TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS case has a chequered history behind it; spreading over a period of two decades or so. By reason of the sheer length of the years that the parties have spent fighting over what can hardly be said to be a fabulous piece of property measuring 10' x 20' one would have very much liked to give a quietus to the controversy if only the same was possible within judicially manageable dimensions. Pious hopes and noble intentions notwithstanding, the solution does not seem to be anywhere in view for what is under challenge in this petition is not a final order but one remanding the case back for a further enquiry, thereby ensuring yet another round of appeals revisions and eventually writ petitions in this Court. ( 2 ) IT is unnecessary to set out in detail the various stages through which this litigation has passed over the years. The impugned order passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal at bangalore sufficiently serves that purpose. Suffice it to say that the small piece of land which constitutes the proverbial bone of contention between the parties is situate on the Indi-Bijapur road within the town limits of Indi. The petitioner who claims to be an unemployed graduate and the 4th respondent were rival claimants for the site in question both having applied for the same on lease basis to the authorities concerned. While the application made by the 4th respondent was rejected on the ground that any grant in his favour would offend the Ribbon development Rules the petitioner showed greater perseverance and succeeded in getting orders granting short terms leases in his favour from time to time. These orders were successfully challenged by the 4th respondent who preferred appeals against the same before the Deputy Commissioner, the Karnataka appellate Tribunal and eventually in this Court in Writ Petition no. 17184 of 1981. The pendency of the writ petition, notwithstanding the authorities were given the liberty to consider the question of renewal of the lease in favour of the petitioner which was granted from time to time till 18th of september, 1991 when the Deputy Commissioner, Bijapur in an appeal filed against one of such grants observed that there was no objection to the grant of the land in favour of the petitioner on a permanent basis. Consequently, the Assistant Commissioner, indi, by an order made by him in that behalf permanently granted the site in question in favour of the petitioner. This order also came under challenge at the instance of the 4th respondent before the Tribunal who remanded the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner, Bijapur with a direction to hold a fresh enquiry. The later made a spot inspection and confirmed the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. Against the said order the 4th respondent once again preferred an appeal before the Tribunal which has by order dated 4-5-1993, been allowed resulting in the orders made in favour of the petitioner being set aside and the matter being remanded back to the assistant Commissioner, Indi, for fresh disposal in accordance with law. It is this remand order that has been brought under challenge in the present writ petition. ( 3 ) MR. Goulay, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner found fault with the Tribunal's order primarily on two distinct counts. His foremost submission was that the 4th respondent had no locus standi to have filed the appeal before the Tribunal inasmuch as his own application for grant of the site in question had been rejected years ago whereafter he had not agitated the matter any further. It was argued that even the alternative case set up by the 4th respondent before the Tribunal that the grant in question had the effect of depriving the 4th respondent of the access to his property had been turned down with the result that the 4th respondent had no real or genuine, grievance against the same so as to give him the locus to maintain an appeal. The question as to whether the grant would have the effect of violating the provisions of the Ribbon Development Rules, it was contended, could not have been raised by the 4th respondent who was unconcerned with the property especially in the light findings returned by the Tribunal. Any such possible violation was, according to Mr. Goulay, a matter only between the petitioner and the authorities concerned. Any such possible violation was, according to Mr. Goulay, a matter only between the petitioner and the authorities concerned. Alternatively, it was urged that the question as to whether the grant violated the ribbon Development Rules had been answered in favour of the petitioner by the Tribunal while disposing of an earlier appeal filed by the 4th respondent by its order dated 16th March, 1981, where it was held that the proposed construction to be raised by the petitioner would not offend the provisions of the aforesaid rules. A remand made by the Tribunal for a fresh finding on the said question was according to Mr. Goulay wholly unnecessary and unsustainable in law. ( 4 ) I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made at the bar and propose to deal with the same in the order in which they have been made. ( 5 ) THE question as to whether the 4th respondent had the locus to file an appeal before the Tribunal against the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner granting the land in question to the petitioner would largely depend upon the nature of the grievance that the appellant-respondent 4 herein had to make against the said grant. It is not in dispute that the appellant before the Tribunal had inter alia urged that the grant in question had been made without any notice to him and in violation of the directions issued by the authorities in the previous proceedings between the parties. It was also contended that the inspection of the site in question by the Deputy commissioner was without notice to the appellant-respondent 4 and in violation of the land grant rules. The grant, it was urged had the effect of depriving the appellant of the access to his property besides being in violation of the provisions of the ribbon Development Rules. Suffice it to say that the grievance was multifaced and could hardly be said to be a pretence. Keeping in view the nature of controversy between the parties and the fact that they have litigated over the same for nearly 20 years at various stages including in this Court as also the nature of the grievance sought to be projected in the appeal before the tribunal it could not be said that the appellant had no real grievance to make and therefore no locus standi to maintain such an appeal. This is so because apart from the fact that the grant in question was assailed on the grounds mentioned earlier one of the major provocations for the appellant to challenge the grant was the rejection of his own claim for the site in question on the ground that the same would offend the provisions of the ribbon Development Rules. The appellant justifiably felt aggrieved of the grant in favour of the petitioner for the disputed site for whom the provisions of the said rules were never considered to be a disabling factor. The fact that the site in question is adjacent to the property owned by the appellant-4th respondent herein, and any grant of the said could not be ex facie said to be unconnected with the said respondent can also not be over-looked. In the totality of these circumstances it is not possible to accept Mr. Goulay's submission that the appellant before the Tribunal did really have no locus to challenge the grant in question, or that he had no reason to feel aggrieved of the same. ( 6 ) THERE is yet another aspect of the matter which can also not be undermined let alone ignored. The site in question is admittedly State property. A grant made by the authorities of any such property could be legitimately questioned by any person claiming any reasonable interest in the same or alleging violation of the provisions of the Act or the rules under which such a grant was made. This is particularly so when the allegation made is that the grant would offend the provisions of the Ribbon Development Rules which prohibit constructions within a specified distance from the centre of the Road. The principle of locus standi has of late been extended to much wider horizons. Courts have been considerably liberal in examining the validity of actions taken by public functionaries, even when the person who initiates any such legal proceedings does not claim any demonstrable, real or substantial interest in the transaction that is brought under challenge. This judicial activism on the part of the Courts and statutory fora has considerably eroded the conventional rules governing locus standi in matters of legal proceedings particularly those relating to issues of general public good. This judicial activism on the part of the Courts and statutory fora has considerably eroded the conventional rules governing locus standi in matters of legal proceedings particularly those relating to issues of general public good. Seen in the light of these developments, there is no gainsaid that an action of granting land like the one here could be brought under challenge by a citizen not only to vindicate his own claim or interest in any such transaction but also with a view to expose the abuse of authority if any by the functionaries who made such a grant. Violation of the provisions of law prescribing the procedure for making such grants or those meant to benefit the general public like the provisions of the Ribbon development Act forbidding construction within the specified distance from the centre of the road for the general benefit of the public and in the interest of smooth flow of traffic on the highways could also be brought up before the Appellate authority. In the circumstance the conservative and legalistic approach which Mr. Goulay wanted me to adopt in a matter of this nature has not commended itself to me. My answer to the first ground of attack urged by Mr. Goulay is accordingly in the negative. ( 7 ) COMING to the second limb of Mr. Goulay's submission, I find no substance even in the same. The Tribunal has remitted the matter back for a fresh enquiry, as it was of the 'opinion that the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner granting the land in favour of the petitioner was not consistent with the earlier order passed by him in that a similar prayer made by the 4th respondent herein was rejected on 30th July, 1977 on the ground that any such grant would violate the provisions of the ribbon Development Rules. The Tribunal felt that there was no material on record to show as to why and how the authorities had revised their earlier opinion, nor did the orders record any reasons for doing so. That being the position, the Tribunal considered a remand to be justified in order to get a clearer picture on the said aspect of the matter. There is in my opinion no error of law or jurisdiction in the Tribunal taking the said view nor was it Mr. Goulay's submission that there was any such error. That being the position, the Tribunal considered a remand to be justified in order to get a clearer picture on the said aspect of the matter. There is in my opinion no error of law or jurisdiction in the Tribunal taking the said view nor was it Mr. Goulay's submission that there was any such error. What was argued by the learned Counsel was that since the finding sought by the Tribunal had already been returned in the previous order of the Tribunal, any such remand was wholly unnecessary. Reliance in support was placed upon the observations made by the Tribunal in its previous order dated 16th March, 198,1 disposing of Appeal No. 234 of 1978 to the following effect:"the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant took us through the long history of the case and contended with reference to the Plan prepared that the site granted would be within 80' x 100' from the centre of Indi-Bijapur read and so it should not have been granted. It is not possible for us to say, if really the construction will be within 80' from the centre of the road. There is plenty of open space between the road and the site belonging to the appellant for lease of the space was rejected. As pointed out by the deputy Commissioner such rejection is no ground to deny the request of the respondent who is an educated unemployed person and who has put up a small wooden booth 1for vending milk or tea. The appellant appears to have asked for the whole of vacant land right up to the road margin. Now we find that the site leased even according to sketch prepared by the appellant is several feet away from the road margin. We agree with the Deputy Commissioner that in the event of the area being developed and the booth becoming a source of business or obstruction the respondent could be asked to vacate. The lease is after all temporary on annual basis". ( 8 ) THE above passage does not in my opinion specifically record a finding as to whether the grant in question would violate the provisions of the Ribbon Development Rules. All that the Tribunal appears to have observed is that the construction proposed to be raised may or may not be within 80' from the centre of the road. ( 8 ) THE above passage does not in my opinion specifically record a finding as to whether the grant in question would violate the provisions of the Ribbon Development Rules. All that the Tribunal appears to have observed is that the construction proposed to be raised may or may not be within 80' from the centre of the road. The prohibited distance from the centre of the road has not however been mentioned nor is the exact location of the site from the centre of the road indicated. It is therefore difficult to accept the submission made by Mr. Goulay that the above observations were sufficient to resolve the controversy making any remand on the question of violation of the Ribbon developmeht Rules unnecessary. ( 9 ) MR. Goulay next contended that the impugned order of remand would perpetuate the litigation for yet another decade or so, and that this Court should itself resolve the question of violation of the rules and the distance between the site and the centre of the road instead of leaving it to be examined by the authorities below. I was not averse to this course being adopted as a special case looking to the fact that the parties had already spent a sizeable part of their life time in the present litigation mr. Goulay was not however prepared to furnish an undertaking to the effect that in case the grant was held to be in violation of the Ribbon Development Rules upon physical verification the petitioner would give up his claim for the land in question. In the absence of such an undertaking, I am not inclined to appoint a commission for the purpose of resolving this part of the controversy. The result is that the parties shall have to continue their fight in their glorious tradition in yet another round of litigation. For the present all that can be said is that there is no merit in this petition which is hereby dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .