R. K. GULATI, J. This is a revision under section 11 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (for short, "the Act") and is directed against the order dated 13/19th September, 1995, passed by a three-member Bench of Trade Tax Tribunal, U. P. , Lucknow. By the order under challenge, the Tribunal has dismissed the application of the revisionist seeking condition of delay in filing the appeal under section 10 of the Act. As a result whereof the appeal was also dismissed as barred by time. 2. Briefly stated the facts are that M/s. Laxmi Sales Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the assessee") had applied for grant of eligibility certificate under section 4-A of the Act. The said provision, inter alia, provides for exemption from payment of tax, amongst others on the turnover of sales in respect of goods manufactured by a new unit for a specified period. The Divisional Level Committee by its order dated May 2, 1992 rejected the application for grant of eligibility certificate, against which a review application filed by the assessee was also rejected on February 20, 1993 by the same authority. On February 27, 1993 a second application for review was filed before the Divisional Commissioner, Allahabad, which was also rejected on March 25, 1995 by the Divisional Level Committee on the ground that it was not maintainable. The two orders aforesaid dated February 20, 1993 and March 25, 1995 by which the review applications were rejected, were thereafter challenged by the assessee before this Court in Writ Petition No. 611 of 1995. On April 26, 1995 a Division Bench of this Court disposed of the writ petition with certain observations to which reference shall be made at its appropriate place. Finally, on June 26, 1995 the assessee preferred an appeal before the Trade Tax Tribunal against the order dated February 20, 1993 together with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. As stated earlier, the Trade Tax Tribunal refused to condone the delay and rejected the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Consequently, the appeal itself was dismissed as barred by limitation. Hence, this revision. 3. I have heard Sri S. C. Mandhyan, counsel for the assessee and the Standing Counsel for the respondent, Commissioner of Trade Tax. As stated earlier, the Trade Tax Tribunal refused to condone the delay and rejected the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Consequently, the appeal itself was dismissed as barred by limitation. Hence, this revision. 3. I have heard Sri S. C. Mandhyan, counsel for the assessee and the Standing Counsel for the respondent, Commissioner of Trade Tax. The learned counsel for the assessee assailed the order under challenge by saying that it was wholly unsustainable in law for the reason that the Tribunal had not considered the reasonings and grounds on which the condonation of delay was sought. The submission was that on facts the delay in filing the appeal was fully explained which deserved to be condoned at the hands of the Tribunal, inasmuch as, the assessee had throughout been pursuing the cause bona fide and with due diligence. It was argued that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause on account of which the appeal could not be filed within time. The learned consel urged that justice should not be allowed to be defeated on account of technicalities especially when substantial stakes were involved in so far the assessee was concerned inasmuch as if the matter was not adjudicated on merits, the assessee would be put to an irreparable loss and will be required to pay large sum of money as taxes to which the assessee was not otherwise liable in respect of the period for which the exemption was sought. In other words, it was canvassed that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would in itself be a ground to excuse the delay. 4. The learned Standing Counsel on the other hand canvassed that the period of limitation for filing an appeal as prescribed by the law had elapsed, the court was not competent to extend the period of limitation but the delay could be condoned for "sufficient cause" alone which was not there in the instant case. 5. The Trade Tax Tribunal divided the period of delay into four parts, which in the words of the Tribunal were as under : " First period relates to the second review petition filed on the basis of wrong legal advice before the Divisional Commissioner, Allahabad. 5. The Trade Tax Tribunal divided the period of delay into four parts, which in the words of the Tribunal were as under : " First period relates to the second review petition filed on the basis of wrong legal advice before the Divisional Commissioner, Allahabad. Second review petition related to the period from the date of passing of the order of the honourable High Court, i. e. , April 26, 1995 to May 17, 1995. Third period relates to the time from May 17, 1995 to June 23, 1995, the period involved in obtaining the certified copy of the Writ Petition No. 611 of 1995. Fourth period relates to the period June 23, 1995 to June 27, 1995 when this writ petition was filed. There is no explanation whatsoever, for the delay from June 23, 1993 to June 27, 1993. " 6. Before proceeding further it will be useful to refer to the provisions of the Act under which the appeal was filed. Sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Act provides for an appeal by any person aggrieved, inter alia, against an order refusing to grant an eligibility certificate, within a period of 90 days from the date of service of copy of such order, decision or direction. Clause (c) of sub-section (9) of section 10 directs amongst other things that an appeal against an order granting or refusing to grant an eligibility certificate shall be filed before the President of the Tribunal and shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of three members. Sub-section (3) of section 10 says that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to appeal or other applications under that section. Sub-sections (4) and (5) contemplates the disposal of an appeal before the Trade Tax Tribunal. 7. Now section 5 of the Limitation Act, inter alia, provides that an appeal or application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. The expression "sufficient cause" has not been defined in the Limitation Act. It is difficult and also not feasible to define precisely the meaning of the words "sufficient cause". The provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act also does not lay down any standard test. The expression is very wide and comprehensive. The expression "sufficient cause" has not been defined in the Limitation Act. It is difficult and also not feasible to define precisely the meaning of the words "sufficient cause". The provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act also does not lay down any standard test. The expression is very wide and comprehensive. What is sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act would depend on the facts of an individual case. The test of sufficient cause is purely an individualistic test and not an objective test. It is settled by now that the court should not apply too exacting a standard of diligence and if the delay is not unreasonable then the judicial discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act should ordinarily be exercised in favour of the person seeking condonation of delay. It has been repeatedly held by the apex Court and other courts also that the expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant seeking the indulgence of the court. 8. Now reverting to the case on hand in so far as the first period between February 20, 1993 to March 25, 1995 was concerned, it related to the filing and disposal of the second review application. The second application was filed on February 27, 1993 within a week the first application was rejected. The explanation of the assessee was that the second application for review, which was more in the nature of representation was filed under a wrong legal advice bona fide believing it to be true. The Trade Tax Tribunal refused to accept the explanation on the ground that no second application was maintainable in law. It held that the story of wrong legal advice was not proved and the affidavit filed by the assessee in support of the application for condonation of delay, though not controverted, was not acceptable because it was vague as the name of the counsel who gave the wrong advice was not disclosed. The Tribunal was of the view that no legal practitioner conversant with Sales Tax Act (now called Trade Tax Act) would advise a second review application and that too before a Divisional Commissioner. The Tribunal was of the view that no legal practitioner conversant with Sales Tax Act (now called Trade Tax Act) would advise a second review application and that too before a Divisional Commissioner. According to the Tribunal, the assessee being a registered company under the Companies Act, 1956 all its decisions were to be taken through the resolution of Board of Directors but no agenda or resolution of the Board of Directors was placed on record accepting the legal advice for filing the second review application. 9. It is relevant to mention that before section 10 of the Act was amended by section 24 of the U. P. Act No. 31 of 1995 which was enforced with effect From May 14, 1994, there was no provision for appeal under the Act before any forum against an order refusing to grant the eligibility certificate under section 4-A of the Act. The first review application was rejected on February 20, 1993 and at the material time no appeal lay before the Trade Tax Tribunal against that order. This question was also canvassed before the Tribunal but the plea was rejected observing as under : " It may further be added that on February 20, 1993 there was no right of appeal against order under section 4-A of the Act to this Tribunal and the appellant could have preferred the writ petition before the honourable High Court. It was not done. On the other hand, the order dated March 25, 1995 was challenged in the writ petition. " 10. The Tribunal was factually incorrect when it proceeded on the assumption that the order dated February 20, 1993 was not challenged before this Court in the writ petition. From the copy of the writ petition which was placed before this Court, it is apparent that both the orders dated February 20, 1993 and March 25, 1995 were assailed and a writ in the nature of certiorari was sought, seeking quashing of those orders as would be evident from the first prayer set out in the writ petition. 11. However, a Division Bench of this Court disposed of the writ petition with the following orders : " Heard learned counsel for the petitioner we do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment dated March 25, 1995 (annexure 9 to the writ petition ). 11. However, a Division Bench of this Court disposed of the writ petition with the following orders : " Heard learned counsel for the petitioner we do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment dated March 25, 1995 (annexure 9 to the writ petition ). The said order was on the basis of the report to the report to the second review application which has been held that it does not lie. The contention is that the same has been filed on a wrong advice. Hence the petitioner is entitled to challenge the original order rejecting his review application. In fact against the impugned order appeal lies to the Trade Tax Tribunal. Learned counsel for the petitioner urges that he may be permitted to present the same along with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act before the Tribunal for considering his review petition. It is not necessary for this Court to pass any order in this regard. It is without prejudice to the right of the petitioner, if any to move to the Trade Tax Tribunal along with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act in accordance with law. With the aforesaid observations the present writ petition is disposed. " 12. It is evident that the writ court did not go into the merits of the order dated February 20, 1993 because the assessee had an alternative remedy of appeal against that order to the Trade Tax Tribunal. It was left open to the assessee to seek its remedy according to law along with an application for condonation of delay. As already stated on the date the order appealed against was made, no appeal lay against that order. It was during the pendency of the second review application that the law was amended and against an order refusing to grant the eligibility certificate, a right of appeal was provided to the Trade Tax Tribunal. The Divisional Level Committee took over two years to decide the second review application for which the assessee cannot be blamed. Soon after these proceedings were terminated both the orders which were passed on the review applications, were challenged in the writ petition. But the writ court relegated the assessee to the appellate forum in so far the order dated February 23, 1993 was concerned. Soon after these proceedings were terminated both the orders which were passed on the review applications, were challenged in the writ petition. But the writ court relegated the assessee to the appellate forum in so far the order dated February 23, 1993 was concerned. In these circumstances, there seems little justification when the Tribunal refused to condone the delay pertaining to the first sub-period. 13. The view expressed by the Tribunal that no legal practitioner could have advised for filing of a second review application is also not well-founded. The Divisional Level Committee for its view had relied upon two decisions of this Court, which it appears, are unreported decisions. The learned counsel for the assessee explained that the constitution of the Divisional Level Committee apart from the officers of the Sales Tax Department also had as its members amongst others, the Joint Director of Industries and General Manager of District Industries Centre. It was pointed out that the second application for review was filed before the Divisional Commissioner under some mistaken notion to which the Tribunal did not advert in its order and, in any case, that application was decided by the Divisional Level Committee and not by the authority before whom that application was allegedly filed. The fact that the name of the counsel who gave the wrong advice, was not given, in my opinion, was not of much consequence. It does not stand to reason as to why the assessee would have taken recourse to a wrong forum unless it had been so advised particularly when the grant of eligibility certificate was vital to the assessee and involved heavy financial burden in the event the order complained of was not set aside by the by the competent authority or the court. 14. Now the judicial exercise of the discretion in the matter of condonation of delay does not contemplate an inquiry into the facts whether the person claiming indulgence has been so negligent or inactive or there is such serious lack of bona fide that to upheld the plea of sufficient cause is likely to result injustice to the opposite party. It is not in dispute that the assessee took immediate steps to get rid of the order dated February 23, 1993 by which its first review was rejected. It is not in dispute that the assessee took immediate steps to get rid of the order dated February 23, 1993 by which its first review was rejected. In the presence of the affidavit filed by the assessee and in absence of any denial by the other side, there was no material before the Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the explanation given by the assessee about the wrong legal advice was incorrect. Where the remedy against an order complained is sought before a wrong forum or court, bona fide, that is under an honest though mistaken belief entertained by the appellant that he was pursuing the cause before the right forum, the period spent bona fide in prosecuting the case before a wrong forum is liable to be excused while considering the question whether there was sufficient cause or not is preferring the appeal within the prescribed period. If the mistaken advice misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy the default in delay was liable to be condoned. There is nothing on record to show that the plea of wrong advice was not bona fide and it was merely advice to cover an ulterior purpose. 15. The power of the Trade Tax Tribunal under sub-section (3) of section 10 of the Act to condone the delay is discretionary, but the discretion either way should be judicially exercised. The discretion given by section 5 of the Limitation Act, as observed above, cannot be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The true guide for court or Tribunal to exercise the judicial discretion shall be whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the cause. Unless want of bona fide and gross negligence is proved, which may deprive the protection of section 5, the application should not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. In the context of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst, Katiji [1987] 167 ITR 471 has observed that expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of courts. In the context of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst, Katiji [1987] 167 ITR 471 has observed that expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of courts. It was held that section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. It was held as under : ". . . . . . . . It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that : 1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging and appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. every days delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 16. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 16. Now coming to second period between April 24, 1995 to May 17, 1995 it was explained an affidavit that the director in-charge was out of station with personal urgent work and it was only on his return the fate of writ petition was known when steps were taken to obtain the certified copy of the order, which was passed in the writ petition. The Tribunal has not accepted this explanation also on the view that the nature of personal work was not disclosed. The fact that the director in-charge was not available, during the said period, has not been disputed by the Tribunal. The concerned director filed his own affidavit. The averments of the affidavit were not controverted and were not shown to be untrue. Now where the averments are not contradicted ordinarily, there is hardly any option except to take those averments as correct. 17. In Juggi Lal Kamla Pat v. Ram Janki Gupta AIR 1962 All. 407 , a Division Bench of this Court observed as under : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . We do not think it is open to a party to brush aside the averments of his opponent by merely stating that the allegations were untrue. A statement on oath, whether true or false, has to be met by a counter-affidavit in reply, or by challenging the statement by cross-examining the deponent. If that is not done it would be presumed that the allegations, if untrue, would have been rebutted by the other side. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Here also the court below had before it a duly sworn affidavit of the pairokar of the plaintiff in support of his application and there was no counter-affidavit in traverse of the allegations contained in that affidavit. Under the circumstances it was not open to the court to disbelieve the version of the plaintiff that he had brought his witnesses to the court. . . Under the circumstances it was not open to the court to disbelieve the version of the plaintiff that he had brought his witnesses to the court. . . . . . . . . . . . " 18. The Tribunal in my opinion, erred in disbelieving the assessee and rejecting the affidavit which had not been controverted. 19. The third sub-period between May 17, 1995 to June 23, 1995 was consumed during which the certified copy of the High Court in writ petition was delivered to the assessee. The fourth period of four days between June 23, 1995 to June 27, 1995 was spent in preparation and filing of the appeal before the Trade Tax Tribunal. The time spent in those period was also not condoned by the Tribunal on the reasoning that it was not necessary to obtain a certified copy of the order for the purposes of filing the appeal. In my opinion, the Tribunal has again not approached the matter from its correct perspective. The writ court in its order, as seen above, had made certain observations while directing the assessee to approach the appellate forum. It cannot be said that the time spent in obtaining the certified copy under the circumstances was wholly irrelevant or unnecessary. The delay caused in obtaining the certified copy under the bona fide belief that it was essential, while factually that order was not necessary, the condonation of delay could not be justifiably refused. Likewise, some time was required to prepare and file the appeal and the period of four days by any standard cannot be said to be unreasonable which could not be excused on the plea of laches or want of due diligence on the part of the assessee. All that had to be seen was whether the explanation offered was reasonably proper and acceptable. The assessee was not required to conclusively establish his case as the Tribunal seems to think. The Tribunal, in my opinion, has viewed the matter from a very hyper-technical approach and with overstrictness which was not at all warranted on the facts. The assessee had nothing to gain by such delay. The Tribunal should not have adopted injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. 20. The Tribunal, in my opinion, has viewed the matter from a very hyper-technical approach and with overstrictness which was not at all warranted on the facts. The assessee had nothing to gain by such delay. The Tribunal should not have adopted injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. 20. In O. P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) AIR 1984 SC 1744 it was held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. The delay was accordingly, condoned. 21. In view of the above discussion and keeping in mind the decisions cited above, in my considered view the Tribunal has erred in taking the view that no sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances and the dispute involved in the appeal, the delay deserved to be condoned at the hands of the Tribunal. The order of the Tribunal, therefore, cannot be sustained. It is accordingly, set aside. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned. The order dismissing the appeal as time-barred is also set aside. The Tribunal shall give effect to this judgment and order as required under section 11 (8) of the Act and will pass appropriate consequential orders accordingly. 22. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .