PARITOSH K. MUKHERJEE, J. A usual clamour for seniority forms the theme of the present writ petition. The petitioners claim that although they were appointed much earlier in the grade of Rs. 3200-4875 than the contesting respondent Nos. 3 to 9, nevertheless, simply because they were appointed/designated as Deputy Registrar later than the respondent Nos. 3 to 9, they cannot be treated as junior to the aforesaid respondents. 2. The petitioners have also alternatively prayed for declaration to the effect that Rule 34 of the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conduct) Rules, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) is unconstitu tional, being ultra vires Articles 14, 16 and 2i of the Constitution of India. 3. The basic facts, pertinent to the issue in question, may be stated as follows : (a) On 5-3-1992, the petitioner No. 1, namely, Sri Rais Ahmad was appointed as Private Secretary (Senior Scale ). The petitioner No. 2 was appointed as such, on 26-8-1992. The post of PS (Senior Scale) carries the same pay-scale, which is admissible to the post of Deputy Registrar, i. e. , Rs. 3200-4875. The petitioners were thereafter appointed as Deputy Registrars on 1-6-1993 and 24-7-1995, respectively. (b) On the direction of this Court, the petitioner have impleaded respondent Nos. 3 to 9, who can be affected by adverse judgment of this Court. They have been duly impleaded, and served as well. One of them, namely, Sri R. S. Pandey has also filed a counter-affidavit. The other respondents, despite due service, have not answered the writ petition. (c) The petitioners have described the entire career graph of the newly added respondents. These necessary facts have been stated in paragraphs 14-A to 14-F of the writ petition. This too was amended consequent upon impleadment of the afore said respondents. These facts clearly disclose that S/sri R. S. Pandey, Diwakar Misra and J. P. Chaurasia were appointed in class II service, in the pay-scale of Rs. 2000- 3500, much later to the petitioner No. 1. For better understanding, a chart, showing the respective date of promotion to the class II and class I service, to the establishment of this Court, in respect of petitioners and respondent Nos. 3 to 9, is being set out, herein-below :- @table Names Petitioners :- 1. Sri Rais Ahmad 2. Sri R. C. Upadhyaya Respondents :- 1. R. S. Pandey 2. Diwakar Misra 3. 3 to 9, is being set out, herein-below :- @table Names Petitioners :- 1. Sri Rais Ahmad 2. Sri R. C. Upadhyaya Respondents :- 1. R. S. Pandey 2. Diwakar Misra 3. J. P. Chaurasia (retired on 31-3-1996) 4. M. I. Jafri 5. H. C. Srivastava 6. Mohanji Srivastava 7. K. B. Srivastava Date of promotion to class II post in the pay-scale of (Rs. 2000-3500) Date of promotion to upgraded scale of pay (Rs, 3000-4500) Date of promotion as Asstt. Registrar (Rs. 2200-4000) Date of promotion F* as PPS/ps (SG)/dr 5 9-7-1968 7-8-1968 28-6-1985 8-7-1986 3-2-1986 1-3-1986 1-4-1989 2-5-1990 1-9-1989 l-i-1988 1-9-1988 5-4-1992 2-11-1992 (Transferred to the post of DR w. e. f. 1-6-199j) (Transferred to the post of DR w. e. f. 24-7-1995) 5-3-1992 26-8-1992 17-6-1995 (d) Thus, it is absolutely clear from a bare perusal of the aforesaid chart that the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are, without any manner of doubt, much senior to the respondent Nos. 3 to 9. These respondents are juniors by 17 to 18 years. It, prima facie, sounds unreasonable and inequities that the persons, who had all along, throughout the course of service, been senior to res pondent Nos. 3 to 9, should be denied the seniority when they are about to shores. Should rule be interpreted in such a manner as to reverse the settled course, and, thus breed inequity, arbitrari ness and unreasonableness (e) In this regard, before embarking upon the controversy raised in this behalf, it may be pointed out that the settled canon of construction is that the consistent effort of the court should be to rationalise the rule, and, make it harmonious and com patible with Ihe requirement of reasonableness, fairness and non-arbitrariness, as enshrined in the Constitution of India. Unconstitutionality is last resort. We do feel that the construc tion, which we are giving to the rule, is that the rule would be wholly reasonable and it will ensure fairness and even handed treatment to all the echelons of service in the establishment of this Court. It would not work injustice ; rather promote justice and fair play. 4. Sri Ravi Kant, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that any rule, which forfeits the length of service in the matter of seniority, is, per se, arbitrary. It would not work injustice ; rather promote justice and fair play. 4. Sri Ravi Kant, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that any rule, which forfeits the length of service in the matter of seniority, is, per se, arbitrary. Therefore, all efforts should be made to rationalise, and, bring the rule of determining seniority in consonance to the principles of equality, fairness, and reasonableness, as enshrined in Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. He further contended that Rule 34 of the Rules, which governs seniority, consciously and delibe rately uses the words categories of posts in contradistinction of cadre or pests. According to him, posts of Deputy Registrar, Private Secretary (Senior Scale) and Principal Private Secretary to the Chief Justice fall on the same category ; being in the same pay-scale. 5. To buttress the aforesaid plea, he points out the distinction in phraseology used in Rule 20 (b) (i) and (ii) of the Rules. While Rule 20 (b) (i) speaks of promotion from inferior posts, Rule 20 (b) (ii) speaks of appointment by transfer. Thus, it clearly gives rise to an irresistible inference that these three posts fall in the same category. The posts of PS (Senior Scale), PPS to Chief Justice are not inferior to that of DR. They form one cluster of posts. 6. According to Sri Ravi Kant, Rule 34 takes care of only vertical appointment/promotion and not horizontal appointments. Rule 20 (b) (i) covers vertical promotion/appointment, i. e. , appointment from inferior to superior post. On the other hand, Rule 20 (b) (ii) takes care of horizontal appointments, i. e. from one parallel post to another parallel post. Sri Ravi Kant further contended that it cannot be said that the post of DR is a post of higher responsibility, so as to bring it out of one category of post. 7. Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Additional Advocate General, repre senting High Court, countered the aforesaid pleas. According to him, a cursory glance at the rules would bear out that the posts of PS (Senior Scale), PPS to Chief Justice belong to entirely different and distinct cadre. Therefore, appointment of PS (Senior Scale) and PPS to the post of DR is an appointment to an altogether new cadre/post. According to him, a cursory glance at the rules would bear out that the posts of PS (Senior Scale), PPS to Chief Justice belong to entirely different and distinct cadre. Therefore, appointment of PS (Senior Scale) and PPS to the post of DR is an appointment to an altogether new cadre/post. Therefore, the petitioners cannot be extended the benefit of length of service rendered by them on the other post in view of Rule 34 of the Rules. 8. According to Sri Dwivedi, the aforesaid inference is strengthened by reading together Rules 20, 22 and 34 of the Rules. According to him, a cumulative reading of these rules would reveal that PPS to Chief Justice, and PS (Senior Scale) form an entirely distinct and different stream. The incumbents of these posts are to be drawn and confined to permanent PS, including the PPS to Chief Justice. Persons belonging to other cadres, or, categories of posts cannot be appointed either as PPS, or, PS (Senior Scale ). The manner of selection too is entirely different. 9. Sri Dwivedi further contends that Rule 20 was amended with a view to remove stagnation amongst the Private Secretaries, as also to provide them further avenues of promotion. But, for the aforesaid amend ment, the Private Secretaries would have been left to stagnate on the post of Private Secretary (Senior Scale), or, PPS to Chief Justice. By appointing them as Deputy Registrar, they now have the prospects of becoming Joint Registrar or Additional Registrar an opportunity, which was hitherto not available to them. Thus, the contention of Sri Dwivedi is that the afore said persons cannot be allowed to carry their seniority, or, length of service rendered on other posts, while claiming benefit of future promotion. 10. Before delving into the aforesaid controversy, it would be neces sary to have a birds eyes view, of the various provisions of rules. Rule 3 (1) of the Rules states that the number of permanent posts of the various categories in classes I, II, III and IV, respectively, in the establishment of the High Court shall be such as may be determined by the Chief Justice, from time to time, with the approval of Government of Uttar Pradesh. 11. Rule 3 (4) is significant. According to it, there shall be separate cadre for each category of posts. 12. 11. Rule 3 (4) is significant. According to it, there shall be separate cadre for each category of posts. 12. Rule 16 of the Rules provides for sources of recruitment to class II posts. They include the posts of Section Officer, General Office ; Bench Secretaries, Grade I, Stamp Reporter, Private Secretaries, Assistant Prin cipal Private Secretary, Librarian and Officer on Special Duty or any other post. So far as Bench Secretaries, Private Secretaries and Assistant Prin cipal Private Secretary are concerned, they are promotional posts. The promotion is confined, in the case of Bench Secretary Grade I, from the post of Bench Secretary Grade II, and, in the case of Private Secretary, from the post of permanent, Personal Assistants. The Asstt. PPS is an ex-cadre post, selected from amongst the Private Secretaries. 13. Rule 20, which relates to the source of recruitment to various class I posts to the establishment of High Court, has already been referred to above. It is not necessary to reproduce the same at this stage. 14. Rule 22 of the Rules lays down method of selection for the posts of PPS to Chief Justice and Deputy Registrar. According to it, the Regis trar is obliged to prepare a list of candidates, eligible for promotion to the post of PPS to Chief Justice or PS in the same pay-scale of PPS. Rule 22 (ii) is significant. It is as follows :- "whenever it is required to make selection or promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar, the Registrar shall prepare four separate lists one each of permanent Section Officers of General Office, permanent Officers on Special Duty, permanent Bench Secre taries Grade I and permanent Private Secretaries including Assistant Principal Private Secretary who are eligible for promotion under these rules. These lists shall be drawn accord ing to the inter se seniority of the candidate on the post from which the promotion is made. " 15. Thus, on a conspectus of provisions of Rules, it is absolutely clear that the post of PPS belongs to the category of Deputy Registrar. Marginal note to Rule 22 provides a vital clue in this behalf. The aforesaid marginal note clubs the two post together. " 15. Thus, on a conspectus of provisions of Rules, it is absolutely clear that the post of PPS belongs to the category of Deputy Registrar. Marginal note to Rule 22 provides a vital clue in this behalf. The aforesaid marginal note clubs the two post together. It is settled rule of interpretation that marginal notes do not form substantive part of the statute ; but, in case of doubt or confusion, aid can be drawn from then to clear the doubt. Since , the rules do not define the term categories of posts, marginal note to Rule 22 clinches the issue. 16. It also meets the argument of Sri Dwivedi, learned Additional Advocate General that the Private Secretaries form entirely separate and different stream. Rule 22 (ii) obliges the Registrar to prepare four separate lists-one each of permanent Section Officer of General Office, permanent Officers on Special Duty, permanent Bench Secretaries Grade I, and perma nent Private Secretaries, including the Assistant Principal Private Secretary, who are eligible for promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar, under the rules. 17. Rule 20 (b) (ii) deliberately uses the term transfer of Principal Private Secretary. It makes conscious distinction between promotion and appointment by transfer. In the case of posts, inferior to Deputy Registrar, Rule 20 (b) (i) deliberately uses the word promotion*. On the other hand, in case of Principal Private Secretary, the term used is trans fer. Use of the term transfer assumes significance, inasmuch as, it has been used on account of sheer difference to an equivalent post. The post of PPS is a post equivalent to that of Deputy Registrar. It is equivalent in terms of Pay-scale, as well as, responsibility. On appointment, by transfer, the emoluments of PPS do not witness a hike. This is in accordance with Fundamental Rule 22-B of the U. P. Fundamental Rules. They provide for stepping up of pay-scale in case a person is appointed on a post, involving higher and greater responsibility. Therefore, there is absolutely no manner of doubt that the post of Deputy Registrar and that of PPS to Chief Justice, or PS (Senior Scale), are equivalent posts and they belong to the same category. 18. Let us new refer to Rule 34 of the Rules, which lays down the manner of determination of seniority. It is as follows :- "34. 18. Let us new refer to Rule 34 of the Rules, which lays down the manner of determination of seniority. It is as follows :- "34. Seniority.- Except as provided in Rule 35 seniority in each category of post in the establishment shall be determined by the date of the order of appointment in a substantive capacity and where more than one persons are appointed together, by the order in which their names are arranged in the said order. " The rule making authority, i. e. , the Honble the Chief Justice, has deliberately refrained from using the word cadre or post. It has delibe rately used the term to each category of post. Category of post may include the cluster of posts, or, it may even consist of a single post, such as, in the case of Registrar, or, Additional Registrar, or Joint Registrar. 19. Since the posts of Principal Private Secretary to the Chief Justice and Private Secretary (Senior Scale) carry same pay-scale as Principal Private Secretary to the Chief Justice, they fall in the same category, in accordance with Rule 34, seniority of incumbents of the post of Deputy Registrar has to be necessarily computed from the date of appointment on substantive capacity in that category of post. Thus, the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 were undeniably appointed much earlier than the respondent Nos. 3 to 9, as Principal Private Secretary to the Chief Justice, and Private Secre tary (Senior Scale) carry same pay-scale as that of Deputy Registrar. 20. The entire burden of the argument of learned Additional Advocate General has been on the word cadre. He has laid great undue emphasis on the word cadre, as used in Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules. Referring to Rules 16, 20 and 22 of the Rules, he contended that the post of PPS to the Chief Justice and PS (Senior Scale) are not equivalent to that of Deputy Registrar. According to him, the aforesaid three posts, i. e. , the posts of PPS to Chief Justice, PS (Senior Scale) and Deputy Registrar, constitute entirely distinct and separate cadre. According to Sri Dwivedi, the posts of PPS and PS (Senior Scale) form entirely different stream. Therefore, feeding channel of the aforesaid posts too is entirely different. 21. According to him, the aforesaid three posts, i. e. , the posts of PPS to Chief Justice, PS (Senior Scale) and Deputy Registrar, constitute entirely distinct and separate cadre. According to Sri Dwivedi, the posts of PPS and PS (Senior Scale) form entirely different stream. Therefore, feeding channel of the aforesaid posts too is entirely different. 21. Proceeding further, Sri Rakesh Dwivedi contended that since the two streams are altogether different, they cannot claim parity, or, contend to a degree of plausibility, that they should be allowed to compute entire length of service rendered by them towards seniority. According to him, appointment or promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar is altogether fresh appointment or promotion. That being so, period of service rendered by them other posts cannot be counted on the post of Deputy Registrar. 22. The aforesaid argument, though seemingly attractive, but does not withstand judicial scrutiny, Rule 8 (4) uses two terms, namely, cadre and each category of posts, differently. The rule making authority was conscious on the distinction of cadre and each category of post. Rules have been framed by as high and learned persons as Chief Justice. It would, therefore, be not prudent to ascribe obliviousness. It would again be equally untenable to treat, the terms as surplus age to the rule. It cannot be said that the terms cadre and each category of post have been used interchangeably. 23. For interpreting as to whether a post falls in one category of posts, one has not to go by history, or, its initial birth marks. For equivalence, as already pointed out, one has to go by the clues and hints, given by the rules themselves. In view of marginal note to Rule 22 and Rule 20 (b) (i) and (ii), conclusion is irresistible and inescapable that three posts in question, namely, PPS to Chief Justice, PS (Senior Scale) and the Deputy Registrar carry the same pay-scale and, thus, they are belonging to the same category of post. 24. In view of marginal note to Rule 22 and Rule 20 (b) (i) and (ii), conclusion is irresistible and inescapable that three posts in question, namely, PPS to Chief Justice, PS (Senior Scale) and the Deputy Registrar carry the same pay-scale and, thus, they are belonging to the same category of post. 24. Equally fallacious is the argument of Sri Dwivedi that since the promotion was provided to the holders of two posts, namely, PPS to Chief Justice and PS (Senior Scale), with a view to remove stagnation in service and provide them with better service prospects, e. g. promotion to higher post of Joint Registrar and Additional Registrar, their appointment or promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar will be treated as fresh one. According to him, but for the aforesaid provisions, the PPS or for that matter, PS (Senior Scale) carrying same pay-scale, would have been Ineligible for further promotion. They would have been stagnating on the aforesaid posts till the end of their career. 25. The aforesaid argument is tenable only in respect of claim for equal pay for equal work. This rule has never been framed with a view to deprive one of his due seniority. The present is not the case of equal pay for equal work. In case of claim of equal pay for equal work, courts have been upholding the distinction or difference of salary, even on the ground of difference in academic qualifications and attainments, experience and degree of responsibility attached to a particular post. These considera tions are altogether irrelevant in case of determination of seniority. 26 At last straw, Sri Dwivedi argued, though feebly, that the rule making authority has an authority to frame rules. Once it lays down criteria for determination of seniority, it is that criteria alone, which will govern the matter. There can be no quarrel with this preposition. But this preposition will always subject to overriding consideration. Such rule has to comport with the constitutionality and reasonableness. If the rules are unreasonable, they are liable to be struck down by courts. 27. However, in view of the course, which we have adopted in the present case, it is unnecessary to embark upon such course of declaring unconstitutional the aforesaid rule. It is settled canon that declaration of a rule as unconstitutional is the last report. If the rules are unreasonable, they are liable to be struck down by courts. 27. However, in view of the course, which we have adopted in the present case, it is unnecessary to embark upon such course of declaring unconstitutional the aforesaid rule. It is settled canon that declaration of a rule as unconstitutional is the last report. Courts should make ail endeavour to interpret rule in a manner so as to harmonise it with rule of fairness, equality and non-arbitrariness. In order to doing so, court may also read down a provision. 28. To give strength to his argument, Sri Rakesh Dwivedi has further referred to Rules 30 and 33 of the Rules. According to Rule 30, on the occurrence of substantive vacancies, appointments have to be made to the various categories of posts in the establishment from the respective list of persons duly selected under the Rules. 29. Rule 32 further states that a person on initial appointment to a post in the establishment in substantive capacity shall be placed on proba tion for a period of one year. Rule 33 speaks about the confirmation. At the end of period of probation or extended period of probation, as the case may be, a probationer shall be confirmed. 30. A close look at the gamut of aforesaid rules, instantly brings out that they refer to appointment on selection. Under Rule 20 (b) (ii) if the appointment is by transfer, there is no selection involved. Thus, the reliance on Rules 30 and 33 of the Rules, placed by Sri Rakesh Dwivedi is wholly misconceived. 31. In support of his contention, Sri Dwivedi has placed reliance in State of Bihar v. Sri Akhouri Sachindra Nath, JT 1991 (?) SC 279. In the aforesaid case, the question for consideration before the Honble Supreme Court was regarding seniority between the direct recruits and promotees. In the Bihar Engineering Service, quota for direct recruit was 75% and for promotees, it was 25%. The promotees were assigned seniority even prior to the date on which they were actually promoted and borne in the service. It was in the backdrop of aforesaid events, the Supreme Court observed as follows ;- "in the instant case, the promotee respondent Nos. 6 to 23 were not born in the cadre of Assistant Engineer in the Bihar Engineering Service, class II at the time when the respondent Nos. It was in the backdrop of aforesaid events, the Supreme Court observed as follows ;- "in the instant case, the promotee respondent Nos. 6 to 23 were not born in the cadre of Assistant Engineer in the Bihar Engineering Service, class II at the time when the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 were directly recruited to the post of Assistant Engineer and as such they cannot be given seniority in the service of Assistant Engineers over the respondent Nos. 1 to 5. It is well-settled that no person can be promoted with retrospective effect from a date when he was not born in the cadre so as to adversely affect others. It is well-settled by several decisions of this Court that amongst the members of the same grade seniority is reckoned from the date of their initial entry into the service. In other words, seniority inter se, amongst the Assistant Engi neers in Bihar Engineering Service Class II will be considered from the date of the length of service rendered as Assistant Engineers. This being their position in law the respondent Nos. 6 to 23 cannot be made senior to the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 by the impugned Government orders as they entered into the said service by promotion after the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 were directly recruited in the quota of direct recruits. The judgment of the High Court quashing the impugned Government orders made in Annexures 8, 9 and 10 is unexceptionable. " Thus, it can be seen that the aforesaid case is clearly inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Undeniably, in the present case, in the context of view being taken by us, it cannot be said that the petitioners were not born in service, namely, in the category of post of Deputy Registrar, since the posts of Principal Private Secretary to the Chief Justice, Private Secretary (Senior Scale) and the Deputy Registrar carry the same scale of pay. 32. Reliance was also placed by Sri Dwivedi in the case of Vinoda Nand Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1994) Supp (2) SCC 44. Here too, the controversy was same, as in the case of State of Bihar v. Sri Akhouri (supra ). 32. Reliance was also placed by Sri Dwivedi in the case of Vinoda Nand Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1994) Supp (2) SCC 44. Here too, the controversy was same, as in the case of State of Bihar v. Sri Akhouri (supra ). In fact, the Supreme Court referred to the aforesaid judgment in the case of State of Bihar v. Sri Akhouri (supra), and approved the view taken by it in the said case. 33. Thus, for the reasons disclosed for the citation of Sri Akhouris case (supra), the present case, i. e. , Vinoda Nand Yadavs case (supra) too is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case, in hand. 34. On the other hand, Sri Ravi Kant, learned counsel for the peti tioners has referred to the case of R. S. Makashi v. I. M. Menon, AIR 1982 SC 101 . In the aforesaid case, Supreme Court has held thus :- ". . . . (d) Persons directly recruited to the BRO. Here is, therefore, a case where the staff for manning a new department has been drawn from four different sources. In such a situation, it was inevitable that some reasonable principles had to be formulated for the determination of inter se seniority of the personnel appointed to work in the different categories of posts in the new organization. . . . " Proceeding further, the Apex Court has held that: ". . . . . It is open to the rule-making authority to take a note of the relevant circumstances obtained in relation to each department and determine with objectivity and fairness what rules should govern the inter se seniority and ranking of the personnel work ing in the concerned departments, and the courts will only insist that the rules so formulated should be reasonable, just and equit able. " (Emphasis supplied) 35. In the same judgment, the Apex Court also made the following observations :- ". . . . We fail to see how the said direction contained in the impugned proviso for preservation of the inter se seniority of deputationists who have been drawn from one and the same Govern ment department to serve the CFD can be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. . . . We fail to see how the said direction contained in the impugned proviso for preservation of the inter se seniority of deputationists who have been drawn from one and the same Govern ment department to serve the CFD can be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. It is a just and whole-some principle com monly applied that in such situations where persons from other departments are drafted to serve on deputation their inter se seniority in the parent department should be respected and preserved during the period of such deputation to the new department. " 36. In K. Madhavan v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SG 2291, the Supreme Court observed as under : "there is not much difference between deputation and transfer. Indeed, when a deputationist is permanently absorbed in the CBI, he is under the rules appointed on transfer. In other words, deputation may be regarded as a transfer from one Government department to another. It will be against all rules of service jurisprudence if a Government servant holding a particular post is transferred to the same or an equivalent post in another Govern ment department, the period of service in the post before his transfer is not taken into consideration in computing his senio rity in the transferred post. The transfer cannot wipe out his length of service in the post from which he has been transferred. It has been observed by this court that it is a just and whole some principle commonly applied where persons from different sources are drafted to serve in a new service that their pre-exist ing total length of service in the parent department should be respected and presented by taking the same into account in determining their ranking in the new service cadre. " (Emphasis supplied) On 16-8-1995, when we heard the petitioners at the time of moving of the writ petition, we had observed as followed : "at the same time this court is the Supreme Court, in unmindful of the decisions of the Supreme Court, in the case of Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1989. In the aforesaid case, in paragraph 5, the apex court has observed as follows : "in our opinion the constitutional objection taken by the petitioner to this part of the notification is well founded and must be accepted as correct. In the aforesaid case, in paragraph 5, the apex court has observed as follows : "in our opinion the constitutional objection taken by the petitioner to this part of the notification is well founded and must be accepted as correct. At the time when the petitioner and the direct recruits were appointed to Grade d there was one class in Grade d formed of direct recruits and the promotees from the grade of artisans. The recruits from both the sources of discrimination could thereafter be made in favour of recruits from one source as against the recruits from the other source in the matter of promotion to Grade c. To put it differently, once the direct recruits and promotees are absorbed in one cadre, they form one class and they cannot be discriminated for the purpose of further promotion to the higher Grade c. In the present case, it is not disputed on behalf of the first respon dent that before the impugned notification was issued there was only one rule of promotion for both the departmental pro motees and the direct recruits and that rule was seniority cum-suitability, and, there was no rule of promotion separately made for application to the direct recruits. " Thus, in Roshan Lals case (supra), the apex court laid down a principle for determination of seniority, as early as in 1967 and the said principle has been followed by Supreme Court all along these years. 37. Thus, in view of the aforesaid observation it is absolutely clear that protection of length of service is a reasonable and wholesome principle for determination of seniority. If it is given a go by, it will instantly expose a rule providing otherwise to charge of arbitrariness and unfairness ; thus, compelling a court to strike it down. 38. Sri Rakesh Dwivedi. learned Additional Advocate General made a vain attempt to distinguish the aforesaid case on the ground that in K. Madhyavan6 case (supra), every person, whether on deputation, or pro motion, had to be deputed as Deputy Superintendent of Police. Thus, feeding channel was the same. Therefore, according to Sri Dwivedi, dicta laid down in the case of K. Madhavan (supra) is confined to the peculiar facts of the said case. 39. The aforesaid argument lacks substances. A distinction is sought to be drawn, which is more imaginary, than real. Thus, feeding channel was the same. Therefore, according to Sri Dwivedi, dicta laid down in the case of K. Madhavan (supra) is confined to the peculiar facts of the said case. 39. The aforesaid argument lacks substances. A distinction is sought to be drawn, which is more imaginary, than real. Even in the present case we have already observed that the posts of Deputy Registrar, Principal Private Secretary to the Chief Justice and Private Secretary (Senior Scale) are equivalent posts. Thus, the ratio laid down in K. Madhavans case (supra) applies with full vigour and force to the facts and circumstances of the present case. There is absolutely no vestige of distinction ; more so, in view of the fact that Supreme Court has put on even footing deputation on transfer. According to the apex court, appointment on deputation is appointment by transfer. In the case of deputation, seniority of the person, i. e. , deputationist, has to be protected and preserved. 40. Sri Ravi Kant, learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance in the case of K. Narayan v. State of Karnataka, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 44. Honble Supreme Court declared the law thus : "a policy decision taken by the Government is not liable to inter ference, unless the court is satisfied that the rule making autho rity has acted arbitrarily or in violation of the funda mental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16. Appoint ment by transfer in the same service or from the different cadre of service but equal in rank and status is well known. But transfer from lower to higher cadre not by promotion but direct appointment only because the incumbent became eligible without any selection, test or criteria may not be in consonance with service discipline. What the rules contemplate is that once a Junior Engineer acquires a degree qualification then he auto matically should be deemed to have become an Assistant Engineer. An employee occupying a higher post in different cadre may on regularisation be entitled to claim his seniority from the date he was holding the post but giving a higher post in different cadre in which the employee has never worked either as officiating or temporary or even ad hoc because the em ployee became eligible earlier would be violative of the right of equality. The methodology adopted in the rules by transferring such a person and placing him in the category of direct recruits from the date of acquiring the degree the Government in our opinion violated the basic norms of appointment and recruit ment to any particular service. The Government may appoint all junior Engineers embolic after framing of the rule and place them below all those who were working as Assistant Engineers on that date but then cannot be so appointed as to get pre cedence over those who are working from before. It would result in artificially making unequals as equals. Any person entering the service can justly feel secure of equality in continu ance, promotion etc. Any executive action violating it cannot be upheld. Seniority is an incident of service which cannot be eroded or curtailed by a rule which operates discriminately. . . . Article 309 of the Constitution empowers the appropriate Legislature to frame rules to regulate recruitment to public service and the post. recruitment according to the dictionary means enlist. It is a comprehensive term and includes any method provided for inducting a person in public service Appointment, selection promotion, deputation are all well known methods of recruit ment. Even appointment by transfer is not unknown. But any rule framed is subject to other provisions of the Constitution. Therefore it has to be tested on rule of equality. Transfer is normally resorted in same cadre" Therefore, the aforesaid observation that the transfer is normally resorted in same cadre, clinches the whole controversy. 41. As already stated, we cannot persuade ourselves to subscribe to view that the Chief Justice, a legal luminary, was so oblivious that he could not, or did not, understand the purport and true import of the words appointment on transfer, when he used it in Rule 2q (b) (ii) of the Rules. These words have assumed technical meaning ; except for weighty and sound reasons, it is difficult to deviate from it. No such reason is forthcoming in the present case. In fact, the view taken by the apex court that normally transfer is resorted in same cadre, totally destroys the argu ment, which has been built up by Sri Dwivedi, before us. 42. No such reason is forthcoming in the present case. In fact, the view taken by the apex court that normally transfer is resorted in same cadre, totally destroys the argu ment, which has been built up by Sri Dwivedi, before us. 42. Sri Ravi Kant further contends, with a view to supplement that the posts of Deputy Registrar, Principal Private Secretary to the Chief Justice and Private Secretary (Senior Scale) are equivalent posts, and the rule of seniority envisaged by Rule 34 of the Rules takes care only of vertical appointment promotion, and, not of horizontal appointment. 43. Rule 20 (b) (i) postulates vertical promotion/appointment, i. e. , appointment from lower or inferior post to higher or superior post. . In such an event, undeniably, rule providing for determination of seniority from the date of substantive appointment cannot be said to be unfair, or, unreasonable, or unwholesome. This is one of the settled criteria for determination of seniority. It does not engender arbitrariness. But the same rule cannot be extended so as to cover the case of horizontal appoint ment, i. e. from one equivalent post to another equivalent post. The case on hand is one of horizontal appointment. 44. It is in view of this contention that Sri Ravi Kant, learned counsel for the petitioness invokes the settled constitutional rule of reading down. The aforesaid rule is, by now, formal entrenched in our constitu tional jurisprudence. It was successfully applied in a number of cases, including the famous case of D. S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 130. The aforesaid rule envisages that all efforts should be made by court to rationalise and hormonise the rule. The endeavour of the court should be to bring the rule, so far as possible, in accordance with constitutional mandate and sanctions, as contained in Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Con stitution of India. It is only when adoption of such course is impermissible, the court may, as last resort, embark upon the course of declaring the legis lation to be unconstitutional. 45. In D S. Nakaras case (supra), the following observations of Honble Supreme Court are relevant: "in reading down the memoranda, is this court legislating ? Of course not then we delete basis of classification as violative of Article 14, we merely set at naught the unconstitutional portion retaining the constitutional portion. 46. 45. In D S. Nakaras case (supra), the following observations of Honble Supreme Court are relevant: "in reading down the memoranda, is this court legislating ? Of course not then we delete basis of classification as violative of Article 14, we merely set at naught the unconstitutional portion retaining the constitutional portion. 46. Now we would like to come to the argument advanced before us by Sri H. N. Singh learned counsel for Sri R. S. Pandey one of the respon dents. He substantially adopted the arguments advanced by Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Additional Advocate General. He, however, raised novel argument. According to him, Sri R. S. Pandey was appointed as Deputy Registrar much earlier to the petitioners and, even in the lower cadre, he was senior to the petitioners. 47. We must confess our inability to accept the aforesaid contention, which is to say the least astounding and reveals in ingenuity. 48. Sri Singh referred to Annexure C-A-4 to the counter-affidavit of Sri R. S. Pandey. The aforesaid document is a report of Three Judges Sub-Committee of this court. The aforesaid Sub-committee was formed with a view to decide the question of seniority in the cadre below the cadre of Deputy Registrar. Sri Pandey claimed himself to be senior to one Sri C. L. Agarwal, According to him, he should be notionally treated senior to Sri C. L. Agarwal. 49. The Sub-Committee, however, rejected the aforesaid argument in the following words : "under these circumstances, we cannot but the clock back for all purposes and treat Sri Pandey having been notionally promoted as Deputy Registrar with effect from 1-2-1992, but all that this Committee can do at this stage in conformity with the right, so as to meet the ends of justice, is that, to recommend his case to Honble the Chief justice to promote Sri Pandey to the post of Deputy Registrar w. e. f. the date of his representation. We, however, make it clear that Sri Pandey will not be entitled for the salary of the post of Deputy Registrar w. e. f. the date of his representation. . . . . . " Thus, the aforesaid Sub-Committee merely made recommendation to the Chief Justice to the effect that Sri Pandey be treated as senior to Sri C. L. Agarwal, at least from the date he made representation. . . . . . " Thus, the aforesaid Sub-Committee merely made recommendation to the Chief Justice to the effect that Sri Pandey be treated as senior to Sri C. L. Agarwal, at least from the date he made representation. However, it is clear from Annexure CA-5 to the counter-affidavit that Chief Justice did not accept the aforesaid recommendation made by the aforesaid three Judges Sub-Committee. Sri R. S. Pandey, though was placed senior to Sri C. L. Agarwal, nevertheless, his date of appointment to the post of Deputy Registrar remained unaltered. He was confirmed, as such, from 14-10-1993. Thus it is clear that his appointment as Deputy Registrar was only w. e. f. 14-10-1993 and not from an anterior date, as claimed by Sri Pandey. 50. Furthermore, the aforesaid Sub-Committee |was constituted for determining seniority of the officers for promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar. It is clear from the statement of fact, contained at page 14 of the aforesaid report. Thus, the aforesaid report cannot come to the aid of Sri Pandey and the argument of Sri Singh, in this behalf, is thoroughly misconceived. 51. In view of discussion, in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, we have no hesitation in holding that the entire service rendered by the petitioners, either as Private Secretary (Senior Scale) carrying the same pay scale as that of Principal Private Secretary to the Chief Justice or PPS, has to be reckoned while determining seniority on the post of Deputy Registrar. Undeniably, the petitioners were appointed in the aforesaid two categories of posts which prior to the respondent Nos. 3 to 9. Therefore, treating the petitioners as junior to respondent Nos. 3 to 9 smacks of arbi trariness and unfairness 52. Therefore, even without declaring Rule 34 of the Rules ultra vires Articles 14, 16, 21 of the Constitution and contrary to the dicta laid down in Roshan Lals (supra), we hold that the petitioners are entitled to be fitted as senior to the respondent Nos. 3 to 9. 53. Accordingly, we are of the view that the petitioners are entitled to all consequential benefits, including seniority and future promotions. Let a mandamus be issued to the respondents 1 and 2 directing them to refix the seniority of the petitioners in accordance with the observation and direction made above, and give all consequential benefits, in accordance with law to the petitioners. 54. Let a mandamus be issued to the respondents 1 and 2 directing them to refix the seniority of the petitioners in accordance with the observation and direction made above, and give all consequential benefits, in accordance with law to the petitioners. 54. Before parting with the case, we may venture to suggest that it-would be conducive to minimizing bickering and heart burning amongst the officers and employees of this court, that there should be a "combined seniority list" of all equivalent posts, in Class I, Class II, Class III and-Class IV respectively. This would not only instill a sense of certainty and confidence amongst the officers and employees of this court, but would also avoid unnecessary litigations, short cut promotions, as well as, back-door entries. 55. Parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed. .