ORDER C.K. Prasad, J. 1. By this writ petition filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for quashing of the order dated 23.6.94 passed by the Collector Surguja where by the election petition filed by respondent no. I challenging the election of the petitioner as a member of the Janpad Panchayat has been allowed and the petitioner's election set aside. 2. Short facts, giving rise to the present application are that the petitioner was elected as a member of Janpad Panchayat, Shankargarh from ward no. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the returned candidate). Respondent no. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the election petitioner) submitted his nomination papers for contesting the election. The election petitioner objected to the nomination of the returned candidate on the ground that he holds office of profit in a co-operative society as also the State Government and therefore, disqualified for being a member of the Janpad Panchayat under section 36 (1) (d) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act. 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). However, the nomination of the returned candidate was accepted and ultimately he was declared elected from ward no, I of the Janpad Panchayat. Aggrieved by his election, the election petitioner preferred an election petition before the Collector under section 122 of the Act. According to the election petitioner the returned candidate was in service of Adim Jali Seva Sahakari Samiti, hereinafter referred to as Society, on a monthly Salary of Rs. 300/-as Asstt. Manager and further he was a supervisor in the Adult Education Program and was getting a salary of Rs. 200/- per month. Returned candidate contested the claim of the petitioner and according to him he was not a paid employee of the society but it has been admitted that the society used to pay him Rs. 300/- per month as honorarium. Similarly, he has not denied the fact that he was in the service in the Adult Education programme but his stand is that he was being paid as honorarium in Propagating the adult education programme in the district. Thus his stand is that he is not holding office of profit either under the Samiti or Adult Education Programme. Similarly, he has not denied the fact that he was in the service in the Adult Education programme but his stand is that he was being paid as honorarium in Propagating the adult education programme in the district. Thus his stand is that he is not holding office of profit either under the Samiti or Adult Education Programme. The Collector hearing the election petition, on analysis of the materials produced before him held that the returned candidate was appointed as propagator on a temporary basis till further orders on an honorarium of Rs. 200/- per month and also as Asstt. Salesman by the society and was paid Rs. 300/- per month. After holding that the returned candidate was getting profit of Rs. 500/- per month found him disqualified for holding the office of member of Panchayat and accordingly set aside his election. 3. Section 36 of the Act inter alis provides for disqualification for being office bearer of Panchayat. Section 36 (1) (d) which is relevant for the purpose of being quoted below :- 36. Disqualification for being office bearer of panchayat - (1) no person shall be eligible to be an office-bearer of Panchayat who - (a)........................ (b)........................ (c)........................ (d) hold an office of profit under any Panchayat or is in the service of any other local authority or co-operative society or the State Government or the Central Government or any public sector undertaking under the control of the Central Government or the State Government. 4. The appointment letter of the returned candidate of the society dated 1.9.94 shows that he is an employee of the society, his appointment is purely temporary and could be terminated without any notice. As a part time salesman he was entitled for a sum of Rs. 150/- as pay. Similarly, the appointment letter of the returned candidate dated 15.4.89 shows that he was appointed as propagator on a temporary basis till further orders on a honorarium of Rs. 200/- per month. 5. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that a person holding an office of profit under any Panchayat or in the service of any other local authority Co-operative Society he shall not eligible to be office bearer of Panchayat. Service of a person with any co-operative society disqualifies him for being a member of the Panchayat. 5. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that a person holding an office of profit under any Panchayat or in the service of any other local authority Co-operative Society he shall not eligible to be office bearer of Panchayat. Service of a person with any co-operative society disqualifies him for being a member of the Panchayat. For the purpose of disqualification for being office bearer of Panchayat a person must not hold any office of profit under any Panchayat. However the officer of profit under section 36 (1) (d) of the Act has to be confined to the officer of profit under Panchayat but not to other local authority, co-operative society etc. For the purpose of application of section 36 (1) (d) of the Act a person in service of society is disqualified to be an office bearer of Panchyayat the moment it is shown that he is in service of co-opera-live Society, local authority etc. The expression service according to Black Law Dictionary implies that employer compensates the employee or person rendering the service. Here in the present case, I find that the returned candidate is being compensated for the service rendered by him and therefore, he is in the service of the society which disqualified him for holding any office under Panchayat. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that what is being paid to him is honorarium and in that view of the matter he is not holding any officer of the profit under the Society or the State Govt. and therefore, cannot be held to be disqualified for being the officer bearer of the Panchayat. 7. As held earlier, the expression office of profit has to be confined to the office under Panchayat only and not for the society and for disqualification under section 36 (1) (d) of the Act service only under the co-operative society is contemplated. Even if it is accepted that the expression office of profit also applies in the case of co-operative society, the same does not advance the case of the returned candidates. 8. It is the stand of the returned candidate that the amount paid to him by the society as also in the Adult Education Programme are honorarium and therefore the office hold by him cannot be said to be an office of profit. 8. It is the stand of the returned candidate that the amount paid to him by the society as also in the Adult Education Programme are honorarium and therefore the office hold by him cannot be said to be an office of profit. In support of the aforesaid submission learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Karbhari Bhimaji Rohamare Vs. Shanker Rao Ganuji Kolhe and others 1975 S.C. 575. My attention has been drawn to the following passage from the said judgment which reads as follows :- 6. Reference is made to the dictionary meaning of the word 'honorarium' and it is said that while the daily allowance is expected to meet the expenses of the member concerned while attending the meeting of the Board, the honorarium is in the form of a fee for performing his duties on these days. The shorter Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of the word 'honorarium' as an honorary reward a fee for professional service rendered, while one of the meanings of the word 'salary' is fixed payment made periodically to a persons a compensation for regular 'work' remuneration for services rendered Ice honorarium. Thus, in one aspect honorarium and fee are used almost as though they are interchangeable terms. Even so what was paid to the 1st respondent cannot be said to be a salary. It was not a fixed payment made periodically as compensation for regular work we do not think that the dictionary meaning is of much help here. We are of opinion that the matter must be considered as a matter of substance rather than of form, of the essence of payment rather than its nomenclature. Even so, it is urged on behalf of the appellant that the payment of honorarium in this case could not have been for any purpose other than payment for services rendered on particular days on which the meetings of the Wage Board were held. We are not able to accept this contention. In the aforesaid case, the elected candidate was a member of the Wage Board in the Sugar Industry and it was held that the allowance paid to him was not a source of profit. In the words of the Supreme Court: The question has to be looked at in a realistic way. We are not able to accept this contention. In the aforesaid case, the elected candidate was a member of the Wage Board in the Sugar Industry and it was held that the allowance paid to him was not a source of profit. In the words of the Supreme Court: The question has to be looked at in a realistic way. Merely because part of the payment made to the 1st respondent is called honorarium and part of the payment daily allowance, we cannot come to the conclusion that the daily allowance is sufficient to meet his daily expenses and the honorarium is a source of profit. 9. As cautioned by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that the matter must be considered as a matter of substance rather than form, of the essence of payment rather than its nomenclature. The, use of the expression honorarium is of no consequence. Here in the present case it is not the case of the returned candidates that the amount paid to him was spent for the work assigned to him. The amount paid to the returned candidate was used by him for his own benefit and therefore, it cannot be said that he was not holding the office of profit under the society or in adult education programme of the Govt. As such, authority relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not support his case. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner further places reliance on a Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kona Probhakara Rao Vs. K. Prabhakar Rao and another A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 658: My attention has been drawn to the following paragraph of the said judgment which reads as under :- 11. In view of these decisions, it is absolutely clear that as the appellant was neither appointed nor was removable by Government and even his compensatory allowances were paid from the funds of the corporation and not from the coffers of the Government, he cannot he said to be person holding any officer of profit under the Government. I fail to understand how the aforesaid judgment in any way advances the case of the returned candidate. I fail to understand how the aforesaid judgment in any way advances the case of the returned candidate. In the aforesaid case the compensatory allowance was paid by the corporation and not from the coffers of the Government and ultimately it was held that the person was not holding the office of profit under the Government. Here in the present case, returned candidate was paid by the co-operative society and in that view of the matter he was in service and holding the officer of profit under the society. 11. Yet another decision on which learned counsel has placed reliance is the case of S. Umarao Singh Vs. Darhara Singh and others A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 262. My attention has been drawn to the following paragraph of the said judgment, which reads as follows :- 4. In this appeal also, the same three questions have been again raised by the appellant. We consider that this appeal can be disposed of on the basis of the answer to the first question, alone because in our opinion, the High Court came to a correct conclusion in holding that the allowances paid under. Rules 3 to 7 of the Rules did not convert the office of Chairman of a Panchayat Samiti into an office of profit. A reading of the aforesaid paragraph makes it clear that the amount of allowance paid was to be spent in performing the duties and the chairman was not expected to spend money out of his own pocket. Mere it is not the case of the returned candidate that the amount paid to him was spent for the discharge of his duties. As such, the authority relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is clearly distinguishable. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the meaning of the express on honorarium as explained in legal glossary published by the Govt. of India which means "a voluntarily fee paid especially to a professional man for his services. "As stated earlier the use of the expression honorarium is of no consequence and one has to see the substance of the payment and its use. of India which means "a voluntarily fee paid especially to a professional man for his services. "As stated earlier the use of the expression honorarium is of no consequence and one has to see the substance of the payment and its use. The returned candidate is not a professional man, he was in the service of the society and the amount paid to him was not used for discharge of his duties, but was spent by him and therefore, the amount paid to him cannot be said to be honorairum. 13. Having held that the returned candidate is in service of the society as also holding the office of profit under the society and in the Adult Education Scheme of the Govt., I am of the view that he was disqualified for being the member of Panchayat, The Collector was right in setting aside his election on this ground. In the result, I do not find any merit in the petition. Accordingly, it is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.