ORDER 1. This is third application for bail on behalf of accused-applicant Atarsingh. 2. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that the applicant has been involved in a case along with two other co-accused persons, who are his brothers in Crime No. 160/95 under section 307/34 I.P.C. The case was later on converted to section 302/34 I.P.C., when the injured Rajendra died. The applicant was arrested on 24.12.1995. 3. The allegations made against the applicant are that he surrounded the deceased and caught hold of him. There was a civil litigation going on between the applicant's brother Achhelal on the one hand and the deceased Rajendra on the other with respect to a Mend of a field. On the date of occurrence, the deceased, along with his companions, went to the applicant's field, where applicant's brother Achhelal did marpit. He did not commit any marpit and has been falsely implicated, Achhelal along with Gulab had gone to lodge the report at Police Station Dinara, but the police did not write the report and arrested the three brothers. No medical was got done on 24.12.95. Lateron a complaint was made to the S.D.O. (P) Karera by the applicant's brother-in-law Raghuvir Singh on 28.12.95. Thereafter, they were medically examined and produced before the Magistrate. At the time of filing charge-sheet, medical report was not submitted and an application was moved by the counsel for the applicant on 15.4.1996 for obtaining copies of the medical certificates and the report lodged, which have been filed along with the petition. Two applications were moved earlier, which were rejected. 4. Lengthy argument has been advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant with respect to the fact that subsequent applications for bail can be moved even if earlier applications for bail were rejected. He urged that accused has got a valuable right of liberty mentioned in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on certain authorities, which are being dealt with hereinafter. He argued that there is no allegation that the applicant caused any injury. He is entitled to bail. 5. Besides it, the next contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that he had also injured on his person, which have not been explained by the prosecution. He argued that there is no allegation that the applicant caused any injury. He is entitled to bail. 5. Besides it, the next contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that he had also injured on his person, which have not been explained by the prosecution. Lastly, it has been contended that the accused/applicant has been in custody since 24.12.95 and there has been no progress in the case. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State contended that the charge-sheet in the present case was submitted on 6.2.96. First bail application was rejected on 17.4.96 and second bail application on 3.7.96. He pointed out that all the materials now pointed out were available at the time of disposal of the earlier bail applications. No doubt, subsequent bail applications can be moved, but there must be new ground and as no new ground has been shown, the application deserves to be rejected. 7. Admittedly, the first bail application of the applicant was rejected on merits and while disposing of the second bail application, it was argued that another co-accused had been enlarged on bail, but after taking into consideration that aspect as well, second bail application was rejected on 3.7.96. 8. Now, the main question is as to whether the subsequent bail application is maintainable on the same grounds or on the facts which were available to the applicant at the time when the first or subsequent bail applications were rejected, after hearing the parties. True that subsequent bail applications can be made for bail and the accused has got a valuable right of liberty. Liberty cannot be denied. The earliest authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is Babu Singh v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1978 SC 527 ) and the learned counsel placed much reliance on this authority. In this case, the Apex Court ruled that ''order refusing bail does not bar fresh application on later occasion giving more details, further developments and different considerations". In this case, the Apex Court ruled that ''order refusing bail does not bar fresh application on later occasion giving more details, further developments and different considerations". In this case, it was also held' 'that personal liberty is deprived where bail is refused, is too precious value of our constitutional system recognized under Article 21 that the crucial power to negate it is a great trust exercisable not casually but judicially, with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the community." A careful perusal of the entire authority goes to show that a personal liberty is a valuable right conferred by our Constitution under Article 21. It has further been laid down that refusal of bail deprives a citizen of that liberty and power to negate that right has not to be exercised casually but judicially. It has also been laid down in this authority that subsequent application for bail can be moved later on giving more details, further developments and different considerations. It nowhere lays down that a subsequent bail application is maintainable even on the ground or on the basis of the facts which existed at the time of refusal of earlier bail application. 9. The other authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is Ram Sehodar v. State of M.P. (1986 Cr.L.J. 279) a Division Bench decision of this Court. In that case, it was held that "Chapter 33 does not contain any provision prohibiting subsequent applications for release on bail after an application for that purpose has earlier been rejected. There also does not appear to be any provision under this Chapter or anywhere else in the Code authorising Court to put a clog on such subsequent application where one such application has been earlier rejected. ...Circumstances may change and a person earlier found not entitled to be released on bail, may subsequently become so entitled due to those changed circumstances. ..." This authority too does not, to my mind, support the contention of the learned counsel to the effect that subsequent application for bail is maintainable even on the same grounds which existed at the time of rejection of the earlier bail application. ..." This authority too does not, to my mind, support the contention of the learned counsel to the effect that subsequent application for bail is maintainable even on the same grounds which existed at the time of rejection of the earlier bail application. It simply lays down that if circumstances are changed, subsequent application can be maintained and a person who was not found to be entitled to bail earlier, may become so entitled due to those changed circumstances and it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that it goes to show that even if there are no changed circumstances and the same facts exist, which existed at the time of rejection of the earlier application then the subsequent bail application is maintainable. This authority specifically lays down that there must be changed circumstances; and this principle can never be denied. It is rather established by a large number of decisions of various High Courts and Apex Court that subsequent application for bail on new ground is always entertainable. If it is permitted, i.e. to raise grounds, which existed earlier at the time of hearing earlier bail application or not raised or argued even at subsequent stage, there will be no end to such applications. It will amount to laying down a law which will go against the basic principle that there must be finality to the orders passed on the basis of existing facts and grounds. In other words, if a point was not raised, though it existed even at the time of hearing of the first bail application, then it cannot be allowed to be raised again in subsequent bail application in order to give finality to the earlier order with respect to those facts or grounds. Of course, if there are changed circumstances and additional material or further developments and different considerations are brought on record, as laid down by the Apex Court in Babu Singh's case (supra) subsequent application for bail can be heard and it can also be granted if the Court comes to the conclusion that on the basis of those changed facts and circumstances, the case for bail is made out. 10. 10. Learned counsel for the applicant also placed reliance on State of M.P. v. Dalipa [1986 C.Cr.J. (M.P.) 66], Meninolopes v. State of Goa [II (1955) CCR 795 (DB)], which is a Division Bench decision of Bombay High Court, Dharmendra Rao v. State of M.P. ( 1993 JLJ 476 ). In this case learned Single Judge of this Court held that a bail application got dismissed as 'not pressed' or as 'withdrawn', the second application is not barred. Even on merits second application can be filed when there are changes in circumstances. Thus, a perusal of all these authorities goes to show that none of them considered the question now raised it was not considered as to whether subsequent bail application is maintainable on the basis of the facts and grounds available to the applicant at the time when the earlier application was rejected. Thus these authorities do not help the learned counsel. 11. It has also been contended that after rejection of the first bail application, co-accused has been granted bail on 30.5.1996 and this Court took into consideration this fact while rejecting the second bail application on 3.7.1996, observing that the fact that rejection of the first bail application was not brought to the notice of this Court. Learned counsel urged that it cannot be a ground to deny parity. Learned counsel for the applicant relied upon Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh ( AIR 1996 SC 2176 ) and argued that non-mentioning of fact that bail application of co-accused was rejected earlier cannot be a ground for rejection of the ground of parity. In this connection, I may mention that once an order has been passed by this Court, that order cannot be re-opened in subsequent application. As far the authority relied upon is concerned, it may be noted that this authority has no application. There the Apex Court was considering the question of cancellation of bail and while considering it, observation was made that non-filing of cross-complaint and non-mentioning of the fact that bail application of co-accused was rejected twice cannot be a ground for cancellation of bail granted to the appellant/accused especially when the Court was aware of the facts that it had granted bail. It is settled law that there are fixed norms for cancellation of bail and bail can be cancelled if the case falls within the norms. It is settled law that there are fixed norms for cancellation of bail and bail can be cancelled if the case falls within the norms. The mere fact that the rejection of bail application twice earlier was not brought to the notice of the Court cannot constitute a ground for cancellation of bail. 12. Thus, I am of the definite opinion that subsequent bail application is not entertainable and cannot be heard on the basis of facts and circumstances which existed at the time of hearing of the earlier bail application on merits. It is however maintainable on changed circumstances and new grounds alone. I, therefore hold accordingly. 13. Having found that subsequent bail application is not maintainable on the facts and circumstances and grounds which existed at the time or hearing of the earlier application, it has now to be seen as to whether there are new facts and circumstances or grounds available to the applicant which did not exist at the time of hearing of the earlier bail applications. 14. Learned counsel contended that the applicant had also received injuries in the occurrence and these injuries were not explained. This ground was available to the; applicant even at the time of hearing of first bail application on merits. It cannot be said to be a new ground or a changed circumstance and consequently, the applicant cannot be heard arguing this point in this third application. Even if it is taken for the sake of argument that the petitioner may be heard in that case too, I do not find any substance in this connection. The simple reason is that the occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 24.12.95 and the injury report filed shows that it is of 28.12.95. Doctor has no doubt mentioned that the injuries were 3 or 4 days old but he found in injury No.1 clotted blood and has given the colour of the cotusion as brownish. It will not be advisable to make any observation about the duration of this injury at this stage as it may cause embarrassment at the trial. I, therefore, refrain from making any observation. On this ground, to my mind, no case for bail is made out. 15. Lastly, learned counsel contended that the accused-applicant is in custody since December, 1995 and there has been no progress in the case. I, therefore, refrain from making any observation. On this ground, to my mind, no case for bail is made out. 15. Lastly, learned counsel contended that the accused-applicant is in custody since December, 1995 and there has been no progress in the case. The principle that a person has got a right to speedy trial cannot be denied. It has however not been brought to record as to why and under what circumstances the trial has not made progress. It was the duty of the applicant to have shown that the delay in the trial was not on account of the applicant himself. It has not been shown. I may further mention that in this case charge-sheet was submitted, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the State, on 6.2.1996. It has to be taken note of that a large number of cases are pending before the subordinate Courts and preference has to be given to older cases in which there are under trials. Thus, unless it is brought on record that the trial of the applicant is being ignored inspite of the fact that there are no older cases in which there are undertrials, it cannot be said that there is negligence on the part of the prosecution or there is inordinate delay in the trial. The Apex Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak ( AIR 1992 SC 1701 ) held: "In many cases, the accused may himself have been responsible for the delay in such cases, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. In some cases, delays may occur for which neither the prosecution nor the accused can be blamed but the system itself. Such delays too cannot be treated as unjustifiable -- broadly speaking." Thus, there may be systematic delay which cannot be helped. Under these circumstances, the delay in the present case cannot be said to be a ground for bail. 16. In view of what has been said above, I find no substance in this application. It is accordingly rejected.