S. K MAHAJAN ( 1 ) THE petitioners were convicted by the Metropolitan Magistrate for their having committed an offence punishable under Section 447 Indian Penal Code and giving them the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, they were released on probation on each one of them furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 2,000. 00 with one surely in the like amount for a period of one year for keeping peace and good behaviour. They were also directed to restore possession of the land trespassed by them falling in khasra Nos. 182-83-84 within the revenue estate of village Pul Pehladpur belonging to Hamdard Dawakhana which had been trespassed by them. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Metropolitan Magistrate, the petitioners preferred an appeal before the Court of Sessions, however, by his judgment dated 30th August, 1995 learned Additional Sessions Judge confirmed the conviction and sentence of the petitioners and dismissed the appeal. ( 2 ) THE present petition has now been filed challenging the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge passed in appeal. The facts in short relevant for purposes of deciding this petition are: ( 3 ) THAT Hamdard Dawakhana was the owner of large area of land in village Pul Pehladpur which included land in khasra Nos. 182-83-84. On 18th April, 1983, a complaint was made by the said Hamdard Dawakhana alleging that the petitioners along with certain other persons had on 17th April, 1983 forcibly and wrongfully entered on its land in khasra Nos. 183/184/185/186 at village Pul Pehladpur and intimidated its general attorney as well as other employees with threats of their life and dire consequences if any one of them objected or obstructed the petitioners and other persons in constructing on the said land. On the basis of the complaint, case under Section 447/448/452/ 506/34 Indian Penal Code was registered with PS Badarpur and after investigation challan was filed in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate. The Metropolitan Magistrate after recording evidence and hearing the parties held them guilty of the offence punishable under Section 447 only and giving them the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act released them on probation on their furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 2,000. 00 along with one surety in the like amount for the period of one year for keeping peace and be of good behaviour. 2,000. 00 along with one surety in the like amount for the period of one year for keeping peace and be of good behaviour. The Metropolitan Magistrate in exercise of his powers under Section 456 of the Code also directed restoration of possession of land trespassed by the accused persons to the complainant. The appeal preferred by the petitioners to the Court of Sessions was also dismissed and the judgment of the Metropolitan Magistrate was confirmed. ( 4 ) THE only contention raised by the petitioners is that the ingredients of the offence under Section 447 Indian Penal Code were not available inasmuch as there was no criminal intimidation or any intention to commit the offence or cause annoyance to any person in possession of land and the prosecution had failed to establish any alleged intimidation or annoyance to the person who was actually in possession of the same. Another contention raised is that the Additional Sessions Judge having dismissed the appeal against the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate, direction given under Section 456 could be executed only by the Appellate Court and not by the trial Court. ( 5 ) IN my view, there is fallacy in the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners. To prove that a person has committed an offence under Section 447 Indian Penal Code, what has to be proved is that the accused has committed criminal trespass. Criminal trespass has been defined in Section 441 of the Indian Penal Code. As per the provisions of Section 441 of the Code whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with the intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property or having lawfully entered upon such property unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person or with intent to commit an offence, will be said to have committed criminal trespass. The petitioners have failed to show to this Court as to what was their right in the property whereas there was sufficient material before the Court to hold that the land was owned by the complainant. The petitioners have failed to show to this Court as to what was their right in the property whereas there was sufficient material before the Court to hold that the land was owned by the complainant. The two Courts having concurrently held that the petitioners had unlawfully entered the land which was in possession of the complainant and had threatened to kill the attorney of the complainant in case they were stopped from digging the foundation, it will not be proper for this Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code to interfere with these findings of fact. Even otherwise, I find that there was sufficient material on record to hold that the complainant was the owner of the land and was in possession thereof and the petitioners had trespassed upon the said land and intimidated the attorney of the complainant and threatened to kill him in case he stopped the petitioners from digging the foundation. In my view, therefore, the ingredients of Section 447/441 were fully satisfied in this case and the petitioners were rightly held guilty of having committed an offence under Section 447 of the Code. ( 6 ) THE petitioners having criminally trespassed on the land could not be allowed to enjoy the fruits of the same and, in my view, both the Courts below were within their right to direct the restoration of possession of land to the complainant. There is also no force in the arguments of the petitioner that only the Sessions Court could direct the restoration of possession. After the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate had been confirmed in appeal, it is the Court of first instance only which will execute its order and no objection can be taken to the same. In my view, the petitioner is trying to delay the proceedings by raising frivolous objections. I do not find any infirmity in the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge and, in my view, there are no merits in this petition. ( 7 ) THE petition is, accordingly, dismissed. ( 8 ) INTERIM order passed on September 14,1995 stands vacated.