S. K. DUBEY, J. ( 1 ) THE aforesaid four civil revisions under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Code) have come up for hearing before as because of the disagreement of S. S. Jha. J. , with the view taken in Civil Revision No. 111/95 (Ayodhya Prasad v. Idandas), dated 12-12-1995, by N. P. Singh, J. , who referred the cases before the Hon'ble Chief Justice to constitute a Division Bench for consideration of the following questions" (A) Whether revision challenging the order in civil revision by the Court subordinate to High Court is maintainable before the High Court? (h) Whether the Judgment of Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, AIR 1980 SC 892 , is applicable to the revision filed after Code of Civil Procedure (M. P. Amendment) Act, 1994 came into force?" ( 2 ) WE have heard Shri R. P. Pandey, Shri Ravish Agarwal, Shri A. K. Khaskalam, Shri H. B. Agarwal and Shri A. K. Choubey for the Revision-Petitioners, Shri R. P. Agarwal, Additional Advocate General for the State, Shri R. K. Pandey. Shri R. P. Jain and Shri Rakesh Jain for the Respondents. ( 3 ) THE Code was amended from 1-2-1977 by Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (104 of 1976): wherein by S. 43 of the Amendment Act, the original S. 115 was re-numbered as sub-sec. (1) thereof to which a proviso was added and sub-sec. (2) was inserted after re-numbered sub-sec. (1 ). The amended S. 115 reads thus :"115. Revision. ( 1 ) The High Court may call for the record of any case, which has been decided by any Court Subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto. (1) thereof to which a proviso was added and sub-sec. (2) was inserted after re-numbered sub-sec. (1 ). The amended S. 115 reads thus :"115. Revision. ( 1 ) The High Court may call for the record of any case, which has been decided by any Court Subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto. and if such Subordinate Court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity,the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit :provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court Subordinate thereto. Explanation.- In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings. " ( 4 ) AFTER the amendment in the Code by Central Amendment Act, 1976, by the Code of Civil Procedure (M. P. Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 29 of 1984), published in Rajpatra, dated 14-8-1984, the Code was amended, in its application to the State of M. P. , whereby the revisional jurisdiction of High Court under S. 115 of the Code in cases arising out of original suit or other proceedings of the value Rs. 20,000/- or above was left intact and revisional power in other cases was conferred on the District Judge. Section 115 in its application in the State of M. P. was substituted which reads thus :"115. 20,000/- or above was left intact and revisional power in other cases was conferred on the District Judge. Section 115 in its application in the State of M. P. was substituted which reads thus :"115. Revision.- The High Court in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value twenty thousand rupees and above, and the District Judge in any other case may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court Subordinate to such High Court or District Judge, as the case may be, and in which no appeal liesthereto, and if such subordinate court appesrs - (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity;the High Court or the District Judge, as the case may be, make such order in the case as it thinks fit :provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation, decided by the District Judge, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section :provided further that the High Court or the District Judge shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order including an order deciding an issue, made in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where, (i) the order, if so varied or reversed, would finally dispose of the suit or other proceeding; (ii) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. Explanation.- In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding. " ( 5 ) THE intention behind the bifurcation by Amending Act, 1984 of the jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 115 was to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court. However, even after conferral of revisional jurisdiction on District Court, the backlog of High Court did not reduce for the reason that the petitions were being filed in the High Court against the orders of District Judges by taking advantage under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. However, even after conferral of revisional jurisdiction on District Court, the backlog of High Court did not reduce for the reason that the petitions were being filed in the High Court against the orders of District Judges by taking advantage under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. As a result of this state of affairs, the object of earlier amendment could not be served, therefore, the Legislature proposed the necessary amendment by introduction of the Bill on 22nd Feb. 1994, and thereafter by enacting Code of Civil Procedure (M. P. Amendment) Act, 1994 (No. 4 of 1994) to amend Section 115 of the Code in its application to the State of M. P. , which substituted Section 115 restoring the provision in the Code as it was before M. P. Act No. 29 of 1984. This Amending Act of 1994 came into force from 16-3-1994. ( 6 ) AFTER restoration of Section 115 of the Code, the District Judge, Jabalpur in view of the pendency of number of revision petitions in the District Court as on 16-3-1994, made a reference under Section 113 of the Code on the following question:"whether the District Court has jurisdiction to decide the civil revisions pending in the District Court just before and at the time of coming into force (of) the amending Act No. 4 of 1994 in respect of order passed by subordinate Courts while District Judge had no revisional jurisdiction?" ( 7 ) A Division Bench constituted of U. L. Bhat, C. J. and M. V. Tamaskar, J. answered the reference, In re- Krishna Deo Singh, ( 1995 MPLJ 94 ), holding that there is no specific provision in 1994 Amending Act indicating legislative intention to the effect that the amendment would act only prospectively nor is there anything in the provision from which such an intention can be gathered. The amendment has retrospective effect in the sense that if an aggrieved party has not filed any revision before 15-3-1994, he cannot thereafter file revision before the District Court, but is required to file it before the High Court, even though the proceedings in the suit or other proceedings in which the order was passed, was instituted prior to the amendment. There is no provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of the District Judge to decide revision petitions pending before that forum on 16-3-1994 nor can such an intendment be inferred from any provision of the 1994 Amending Act. The District Judges have therefore, exclusive power to deal with revisions pending before them on 16-3-1994. ( 8 ) IN the revisions pending as on 16-3-1994 the District Judges passed the orders. In a bunch of Revision Nos. 111/93, 1156/94, 443/95, 451/95, 1551/95, 1193/95 and 1957/95, filed against the orders passed in revisions by the District Judges, N. P. Singh, J. , by a common order dated l2-12-1995, passed in Civil Revision No. 111/93 (Ayodhya Prasad v. Idandas), relying on the decision of the Supreme Court, in Vishesh Kumar's case, AIR 1980 SC 892 , took the view that no second revision would lie to the High Court against an order passed by the District Judge in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. To this view, S. S. Jha, J. did not agree. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the revisionpetitioners contended that the revisions have been decided by a Court subordinate to High Court, therefore, revision under Section 115 of the Code against any order passed by the Court subordinate to High Court from which no appeal lies in the absence of specific provision in the statute making such decision final to the exclusion of the supervisory powers of High Court under Section 115, would be revisable by High Court under Section 115 of the Code. It was submitted that the revisions arise out of orders passed in civil suits and will fall within the meaning "other proceedings in the suit" which are to be read `ejusdem generis' with the words "original suits", and would be included because of Explanation appended to Section 115 as amended by Central Amending Act 104 of 1976. As there is no exclusion of the jurisdiction expressly or impliedly by Act No. 4 of 1994 to exercise revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 115 against the order of District Judge passed in revision which is a Court subordinate to High Court irrespective of consequences, the jurisdiction conferred under Section 115 on the High Court cannot be curtailed. In support the counsel cited number of decisions which have been referred to in the order passed by N. P. Singh, J. in Ayodhya Prasad's case. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents submitted that power of revision can be exercised under sub-section (1) of Section 115 only once, and cannot be invoked by a second revision. Counsel took us to the statements and objects of two State Amendment Acts. In the Central Act. it is only the High Court which can exercise revisional jurisdiction. But, by State amendment this jurisdiction was bifurcated for exercise of the powers under Section 115 against the orders passed in a civil suit or other proceedings by the District Judge of the value below Rs. 20,000/- and the jurisdiction of the High Court was retained in respect of the revisions arising out of the orders passed in civil suit or other proceedings of the value of Rs. 20,000/- or more. The Amendment Act of 1984 was with a view to reduce the inercasing burden of the High Court and in the interest of poor litigants, but having found that in spite of the bifurcation of the jurisdiction against the orders of the District Judge in revision arising out of order passed in suit or other proceedings of the value below Rs. 20,000/- petitions under Art. 227 are being filed which is increasing litigation and expenses both, by Amendment Act of 1994 the State Amendment by Act of 1984 in Section 115 was repealed and the power under Section 1l5 of the High Court was left intact in all cases arising out of original suit or other proceedings irrespective of the value. The right of revision is not a vested right and in the absence of express or implied intention it cannot be inferred that onee a litigant has exercised the right of revision in accordance with the law as it stood after its repeal can exercise again the right of revision against the order passed by the District Judge in revision. Exercise of such right would frustrate the intention of the Legislature. Counsel relied mainly on Vishesh Kumar's case ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ) (supra) and Sri Vishnu Awatar's case AIR 1980 SC 1575 , and the decision in Ayodhya Prasad's case. Exercise of such right would frustrate the intention of the Legislature. Counsel relied mainly on Vishesh Kumar's case ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ) (supra) and Sri Vishnu Awatar's case AIR 1980 SC 1575 , and the decision in Ayodhya Prasad's case. ( 11 ) THE intention of the Amending Act of 1984, bifurcating the revisional jurisdiction of High Court under Section 115 was to reduce the burden of the High Court. By this Act mutually exclusive jurisdiction of revision under Section 115 was conferred on the District Judges, in cases arising out of orders passed in original suit or other proceedings of the value below Rs. 20,000/-, while the revisional power of the High Court in regard to revisions arising out of the orders passed in original suit or other proceedings of the value Rs. 20,000 /- or more was kept intact. However, after the orders of District Judge in revisions against an order of Civil Court the backlog of the High Court did not reduce for the reason that the petitions were being filed in the High Court against the orders of the District Judges passed in revision by taking advantage of Art. 227 of the Constitution of India which frustrated the object of Amending Act of 1984, therefore, Amending Act of 1994 was enacted whereby the conferral of jurisdiction of the High Court of hearing of revision under Section 115 of the Code against the order arising out of the original suit or the other proceedings of the value below Rs. 20,000/- was taken away restoring the jurisdiction of the High Court intact as it was prior to Amending Act of 1984. The pending revisions as on 16-3-1994 were decided in view of the decision in refetence under Section 113 of the Code, in 1995 M PLJ 94 (supra ). Against such orders passed in the revisions by the District Judges the revision petitions have been filed contending that as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 has been restored by Amending Act of 1994, therefore, the High Court may call for the record of any case, which has been decided by any Court subordinate to High Court, in which no appeal lies, subject to the limitations set out in Section 115. ( 12 ) AN identical controversy was dealt with by the Supreme Court in relation to U. P. Amendment in case of Vishesh Kumar's case ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ) (supra), the Supreme Court after considering the Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court relied by the revision petitioners in case of Har Prasad Singh v. Ram Swarup, AIR 1973 All 390 , Phoolwati v. Gur Sahai, AIR 1975 All 262 and Jupiter Chit Fund (Pvt.)Limited v. Dwarka Diesh Dayal, AIR 1979 All 218 (FB), held that the High Court is not vested with revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, over a revisional order made by the District Court under that section, as the phrase "case arising out of an original suit" occurring in Section 115 does not cover orders in revision. We quote the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 13 and 14 thus:"13. The controversy whether it is open to the High Court to exercise revisional power in respect of a revisional order under Section 115 of the District Court presents little difficulty. The basis for determining that question flows from the principle incorporated in the bifurcation of the revisional jurisdiction and legislative history comes to our aid. The consistent object behind the successive amendments was to divide the work load of revision petitions between the High Court and the District Court and decentralise that jurisdiction. That purpose was sought to be achieved by classifying all cases into two mutually exclusive categories depending on the valuation of the suit out of which they arose. In determining whether the Legislature intended a further revision petition to the High Court, regard must be had to the principle that the construction given to a statute should be such as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it. It seems to us that to recognise a revisional power in the High Court over a revisional order passed by the District Judge would plainly defeat the object of the legislative scheme. The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction - to reduce the number of revision petition filed in the High Court - would be frustrated. The scheme would, in large measure, lose it, meaning. If a revision petition is permitted to the High Court against the revisional order of the District Court arising out of a suit of a value less than Rs. The scheme would, in large measure, lose it, meaning. If a revision petition is permitted to the High Court against the revisional order of the District Court arising out of a suit of a value less than Rs. 20,000/-, a fundamental contradiction would be allowed to invade and destroy the division of revisional power between the High Court andthe District Court, for the High Court would then enjoy jurisdictional power in respect of an order arising out of a suit of a valuation below Rs. 20,000/ -. That was never intended at all. 14 In Phoolwati (supra), considerable importance was attached to the proviso introduced in Section 115 by the U. P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1973. The proviso declared that " in respect of. . . all cases arising out of original suits of any valuation devided by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this Section". What it said is that no matter what the valuation of the original suit, be it Rs. 20,000/- and above or below Rupees 20,000/-, if a case arising out of such suit was decided by the District Court, the case would be amenable to the revisional power of the High Court. We are already familiar with the category of cases where the High Court wields revisional jurisdiction over cases arising out of original suits of a value of Rs. 20,000/- or more. That is the category already covered by the substantive provision in Section 155. The other category covered by the proviso would include those instances, for example, where an original suit, although of a value making it triable by a Court subordinate, is transferred to the District Court for trial. Orders passed by the District Court in such a suit could constitute a case decided by it, and amenable to the revisional power of the High Court. What must be noted is that the test incorporated in the proviso is the fact that the case has been decided by the District Court. The valuation of the suit is irrelevant. But the proviso cannot be construed to include the case of a revisional order passed by the District Court, for that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental structure itself of Section 115 evidencing that a mutually exclusive jurisdiction has been assigned to the High Court and the District Court within its terms. But the proviso cannot be construed to include the case of a revisional order passed by the District Court, for that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental structure itself of Section 115 evidencing that a mutually exclusive jurisdiction has been assigned to the High Court and the District Court within its terms. A proviso cannot be permitted by construction to defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive provision. Har Prasad Singh (supra) and Phoolwati (supra) were considered by a Full Bench of the High Court in Jupiter Chit Fund (Pvt.)Limited v. Dwarka Dinesh Dayal, AIR 1979 All 218 and, in ourjudgment, the High Court rightly laid down there that the phrase "case arising out of an original suit" occurring in Section 115 does not cover orders passed in revision. " ( 13 ) THE scope of Section 115 (as amended in U. P.) was again considered by the Supreme Court in case of Sri Vishnu Awatar v. Shiv Avtar, AIR 1980 SC 1575 , the Supreme Court after considering the decision in Vishesh Kumar ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ) (supra) which considered the scheme, setting and purpose of U. P. Amendment to the Code bearing on the revisory power of the High Court under Section 115 and the decision in Jupiter Chit Fund's case ( AIR 1979 All 218 ) (supra) observed that the words "or other proceedings" in the phrase "cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings" refer to proceedings of final nature. These words have been added in order to bring within the purview of the revisional jurisdiction orders passed in proceedings of an original nature, which are not of the nature of suits, like arbitration proceedings. This phrase cannot include decisions of appeals or revisions, because then the legislature will be deemed to have contradicted itself. The words "or other proceedings" have to be read ejusdem generis with the words "original suits". They will not include appeals or revisions. The phrase "in any other case" used with reference to the District Court will refer to cases arising out of original suits of the value of less than Rs. 20,000/- and also cases arising out of other proceedings of an original nature of a valuation below Rs. 20,000/ -. They will not include appeals or revisions. The phrase "in any other case" used with reference to the District Court will refer to cases arising out of original suits of the value of less than Rs. 20,000/- and also cases arising out of other proceedings of an original nature of a valuation below Rs. 20,000/ -. Schematically, if the District Court has decided, not in its original jurisdiction, then the case, be it a revisional or appellate order, is not amenable to the High Court's revisional jurisdiction. Of course, if the case arises out of suits or other proceedings of the value of Rs. 20,000/ - and above, the High Court has revisory power. All other cases fall outside and becomes final at the District Court level. ( 14 ) IN case of Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 203 the supreme Court while considering a case under Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act and powers of revision under Section 115 of the Code against an order passed in revision by the District Judge under Section 115, referred in para 22 of the report, the decision in Vishesh Kumar's case ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ) and reiterating the view observed that the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear a further revision under Section 115 is barred. ( 15 ) IN case of Shyamaraju Hegde v. U. Venkatesha Bhat, AIR 1987 SC 2323 , the Supreme Court while considering the case of revisional jurisdiction under Section 50 (2) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 read with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, while affirming the ratio of Vishesh Kumar's case ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ) (supra) observed in paras 4 and 5 thus :"4. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Vishesh Kumar's case AIR 1980 SC 892 was considering whether the High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, Civil P. C. in respect of an order of the District Court under Section 115 disposing of a revision petition and whether the High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 against an order of District Court under Section 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, as amended by the Uttar Pradesh Amendment Act 1978. The amendment shows that the District Court had also revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 and the revisional jurisdiction under that section was shared between the High Court and the District Court by providing that the High Court has exclusive revisional jurisdiction in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above and the District Court alone had such jurisdiction in any other case. This Court after discussing this provision and some authorities of the Allahabad High Court reached the conclusion that the High Court was not vested with revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C. P. C. in respect of a revisional order made by the District Court under that section. 5 This conclusion was obviously reached - and in our view ery rightly -- on account of the fact that the power under Section 115 of the Code had clearly indicated the revisional jurisdiction of the District Court and the High Court and vested that jurisdiction exclusively in either the District Court or the High Court depending upon the pecuniary valuation of the dispute. " ( 16 ) IN case of M/s. Jethabhai and Sons, Cochin v. M/s. Sunderdas Rathenai, AIR 1988 SC 812 , while dealing a case of revisional order of District Court passed under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1965, the Supreme Court while reiterating the view in Vishesh Kumar's case ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ) (supra) of which support was taken in case of Aundal Amma's case ( AIR 1987 SC 203 ) (supra), observed that there is no conflict between the decisions in Aundal Ammal's case and Shyamaraju Hegde's case ( AIR 1987 SC 2323 ) and the ratio of the former case does not require reconsideration on the scope of Section 20 read with 18 (5) of the Kerala Act. On the contrary, on the renewed discussion of the matter only calls for a reiteration of the view in Aundal Ammal's case. On the contrary, on the renewed discussion of the matter only calls for a reiteration of the view in Aundal Ammal's case. ( 17 ) IN view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases and in particular in case of Vishesh Kumar ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ) which squarely deals with the controversy in the present revisions, which has been reiterated while considering the meaning of the words "or other proceedings" in case of Sri Vishnu Awatar ( AIR 1980 SC 1575 ) and further reiterated in Aundal Ammal's case ( AIR 1987 SC 203 ) and in M/s. Jetha Bhai and Sons case ( AIR 1988 SC 812 ), in our opinion, an order passed by the District Judge in exercise of its mutually exclusive jurisdiction under Section 115 conferred by Amending Act of 1984 and later restoring it to High Court under Section 115 by Amending Act of 1994, would not be amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 before the High Court, merely on the ground that the Court rendering the decision is a Court Subordinate to High Court and the words "other proceedings" used in Explanation to Section 115 will cover the proceedings of revision as the proceedings of the Court of civil jurisdiction. ( 18 ) IT is well settled that Explanation to a section is not a substantive provision by itself. It is entitled to explain the meaning of the words contained in the section or clarify certain ambiguities or clear them up. It becomes a part and parcel of the enactment. Its meaning must depend upon its terms. Sometime, it would be added to include something within it or to exclude from the ambit of the main provision or condition or some words occurring in it. Therefore, the explanation normally should be so read as to harmonise with and to clear up any ambiguity in the same section. See, Sulochna Amma v. Narayanan Nair, AIR 1994 SC 152 . ( 19 ) IT is settled rule of interpretation that an Explanation is at times appended to a section to explain the meaning of words contained in the section. It becomes a part and parcel of the enactment. See, Sulochna Amma v. Narayanan Nair, AIR 1994 SC 152 . ( 19 ) IT is settled rule of interpretation that an Explanation is at times appended to a section to explain the meaning of words contained in the section. It becomes a part and parcel of the enactment. The meaning to be given to an Explanation must depend upon its terms, and "no theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language used. " But the language of the Explanation shows a purpose and a construction, consistent with that purpose can be reasonably placed upon it, that construction will be preferred as against any other construction which does not fit in with the description or the avowed purpose. An Explanation, normally, should be so read as to harmonise with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section and should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section. See, Bihta Co-operative Development and Cane Marketing Unionlimited v. Bank of Bihar, AIR 1967 SC 389 , Hiralal Ratan Lal v. Sales Tax Officer III, Kanpur, AIR 1973 SC 1034 , M/s. Aphali Pharmaceuticalslimited v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1989 SC 2227 and `principles of Statutory lnterpretation' - G. P. Singh, 6th Edn. P. 151. ( 20 ) THE Explantion to sub-section (2) of Section 115 has been added by Central Amending Act No. 104 of 1976 to explain the expression "any case which has been decided" so as to include any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings. The Explanation, in our opinion, does not widen or enlarge the scope so as to include any order passed in revision by the District Court arising out of a suit or other proceedings of original jurisdiction, scope of which has been considered by the Supreme Court in case of Sri Vishnu Awatar's case ( AIR 1980 SC 1575 ) (supra) wherein it has been held that the words "or other proceedings" have to be read ejusdem generis with the words "original suit. " They will not include appeals or revisions. " They will not include appeals or revisions. ( 21 ) AS an upshot, we are of the opinion that the words "or other proceedings" used in Explanation, as amended, cannot enlarge the scope so as to entertain a further revision against an order of the District Judge passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 conferred on it by Amending Act of 1984. Hence, we respectfully approve the view taken by N. P. Singh, J. in case of Ayodhya Prasad v. Idandas (supra ). ( 22 ) AS a result of aforesaid discussion, our answer to the two questions referred to us are :question : (a) Whether revision challenging the order in civil revision by the Court subordinate to High Court is maintainable before the High Court ?answer : In the negative. Question : (b) whether the Judgment of Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, AIR 1980 SC 892 is applicable to the revision filed after Code of Civil Procedure (M. P. Amendment) Act, 1994 came into force ?"answer : In the affirmative. Let the cases be placed before the learned single Judge with the opinion and answer. ( 23 ) REFERENCE answered accordingly. Reference answered accordingly. .