D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. This appeal, with the consent of the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent, is being finally disposed of at the admission stage. 2. Learned counsel for the parties agreed that there is no necessity to summon the record of lower court. 3. The appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 28th April, 1995 of Sri R. P. Pandey, District Judge, Jhansi, reversing the judg ment and decree of the trial Court passed on 23rd August, 1994. 4. The brief facts essential for disposal of this appeal are that the appellant was employed in the Central Bank of India, as an Officer. There was allegation against him that he had embezzled rupees two lacs between 13-3 19/8 to 24-6-1984. When the matter was detected, the appellant con fessed the alleged embezzlement and deposited a sum of Rs. 1,30,000 with the Bank and further assured to deposit another sum which is found to have been embezzled. Departmental proceedings were initiated against the appellant. Enquiry Officer was appointed, who was other than the Disci plinary Authority. The enquiry officer framed charges, served the same upon the appellant. Dates for enquiry were given. The appellant appear ed only on one date through his representative, but on subsequent dates he did not appear. Notices of all the dates of hearing were given to the ap pellant. Since the appellant failed to appear in spite of due intimation of dates given by the enquiry officer, the enquiry proceeded ex pane. Report of enquiry officer was submitted against the appellant. It was considered by the disciplinary authority, who agreed with the finding of the enquiry officer. Ultimately dismissal order was passed by the disciplinary autho rity against the appellant. The copy of enquiry report was also sent to the appellant along with the order of dismissal. The appellant filed appeal against the order of dismissal known as departmental Appeal, which also failed. Thereafter he filed a suit challenging the order of dismissal on various grounds. Ultimately dismissal order was passed by the disciplinary autho rity against the appellant. The copy of enquiry report was also sent to the appellant along with the order of dismissal. The appellant filed appeal against the order of dismissal known as departmental Appeal, which also failed. Thereafter he filed a suit challenging the order of dismissal on various grounds. The first ground was that he was not afforded reasonable opportunity of hearing ; that the copy of the report of the enquiry officer was not supplied to him before the order of dismissal was passed against h-;m ; that his reply against the charge-sheet was not considered by the disciplinary authority ; that the orders of Disciplinary Authority and the appellate authority are non- speeding orders hence bad in law. 5. The suit was resisted by the respondent denying the above allega tions. It was pleaded that the embezzlement of more than rupees two lacs by the appellant was detected, between the period 13-3- 1978 to 24-6-1984. Departmental proceeding was conducted. Sri A. P. Arora was appointed enquiry officer by the Disciplinary Authority. The appellant did not appear before the enquiry officer and did not participate in the enquiry on any date despite several opportunities were given to him. The enquiry was, there fore, concluded ex parte and on the basis of the enquiry report the order of dismissal was passed. The appellant himself made confession that he had fraudulently withdrawn a sum of Rs. 1,30,000 by debiting different P and L Accounts such as interest on M. M. D. C. etc. and deposited Rs. 1,30,000 in the Bank towards part of the adjustment of the embezzled amount withdrawn by him by making fraudulent entries and the appellant had further assured the bank in the same letter that if any other entry comes to light and the amount is found to have been unauthorisedly withdrawn by him, he will make good the loss caused to deposited a sum of Rs. 1,30,000 in the bank, hence dismissal order is perfectly valid. 6. The trial Court decreed the suit, but the appellate court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court hence this second appeal. 7. The first legal question argued by the learned counsel for the appel lant was that reasonable opportunity of hearing was not given to the appellant. 1,30,000 in the bank, hence dismissal order is perfectly valid. 6. The trial Court decreed the suit, but the appellate court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court hence this second appeal. 7. The first legal question argued by the learned counsel for the appel lant was that reasonable opportunity of hearing was not given to the appellant. On this plea, the finding of the appellate court is that adequate opportunity of hearing was given to the appellant by the enquiry officer. This finding its based upon the evidence on record and admission of the appellant in the trial court. The appellant admitted that the enquiry conti nued between 1-9-1986 to 21-2-1987 and further admitted that the enquiry officer had given him information about the date of first hearing also sub- , sequent hearings on 1-9-1986, 10-11-1986, 2. 5-11-U86, 13-12-1986 and 19th to 22nd December, 1986, 12-1-1987, 30-1- 1987, 16-2-1987 and 21-2-1987. Like wise he admitted that he did not appear on any of the dates given to him by the enquiry officer. His justification has been that because parable criminal case was also pending, he appeared in the criminal courts on those dates. This plea was rightly repelled by the lower appellate court because copy of the order-sheet of criminal cases was not filed by the appellant. Unless copy of order-sheet of criminal cases was filed, it could not be said that on so many dates criminal courts also fixed the same date which was given by the enquiry officer. Consequently this finding of fact does not suffer from any perversity or illegality. From the own admission of the appellant that he was intimated (sic) by the enquiry Officer of various dates of hearing. He appeared through his representative only on the first date and his non appearance on the subsequent dates does not appear to be justified. As such the appellant cannot be permitted to say that he was not afforded adequate opportunity of hearing. 8. In Bank of India v. Apurba Kumar Saha, (1994) 2 SCC 615 , it was held that where the delinquent official refused to participate in the enquiry without any valid reason, his plea, at a late stage, about violation of prin ciple of natural justice cannot be accepted. 9. Besides this, the enquiry officer, on the basis of Exh. 8. In Bank of India v. Apurba Kumar Saha, (1994) 2 SCC 615 , it was held that where the delinquent official refused to participate in the enquiry without any valid reason, his plea, at a late stage, about violation of prin ciple of natural justice cannot be accepted. 9. Besides this, the enquiry officer, on the basis of Exh. 5 found that the appellant made admission about embezzlement and deposited of a sum of Rs. 1,30,000 and further promised to deposit, if any subsequent amount is found to have been embezzled. The explanation of the appellant that he did so under some letter of the bank does not appear to be convincing. That letter has not been filed nor the appellant was so innocent who could have deposited a sum of Rs. 1,3,000 from his own pocket without any valid reason. In view of this admission of the appellant also no further oppor tunity of hearing was needed nor it can be said that there was violation of principles of natural justice. The case of Controller of Examinations v. G. S. Sunder, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 82 can be referred on the point. I, there fore, do not find any force in the contention that principles of natural justice were violated by the enquiry officer or that adequate and reasonable opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the appellant by the enquiry officer of rules of natural justice. Learned counsel for the appellant con tended that the enquiry report should have been furnished to the appellant before the impugned orders were passed and on this point emphasis was laid on the pronouncement in Managing Director, Ecil. Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, (supra ). The learned District Judge has observed that because the copy of the enquiry report was enclosed with the order of dismissal, it was sufficient compliance of law. This observation does not seem to be correct in view of the pronouncement in Managing Director, Ecil, Hyderabad v. Karunakar (supra ). What has been laid down in this case is that if the disciplinary authority is other than the enquiry officer then the disciplinary authority was to provide copy of the report of enquiry officer to the charg ed official/officer before he made up his mind and took decision on the guilt of the delinquent. This was obviously not done in the instant case. 10. This was obviously not done in the instant case. 10. However, the next question is whether this non-compliance has Rendered the impugned orders invalid. For this certain dates have to be kept in mind. The order of dismissal was passed on 16th July, 1987 and the appeal against this dismissal order on the departmental side was dismis sed on 21st September, 1987. Intimation of both these orders were given to the appellant. Since the dismissal order was passed on 16th July, 1987,. it has to be seen whether on these facts copy of enquiry report was to be served upon the appellant before the Disciplinary Authority took decision regarding the guilt of the appellant. In Managing Director, Ecil, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar the pronouncement in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991)1 SCC 588 was affirmed. It is in Mohd. Ramzan Khans case that it was laid down on 20th November, 1990 that copy of enquiry report should be served upon the officer charged before the Disciplinary Authority taken up a decision regarding the guilt of the officer charged. 11. In Compandant, Central Industrial, Security Force v. Bhopal Singh, (1993) 4 SCC 785 it was laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khans case on Novem ber 20, 1990 will operate prospectively. It was, therefore, clear that on 16th July, 1987 when the impugned dismissal order was passed the verdict of Mohd, Ramzan Khans case was not available and since it was prospective with effect from 20th November, 1990 and not retrospective, no illegality was committed in passing the impugned order of dismissal. 12. In Managing Director, Ecil, Hyderabad v, B. Karunakar (supra) the effect of 42nd Amendment of the Constitution of India was considered and it was laid down that this ruling, however, is not to be understood as reviving the pre-42nd Amendment position of hearing before disciplinary authority either on the proof of the charge or on the imposition of the penalty. The second opportunity of hearing was not affirmed in this case. The only thing laid down was that only copy of enquiry report is to be supplied to the delinquent before decision is taken by the disciplinary authority. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that even under relevant rules of the Bank, the appellant was entitled to a copy of enquiry report. 14. The learned District Judge has rightly held that the provisions of Rule 8. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that even under relevant rules of the Bank, the appellant was entitled to a copy of enquiry report. 14. The learned District Judge has rightly held that the provisions of Rule 8. 8 of the Rules of Disciplinary Action procedure have not been violated inasmuch this rule applies to award staff, who are governed by Industrial Disputes Act. The appellant is an officer in the bank and he is governed by the Central Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. These regulations do not apply to the award staff, which is evident from Regulation No. 2. The appellant being an officer employee of the Central Bank of India, he is governed by the Regulation of 1976 and there is nothing if this regulation, which may provide that a show, cause notice should be given to the officer-employee before awarding punish ment against him. Consequently the statutory provisions, namely, Regula tions of 1976 also do not help the appellant. 15. The violation of Regulation 9 of the aforesaid regulation was rightly repelled by the learned District Judge inasmuch as the copy of enquiry report was annexed with the order of dismissal. The learned District Judge has rightly observed that the appellant did not state in the trial that the appellant did not state in the trial that the report of the enquiry officer was not given to him along with the" order of dismissal. The order of dismissal dated 16th July, 1937 was perused by the learned District Judge. He made special reference of paragraph 3 of missal order in which it was clearly mentioned that the copy of the findings of the enquiry officer was enclosed therewith. 16. For the reasons given above, I do not find that the impugned order of dismissal, which was affirmed in the appellate order suffers from any illegality. 17. No other point was pressed in this appeal. The appeal is, there fore, devoid of merit and deserves dismissal. 18. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .