Judgment : S. K. Verma. J. 1. The present petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner claiming to be landlord of the disputed accommodation for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing annexure 9, order dated 20-12-1993 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer I, Allahabad. 2. ONE Sri J. P. Joshi was tenant of the accommodation in dispute. The petitioner claimed that he had let out the accommodation to Sri Joshi. The petitioner filed an application for release under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter called 'the Act') which was allowed by the Prescribed Authority by Judgment dated 6-11-1987 passed in P. A. Case No. 34 of 1987. The petitioner claims that the possession of the accommodation was delivered to him through police in December, 1991. Respondent No. 2 Rajendra Pratap Singh alias Neel Kanth moved an application on 9-7-1992 for allotment of the accommodation. The petitioner claims that the aforesaid application was moved in collusion with petitioner's brother Abdul Hai Khan who was wrongly shown to be the landlord. The Rent Control Inspector inspected the accommodation on 15-10-1992. The petitioner gave photostat copy of the judgment of P. A. case No. 34 of 1987 to the Inspector. The Inspector submitted report suggesting that parties might be summoned to file evidence in support of their respective cases. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer without issuing any notice or calling for any evidence from the petitioner and within two days of the Inspector's report dated 15-10-1992 passed a cryptic order dated 17-10-1992 against which the petitioner filed writ petition No. 46437 of 1992 which was allowed on 9-11-1992 directing the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to pass orders afresh after hearing the parties and after recording the findings regarding the matter in dispute. Meanwhile. Abdul Hai Khan claiming to be the landlord of the premises in dispute had moved an application before the Prescribed Authority under Section 21 of the Act for recalling the order dated 6-11-1987 passed in P. A. Case No. 34 of 1987. However. Abdul Hai Khan. according to the petitioner. had not moved any application for release. He had only claimed that the building was not vacant and he was the landlord. However. Abdul Hai Khan. according to the petitioner. had not moved any application for release. He had only claimed that the building was not vacant and he was the landlord. As per directions in writ petition No. 46437 of 1992, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order on 16-8-1993 that since a recall application was pending before the Prescribed Authority in respect of order dated 6-11-1987 passed in P. A. Case No. 34 of 1987. the proceedings regarding declaration of vacancy under Section 16 (1) of the Act shall remain stayed. Against this order dated 16-8- 1993, Civil Misc. Writ No. Nil of 1993 was filed by Rajendra Pratap Singh. Respondent No. 2 against the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Petitioner and Abdul Hai Khan. In that proceeding, it was claimed that the property in dispute is waqf property and that the petitioner, namely, Abdul Qavi Khan,. obtained the release order by concealing facts and that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer should decide the matter as early as possible. This Court vide order dated 15-9-1993 directed the petitioner of that writ petition, namely, Rajendra Pratap Singh, to move an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer stating all the facts and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to take such steps and proceed in the matter of release moved by Abdul Hai Khan pending before the same Court to be decided expeditiously within a period of one month from the date of filing of a certified copy of the order dated 15-9-1993 in accordance with the direction given by the High Court in its order dated 9-11- 1992. 3. THE Rent Control and Eviction Officer then passed the impugned order dated 20-12-1993 (annexure 9) declaring vacancy and directing further consideration of release application on 30-12-1993. This order has been challenged, firstly, on the ground that the premises in dispute could not have been declared to be vacant when it had been released in favour of the petitioner vide order dated 6-11-1987. Secondly. it has been argued that even according to the case of the respondents. the application of Abdul Hai Khan for recalling the order dated 6-11-1987 was pending and no vacancy could be declared until the matter of release had been decided. Secondly. it has been argued that even according to the case of the respondents. the application of Abdul Hai Khan for recalling the order dated 6-11-1987 was pending and no vacancy could be declared until the matter of release had been decided. Thirdly, it has also been argued that since vide U. P. Act No. V of 1995 which has come into force with effect from 26- 9-1-994, any building belonging to or vested in a waqf including Waqf Alal Aulad is exempted from the operation of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority as well as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer are without jurisdiction and, therefore, also the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 4. THE learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 has argued that the release dated 6-11-1987 is not enforceable as it is a collusive order and the petitioner Abdul Qavi Khan is not landlord and the requirement of Rent Control Act are to be fulfilled but the order dated 6-11-1987 was passed on the basis of compromise with the previous tenant which is liable to be set aside. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the entire record. 5. IT may be noted at the first instance that when once this disputed premises had been released in favour of the petitioner by the Prescribed Authority who was competent to decide the matter and an application by Abdul Hai Khan for recalling that order dated 6-11-1987 was pending before the Prescribed Authority, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain an application for declaration of vacancy and allotment of the premises in dispute. In a decision of this Court in Smt. Shanti Devi v. Vth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and others 1987 (2) ARC page 130 placing reliance on Sultan Ahmad v. Prescribed Authority reported in 1984 (1) A. R. C. 283, this Court held as follows: "it is settled law that if an application for release under Section 21 (1) of the Act is made, the landlord is not called upon to obtain a further order of release from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer nor has the said officer any jurisdiction to allot the accommodation to anyone else. " IT is, thus, abundantly clear that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for declaring vacancy or for allotting the premises in question to anybody else when once the Prescribed Authority has released the accommodation under Section 21 of the Act in favour of the petitioner. Unless the order dated 6-11-1987 is set aside, no action can be taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 6. THE Second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is also good and valid. THE amendment in Section 2 of the Act inserted by U. P. Act No. 5 of 1995 exempts waqf property from the operation of the Act. In Parripati Chandrashekharrao v. Alapati Jalaiah ( AIR 1995 SC 1781 : 1996 (2) JCLR 737 (SC) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: "there is a material difference between the right which accrue to a landlord under the common law and the protection which is afforded to the tenant by such legislation as the Rent Act. In the former case the rights and remedies of the landlord and tenant are governed by the law of contract and the law governing the property relations. These rights and remedies continue to govern their relationship unless they are regulated by such protective legislation as the present Act in which case the said rights and remedies remain suspended till the protective legislation continues in operation. Hence while it can legitimately be said that the landlords normal rights vested in him by the general law continue to exist till and so long as they are not abridged by a special protective legislation, in the case of tenant, the protective shield extended to him survives only so long as and to the extent the special legislation operates. In the case of the tenant, therefore, the protection does not create any vested right which can operate beyond the period of protection or during the period the protection is not in existence. When the protection does not exist, the normal relations of the landlord and tenant come into operation. Hence the theory of the vested right which may validly be pleaded to support the landlord's case is not available to the tenant. When the protection does not exist, the normal relations of the landlord and tenant come into operation. Hence the theory of the vested right which may validly be pleaded to support the landlord's case is not available to the tenant. " Thus, as soon as the amended Section 2 (1) (bbb) of the Act came into operation from 28-9-1994, the protection afforded to the tenants regarding declaration of vacancy and allotment came to an end. Therefore also the impugned order has to be set aside. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 20-12-1993 is quashed. The parties are free to settle their disputes in accordance with the common law. Petition allowed.