JUDGMENT 1. - I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the order. 2. The petitioner-plaintiff filed a suit for eviction and recovery of rent against the non-petitioner Satya Prakash in the Court of Addl. Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) No. 5, Jodhpur. It is an admitted position that in that suit, the rent was determined in accordance with sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act. The defendant deposited rent. The dispute is with regard to the rent for the months of March and April, 1994. The petitioner filed an application under sub-section (5) of Section 13 of the Act, complaining of the fact that despite the order of determination, the defendant did not deposit rent for the months of March and April, 1994. It was, therefore, prayed that the defence of the defendant-non-petitioner be struck out. The explanation of the non-petitioner-defendant was that he has been depositing rent through cheques. The plaintiff has got his S. B. A/c in the Central Bank of India, Jalori Gate, Jodhpur whereas the defendant has got his A/c in Uco Bank, Paota, Jodhpur. Regarding the rent for the month of April it has been satisfactorily moved that it was deposited in time. Regarding the rent for the month of March, the defendant issued a cheque No. 826251 for a sum of Rs. 690/- in the name of Shri Madanlal and deposited the same in the Central Bank of India, Jalori Gate, Jodhpur. It was revealed later on that the above cheque was sent by the Central Bank of India for collection to Uco Bank, Paota, Jodhpur and the latter did not encash same on the ground the specimen signature on the cheque of the defendant did not tally with his specimen signature. However, no information was sent by the Bank to the defendant and only a debit entry of Rs. 10/- was made by the Bank in the A/c of the defendant as cost of sending the cheque for collection. It was on account of the above entry, the defendant came to know about this fact. Thereafter, he deposited the rent on 15-6-94. The defendant, therefore, submitted that the delay was bona fide and must be condoned for the aforesaid reason. Both the courts below found the above reason to be convincing and trustworthy. It was on account of the above entry, the defendant came to know about this fact. Thereafter, he deposited the rent on 15-6-94. The defendant, therefore, submitted that the delay was bona fide and must be condoned for the aforesaid reason. Both the courts below found the above reason to be convincing and trustworthy. They, therefore, condoned the delay and the application of the petitioner-plaintiff was dismissed. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. He has very vehemently contended that the provisions contained in sub-section (5) of Section 13 of the Act postulate that as soon as the defendant commits default in payment of rent, he incur the liability of his defence being struck out by the Court. Therefore, a duty is cost on the Court to pass the above order. This view was taken in Ms. Manju Choudhary v. Dulal Kumar Chandra, AIR 1988 SC 602 . According to the learned counsel, in the instant case, the defendant has not even filed a separate application condoning delay. Hence, the learned Courts erred in considering the case of condoning delay in favour of the defendant. In this connection, he placed reliance on J. Narain v. Satyanarayan, 1995 DNJ (Raj) 373. 4. I have considered the arguments. It may be stated that in Ganeshprasad v. Laxmi Narayan, AIR 1985 SC 964 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the provisions contained in Section 11-A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and particularly the phrase was "order the defence - to be struck of" and observed "the word 'shall' used Section 11A is directory and not mandatory and must be read as 'may' ILR (1977) 56 Pat 873 Reversed.If one ascertains the intendment of the legislature, the purpose for which the provision was enacted, the beneficent nature of the statute to protect the harassed tenant a obviously it does not require long argument to hold that the expression 'shall' was used not with a view to making the provision mandatory or imperative but it was to be directory. Such which (sic) the Act was enacted namely the protection of tenants. Such which (sic) the Act was enacted namely the protection of tenants. It will also not render the Court powerless in the fact of harsh facts where striking off the defence would be nothing short of miscarriage of justice.It is true that where the legislature uses two words 'may' and 'shall' in two different parts of the same provision prima facie it would appear that the legislature manifested its intention to make one part directory and another mandatory. But that by itself is not decisive. The power of the Court still to ascertain the real intention of the Legislature by carefully examining the scope of the statute to find out whether the provision is directory or mandatory remains unimpaired even where both the words are used is same provision". 5. Hence, from the above it is clear that the provisions contained in sub-section (5) of Section 13 of the Act are directory and not mandatory. 6. It is correct that the defendant-non-petitioner did not move a separate or independent application seeking condonation for delay but in the reply to the application under Section 13(5) of the Act filed by the plaintiff, the defendant after explaining the circumstances in which the above default occurred also added a prayer that from the above facts it was clear that the default was committed was bona fide and deserved to be condoned. I am of the view that there should be a prayer for condonation of delay and the same was contained in the reply filed by the defendant. The Court was, therefore, competent to consider the same. Regarding the merits of the explanation conferred by the defendant I will not differ with the conclusion drawn by the Courts below. It is definitely a bona fide mistake. The defendant has been paying rent by cheques and it was accidently not encashed for a very technical reason that the signature of the defendant on the cheque did not tally with his specimen signature according to the bank authorities. Such objections are sometimes made on cheques and this is not an universal phenomenon. Further, the defendant specifically stated that he did not get any information about the non-encashment of the cheque. As soon as he came to know of this fact by seeing the debit entry in his pass-book, he deposited the cheque in the Bank. Such objections are sometimes made on cheques and this is not an universal phenomenon. Further, the defendant specifically stated that he did not get any information about the non-encashment of the cheque. As soon as he came to know of this fact by seeing the debit entry in his pass-book, he deposited the cheque in the Bank. The defendant also pleaded that at the relevant time his Bank Balance was enough to honour the above cheque. 7. For the above reasons I find no force in the petition and it is hereby dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******