B. S. CHAUHAN, J. The petitioner is facing criminal trial under Section 354 I. P. C. as on 5-7-96 one Smt. Shobha Devi lodged an FIR against the petitioner who was posted as a Sub-Inspector in Police Sta tion Deorahat, district Kanpur Dehat, alleg ing that on that date at about 8. 30 p. m. the petitioner entered her house along with two other persons. The petitioner was dead drunk, though he was in police dress. At that time there was no person in the house of the complainant, the petitioner torn away her blouse and misbehaved with her. On raising the noise other persons came there and the petitioner was apprehended. The petitioner was taken into custody by the Deputy Super intendent of Police and Station House Of ficer of Bhognipur from the house of the complainant as they arrived there on her complain. The aforesaid case was registered against the petitioner under Section 354 I. P. C. and he was sent to jail. After being enlarged on bail the petitioner was suspended resorting to the provisions of Section 17 (1) of the U. P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Rank (Punishments and Appeal) Rules, 1991. The petitioner was put under suspension by the Superintendent of Police, respondent no. 2 vide impugned order dated 10-7-96 contained in annexure 2 to the writ petition. 2. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition challenging the impugned order on various grounds. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the impugned suspension order has been passed by the Superintendent of Police who is not the appointing authority of the petitioner. Ac cording to the averments made in the writ petition the Deputy Inspector General of Police is the appointing authority of the petitioner and thus, the impugned order is bad for want of competence. 4. In State of M. P. Sardul Singh, 1970 (1) SCC 108 , the Supreme Court held that Article 311 (1) of the Constitution provides for guarantee to a civil servant that he would not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to his appointing authority but it does not provide for further guarantee that the disciplinary proceedings resulting in dismissal or removal of a civil servant should also be initiated and conducted by the authority mentioned therein. 5. 5. Similarly, in E. V. Srinivas Shastri v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 1993 (1) SCC 419 , the Honble Supreme Court elaborated the same issue again and observed as under: "it need not be pointed out that initiation of a departmental proceedings per se does not visit the officer concerned with any evil consequences and the framers of the Constitution do not consider it necessary to guarantee even that too holder of civil posts. . . . . . . . At the same time this will not give right to authorities having the same rank as that of the officer against whom proceedings is to be initiated to take a decision whether any such proceedings should be initiated. In absence of a rule any supervisory authority, who can be held to be a controlling authority, can initiate such proceeding. " 6. A view similar to Srinivas Shastri (supra) case has been taken by the Supreme Court in Inspector General of Police and another v. Thavasiappan, 1992 (2) SCC 145 and Director General, E. S. I, and another V. E. Abdul Razak, 1996 (6) JT 502 . 7. In the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court had considered its earlier judgment in Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Defence v. S. Denial etc. , 1995 Suppl. SCC 374, held that the rules applicable in that case do not permit any delegated authority to initiate the departmental proceedings. 8. It is well settled law that the Control ling/supervising authority has a right to in itiate disciplinary proceedings unless the statutory rule provides for the contrary. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not produced the rules applicable in the instant case to show that the said rules do not permit the Controlling/supervising authority to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Thus, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that as the criminal trial may take a long time and if the suspension order is not revoked, it will prejudice the entire future career of the petitioner. 11. In Kusheshwar Dubey v. Mis Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and others, AIR 1988 SC 2118 , it has been held that where a discipli nary proceedings and criminal proceedings are based on the same set of facts, the dis ciplinary proceedings should be stayed. 12. 11. In Kusheshwar Dubey v. Mis Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and others, AIR 1988 SC 2118 , it has been held that where a discipli nary proceedings and criminal proceedings are based on the same set of facts, the dis ciplinary proceedings should be stayed. 12. Similarly in R. P. Kapoor v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787 the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has observed asunder; "the usual practice is that where a public servant is being tried, on a criminal charge, the Government postpone holding a departmental enquiry- and awaits the result of the criminal trial and departmental proceedings follow on the result of the criminal trial. " 13. In Delhi Cloths General Mills Kushan Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 806 , the Apex Court observed as under: "it is true that very often employer stays the inquiries pending the decision of the trial court and that is fair, but we cannot say that principle of natural justice requires that an employer must wait for the decision at least of the criminal trial court before taking action against an employee. . . . . . We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave nature and involves question of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. " 14. However, the law laid down in the aforesaid cases is not applicable in the in stant case. The reason being that in all the aforesaid cases the offence committed by the employees do not relate to their respec tive official duties. 15. The Constitution Bench of the Apex court in R. P. Kapoor (supra) observed as under: "the usual ground for suspension pending a criminal proceeding is that the charge is con nected with his position as a Government servant and is likely to embarrass him in discharge of his duties or involves merely turpitude. In such a case a public servant may be suspended pending inves tigation, enquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge. " 16. In Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1996 (5) J. T. 155, the Supreme Court has explained the meaning of moral turpitude as conduct, which is "inherently base vile depraved or having any connection showing depravity". In such a case a public servant may be suspended pending inves tigation, enquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge. " 16. In Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1996 (5) J. T. 155, the Supreme Court has explained the meaning of moral turpitude as conduct, which is "inherently base vile depraved or having any connection showing depravity". For example the acts which shock merely the conscious of the society in general, a motive which leads to the act which is base one or the act by which the perpetrator would be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who can be looked down upon by the society. 17. The scope of interference by the court or tribunal in a case of suspension was considered by the Supreme Court in U. P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad v. Sanjiv Rajan, 1993 (2) JT 550 , wherein the Supreme Court has held as under: "whether the employees should or should not continue in their office during the period of inquiry is a matter to be assessed by the concerned authority and ordinarily, the court should not in terfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed mala fide and without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employees with the case, before the preliminary report was received, the Director was impressed by the 1st respondent-employees representation. However, after the report, it was noticed that the employee could not be innocent. Since this is the conclusion arrived at by the management on the basis of the material in their possession, no con clusion to the contrary could be drawn by the Court at the interlocutory stage and without going through the entire evidence on record. In the circumstances, there was no justification for the High Court to revoke the order of suspension. 18. This view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. B. K. Mohanty, 1994 (2)JT5l. 19. In the circumstances, there was no justification for the High Court to revoke the order of suspension. 18. This view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. B. K. Mohanty, 1994 (2)JT5l. 19. On the issue of delay in conclusion of the criminal proceedings this Court in Vmai Pal v. State of U. P. and another, 1996 AWC861, has observed as under: "it is well settled that it is always open to the appointing authority to review the suspension order and revoke the same if either the discipli nary proceedings or the criminal case is unusually delayed for no fault of the employee concerned. However, this cannot be a ground to quash the suspension order at the thresh hold. If, in spite of long delay in conclusion of the proceedings, the Government does not accept the prayer of an employee to revoke the suspension order, it is always open to him to approach this Court. " 20. Thus, in view of the facts and cir cumstances of the case there is no scope of interference with the impugned suspension order. Petition is devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed. .