A. P. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) PRESENT is defendants second appeal arising out of suit filed by plaintiffrespondent, here after the respondent, for specific performance of contract of sale of land in suit dated 2-2-1968 and in the alternative for recovery of a sum of Rs. 14,000. 00 along with future and pendente lite interest at the rate of 6% per annum. ( 2 ) RESPONDENTs case was that defendantsappellants hereafter the appellants are the bhumidhars of the land specified in Schedule a of the plaint. Appellants executed an agreement of sale of their land (Khasra Nos. 1090/5 and 1090/6 of V. Puthi Ibrahimpur, Khasra No. 11/2 of Jamapur Khador and Khasra of Plot No. 85a of village Samber here) with respondents for a consideration of a sum of Rs, 13,000/- out of which a sum of Rs. 12,000. 00 had been paid to the appellants by the respondent at the time of the agreement and the remaining sum of Rs. 1,000/was agreed to be paid at the time of registration of the sale deed which was to be executed within a period of two years from the date of the agreement. There was a stipulation in the agreement of sale that if appellants failed to execute the sale deed the respondent would be entitled to recover the sum of Rs. 12,000. 00 plus Rs. 2,000. 00 towards damages and in case respondents fail to get the sale deed executed appellants will be entitled to recover Rs. 1,000. 00 from respondents through Court. It was further alleged by respondent that though he asked appellants to execute the sale deed but he failed to turn up before the Subregistrar on 2-2-1970, as agreed. It was also alleged that the respondent was ready and willing to get the sale deed executed and is still ready and willing whereas appellants have failed to perform their part of contract, hence the suit. ( 3 ) ON the other hand, appellants point blank denied execution of the contract of sale and receipt of the money (Rs. It was also alleged that the respondent was ready and willing to get the sale deed executed and is still ready and willing whereas appellants have failed to perform their part of contract, hence the suit. ( 3 ) ON the other hand, appellants point blank denied execution of the contract of sale and receipt of the money (Rs. 12,000/-); they denied having agreed to sell the land in suit which according to appellants did not exist nor was in existence at the time of execution of the alleged agreement of sale, they denied settlement of the terms and conditions of sale of the land or that they promised to execute the sale deed of the land on 2-2-1970 before the Sub-Registrar. It was also pleaded by the respondent that the suit was barred by time, they also denied that respondent ever asked them to execute the sale deed as there could have been no occasion for the same. On 4-5-1977 respondent gave notice to Baru Singh, the appellant No. 1 through his lawyer, Sri Nahar Singh, Advocate that the land of Pathi Ibrahimpur was purchased by the respondent benami in the name of the appellants and its real owner was the respondent, which according to the appellants amounted to refusal by the respondents for performance of their part of the agreement of sale if there was one, as per the case set up by the respondent, plea of estoppel and acquisition was also set up. ( 4 ) ON the pleading of the parties the trial Court framed as many as eight issues of which issues Nos. 1 and 2 related to execution of agreement and payment of Rs. 12,000. 00 by way of earnest money, issues Nos. 7 and 8 related to the appellants plea of waiver, estoppel and acquiscence; issues Nos. 3 and 4 related to respondent being ready and willing to perform their part of contract and the breach of contract by appellants whereas issues Nos. 5 and 6 related to the relief part. ( 5 ) THE trial Court decided issues Nos. 7 and 8 in the negative against appellants. Issues Nos. 3 and 4 related to respondent being ready and willing to perform their part of contract and the breach of contract by appellants whereas issues Nos. 5 and 6 related to the relief part. ( 5 ) THE trial Court decided issues Nos. 7 and 8 in the negative against appellants. Issues Nos. 1 and 2 which were the main issues and were to be proved by respondent, were discussed in great detail by the trial Court, it found that respondent had failed to prove the execution of contract of sale by appellants and also the payment of Rs. 12,000. 00 to them by way of earnest money. Similarly, issues Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 were also decided against respondent. The suit was accordingly dismissed by the trial Court with special costs of Rs. 500. 00 in view of the fact that a wholly false and frivolous case had been filed by the respondent which according to the trial Court resulted in the amendment of the plaint on several occasions even in respect to the details of the land in suit which appellants had allegedly agreed to sell to him. ( 6 ) ON appeal filed by respondent under S. 96 of C. P. C. the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was set aside and the suit of the respondent was decreed with costs with the direction that the appellants shall execute the sale deed in respondents favour or in favour of his nominees, if any, on receiving a sum of Rs. 1000/within a period of one month failing which respondent was authorised to get the sale deed executed in his favour through Court. 1000/within a period of one month failing which respondent was authorised to get the sale deed executed in his favour through Court. ( 7 ) IN support of the present appeal it was contended by Sri O. P. Singh, Advocate on behalf of the appellants that : (A) The lower appellate Court, hereinafter referred to as l. A. C. , for short, has committed a manifest error of law by interfering with the findings recorded by the trial Court that agreement of sale, as alleged by the respondent, was notexecuted and that it was a fictitious document manufactured by respondent, as the said finding was based on trial Courts own observations and impressions gathered from the evidence on record and the opinion formed regarding the signature and thumb impressions appearing on the agreement of sale attributed to be of the appellants with which no interference could legally be made even in exercise of power of appeal under S. 93, C. P. C. in absence of glaring absurdities in the reasonings on which the view was formed by the trial Court; (B) The L. A. C. illegally interfered with the findings which were recorded by the trial Court on the basis of the assessment of evidence and circumstances showing in a natural way the falsehood of the case of respondent which he had set up in the plaint illegally ignoring the overwhelming prominent features showing falsehood of respondent case; and (C) The L. A. C. illegally discarded the notice dated 4-5-1977 and the testimony of Sri Nahar Singh, Advocate through whom the said notice was sent by respondent to the appellants on wholly irrelevant and legally unsustainable grounds which vitiate the finding recorded by it on the question of genuineness of the agreement of sale. ( 8 ) ARGUMENTS in this appeal on behalf of the appellants were heard on 12-7-1996 when Sri S. A. Zilani, Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent sought time to prepare the case for arguing the case on behalf of respondent. On his request the case was directed to be listed on 18-7l996. On 18-7-1996, instead of Sri Zilani, Sri M. C. Tewari, Advocate appeared and sought adjournment on behalf of the respondent to enable him to file his appearance on behalf of respondent saying that Sri Zilani had returned the brief to the respondent who had since engaged him. On his request the case was directed to be listed on 18-7l996. On 18-7-1996, instead of Sri Zilani, Sri M. C. Tewari, Advocate appeared and sought adjournment on behalf of the respondent to enable him to file his appearance on behalf of respondent saying that Sri Zilani had returned the brief to the respondent who had since engaged him. The request made by Sri Tewari for appearance in the case of the condition of grant of adjournment was rejected. He was, however, asked to argue the case if he could. Sri Tewari, however, expressed his inability to argue the case specially in the midst of the arguments in the case; he expressed his ignorance about the fact that the case already in the midst of argument before he agreed to appear in the case. Sri Tewari, however, requested that he may be given time to communicate his refusal to the respondent so that he may make alternative arrangement. Accordingly, a days time was allowed to the respondent as per request of Sri M. C. Tewari, Advocate. On 19th July, respondent himself appeared along with his written arguments and expressed his desire to argue the case himself. Accordingly, he was heard on 19-7-1996. ( 9 ) SRI Sharma, the respondent in his oral submission contended that the conclusions drawn by the L. A. C. for decreeing the suit are conclusions of fact which this Court, exercising power under S. 100, C. P. C. , cannot disturb and, therefore, the appeal lacked merit which deserves to be dismissed. He further reiterated that the findings recorded by the L. A. C. are just and proper which are based on proper appreciation of evidence and are also fully backed by the judicial propriety and on merits also the findings do not call for interference by this Court as the same cannot be said to be perverse nor against the settled principles of law. ( 10 ) AFTER giving my thought to the rival contentions made by learned counsel for the appellants and also by the respondent, both in his oral and written submissions, I do not feel inclined to agree with the contentions of the respondent. ( 11 ) THERE should be no doubt at all that the controversy involved in the case is basically a controversy of fact. ( 11 ) THERE should be no doubt at all that the controversy involved in the case is basically a controversy of fact. The conclusions arrived at by the Courts of law for settlement of factual controversy is to be based on settled principles of law of evidence and prudence and if the findings of fact are recorded in a manner which is not recognised by law nor is acceptable as per the settled principles of law, such findings, though of fact, have to be branded as finding vitiated by law which, in any case, has to be set aside so as to restore justice to the aggrieved party who feels injured from the uncalled for findings of fact which are not warranted from the evidence on record and from the circumstances prevailing in the case specially so when the entire case rests on the said finding. ( 12 ) THIS Court exercising second appellate power under S. 100, C. P. C. has been conferred power to interfere with the findings of L. A. C. which are recorded by it in clear breach of legal procedure or by committing apparent error of law which goes to the root of matter. Though wrongful appreciation of evidence is no ground for interference by the Court but where wrong onus of proof has been placed or if a documentary evidence has been utterly misconstrued or amaterial piece of evidence has been ignored from consideration of the L. A. C. in recording a finding this Court has good reasons to set aside such a finding though it is one of the facts. Similarly, gross misappreciation of evidence going to the root of the matter also justifies High Courts interference in second appeal. Again, if weight of evidence is ignored and judgment is allowed to be influenced by irrelevant matters it will be open for this Court to itself appraise the evidence and come to a finding of its own. ( 13 ) THERE should, therefore, be no doubt left with the power of this Court under S. 100, C. P. C. justifying its interference against findings of fact recorded by L. A. C. in total disregard of the settled principles of appreciation of evidence. ( 13 ) THERE should, therefore, be no doubt left with the power of this Court under S. 100, C. P. C. justifying its interference against findings of fact recorded by L. A. C. in total disregard of the settled principles of appreciation of evidence. Where the L. A. C. has recorded findings on its surmises and conjectures, though the finding is one of fact ostensibly based on appreciation of evidence, though on its very face it is not so and the findings in question have been arrived at by the L. A. C. in utter disregard of the settled norms relating to appreciation of evidence, the High Court will not at all hesitate in upsetting that finding and restoring the one, recorded by the trial Court. ( 14 ) L. A. C. has power to reappraise evidence only on set norms. It has no power to outrightly reject the findings recorded by the trial Court and substitute its own because it has some other view to take in the matter. Power of L. A. C. to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court is, thus, subject to the settled legal norms; the power is not a naked or arbitrary power to enable the L. A. C. to substitute its own opinion in the matter in place of the one lawfully arrived at by the trial Court. It can do so, no doubt, if the trial Courts findings are against the evidence and have been arrived at in utter disregard of the evidence on record or when the finding is based on no evidence or for coming to the finding the trial Court has misconstrued any documentary evidence or the finding had been arrived at in utter disregard of the provision of law. ( 15 ) IN the present case, the trial Court after appreciating the oral testimony of D. W. 1, the scribe, the expert of the hand-writing and finger prints reached to the conclusion that the deed of agreement set up by the respondent was a fake document which was never executed by the appellant nor the appellant was paid the sum of Rs. 12,000. 00 as was alleged by the respondent. 12,000. 00 as was alleged by the respondent. For reaching on these vital conclusions of fact, the trial Court noticed existence of the following circumstances which clearly supported the version of the appellants herein : (A) Non-production of Hukum Singh as a witness by the respondent although as per the case set up by respondent himself the deal for the sale of the land was settled in his presence between appellants and the respondent including the rate on which the land was to be sold specially so when respondents said version had been specifically denied by the appellants. In the opinion of the trial Court there was no reason for non-production of Hukum Singh in the witness-box though he was alive and was available for being produced as a witness. On the circumstances, could it be said that the trial Court acted illegally in taking note of this aspect for forming the opinion. If the version of settlement of deed of sale of the land and its rate as asserted by the respondent was denied by the appellants, the fact that the said settlement between the two parties took place had to be proved by an independent witness. In the absence of suggestion from the side of respondent that Hukum Singh before whom the deal had been settled, had been won over by the appellants, there should have been no reason for his non-production as witness in Court who alone was in a position to reveal the truth. Therefore due to non-production of Hukum Singh as witness by the respondent the very bottom of the case set up by the respondent stood knocked out. The trial Court was fully justified in believing that non-production of Hukum Singh by the respondent was deliberate so as to prevent the Court to know the correct position in this regard. In my opinion, the trial Courts assessment of the above version of respondent in the light of the above circumstances of the case was fully justified which left no room whatsoever for interference by the L. A. C. exercising its power under S. 96, C. P. C. Simply because the L. A. C. can solve how form another opinion than the one formed by the trial Court on the facts and circumstances of the case, offers no ground for interference by L. A. C. against the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court. (B) Statement of Nahar Singh, Advocate, D. W. 1 and the proof of the notice dated 4-5-1971 paper No. 33-A by him which was sent by the respondent to the appellants to state that he and not the appellants in whose name the land in dispute was purchased by him benami, was real owner. The L. A. C. discarded the notice and the testimony of Nahar Singh on the ground, firstly, that Nahar Singh had not produced the Vakalatnama duly signed by respondent appointing him as his lawyer for sending the notice and, secondly, the appellants had failed to file the original notice he received from the respondent through Nahar Singh and Nahar Singh was unable to explain the whereabouts of the original. Both these circumstances relied on by the L. A. C. were opposed to law and is also based on the misreading of evidence. In this statement, Nahar Singh; D. W. 1 had clearly stated that he had sent carbon copy of the notice to the defendant. At another place, he stated that he had sent notice on behalf of respondent as per his instructions and had also sent another notice to appellants (Ext. 34-A) on behalf of Sudarshan Kumar, respondents son. The fact that carbon copy of the notice was sent to the appellants very much established the fact that what the appellants had filed was the original notice and not its copy. If Nahar Singh failed to account for the original that reason was not a good one to discard the version of the appellants when Nahar Singh, an important person of status had supported that version. Still the L. A. C. totally ignoring this part of statement of Nahar Singh rejected the notice on the ground that it was a copy and not the original. In view of the statement of Nahar Singh that carbon copy of the notice was sent to appellant, there remained no justification at all to justify discarding of that notice which was clearly admissible under S. 65 (a) of the Evidence Act. The other reason for discarding the evidence of Sri Nahar Singh, Advocate which has been given by the L. A. C. too is not acceptable on legal plank as it is opposed to normal practice. The other reason for discarding the evidence of Sri Nahar Singh, Advocate which has been given by the L. A. C. too is not acceptable on legal plank as it is opposed to normal practice. No lawyer is under legal duty to obtain a signed vakalatnama from his client for performing any legal work, say, giving opinion, sending notices, drafting petitions or other documents. A signed Vakalatnama, however, is required to be obtained when it is to be filed in law Courts or Tribunals where the law requires such document to be filed to enable the lawyer to appear and plead cases in Courts and Tribunals on behalf of his client executing the vakalatnama in his favour. The L. A. C. , thus, committed manifest illegality by discarding the notice (Ext. 33-A) and the oral testimony of Sri Nahar Singh, Advocate or abovementioned two flimsy grounds. To add colour to its above baseless observations and conclusions the L. A. C. also went beyond the judicial norm in branding Sri Nahar Singh manufacturer of forged documents. There was not even iota of justification for disbelieving the testimony of Nahar Singh nor for making observations against him which on the material on record were wholly unjustified and deserved to be branded as abnoxious remarks apart from being tortuous. Evidence present on the record fully established that Nahar Singh, Advocate had been approached by the respondent through Hukum Singh who had introduced the respondent to him and on respondents asking both the notices 33-A and 34-A were sent by Nahar Singh to the appellant No. 1. Sending of notice to the said appellant by Nahar Singh on behalf of respondents son having been admitted by the respondent there was no reason for the L. A. C. to disbelieve Nahar Singh until he proved by producing Hukum Singh as a witness that he never met Nahar Singh, Advocate for asking him to send the two notices. Until Hukum Singh controverted the version of Nahar Singh, there was absolutely no scope for doubting the verson given by Nahar Singh when his version was partly corroborated by receipt of 33-A and 34-A by Baru Singh and admitted sending of 34a to Baru Singh by respondents son. Until Hukum Singh controverted the version of Nahar Singh, there was absolutely no scope for doubting the verson given by Nahar Singh when his version was partly corroborated by receipt of 33-A and 34-A by Baru Singh and admitted sending of 34a to Baru Singh by respondents son. Further, that 33-A and 34-A received by Baru Singh from Nahar Singh were carbon copies added more authenticity to the version given by Baru Singh and support to that version by Nahar Singh at the same time falsifying that of the respondent. If on these circumstances, trial Court admitted the notice 33-A in evidence and believed the testimony of Nahar Singh, it committed no illegality or wrong calling for interference by the L. A. C. on appeal under S. 96, C. P. C. Thus, by discarding most important testimony of Nahar Singh and notice 33-A, the L. A. C. illegally came to the conclusion that the agreement deed had been executed by the appellants for selling the suit land to the respondent. Had the notice been accepted and admitted in evidence as it had been duly proved by Nahar Singh, there was absolutely no chance for the L. A. C. to reach to the conclusion that the agreement deed in question had been executed by the appellants because if anagreement of sale of the land had been already executed by the appellants there was no occasion or necessity for the respondent to send the notice 33-A in view of respondents own assertions in the notice 33-A that he was the real owner of the land in suit whereas the appellants were only ostensible owners being benami. Thus, by discarding the notice and the testimony of Nahar Singh the L. A. C. removed a very important piece of evidence of the appellants which was very material circumstance to falsify respondents version about execution of the agreement of sale. Coupled with the fact that a serious dent in respondents story (version) had already been caused due to the non-production of Hukum Singh as a witness though he was the most natural and important witness for resolving the controversy regarding settlement of the deal regarding sale of land and respondents approaching Nahar Singh for sending notice 33-A to the appellants. Coupled with the fact that a serious dent in respondents story (version) had already been caused due to the non-production of Hukum Singh as a witness though he was the most natural and important witness for resolving the controversy regarding settlement of the deal regarding sale of land and respondents approaching Nahar Singh for sending notice 33-A to the appellants. (C) The L. A. C. has wrongly given much emphasis on the statement of Sri Mahesh Chand, P. W. 1, the writer of the agreement deed. It is well known fact of which judicial notice may also be taken that in the matter of purchase of paper settlement of terms including fees payable to scribe of the document and expenses to be incurred in the execution and registration of documents of title or contract of sale of immovable property major role is played by the purchaser or the would be purchaser. Where execution of a document itself is denied, it is not at all prudent nor it is legally permissible to place too much reliance on the testimony of the scribe so as to blindly believe him for proving execution of the document. ( 16 ) THE L. A. C. in the present case, has not only utilised the testimony of Mahesh Chand for proving the execution of the deed of agreement in question, which was vehemently denied but it also utilised his testimony for proving the : (A) settlement of terms and conditions of the sale of the land between appellants and the respondent; (B) Signing of the deed by the appellants; and (c) Payment of the amount of Rs. 12,000. 00 to appellants by way of the agreement money. ( 17 ) IT is most unnatural that deal for sale including price payable for the sale of the land is settled somewhere else (herein at the Ghar of Sri Hukum Singh ) whereas the other terms regarding payment of instant money, the period for the execution of the agreement, the default clause etc. will be settled before the scribe. Since respondent could not win over Hukum Singh to falsely depose in his favour obviously he found an easy bet in the scribe who as a professional agreed to say everything he was asked to by the respondent. will be settled before the scribe. Since respondent could not win over Hukum Singh to falsely depose in his favour obviously he found an easy bet in the scribe who as a professional agreed to say everything he was asked to by the respondent. Otherwise also there were glaring contradictions in the testimony of Mahesh Chand which were very conveniently ignored by the L. A. C. ( 18 ) MAHESH Chand, in his examination-in-Chief, stated that all the appellants (defendants) had signed the deed of agreement in his presence whereas in cross-examination he changed his version and said that only Baru Singh had signed in his presence whereas others had not signed in his presence. This change of version by him coupled with apparent disparities in the signature of Baru Singh admitted by respondents own expert Sri A. S. Kapoor and the doubtful characteristics present in the thumb impression of Smt. Dropadi Devi, defendant No. 3 clearly indicated that the agreement deed in question was a bogus document which was prepared obviously for getting rid of the legal obstacle which had been created by the enactment of the prohibition of Benami Transactions Act in view whereof it was not possible for the respondent to get the land back from the appellants who according to the notice (33-A) sent by him to Baru Singh etc. through Sri Nahar Singh, Advocate claimed the appellants were only benami whereas he himself was the real owner of the said land. As per the observations of the trial Court, in my view too, it is most unlikely to happen that a person will pay full price (almost full price in this case) at the time of execution of the agreement deed in respect of the land he is going to purchase after two years and that too on an unregistered agreement without obtaining possession of the land and further the agreement deed is not considered necessary to be witnessed by independent witnesses. ( 19 ) IT is common knowledge that in villages people do not leave anything for chance and take with them as many people to witness the deeds of agreement of sale of land specially the person with whose mediation the deal for the sale had been settled. If what respondent said was correct (that the deal of the sale of the land by Baru Singh etc. If what respondent said was correct (that the deal of the sale of the land by Baru Singh etc. and the price payable for it was settled in the Gher of Hukum Singh in his presence) it was most natural thing for the respondent that Hukum Singh would have been asked by him to accompany him to the scribe to witness the agreement of sale. It is strange that L. A. C. paid no attention to this important aspect of the case. ( 20 ) THE L. A. C. is no doubt right in holding that law does not require a marginal witness to witness a contract of sale but the nature of the present transaction and the circumstances surrounding it make it unbelievable without there being an independent witness that the agreement was actually executed, L. A. C. s view that the scribe of the deed was an independent witness, is too much to ask. A scribe engaged by a purchaser is paid his fees by the purchaser. He is supposed to support and help the party who has paid him his fees; like an expert of the hand-writing and finger-prints engaged by a private party, scribe too is engaged by one party who generally supports the party paying his fees. The fate of respondents whole case depends on the oral testimony of the scribe alone as the respondent had no other witness to support his case. Hukum Singh, who was the most crucial and natural witness as per respondents own version, too was not produced. Therefore, it could not be ruled out that Mahesh Chand, the scribe was heavily paid by the respondent so as to avail of his services for filling in all the gaps in his case for proving his entire plaint case. Respondent left everything for the scribe to prove by saying that terms and conditions of the agreement of sale, except the rate of purchase of the land was settled in the presence of the scribe. The compelling reason for showing settlement of the rate at which land was agreed to be sold by the appellants in the presence of Hukum Singh was obviously to explain away the reason of bringing of the money (Rs. The compelling reason for showing settlement of the rate at which land was agreed to be sold by the appellants in the presence of Hukum Singh was obviously to explain away the reason of bringing of the money (Rs. 12,000/-) by the respondent on that date when the agreement was allegedly written by the scribe otherwise that too would have been left to be proved by the scribe Sri Mahesh Chand. Due to non-production of Hukum Singh as a witness the respondent failed to prove the deal of the sale and the price payable for it including the amount which was to be paid at the time of the execution of the agreement specially in the light of respondents own admission that he had no meeting with appellants between his meeting in the Gher of Hukum Singh and at the seat of the scribe, Sri Mahesh Chand. Carrying and paying the amount of Rs. 12,000. 00 by respondent the time of execution of the agreement of sale in question was also not justified in absence of proof of another meeting of appellants and respondent for settlement of the same which admittedly had not been settled in the Gher of Hukum Singh. ( 21 ) THE trial Court though took into consideration the absence of proof of meeting of appellants and respondent for settlement of the point of time and date for going to the scribe and money to be paid for getting the agreement deed executed, no attention, however, was paid to this important aspect by the LAC which conveniently ignored it. ( 22 ) SIMILARLY, the LAC tried to make light of the blatant infirmities in the signature of Baru Singh, the appellant No. 1 on the agreement deed and the thumb impression of Smt. Dropadi Devi, the defendant No. 3 observations of trial court in this regard was as follows :thumb impression of Dropadi Devi, defendant No. 3"this document does contain thumb impressions of Smt. Dropadi Devi, defendant No. 3 with blue ink. They are admittedly blurred. It is another un-usual feature. Sri Mahesh Chand P. W. 1 has stated. . . . . that he does keep ink and pad in his office. Hence it was but natural that the thumb impression of Smt. Dropadi Devi should not have been blurred. This document does contain thumb impression at 3 different places. They are admittedly blurred. It is another un-usual feature. Sri Mahesh Chand P. W. 1 has stated. . . . . that he does keep ink and pad in his office. Hence it was but natural that the thumb impression of Smt. Dropadi Devi should not have been blurred. This document does contain thumb impression at 3 different places. Hence at least one or two of these three thumb impressions should have been decipherable even if this case of the plaintiff is accepted that these thumb impressions were affixed with the ink without sufficiently spreading it over the ink pad. The scribe, a man of such vast experience, would have not left any possibility of leaving the thumb impressions of Smt. Dropadi Devi undecipherable or blurred". ( 23 ) IN regard to the signature of Baru Singh, the trial Courts observations were as follows :"in my view, the expert opinion of the defendants is worth reliance. Because, the disputed signatures baru Singh appearing on the agreement deed 6/a do not contain the natural and inherent characteristics of the defendant No. 1, Sri Baru Singh. Admittedly, Sri Baru Singh, defendant No. 1 has been having trembling (Rasha) for the last 50 years. Hence, he was not expected to make even a small part of the each letter of his signature smoothly without tremor and this thing is visibly found in the specimen and admitted signatures of Sri Baru Singh defendant No. 1 whose enlarged photos filed from the side of the defendants are 93/c and 94-C and filed from the side of the defendants are 70/c and 71/c. In the signatures contain in these photos, we would find tremor of an intensive nature, persisting in every single stroke. But in the questioned signatures of Baru Singh appearing on the agreement deed 6/a there are a number of teamors free strokes. For instance, in the body loops of letters b of the signature of the defendant No. 1 enlarged on photos 88/c and 89/c and in the body loop of letter r as enlarged on photographs 87/c and 88/c there is no tremor. These loops are formed as smoothly as are formed by a normal man having no trembling. For instance, in the body loops of letters b of the signature of the defendant No. 1 enlarged on photos 88/c and 89/c and in the body loop of letter r as enlarged on photographs 87/c and 88/c there is no tremor. These loops are formed as smoothly as are formed by a normal man having no trembling. Regarding Baru Singh the lower appellate Court has observed that Baru Singh defendant No. 1 is a very old man aged about 76 years and he admittedly has got trembling in his hand for the last 50 years. There are clear signs of tremors in the signature of B Rathauar on the document 6a. The trembling naturally increases with the age. The document in question was executed in February, 1968. The written statement was filed by Baru Singh in August, 1976 and the specimen signatures were given by him in March, 74 i. e. after a lapse of about five or six years. During this long period, naturally trembling must have increased and it is no wonder if his admitted and specimen signatures have more tremors then that in the signatures appearing on 6-A. " ( 24 ) REGARDING defects pointed out by the trial Court in the thumb impression of Smt. Dropadi Devi, nothing was said by the lower appellate Court So far as the observation made by the LAC regarding infirmities printed out in the disputed signature of Baru Singh by the trial Court are based on presumptions amounting to its own surmises and conjectures. There was no evidence on record to justify the presumption that the trembling in the hands of Baru Singh had increased all of a sudden. It was admitted to the parties that Baru Singh had trembling in his hands since last 50 years then without specific proof of sudden increase in the trembling in the recent past, there was no justification whatsoever for the LAC to assume that the trembling in the hand of Baru Singh in the year 1968 was minor which subsequently became accute in the years 1973 and 1974. Once the signatures of Baru Singh on paper No. 6-A were found differing from his admitted and specimen signature then without support of evidence justifying the observations of the LAC, noted herein before, there could be no doubt the only conclusion that signatures of Baru Singh on the agreement deed in question had been forged. ( 25 ) NO doubt, the finding that the agreement in question (6-A) was executed by- defendant-appellants is one of the fact but this finding is the meat of the case on which depended the fate of the entire case. If the finding on the question was to be in the affirmative, the suit had to be decreed. Finding on the question, therefore, had to be arrived on proper and lawful appreciation of evidence in a most careful manner on the well established norm. The variation in the disputed and admitted and specimen signatures of Baru Singh as per the observations of the trial court clearly gave rise to doubt as to its genuineness whereas in his admitted signatures there were visible tremor in each of the words at every stroke of the per but in his disputed signatures the tremor was to be found only in letter b at one place which clearly demonstrated that it was a made up tremor to make it appear as the signature of Baru Singh. The LAC. , therefore, was absolutely wrong in trying to explain away absence of tremors in the disputed signatures of Baru Singh which were prominently found present in his specimen and admitted signatures by giving wholly unsustainable reasons for which there was no evidentiary justification on the record. I am, thus, of the opinion that this Court will certainly be justified in setting aside such findings of facts if it is recorded by the LAC in total dis-regard of admissible evidence and glaring circumstances justifying conclusions of fact reached by the trial court on those questions. If reasoning of the LAC given for supporting its finding are based on Court surmises and conjectures it offers more of a ground for this Court to set aside such a finding though it is one of fact. If reasoning of the LAC given for supporting its finding are based on Court surmises and conjectures it offers more of a ground for this Court to set aside such a finding though it is one of fact. The conclusion, therefore, from the evidence on the record of the case is that the trial Court was absolutely right in holding that the agreement in question (paper No. 6-A) had not been executed by Baru Singh and the other defendants and that the said document was a manufactured document. ( 26 ) THERE should be no doubt that law does not require an agreement of sale to be registered and attested by witnesses in case, the said agreement witnesses transfer of possession of the property which is subject matter of the agreement of sale in favour of the proposed purchaser but at the same time it is also not possible normally to believe that respondent will pay almost entire sale consideration to appellants which was the amount settled for sale of the land in dispute at the time of execution of the agreement of sale without the agreement witnessing the transfer of possession of the property in favour of respondent. This coupled with the absence of the signatures of any independent witness to the agreement of sale justifiably, created very serious doubt that such an agreement of sale was executed and the amount of Rs. 12,000. 00 was paid to the appellants in respect thereof. ( 27 ) CIRCUMSTANCES, present in the case clearly speak out and corroborate the defence story of the appellants that respondent had sent notice 33-A to them the claim that the land in suit was his property as he was the actual owner and not of the appellants who were its ostensible owners being benami. From the circumstances, it cannot be ruled out that respondent, tried to manufacture bogus deed of agreement of sale on behalf of the appellants in his favour showing payment of almost entire sale consideration at the time of the execution of the agreement and leaving only a nominal amount of Rs. 1000. 00 which was left to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. 1000. 00 which was left to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. He did not succeed in getting signature s of Sri Hukum Singh on the said agreement as witness obviously for the reason that Hukum Singh was not prepared to be a party to it although it appears earlier respondent had some hope that Hukum Singh may support him in his fraudulent act. ( 28 ) BE that as it may, the evidence in record clearly establishes without any iota of doubt that the story set up by the respondent regarding execution of agreement of sale and payment of sum of Rs. 12,000. 00 out of a sum of Rs. 13,000/for which the land in dispute was to be sold, was fully exploded and found not proved. The L. A. C. however, tried to remove apparent infirmities in the evidence tendered by the respondent by trying to explain away the same on conjectures and surmises which have already been noticed hereinbefore. ( 29 ) ALTHOUGH neither the trial Court nor the LAC have given any consideration to the sufficiency of the amount for which the land in dispute (more than 50 bighas) was allegedly settled to be sold by the appellants to the respondent but this too was a circumstance deserving notice to be taken by the Courts below. Agreement of sale of over 50 bighas of land for a petty sum of Rs. 13,000. 00 was also a relevant consideration which adds to the doubt which have been already pointed out above about the genuineness of the agreement of sale in question set up by the respondents. ( 30 ) THE trial Court had also noticed that description of the land which according to the respondent was subject matter of the agreement of sale and its description in the plank initially filed, were quite different, With the result, the respondent made several attempts by it filling more than one application for the amendment of the plaint so as to give correct description of the land which was owned by the appellants in respect where of he tried to obtain a decree in his favour in the suit. The fact that the land in suit was not correctly described in the agreement of sale as also in the plaint initially filed, also clearly establishes that appellants had no hand in the preparation of the agreement of sale which appears to be an unilateral act of the respondent so as to grab the property of the appellants on the pretext of the agreement of sale. The LAC casually overlooked this glaring circumstance against the respondent and tried to explain it on misconceived reasonings. ( 31 ) FROM that has been discussed above and the circumstances prevailing in the case and the evidence on record which have been referred to hereinabove, there should be no doubt that the LAC recorded finding regarding genuineness of the agreement of sale by rejecting important evidence and by overlooking glaring circumstances falsifying it. With the result, findings recorded by it hat to be set aside by this Court even in the exercise of its powers under S. 100, CPC. From the discussion made hereinabove, it is apparent that glaring illegality has been committed by the LAC in appreciation of evidence and in recording of findings in question which goes to the root of the dispute involved in the case. ( 32 ) IN his written submissions, Sri Sharma, the respondent has given reference to case law for supporting his argument on the points (a) necessity of attesting witness on agreement of sale; (b) mode of proof of signature on a document and value to be given to the expert opinion all of which was fully considered and view in this regard has been formed keeping in view the judicial precedents applicable on the points in issue which need not be noticed in this judgment. ( 33 ) THE result of above discussion is that this Second Appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs through out; the judgment and decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of trial Court is restored. The uncalled for and wholly unjustified observations of Lower Appellate Court against Sri Nahar Singh, Advocate shall also stand expunged. Appeal allowed .