N. L. GANGULY, J. The abovementioned three habeas corpus writ peti tions have been filed challenging the Illegal detention of the pet under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act praying for quashing the detention orders and direction for setting the petitioners at liberty forthwith and also for awarding special compen sation for illegal detention of the petitioners. The writ petitions of Lalji and Ram Samujh were got reported by the Stamp Reporter and presented before the Joint Registrar on 28-2-1996. These two writ petitions wore taken up by the Division Bench on 29-2-1996. The Division Bench directed these petitions to be listed on 11-3-1996. It was observed by the Bench 1 learned A. G. A. shall justify the order vis-a-vis on that date by a count affidavit to be filed by the District Magistrate as also the State Government, who has approved the order of detention. It was made clear that on next date of admission itself if the Government Advocate is not in a potion to defend the order, the position shall be finally disposed c stage of admission itself. 2. The position of Sant Lal Kewat was got reported on 29-2-1996 and presented before the Additional Registrar the same day. The petition was taken up by the Bench on 1-3-1996. It was directed to be listed along with Writ Petition No. 7913 of 1991-Lalji v. Superintendent, District Jail, Gorakhpur and 7914 of 1996-Ram Samujh v. Superintendent, District Jail, Gorakhpur on 11-3-1996. 3. Since the three petition raised common questions of law and facts, they were clubbed together. Counter-affidavit of Sri Rahul Bnatnagar, District Magistrate, Gorakhpur was filed in each of the petitioners, On 22-4-1996 two weeks time was allowed for filing rejoinder-affidavit and it was directed that the petition be listed thereafter for hearing. counter affidavit of Sri Narendra Bahadur Singh, U. D. C. Confidential Section 5, U. P. Civil Secretariate, Lucknow and counter-affidavit or Sri Suresh Nath, Deputy Jailor of District Jail, Gorakhpur have also been filed but no rejoinder-affidavit has been filed to these counter-affidavits. 4. In the counter-affidavit of Sri Rahul Bhatnagar, District Magis trate, Gorakhpur it was stated that the detention order was revoked by the State Government on 28-2-1996 and after receiving the information the petitioners were informed through the jail authorities. 4. In the counter-affidavit of Sri Rahul Bhatnagar, District Magis trate, Gorakhpur it was stated that the detention order was revoked by the State Government on 28-2-1996 and after receiving the information the petitioners were informed through the jail authorities. It was stated that from the aforesaid fact it would be clear that when the time was allowed for filing counter-affidavit the detention order had already been revoked and on this ground the petition for habeas corpus is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed as infructutous. There is no rejoinder-affidavit to the counter-affidavit filed by the District Magistrate. 5. Sri A. K. Tripathi, A. G. A. raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the writ of habeas corpus and submitted that the detention order under the Act had been revoked on 28-2-1996, the date on which the first two writ petitions were filed before the Joint Registrar. Ho relied on the case reported In AIR 1974 SC 2287 -Mohit Chandra Sah v. District Magistrate 24, Pargana, Calcutta. He pointed and that the Apex Court said in the said petition that the petitioner since had been released and the questions raised on his behalf have become academic, the petition also had become infructuous that in the said situation no useful purpose would be served by answering the points which had become academic and the writ petition was dismissed having become infructuous. 6. Sri Daya Shanker Miwa, learned counsel for the petitioner in all the three petitions, vehemently opposed the preliminary objection and sub mitted that the detention order itself was patently illegal, unwarranted and passed mala fide without application of mind in a mechanical fashion. He argued that the respondents No. 2 and 3 have failed to consider and apply their mind in passing the order of detention contravening the provisions, its purport, aims and object contemplated under Sections 3 (4) and 3 (5) of the Act. He further submitted that the detaining authority mechanically and arbitrarily passed the order of detention, which was an abuse of the autho rity vested in respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and which has violated the provisions of Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 (3) of the Constitution and Sections 3 (2), 3 (3), 3 (4), 3 (5), 8, 10, 12 and 14 of the Act. 2 and 3 and which has violated the provisions of Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 (3) of the Constitution and Sections 3 (2), 3 (3), 3 (4), 3 (5), 8, 10, 12 and 14 of the Act. He also argued that the orders impugned resulted in illegal detention of the petitioners violating the funda mental rights of the petitioner of liberty. He further submitted that it ii not very relevant that on the date of hearing of the writ petitions if the detention orders were cancelled, that would not render the writ petitioner infructuous and the petitioners shall be entitled to payment of compensation and damages for the illegal detention of the petitioners under the impugned order. He submitted that the decision reported in AIR 1974 SC 2278 (supra) relied on by the learned A. G. S. is not applicable to the fact and circumstances of the present case. He submitted a number of decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in which special compensation was awarded for illegal detention. We shall refer to the said decisions at a later stage. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed the detention order, Annexurc-1, dated 17-1-1996 and the grounds of detention, copy of which is Annoxure-2. He submitted that the detention order was passed to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supply and services essential to the community it was necessary so to do for making an order under Section 3 (2) of the Act against the petitioner. He referred to the grounds of detention, which are, in brief, as under; 8. Firstly on 24-5-1994-wrongly typed as 1995, the petitioner com mitted an offence in Cage Crime No. 262 of 1994 under Section 307/504, IPC and Section 3 (1) of the SC/st Act in which charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner and others on 24-8-1994. The second ground is in respect of Case Crime No. 184/95 under Section 120-B, IPC for an occurrence dated 16-2-1995 district Ballia in which charge-sheet was submitted on 4-3-1995. The third ground is the involvement of the petitioner in Case Crime NOB, 155 and 156 under Section 305 of the Arms Act and Section 41/411, IPC. The charge-Sheet in the said case was submitted on 7-7-1995 district Gorakhpur. The third ground is the involvement of the petitioner in Case Crime NOB, 155 and 156 under Section 305 of the Arms Act and Section 41/411, IPC. The charge-Sheet in the said case was submitted on 7-7-1995 district Gorakhpur. The fourth ground is in respect of Case Crime No. 55 of 1993 under Section 392/411, IPC, P. S. Alupur, district Faizabad in which charge-sheet was submitted on 13-10-1995. The fifth ground is arising out of Case Crime No. 782 of 1995 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 506 and 427, IPC and Section 3 (2) (v) of the SC/st Act in which charge- sheet was submitted on 23-12-1995. All those cases are said to be pending trial. The concluding paragraph of the grounds of detention shows that the District Magistrate mentioned that he was satisfied from the facts and grounds that with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of law and public order it was consi dered necessary to pass the order under Section 3 (2) of the Act against the petitioner. Sri Misra specifically placed ground No. 5, which is reproduced in Roman as under: "5. Dinank 8-12-1993 ko Sri Om Prakash Paswan Putra Rajaram Paswan Bhutpurva Vidhayak, Vidhan Sabha Khhetra Maniram janpad Gorakhpur ne thana Shahpur, Gorakhpur likhit suchana diya kl din main karib 12 baje ve apne party ke sahyogi Bhutpurva Vidhayak Sri Virtndra Pratap Shahi va apne karyakartaon ke sath Maruti Car va Tata Mobile Vahan se apng niwas se Parly Karyalaya Tamkuhi Kothi shahr Gorakhpur Ja rahe thai ki Mohalla Basaratpui main Nehru Yuva Kendra ka pas Gorakhpur se Medical College takjarte wall mukhya marg par abhlyukt Lalji Yadav urf Laddu Yadav, 2. Rakesh Yadav, 3. Brahma Yadav, 4. Tej Bahadur Yadav, 5. Sant Lal Kewat, 6. Ram-Samujh Kewat urf Dhurdas, 1. Shripat Dhadhi ne ek rai hokar Katta va Bam va Revolver sejan se marne ki niyat se andhadhund fire va prahar karne I age jisse avagaman avrudh ho gay a. Dukane band ho gain lok idhar udhar bhagne lage, Lok vyatastha lunj-punj hogai. Is ghatna kram main vadi Bhutpurva Vidhayak sahit kul Nau log buri tar ah ghapal ho gay iatha dono Vahan hurt tarah kshatigrast ho gai. Is suchnapar AP. SAN. Is ghatna kram main vadi Bhutpurva Vidhayak sahit kul Nau log buri tar ah ghapal ho gay iatha dono Vahan hurt tarah kshatigrast ho gai. Is suchnapar AP. SAN. 782/95 Dhara 147/148/149/307/323/506/427, Bhartiya Dand Vidhan va Dhara 3 (2) (5) Anusuchit Jatijanusuchhit Jan Jati Atyachar Niwaram Adhiniyam, 19s9 Panjikaran hua va vivechan uprant uprokt sabhi abhiyukt gan ke virudh arop Patra Sankhya 349 Dinank 23-12-1985 ko preshat kiya gayajo vicharddhin Niyayalaya hai. " The facts of the other petitions are similar. He placed Annexure 3, copy of the order dated 17-l-199r- passed by the District Magistrate, which was served on the petitioner through jail authorities. The order shows that in the last two paras it was stated that bail application on behalf of the petitioner was pending before the court and there was every likelihood that he may be granted bail, as such the detaining authority was satisfied that in case the petitioner is released on bail, there is every likelihood that ho shall continue in his activities again, which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essenttal to the community. 9 Sri D. S. Misra also pointed out from Annexure-3 that it was stated in the said order that the petitioner shall have a right to make a representation before the State Government. If he so desires, ho may move the representation through the Jail Superintendent before the Home Secre tary of the State Government at an early date. He was also informed that a reference under Section 10 of the Act was to be made within three week from the date of receipt of the information. If no representation is submitted within the prescribed period it shall not be considered by the Advisory Board. Ho was also informed that in case the petitioner wanted to appear for personal hearing as provided under Section 11 (2) of the Act, he may specifically make a request in the representation. Sri Misra pointed out that it was not mentioned in the order and grounds that the petitioner has the right to make a representation before the Central Government also. On this ground also the detention order is rendered illegal. 10. There is no controversy about the service of the detention order dated 17-1-1996 through the jail authorities on 17-1-1996 along with the grounds of detention when the petitioner was confined in jail. On this ground also the detention order is rendered illegal. 10. There is no controversy about the service of the detention order dated 17-1-1996 through the jail authorities on 17-1-1996 along with the grounds of detention when the petitioner was confined in jail. The report of the Station Officer Incharge of the police station, Shahpur, district Gorakhpur is Annexure- 4 to the writ petition in which the S. H. O. of P. S. Shahpur after giving the details of the criminal cases against the petitioner in the concluding paragraph of the grounds of detention referred to that it was likelihood that the petitioner would be released on bail along with co-accused and in such circumstances it was apprehended that the petitioner shall again indulge la creating the atmosphere of terror and the law order situation was likely to be paralysed and the life of the citizens was also likely to be disturbed and shall affect the maintenance of law and public order. 11. Sri Misra submitted that the order of detention was passed under Section 3 (2) of the Act specifically to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community and it was necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. He placed on the explanation to sub-sec tion (2) of Section 3 of the Act, which reads as under: "explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community does not include "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodi ties essential to the community" as defined in the explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commo dities Act, 1980 (7 of 1980) and accordingly, no order of detention may be made under that Act. " 12. Sri Misra submitted that for passing an order for detention in respect of maintenance of supplies und services essential to the community the explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (7 of 1980), was a condition precedent. " 12. Sri Misra submitted that for passing an order for detention in respect of maintenance of supplies und services essential to the community the explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (7 of 1980), was a condition precedent. The explanation of Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Black marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 is quoted as under: "explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community" means- (a) committing or instigating any person to commit any offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), or under any other law for the time being in force relating to the control of the production, supply or distribution of, or trade and commerce in, any commodity essential to the community"; or (b) dealing in any commodity- (i) which is an essential commodity as defined in the Essen tial Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955); or (ii) with respect to which provisions have been made in any such other law as is referred to in clause (), with a view to making gain in any manner which may directly or indirectly defeat or tend to defeat the provisions of that Act Or other law aforesaid. " 13. It is argued that it by no stretch of imagination or any reasonable interpretation of the explanation to sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act read with explanation of the Act No. 7 of 1980 justifies the passing of the detention order against the petitioner. 14. " 13. It is argued that it by no stretch of imagination or any reasonable interpretation of the explanation to sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act read with explanation of the Act No. 7 of 1980 justifies the passing of the detention order against the petitioner. 14. Since the order of detention was revoked by the State Government on 28-2-1996, the date on which the first two writ petitions were got reported and presented before the Joint Registrar and on 29-2-1990 the Division Bench directed the Government Advocate to file counter-affidavit and the petition be disposed of finally at the admission stage itself, the question of validity of the detention order and whether a writ of habeas corpus be issued directing the release of the petitioner on the date of hearing of the petition for final disposal no longer is necessary and no order on the correctness and legality of the detention order is required to be adjudi cated and on that ground the petition becomes infructuous It is no longer necessary to examine the writ petition for decision about the legality of the detention order passed against the petitioner. It would be academic and no useful purpose is likely to be served as held in AIR 1974 SC 2278 (supra ). Sri D. S. Misra submitted that the petition may, so far the decision on the question of legality of the detention order is concerned, not require a decision but the entire writ petition would not become infructuous on the ground that the petitioner was directed to be detained by the impugned order wholly by an illegal order, which was passed by the District Magistrate in violation of the provisions of Articles 14, 19, 21, 22 (5) and Sections 3 (2), 3 (4), 3 (5), 8, 12 and 13 of the Act. The order was passed to harass and punish the petitioner mechanically like a rubber stamp without appli cation of mind by the detaining authority. The petitioner in paragraphs 20, 21, 22 and 23 narrated that on account of political rivalary ill-will and malice the action was taken in collusion with and under political pressure of Ex-M. L. A. Sri Virendra Pratap Shah and Om Prakash Paswan. Om Prakash Paswan had previously been detained under the Act and also under the Gangsters Act. The petitioner in paragraphs 20, 21, 22 and 23 narrated that on account of political rivalary ill-will and malice the action was taken in collusion with and under political pressure of Ex-M. L. A. Sri Virendra Pratap Shah and Om Prakash Paswan. Om Prakash Paswan had previously been detained under the Act and also under the Gangsters Act. Sri Virendra Pratap Shah is also involved in a dozens of criminal cases and both are considered to be terror in the Eastern Region of the State. 15. The question that survives for our decision is whether the peti tioners are entitled for examplary compensation to be recovered from the State and specifically from the District Magistrate, who passed the detention orders against the petitioners. 16. Sri D. S. Misra cited a number of case laws to support his argument that the petitioners fundamental right was violated and the petitioners thus became entitied to be paid monetary compensation. He cited firstly the case reported in AIR 1986 SC 494 -Bhim Singh, MLA. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and referred to the last paragraph of the judgment wherein the Apex Court was pleased to observe: "when a person comes to us with the complaint that he has been Arrested and imprisoned ,with mischievous or malicious intent and that his constitutional and legal rights were invaded, the mischief or malice and the invasion may not be washed away or wished away by his being set free. In appropriate cases we have the jurisdiction to compensate the victim by awarding suitable monetary compensation. " The Apex Court while mailing the observation quoted above stated that: "we have the right to award monetary compensation by way of exemplary costs or otherwise is now established by the decision of this Court in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SO 1086 and Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SG 1026. " 17. Sri Misra also placed the case reported in AIR 1983 SC 1996- Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar. We would like fo examine the brief facts of Bhim Singhs case (supra) and Rahul Sahs case (supra ). " 17. Sri Misra also placed the case reported in AIR 1983 SC 1996- Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar. We would like fo examine the brief facts of Bhim Singhs case (supra) and Rahul Sahs case (supra ). In Bhim Singhs case (supra), Bhim Singh, an M. L. A. , was arrested while enroute to sit in Assembly and in consequence, the member was deprived of his constitutional rights to attend the Assembly Session and responsibility for arrest lay with higher echelons of the Government. The Supreme Court was pleased to observe that there was no doubt that the constitutional rights of Sri Bhim Singh were violated with impunity. In Rudul Sahs case (supra) the petitioner was detained illegally in the prison for over 14 years after his acquittal in a full dressed trial. The Apex Court in paragraph 9 of the judgment observed that it is true that Article 32 cannot be used as a substi tute for the enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced efficaciously through the ordinary processes of Courts, Civil and Criminal. A money claim has therefore to be agitated in and adjudicated upon in a suit instituted in a court of lowest grade competent to try it. The Apox Court further observed that: "but the important question for our consideration is whether in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32, this Court can pass an order for the payment of money if such an order is in the nature of compensation consequential upon the deprivation of a fundamental right. The instant case is illustrative of such cases. The petitioner was detained illegally in the prison for over fourteen years after his acquittal in a full dressed trial. " 18. The Supreme Court took into consideration that great harm done to the petitioner by the Government of Bihar and held that the State must pay, as an interim measure, to the petitioner a further sum of KS. 30,000 in addition to the sum of Rs. 5,000 already paid. 19. In 19991 SCC (Cr) 656-State of Maharashtra v. Ravikant S. Patil, Ravikant S. Patil was arrested in Karnataka State and was brought to Sholapur in early hours of August, 1989. 30,000 in addition to the sum of Rs. 5,000 already paid. 19. In 19991 SCC (Cr) 656-State of Maharashtra v. Ravikant S. Patil, Ravikant S. Patil was arrested in Karnataka State and was brought to Sholapur in early hours of August, 1989. In news item of local paper it was stated that the under trial prisoner (Ravikant S. Patil) would be taken in a procession or a party from Faujdat Chavadi Police Station through the main squares of the city for the purposes of investigation. On August 17,1989 he was handcuffed and both his arms were tied by a rope and he was taken through the street and the same is not in dispute. The Supreme Court reiterated the principle of law laid down in Sunil Gupta and Sunil Batras cases, 1990 SCC (Cr) 440 and 1988 SCC (Cr) 815 respectively and held that handcuffing is an act against all norms of decency and amounts to violation of principle underlying Article 21. The High Court in the said case awarded compensation of Rs. 10,000. The Supreme Court declained to interfere with the judgment of the High Court of Bombay. 20. In 1994 SCC (Cr) JW-R. S. Sodhi, Advocase Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. State of U. P. , the Supreme Court on a public interest litigation awarded interim compensation to be paid to the legal representa tives and other persons, who were victim of killing of innocent people by police encounter at Pilibhit. This judgment is not relevant for the present writ petitions. 21. In 1994 SCC (Cr) 1464-Death of Sawinder Singh Graver, the Supreme Court was pleased to award by way of interim measures ex gratia payment of Rs. 2,00,000 to be paid by the Union of India/director of Enforcement to the widow of deceased Sawinder Singh. It was said that in the event of a suit being filed for compensation, appropriate compensation may be determined in accordance with law after hearing the parties. The facts and circumstances of this case also are not very relevant and material for the present writ petitions. 22. Sri A. K. Tripathi, A. G. A. submitted that the detention order was revoked by the order dated 28-1- 1996 and the same was communicated through the jail authorities on 28-2-1996 to the petitioners. On the date, the writ petition was filed there was no order of detention under the Act against the petitioners. 22. Sri A. K. Tripathi, A. G. A. submitted that the detention order was revoked by the order dated 28-1- 1996 and the same was communicated through the jail authorities on 28-2-1996 to the petitioners. On the date, the writ petition was filed there was no order of detention under the Act against the petitioners. He submitted that the District Magistrate in his preliminary order dated 17-1-1996 has stated that he was satisfied from the report and note of the Senior Superintendent of Police dated 16-1- 1996 that the petitioners were detained in District Jail, Gorakhpur in Case Crime No. 782 of 1995, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 332, 427 and 3 (2) (5), SC/st Act. It was stated in the order that there was likelihood in the near future for the release of the petitioners on bail and in that circumstances it will be prejudicial for the public at large and law and order situation was likely to be seriously affected. The learned A. G. A. submitted that it is correct that in Annexure it was stated that the act and conduct of the peti tioner was such that in view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. In the counter-affidavit of Sri Narendra Bahadur Singh, U. D. A. of the Confidential Section-5, Civil Secretriat in para 6 it was stated that due to clerical flaw in the detention order and in the grounds of detention it has not been mentioned that the detention order was passed to prevent the petitioner from indulging in activities disruptive of public order but from the perusal of grounds of the detention and other annexures it was found that the detention order was rightly passed to prevent the activities of the petitioner prejudicial to maintenance of public peace and tranquility and as such the order was approved by the State Government, as required under Section 3 (4) of the Act. 23 Sri Rahul Bhatnagar, the then District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, stated that the petitioner was in jail since 11-12-1995 in Case Crime No. 782 of 1995 and the detention order was passed when the bad application of the petitioner was pending. 23 Sri Rahul Bhatnagar, the then District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, stated that the petitioner was in jail since 11-12-1995 in Case Crime No. 782 of 1995 and the detention order was passed when the bad application of the petitioner was pending. However, the bail application was rejected later on by the District and Sessions Judge, as such the petitioners continued to be in jail and the detention order has been revoked by the State Government, as already mentioned. 24 We have already discussed the facts and circumstances in the earlier part of the judgment that the ground for passing of the detention order was that the authorities concerned were satisfied with respect to the petitioners concerned that with a view to preventing the petitioners from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. It was necessary to do so, make an order that such person be detained. We have no doubt that there was no question of preventing the petitioners from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the com munity. This observation in the detention order was patently wrong and the State Government was fully justified in setting aside the detention order Annexure-1. As already mentioned, it is not only the setting aside and quashing of the order that the detenu would become entitled for receiving exemplary compensation. The submission of Sri D. S. Misra, is that the order passed by the District Magistrate was patently wrong and this Court may award exemplary compensation recoverable from the District Magis trate, who passed the order of detention. The learned A. G. A. submitted that the present writ petitions have become infructuous and the facts and circumstances do not show that the order impugned was passed mala fide or with any intention to harass the petitioners. The learned A. G. A. placed Section 16 of the Act, which provides the protection of action taken in good faith. No suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against the Central Government or a State Government and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person, for anything in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act. The learned A. G. A. placed a passage from the judgment reported in AIR 1981 SC 179 at pp. The learned A. G. A. placed a passage from the judgment reported in AIR 1981 SC 179 at pp. 180,181- Shibban Lal Saksena v. State of Uttar Pradesh: "the petitioner was arrested on the 5th of January, 1953, under an order, signed by the District Magistrate of Gorakhpuf and the order expressly directed detention of the petitioner in the custody of the Superintendent, District Jail, Gorakhpur, under sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of De tention Act, 1950, as amended by later Acts. On the 7th of January following, the grounds of detention were communicated to the detenu in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the Prevention of Detention Act and the grounds, it appears, were of twofold character, falling respectively under the two categories contemplated by sub-clause (ii) and sub-clause (iii) of Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act. In the first paragraph of the com munication it is stated that the detenu in course of speeches delivered at Ghugli on certain dates exhorted and enjoined upon the cane growers of that area not to supply sugarcane to the sugar mills or even to withhold supplies from them and thereby interfered with the maintenance of supply of sugarcane essential to the community. The other ground specified in paragraph 2 is to the effect that by using expressions, some of which were quoted underneath the paragraph, the petitioner in cited the cane-growers and the public to violence against established authority and to defiance of lawful orders and directions issued by Government officers and thereby seriously prejudiced the maintenance of public order. . . . . . . . The sufficiency of the grounds upon which such satisfaction purports to be based, provided they have a rational probative value and are not extraneous to the scope of purpose of the legislative provision, cannot be challenged in a court of law except on the ground of mala fides. A court of law is not even competent to enquire into the truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned as grounds of detention in the communication to the detenu under Section 7 of the Act. " 25. A court of law is not even competent to enquire into the truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned as grounds of detention in the communication to the detenu under Section 7 of the Act. " 25. The learned A. G. A. relied on paragraph 12 of the decision reported in 1987 All LJ 489-Lallan Singh v. Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, U, P. , Lucknow, where the Division Bench observed that: "we would, however, mention that the claim for damages for wrongful detention under the National Security Act is not maintainable in view of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Kamlakar Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1983)4 SCC 445. " 26. We have heard Sri D. S. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioners, at length and carefully examined the case law cited by him and also consi dered the arguments of Sri A. K. Tripathi, A. Q. A. In our opinion it is not all the detention orders under the Act when set aside or vacated the detenu could become entitled for exemplary compensation or damages to be paid by the State Government or the officer concerned passing the impugned order. It has to be shown positively by the petitioner to claim to be awarded compensation for the illegal detention and violation of the funda mental rights that the act or omission of the State Government or its officer was mala fide, gross negligence, or gross misconduct on the part of the authority concerned passing the impugned order of detention. In the present case the petitioners have not impleaded the District Magistrate by name nor made any allegation against the District Magistrate personally levelling allegations or charges of mala fide, animosity or any such fact which may be said that the detaining authority was acting out of ill-will or malice against the petitioners. It is true that the detaining authority while passing the impugned order Annexure-1 had not correctly appreciated the facts and instead of saying in the order that with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order erroneously stated that it was for preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services to the community and it is necessary so to do. . . . . . . . . . . We have carefully perused the preliminary order, Annexure-2 where the incident of 9-5-1994 and 6 12-1995 have been mentioned in detail which shows that in the incident of 9-5-1994 the informant of the said case was going from his house to the court on a moped two persons on Hero Honda Motorcycle stopped him on the road, who snatched his bag. Those persons were armed with country-made pistol, who escaped with the bag containing Rs. 84,000 and general stamp papers worth Rs. 2,00,000 and other necessary papers. On account of the aforesaid act charge-sheet was submitted. The public order was disturbed seriously and people of the city became terrorised on account of the criminal Act. Similarly in the incident on 6-12-1995 when an Ex- M. L. A. Sri Om Prakash Paswan with his party colleagues and Ex.-M. L. A. Sri Virendra Pratap Shahi was going on his Maruti Car one Tata Mobile Vehicle, the accused including the petitioners started firing with country-made pistols and hurled bombs. The movement of the traffic stopped, people started running helter-skelter and law and order situation was disturbed seriously. Nine persons including Ex.-M. L. A. had received injuries and their vehicle had been seriously damaged. These were the facts and circumstances which consti tuted sufficient ground for passing an order to prevent die petitioners from disturbing the law and order situation. A wrong ordar was passed and perhaps on this ground alone the State Government was pleased to revoke the order of detention passed against the petitioners. 27. The learned counsel for the petitioners has nowhere mentioned in the writ petition that the petitioners were granted bail on the date when the detention order was passed or they were granted bail after the passing of the detention order but they had to remain detained on account of the illegal detention order Annexure 1 passed by the detaining authority. It is not disputed that the bail application moved on behalf of the petitioners had been rejected. 28. After careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case we are not satisfied that the petitioners have made out any case for awarding compensation to them on account of the detention order passed against the petitioners by the detaining authority. The case laws cited by Sri D. S. Misra are of no assistance for the present writ petitions. After careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case we are not satisfied that the petitioners have made out any case for awarding compensation to them on account of the detention order passed against the petitioners by the detaining authority. The case laws cited by Sri D. S. Misra are of no assistance for the present writ petitions. None of the petitioners could make out a case for awarding compensation as argued by Sri D. S. Misra. 29. All three petitions have become infructuous and are dismissed as infructuous. The prayer for awarding compensation for the illegal deten tion order passed against the petitioners is misconceived. No compensation can be granted to the petitioners in view of the facts and circumstances discussed above. 30. The writ petitions are dismissed with. Costs. Petition dismissed. .