ORDER 1. In this appeal the State has challenged the order of acquittal of the respondent, for the offences u/ss. 376, 366 of IPC. The appeal has been preferred by the State u/s 378 Cr. P.C. The respondent was convicted by the trial Court for the offences punishable u/s 363 IPC and instead of sentencing him atonce he was allowed the benefit of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and was directed to submit a personal bond in the sum of Rs, 1000/- with one surety for his maintaining peace and for being of good conduct for a period of 2 years. It was also directed that if any offence was committed by him during the above period or there was a breach of any of the condition, he shall remain present on being summoned for receiving the sentence that may be imposed by the Court. It is not in dispute that by complying with the order of the Court, the respondent did not commit any breach of the conditions imposed by the trial Court. 2. This appeal has come-up for hearing after a period of 16 years. The allegation against the respondent was no. I -" that he had enticed away the prosecutrix on 30.4.79 and the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at that relevant time." No. 2 -" That he had committed rape on the prosecutrix". No. 3 -" that he was also charged for an offence punishable u/s 366 IPC which deals with the abetment of a major lady". 3. Shri K.B. Chaturvedi, appearing for the State took pains in arguing strenuously that the judgment of acquittal of respondent for the said charge is perverse. It is based on absolutely wrong approach adopted by the trial Court. It is contended by Shri Chaturvedi that the learned trial Court has appreciated the evidence and the circumstances of the instant case with the approach that the prosecutirx by not objecting to the conduct of respondent, was a consenting party. But Shri Chaturvedi urged that when the prosecutrix was found to be minor, her consent to the act and conduct of the respondent was not at all material, as the consent of a minor is no consent in the eye of law and cannot be used as a protractive by the accused. But Shri Chaturvedi urged that when the prosecutrix was found to be minor, her consent to the act and conduct of the respondent was not at all material, as the consent of a minor is no consent in the eye of law and cannot be used as a protractive by the accused. Shri D.S. Sharma, appearing for the respondent has controverted the contentions raised by Shri Chaturvedi with equal force. 4. On the consideration of the rival contention, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we arc of the view that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 5. In the instant case, the prosecutrix is the star material witness of the prosecution. In the case of sexual assault, the victim is the most material witness and in most of the cases is the only witness. Generally such an offence is committed in isolation and therefore the eye-witness account is not available. It is only through the circumstances that the version of the prosecutirx may be corroborated. 6. It is well settled that the conviction u/s 376 IPC can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if corroborated by medical evidence. However corroboration of the version of the prosecutirx is not necessary only in those cases where the prosecutrix is found to be a wholly reliable witness. If the prosecutrix is wholly reliable the corroboration of her evidence would not be a rule. But if the reliability of the version of the prosecutrix is shaken, the Court shall look for the corroboration of her statement from the other evidence or circumstances. In the instant case, the learned trial Court though appears to have discussed the evidence of the prosecution as if the prosecutrix was a consenting party, but the learned trial Court has also discussed the infirmities found in her statement to appreciate whether she could be found to a reliable witness. The learned trial Court found in the statement of the prosecutrix that she had resisting the sexual assault on her through her nails and also by the teeth-bits, but no such injuries were found on the person of the respondent. The prosecutrix on the medical examination was found to be habitual of sexual intercourse and therefore the learned trial Court found that the prosecutrix was not a reliable witness. The prosecutrix on the medical examination was found to be habitual of sexual intercourse and therefore the learned trial Court found that the prosecutrix was not a reliable witness. Further a girl would be minor for an offence u/s 363 IPC if she is below 18 years of age, but for an offence u/s 376, she would be major if she is above 16 years of age, and as such no conviction on her testimony for an offence u/s 376 IPC could be based, without corroboration which is not available on record. 7. The view taken by the trial Court cannot be said to be unreasonable. It is well sattled that on the appreciation of the prosecution evidence if the other view was also possible, this Court would not interfere with the order of acquittal. The findings arrived at by the trial Court cannot be said to be perverse or against the record. Therefore the acquittal of respondent for the offence u/s 376 IPC does not call for any interference by this Court. 8. However at his stage, Shri Chaturvedi has raised another objection on the impugned judgment. It is contended that the learned trial Court could not have given the benefit of section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused/respondent for the offence punishable u/s 363 IPC. The accused was required to be sentenced to imprisonment, with or without fine. 9. We have found some substances in the arguments advanced by Shri Chaturvedi. Once the accused is found guilty u/s 363 IPC that too relating to a minor, the Court should not adopt alenient view, for giving the benefit of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The Court has to bear in mind different factors. In Indian society the kidnapping of a girl adversely effects her future life and brings disrepute to the kidnapee and her family both. The Court cannot brush aside the local conditions the society to which the kidnapee and the accused belong and thereafter the antecedents of the accused are to be seen. 10. We would have interfered with the order of giving benefit u/s 4 of the Act to the accused, if the appeal could be heard early. The Court cannot brush aside the local conditions the society to which the kidnapee and the accused belong and thereafter the antecedents of the accused are to be seen. 10. We would have interfered with the order of giving benefit u/s 4 of the Act to the accused, if the appeal could be heard early. But in the circumstances when a period of 16 years since the passing of the order by the trial Court has already elapsed, any interference at this stage now would mean upsetting the settled status of the accused, in the family and the society which will not serve the interest of justice. Therefore we are not inclined to interfere with the order in that regard as well. The accused has already complied with the conditions which were imposed on him while extending the benefit of section 4 of the Act to him under the impugned order. On the foregoing discussion the State appeal does not deserve to succeed. 11. In the above facts and circumstances, we have found no substance in this appeal, warranting interference in the impugned judgment. The appeal therefore fails. It is dismissed.