JUDGMENT : P.K. Misra, J. - These two appeals arise out of the same judgment and as such are taken up together. First Appeal No. 202 of 1988, has been filed by the Plaintiffs against the judgment refusing to specifically enforce the contract for sale of the disputed property. In First Appeal. No. 41/95 the direction to Defendant No. 1 for refund of consideration amount of Rs. 12,000/- is under challenge at the instance of Defendant No. 1, 2. The Plaintiffs' case is as follows: Plaintiff No. 7 is, the husband and Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are his two wives and Plaintiffs 3 to 6 are the children Defendant No 1 is the exclusive owner in-possession of the disputed property. Defendants 2 and 3 are her sons. The Defendants proposed to sell away the suit property to the Plaintiffs. Plaintiff No. 7 agreed to purchase the property for a consideration of Rs. 40,000/-. An agreement dated 19-12-1984 was executed in respect of the property which is a house along with land in Dewan Bazar, Cuttack and a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was paid to the Defendants as advance. Subsequently a further sum of Rs. 7,0001- was paid to Defendant No. 1 on 27-12-1984. It was agreed that the disputed property shall be sold to the Plaintiffs on payment of balance consideration money after obtaining necessary permission from the appropriate authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, After necessary permission was obtained, the Plaintiffs repeatedly approached Defendant No. 1, but the latter refused to execute the sale deed. Subsequently notice through lawyer was served on the Defendant No. 1, but as she did not comply with the notice, the suit was filed for specific performance of the contract. 3. Defendant No. 1 alone contended the suit. In her written statement, Defendant No. 1 pleaded that there was no agreement to sell the suit property, nor had she received the sum of Rs. 12,0001- from Plaintiff No. 7. 3. Defendant No. 1 alone contended the suit. In her written statement, Defendant No. 1 pleaded that there was no agreement to sell the suit property, nor had she received the sum of Rs. 12,0001- from Plaintiff No. 7. It was further pleaded that Defendants 2 and 3 had been gained over by Plaintiff No. 1 and taking advantage of illiteracy of Defendant No. 1, who is a pardanasin widow and by exercising fraud, Plaintiff No. 7 got some blank papers signed by Defendants 2 and 3 and also obtained the thump impression of Defendant No. 1 on the pretest that loan from the Bank will be sanctioned in favour of Defendants 2 and 3. 4. On the aforesaid pleadings, the following issues were framed by the trial court: 1. Is the suit maintainable in law as laid ? 2. Is there any cause of action for the Plaintiffs to file the suit ? 3. Is the suit bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties ? 4. Is Defendant No. 1 the owner in possession of the suit property? 5. Had Defendant No. 1 taken advance of Rs. 5,000/- on 19-12-1984 from Plaintiff No. 7 as a part of consideration money after entering into an agreement with him for sale of the suit property for a consideration of Rs. 40,000/- ? 6. Did Defendant No. 1 take a sum of Rs. 7,000/- from Plaintiff No. 7 on 27-12-1984 for her expenses and for investment in business of her sons as a part of consideration money in continuation of the earlier amount of Rs. 5,000/- ? 7. Is Defendant No. 1 a party in obtaining necessary permission from the appropriate authorities for sale of the suit property? 8. Are the Plaintiffs entitled to any relief as prayed for by them? 5. During trial, Plaintiff No. 7 was examined as P.W. I. The scribe of the two agreements (Exts. 1 and 2) was examined as P.W. 2, P.W. 3 was one of the witnesses to the two documents (Exts. 1 and 2) and P.W. 4 was examined to prove payment of Rs. 7,000/- on 27.12.1984. Defendant No. 1 examined herself as D.W.I to refuse the execution and her son-in-law was examined as D.W.2. 6. In the trial Court, Issue Nos. 3 and 7 were not pressed. 1 and 2) and P.W. 4 was examined to prove payment of Rs. 7,000/- on 27.12.1984. Defendant No. 1 examined herself as D.W.I to refuse the execution and her son-in-law was examined as D.W.2. 6. In the trial Court, Issue Nos. 3 and 7 were not pressed. While deciding other issues, the trial Court came to the conclusion that Defendant No. 1 was the owner-in-possession of the suit property and she had agreed to sell the property to the Plaintiffs and had received advance of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 7,000/- and had duly executed the two agreements (Exts. 1 and 2). However, the trial Court refused to direct specific performance of the contracts on the finding that great hardship would be caused to Defendant No. 1 if the contract is specifically enforced and it would result in Plaintiffs having unfair advantage. Accordingly, the trial Court instead of giving direction for specific performance of the contract, directed for refund of a sum of Rs. 12,000/- to Plaintiff No. 7 with interest at the rate of 6-1/2 per cent per annum from the date of institution of the suit. First Appeal No. 202 of 1988 has been filed by the Plaintiffs claiming that the trial Court should have granted decree for specific performance of contract. Defendant No. 1 filed Title Appeal No. 80 of 1992 in the Court of the District Judge challenging the decree in favour of the Plaintiffs relating to refund of consideration money of Rs. 12.000/-. Subsequently the records of the Title Appeal were called for and the appeal has been re-numbered as First Appeal No. 41 of 1995. 7. In their appeals, the Plaintiffs-appellants have raised the contention that in view of the finding that the agreements were genuine and duly executed and advance of Rs. 12,000/- had been paid, the trial Court should have directed for a specific performance of the contract. It is further contended that in the absence of any pleadings or proof, the trial Court should not have refused a decree for specific performance of contract by applying the principles of Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Defendant No. 1 in her appeal has contended that the findings regarding existence of contract for sale and payment of part consideration amount cannot be sustained as the relevant evidence on record has not been taken into consideration. 8. Defendant No. 1 in her appeal has contended that the findings regarding existence of contract for sale and payment of part consideration amount cannot be sustained as the relevant evidence on record has not been taken into consideration. 8. During the pendency of the appeals while the matter had been heard in part, a petition for amendment of the plaint has been filed on behalf of the Plaintiffs. A petition for adducing additional evidence has also been filed. Defendant No. 1 has filed objections to the aforesaid petitions. While pressing the petition for amendment, the Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff has submitted that since there is some dispute regarding the actual area in possession of Defendant No. 1, which is evident from the Record-of-Rights sought to be proved as additional evidence, paragraph two of, the plaint may be deleted and in its place the following may be inserted: That the Defendant No. 1 in the written agreement dated 19-12-1984 had given the impression to the. Plaintiffs that she is the owner in possession of Ac.0.64 decimals of land which she intended to sell to the Plaintiffs, but later the Plaintiffs have learnt that then she had already alienated Ac.0.34 decimals of land in favour of Quasir Alam, the grand son of the Defendant No. 1 and some others and the Defendant No. 1 is in possession of only Ac.0.30 decimals of land which is evident from the recent R. 0. R. published in the name of the Defendant No. 1, Amina Bibi. That it may noted in this connection that the Defendant No. 1 who is a shrewd lady playing fraud on the Plaintiffs have entered into the agreement with them that she is owner in possession of Ac.3.64 decimals of land. He further submits that in the Schedule of the plaint after the words "Ac.0,64 decimals." the following be inserted: Corresponding to mouza Cuttack Sabar, Unit No. 12 Sutabat, Hal Khata No. 160. It is further submitted that mere change in the schedule by giving Hal Khata number will not necessitate a fresh trial and the Record-of-rights can be brought on record by way of additional evidence. He has cited several decisions to indicate that amendment can be allowed at any stage of the suit, even during pendency of appeal. It is further submitted that mere change in the schedule by giving Hal Khata number will not necessitate a fresh trial and the Record-of-rights can be brought on record by way of additional evidence. He has cited several decisions to indicate that amendment can be allowed at any stage of the suit, even during pendency of appeal. ' The counsel for Defendant No. 1 has vehemently opposed to the proposed amendment at this stage stating that it may necessitate a fresh trial. On consideration of the contentions raised on either side and the citations, I feel that no prejudice will be caused to Defendant No. 1 it the schedule is amended. Incorporation of Hal Khata number and plot Nos. will not prejudice the parties in any manner. Accordingly, only the schedule of plaint is permitted to be amended. However, the other prayer in the petition for amendment relating to some assertion recording the extent of land under possession of Defendant No. 1 cannot be permitted to be amended at this stage, as it may necessitates a re-trial and the Defendant is likely to be prejudiced thereby. Since only the plaint schedule has been permitted to be amended giving Hal Khat number and Plot number, I do not final any necessity to give opportunity to Defendant No. 1 for filing additional written statement. As a matter of fact, in course of bearing, the Learned Counsel for Defendant No. 1 had fairly conceded to the aforesaid position. 9. So far as petition under Order 41, Rule 27 is concerned, the Appellants have sought to prove the final record-of-right in the name of Defendant No. 1 relating to the disputed land. In the said record-of-right, khata No. 160 plot No. 755 with an area of 0. 30 dec. is recorded in the name of Defendant No. 1. The aforesaid document has been filed in support of the assertion made in the petition for amendment of para-2 of the plaint. Since the said prayer for amendment in respect of para-2 of the original plaint has been rejected, I find that the document sought to be proved as additional evidence is not required for rendering a just decision in the appeal and, as such the petition for adducing additional evidence stands rejected. 10. Since the said prayer for amendment in respect of para-2 of the original plaint has been rejected, I find that the document sought to be proved as additional evidence is not required for rendering a just decision in the appeal and, as such the petition for adducing additional evidence stands rejected. 10. Since the facts of the suit and both the appeals is very much interlinked with the question of genuiness of the contract for sale, the correctness of finding of the trial court under Issue Nos. 4, 5 and 6 is taken up first. The finding of the trial court that the Defendant No. 1 is the owner in possession of the disputed property is not under challenge. However, Defendant No. 1, who is the Appellant in First Appeal No. 41 of 1995, has challenged the findings of the trial court under Issue Nos. 5 and 6 The trial court has held that the Defendant No. 1 had executed Exts. 1 and 2 and received Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 7,000/- on 19-12-84 and 27-12-84. The Learned Counsel appearing for the Defendant No. 1 contends that the observation of the trial court that the Defendant No 1 was not a Pardanasin lady is not correct and at any rate the Defendant No. 1 being an illiterate lady the burden was heavy on the Plaintiffs to prove that Exts. 1 and 2 had been duly executed by Defendant No. 1 after understanding the contents thereof. 11. The observation of the trial court that Defendant No. 1 was not a Pardanasin lady as there was no material on record to show that she was not showing her face in public may not be correct. Even otherwise Defendant No. 1. was admittedly an illiterate lady. The protection available to a Pardanasin lady is also available to an illiterate lady and any person claiming right on the basis of document executed by a Pardanasin or illiterate lady has to prove that the document in question has been duly executed by the executant after understanding the contents thereof. 12. In the present case the Plaintiffs have sought to prove the due execution of the documents and payment of part consideration money through the mouth of P.Ws. 1 to 4. P.W. I is Plaintiff No. 7. He has supported the Plaintiffs' case and proved payment of consideration of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 12. In the present case the Plaintiffs have sought to prove the due execution of the documents and payment of part consideration money through the mouth of P.Ws. 1 to 4. P.W. I is Plaintiff No. 7. He has supported the Plaintiffs' case and proved payment of consideration of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 7,000/- in presence of the witnesses. P.W. 2, the scribe of Exts. 1 and 2, is aged about 79 years and had experience as a Mohurir for about 63 years. He has proved the due execution of Exts. 1 and 2. He has stated that he had read over and explained the contents of Exts. 1 and 2 to Defendant No. 1 whereafter Defendant No. 1 had put her thumb impression. He has further stated that Exts. 1 and 2 had been scribed by him as per the instructions of Defendant No. 1, On the, first occasion, at the time of execution of Ext. 1, the Defendants 2 and 3 were present and their signatures have been duly proved by P.W. I and corroborated by P.W. 2. Nothing substantial has been elicited in cross-examination of P.W. 2 so as to discard his sworn testimony. There is no reason as to why P.W. 2 would falsely support the case of the Plaintiffs. P.W. 3. Sk. Moti, is a Rickshawala belonging to same religion as the parties. He had taken Defendant No. 1 to the house of the Plaintiffs. He has signed as one of the attesting witnesses in Ext. 1 and has corroborated the Plaintiffs case generally regarding the payment of money. P. W. 4 an independent witness has supported the Plaintiffs' case and has stated about Payment of consideration money of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 7,000/-. Though some minor contradictions here and there in the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 have beer pointed out nothing substantial has been elicited in cross-examination to discard their evidence which corroborated the evidence of P.W. 1, the Plaintiff No. 7. To rebut the evidence adduced on the side of the Plaintiffs, the Defendant No. 1 has examined herself as D.W. 1. and her son-in-law has been examined as D.W.2. Both D.W.1 and 2 denied about the alleged transactions and payment of money. However, their bare denial does not carry much conviction in the face of evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 as corroborated by evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4. and her son-in-law has been examined as D.W.2. Both D.W.1 and 2 denied about the alleged transactions and payment of money. However, their bare denial does not carry much conviction in the face of evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 as corroborated by evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4. Moreover, in the written statement, the Defendant No. 1 had taken the plea that her thumb impression and the signatures of her two sons, Defendants 2 and 3 had been taken fraudulently by giving them the impression that some bank loan was to be arranged. The Defendant No. 1 has not whispered a single word about the alleged fraud in evidence. Defendants 2 and 3 who are vitally interested in resisting the claim for specific performance of contract in respect of their mother's house have neither chosen to file written statement nor have been examined as witnesses in support of the case of Defendant No. 1. In addition to the above circumstances, the Plaintiffs have also proved the permission obtained from the Urban Land Ceiling authorities and have produced the original gift deed, Ext.C., under which Defendant No. 1 got the property. They have also produced certain original rent receipts, relating to the disputed property. The filing of these original documents by the Plaintiffs go a long way to prove the case of the Plaintiffs regarding the contract for sale. Mr. Rahim, Learned Counsel appearing for Defendant No. 1 contended that adverse inference should be drawn against the Plaintiffs for non-examination of Idu Khan, alleged to be a witness to the transactions as well as other neighbours in whose presence money was paid. However, in view of the facts and circumstances narrated above, 1 do not find any force in this contention of the, Learned Counsel for the Defendant No. 1. Accordingly, in agreement with the findings of the trial court, 1 hold that Defendant No. 1 had agreed to sell the disputed property to the Plaintiffs and had received Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 7,000/- as advance. 13. The trial court refused to pass decree for specific performance of contract applying Section 20(2) of Specific Relief Act, 1963. The trial court held that the price of the land including the building would not be less than Rs. 1,00,000/- at the time of agreement and, therefore, observed that the consideration money fixed at Rs. 7,000/- as advance. 13. The trial court refused to pass decree for specific performance of contract applying Section 20(2) of Specific Relief Act, 1963. The trial court held that the price of the land including the building would not be less than Rs. 1,00,000/- at the time of agreement and, therefore, observed that the consideration money fixed at Rs. 40,000/- gives the Plaintiffs unfair advantage over Defendant No. 1, Thus apparently it applied the provisions of Section 20(2)(a) of the Specific Relief Act. The trial court further held that as per the evidence of P.W. 1. himself, the Defendant No. 1 had no other property and she would be rendered homeless if the contract is specifically enforced. It was further held, basing on the evidence of Plaintiff No. 7 himself, that the Plaintiff No. 7 had got another house for the purpose of rent and his own residential house as well as the rented house are doubled storied buildings. So the trial court Observed that if the contract is specifically enforced great hardship will he caused to Defendant No. 1 who had no other house whereas the Plaintiffs will not suffer any hardship. Thus applying the underlying principles of Section 20(2)(b), the prayer for specific performance was refused. The aforesaid reasonings and conclusion of the trial court are seriously challenged by the Learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiffs-appellants. It is contend that neither there was any pleading nor any material on record to attract the underlying principles of Section 20(2) (a) & (b). The Learned Counsel for the Defendant No. 1 supported the conclusion of the trial court an this aspect and contended that the discretion used by the trial court by applying the principles of Section 20(2) (a) & (b) should not be interfered in appeal. The rival contentions of the parties require careful consideration. 14. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act reads as follows: 20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance - (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance - (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. (2) The following are cases in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance- (a) Where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the Plaintiff an unfair advantage over the Defendant; or (b) Where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the Defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the Plaintiff; (c) Where the Defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. Explanation 1. - Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the more fact that the contract is onerous to the Defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of Clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of Clause (b). Explanation 2. - The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship fin the Defendant within the meaning of Clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the Plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract. (3) The Court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the Plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. (4) The Court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party. A bare reading of the provisions of Section 20 of the Act makes it clear that the jurisdiction to enforce specifically a contract for sale is indeed discretionary. (4) The Court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party. A bare reading of the provisions of Section 20 of the Act makes it clear that the jurisdiction to enforce specifically a contract for sale is indeed discretionary. However, the discretion vested in court is not arbitrary and should be exercised either way in a sound and reasonable manner and must be guided by judicial principles. The judicial discretion used by the trial court is expressly made subject to correction by the appellate court. Thus it cannot be said that once the discretion is used by the trial Court, the same should not be interfered by the appellate court. It is the duty of the trial court to consider the question of specific performance of contract in a reasonable and judicious manner, The discretion vested in the trial court is not unbridled. Though ordinarily the appellate court has always the same power as the trial court, it should be loathe to interfere with the discretionary power of the trial court if it finds that the trial court has used the discretion in sound, reasonable and judicious manner. In the present case, in the written statement, Defendant No. 1, apart from generally denying about the execution of the agreement and receipt of part consideration amount, has hardly stated anything to attract the provisions of Section 20(2) of the Act. In the entire written statement consisting of about 6 pages and 21 paragraphs hardly two lines have been written relating to the question of applicability of Section 20(2) of the Act. At the fag end of paragraph 21 it has been stated that: ...Therefore the alleged contract to sell and all other papers that are prepared to contract for sell (sic) are illegal, void and are not enforceable in the eye of law being without the knowledge and consent of this Defendant and also because the alleged contract if enforced will cause hardship to this Defendant. Apart from the above emphasised portion, there is no other averment in the written statement. In her evidence, Defendant No. 1 has not proved anything to attract the underlying principles of Section 20(2). The trial court has concluded that the price of the property at the time of agreement was about Rs. 1,00,000/-. Apart from the above emphasised portion, there is no other averment in the written statement. In her evidence, Defendant No. 1 has not proved anything to attract the underlying principles of Section 20(2). The trial court has concluded that the price of the property at the time of agreement was about Rs. 1,00,000/-. Even assuming so, in view of Explanation- 1, the mere inadequacy of consideration cannot be considered as a circumstances to refuse specific performance of contract b applying the underlying principles of Section 20(2) (a) & (b) of the Act. The trial court observed that property worth about Rs. 1,00,000/- was proposed to be sold for Rs. 40,000/- which will give an unfair advantage to the Plaintiffs. The trial court has completely ignored Explanation-1 and came to the aforesaid finding. Similarly, the trial court has applied the principles of Section 20(2)(b) by holding that the Defendant No. 1 would be rendered houseless and suffer hardship it the contract is Specifically enforced. The aforesaid conclusion of the trial court has been arrived at without proper perusal of Section 20(2)(b) of the Act. Section 20(2)(b) of the Act takes into account unforeseen hardship to be caused to be Defendant and not some hardship which could be foreseen at the time of agreement. Defendant No. 1 nowhere has alleged that she had not foreseen the fact that she may be rendered shelterless if she were to sell the property. She had two other sons Neither in her written statement nor in evidence she has whispered a single word that she did not foresee the alleged hardship now found out by the trial court. Thus, in terms, of Section 20(2)(b) was not at all applicable to the facts of this case. Since the trial court has not considered Explanation-1 and has applied Section 20(2) (a) & (b) without any materials on record, the discretion exercised by the trial court appears to be arbitrary and unreasonable. In view of the aforesaid, the reasonings given by the trial court for refusing a decree for specific performance of contract cannot be supported. 15. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act reads as follows: 16. In view of the aforesaid, the reasonings given by the trial court for refusing a decree for specific performance of contract cannot be supported. 15. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act reads as follows: 16. Personal bars to relief- Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person: (a) x x x x (b) x x x x (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him other than terms the performance of which has been presented or waived by the Defendant. Explanation - For the purpose of Clause (c): (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the Plaintiff to actually tender to the Defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court ; (ii) the Plaintiff must ever performance of or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction. It has been held in several decisions that in a suit for specific performance of contract of Sale of land the Plaintiff must plead and prove that be was continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract namely, to pay the sale price between the date of the contract and the bearing of the suit. In this connection, the decisions of the Orissa High Court in AIR 1970 Ori 161 Mali Bewa and Others Vs. Dhunda Samal and Another, Durjyodhan Palei and Others Vs. Padana Charan Das and Others, and Division Bench decision in Vol. 50 ( 1980) C.L.T. 77 (Srihari Sahu alias Hayi Charan Shaw v. Smt. Haripriya Ojha) and the decision of P.M. Shinghal, J. as his Lordship then was, in Vol. 21 (1970) RLW page 594 wherein almost in similar circumstances it was held that in the absence of necessary pleadings the suit was liable to fail. Almost all those decisions are based on the decision of Privy Council reported in AIR 1928 208 (Privy Council) and of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1967 S.C. 859 (Gomathinayagdm Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar). Of course I am aware that there are some decisions including that of Orissa High Court which lay down that the plaint should not be construed in a pedantic manner. Of course I am aware that there are some decisions including that of Orissa High Court which lay down that the plaint should not be construed in a pedantic manner. However, the authorities cited above do not support such a view. In view of the consonous of judicial opinion as expressed in the several decisions already noticed, the decision of the learned Single Judge in Vol. 42 (1976) C.L.T. 473 (Mahani Dibya v. Prahallad Swain) which appears to be a singular decision of its kind ploughing a lone furrow must be confined to its own peculiar facts. In the present case, the Plaintiffs have not averred specifically their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract throughout nor the Plaintiff No. 7 has stated so in evidence. As already noticed law is well settled that unless the Plaintiff indicates his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract throughout and even at the stage of evidence, the discretionary relief for specific performance of contract cannot be granted. The Plaintiffs have prayed for alternative decree for refund of Rs. 12,000/- and by way of amendment the Plaintiffs hail added prayer for grant of pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 12.4 per cent per annum. In the absence of any pleading and evidence indicating the continued readiness and willingness of the Plaintiffs to perform their part of the contract at the time of filing the suit and at the stage of evidence, I am not inclined to pass decree for specific performance of contract though I have differed from the reasonings given by the trial court for refusing to grant decree for specific performance of contract. 16. The trial court has directed for refund of consideration of Rs. 12,000/- with interest of 6% per cent. Keeping in view the rate of interest granted by the Nationalised Banks at the relevant time and at present, 1 modify the decree of the trial court and direct that the Defendant No. 1 shall refund the consideration amount of Rs. 12,000/- with 10 per cent interest per annum from the date of filing of the suit till payment, which should be paid within three months from the date of this judgment. 12,000/- with 10 per cent interest per annum from the date of filing of the suit till payment, which should be paid within three months from the date of this judgment. If the amount is not paid or deposited in the trial court within three months from the date of this judgment, the interest shall calculated at the rate of 12 per cent thereafter Subject to the aforesaid modification of the decree regarding payment of interest, both the appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs of these appeals. Final Result : Dismissed