find, thus, that the order passed by the Appellate Authority in remanding the matter back to the Rent Controller does not suffer from any infirmity. During the pendency of the writ petition before this Court the original landlord has already died and therefore the permission granted under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order cannot be said to survive. As regards other grounds, taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case, in my view, the interest of justice would be served if even otherwise the matter is considered afresh by the Rent Controller after permitting the parties to lead evidence and, therefore, no interference is called for in the just and proper order passed by the Appellate Authority in the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly. Rule discharged. No costs. Petition dismissed.