Judgment : B. K. Singh, J. 1. The petitioner though this writ petition, challenged the judgment and order dated 27-5-1991 by which an ex parte order of injunction was granted and the judgment and order dated 2-7-1993 by which the Civil Judge (South) (Junior Div.), Lucknow, has, after hearing the parties, maintained the ad interim injunction and against the judgment and order dated 9-7-1996, passed by the X-Additional District Judge, Lucknow, Who after hearing the parties, has dismissed the petitioners' appeal and maintained the ad interim injunction order, granted by the Civil Judge (South) (Junior Div.) Lucknow. 2. I have heard learned counsel of the petitioners as well as the learned counsel of the opposite parties 1 and 2, who has put in appearance at the admission stage. The learned counsel of the petitioner submitted that the Civil Judge (South) (Junior Div.), Lucknow, has committed material illegality in passing the ad interim injunction order and in maintaining the same by the impugned order dated 2-7-1993 because the provisions of Rule 3 of Order XXXIX CPC have not been followed. The second point of the learned counsel of the petitioner is that the opposite parties 1 and 2, plaintiffs in the trial court, have no legal right in the land in dispute and their status is that of trespassers. So the trial court could not have granted the ad interim injunction in favour of the trespassers. The last point urged by the learned counsel of the petitioners is that the trial court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the suit and grant the ad interim injunction. As such also, the ad interim injunction has been granted without jurisdiction. 3. IN support of his contention, learned counsel of the petitioner has placed the reliance on the decision of a case reported in AIR 1995 All 418 Sri Dasnam Naga Sanyasi and another v. Allahabad Development Authority, Allahabad and another. The decision provides that in a suit for relief of perpetual prohibitory injunction disclosure of facts to satisfy the requirements of Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act and absence of prohibition contained in Section 41 thereof is required. IN such a suit, court has a discretion which is to be exercised judicially for grant of perpetual injunction as the language of Section 38 provides. This decision further provides that filing of a mere suit for perpetual injunction is a conduct of plaintiff. IN such a suit, court has a discretion which is to be exercised judicially for grant of perpetual injunction as the language of Section 38 provides. This decision further provides that filing of a mere suit for perpetual injunction is a conduct of plaintiff. The High Court maintained the orders passed by the lower courts rejecting the application of temporary injunction because on the basis of facts available, the applicant's possession on property in dispute was doubtful. The High Court also doubted whether the writ jurisdiction could have been exercised in such a case. 4. LEARNED counsel of the petitioners then referred to a decision of a case reported in AIR 1986 Karnataka 77, K. V. Narayan v. S. Sharana Gowda and another. In this decision it has been held that a trespasser in possession, is not entitled to a temporary injunction as against the principal owner. The principle of acquiescence in favour of the trespasser in possession, has also been discussed in this decision. Learned counsel of the petitioner then referred to a decision of a case reported in AIR 1996 Delhi 1, M/s. G. M. Modi Hospital and Research central Medical Science v. Sh. Shankar Singh Bhandari and others in this case, it was held that such labourers who had been permitted to live on the site where they were engaged as labourers for the purposes of construction, cannot file a suit for injunction. The labourers having no jural relationship with either lessees or licencees with hospital were not entitled to get the relief of injunction merely on the basis of possession. 5. LEARNED counsel appearing on be half of the opposite parities 1 and 2, submitted that both the courts have concurrently held that the opposite parties are in possession. They have therefore, granted the interim injunction on the basis of plaint allegation that the plaintiffs are owners in possession the learned counsel submitted that where a person has been found in pos session he is entitled to an ad interim injunction There are decisions in support of this proposition in support of his contention, reference was made to the decisions which have been cite and considered by the learned appellate judgment. 6. THE learned counsel then submitted that the defendants petitioners have not filed any documents of title in respect of the property in dispute. 6. THE learned counsel then submitted that the defendants petitioners have not filed any documents of title in respect of the property in dispute. This has led the lower courts to hold that as regards the question of title, that will be decided on the evidence that may be adduced by the parties at the subsequent stage. THE possession of opposite parties, though on a part of it is, is admitted to the petitioner. As such the courts have rightly granted the injunction. Learned counsel further submitted that there is no violation of rule 3 in this case because though the order dated 27-5-1991 was ex parte but later on, the petitioners had put in appearance and filed objections for setting aside the ad interim injunction order. The petitioners were given full opportunity of hearing and thereafter, by the judgment and order dated 2-7-1993, the trial court has maintained the ad interim injuction. The trial court has found that there is a prima facie case in favour of the contesting opposite parties, that balance of convenience is in their favour because they are in possession and the findings of irreparable loss and injury is also in favour of the opposite parties. Thus, there is no illegality or irregularity in the judgment of the trial courts. The appellate court has also rightly dismissed the appeal of the petitioners. 7. LASTLY, the learned counsel of the contesting opposite parties has placed reliance on a decision of this court of a case reported in 1992 Vol. 10 Lucknow Civil Decisions 376, Nainital Bank Ltd., Nainital v. Munsif Nainital and others. In this case, it has been held that no writ petition lies against the judgment and order under order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 against the refusal of temporary injunction. The court has also held that grant of refusal of temporary injunction is discretionary in nature Therefore, interference under Article 226 of the constitution of India is not permissible. 8. THE second case relied upon by the learned counsel, is reported in 1996 JCLR 177 . Mathan Singh v. Additional District Judge Meerut and others. In this case, this Court has held that writ against the appellate order arising out of an application for interim injunction is not maintainable. 8. THE second case relied upon by the learned counsel, is reported in 1996 JCLR 177 . Mathan Singh v. Additional District Judge Meerut and others. In this case, this Court has held that writ against the appellate order arising out of an application for interim injunction is not maintainable. I have considered the above submissions of the learned counsel of the parties and gone through the decisions that have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties. The Submissions of the learned counsel of the petitioner in respect of non-compliance of the rule 3 of Order XXXIX, Has lost its significance in view of that fact that the petitioner had put in appearance before the trial court and had been heard. In such a case the provisions of rule 4 of Order XXXIX comes into play. After the petitioners were heard by the trial court and even after hearing, the ad interim injunction has been allowed to continue then, the ground of non-compliance of rule 3 loses relevance, I am, therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel of the petitioners on this part of the submissions. 9. THE other submissions of the learned counsel relating to title of the opposite parties and the submissions that a suit for perpetual injunction would not lie because no declaratory relief has been claimed, is also not legally permissible. On petitioners' Own showing, it is not disputed that the contesting opposite parties are in possession. According to the petitioners, they are in possession over 200 sq. ft. but according to the opposite parties, they are in possession over the whole area. Admittedly, the petitioners have not yet raised any construction over the disputed land. So in my opinion, the opp. parties No. 1 and 2 possession or possessory right has been rightly recognized by the courts below for granting the ad interim injunction. 10. AS regards the pecuniary jurisdiction, it is admitted that the petitioners have not yet filed written statement. The petitioners have not yet filed written statement. The question of lack of jurisdiction' can only be considered by the lower court of and when the written statement is flied and an issue is struck and parties lead evidence. So at this stage only the plaint averments were before the court. The petitioners have not yet filed written statement. The question of lack of jurisdiction' can only be considered by the lower court of and when the written statement is flied and an issue is struck and parties lead evidence. So at this stage only the plaint averments were before the court. From the documents annexed to the writ petition it is also clear that the plaintiffs have also taken step to amend the plaint in respect of the valuation part and that application has been allowed. So at this stage the question of pecuniary jurisdiction cannot be accepted as a ground of attack in so far the merit of the judgment and orders are concerned. Coming to the decisions referred to by the learned counsel of the petitioner, I have to say that the decisions are not of any help. In the first case of Dasnam Naga Sanyasi (supra), the courts below had refused to grant the ad interim injunction. The reasons were that the plaintiff of the said suit had failed to make out any claim of title. Besides, the plaintiff's possession of the property in dispute was doubtful. Here, in this case, as per the findings recorded by the courts below the plaintiff is in possession. Even the petitioners admit the possession. So the decision is of not help. On the other hand, the court had doubted the maintainability of the writ petition. The second case of the K. V. Narayan (supra), it has been held that a trespasser is not entitled to an injunction. Here, in this case, the ownership of neither party has been determined by the courts below. It is yet to be decided. In this regard, I have to say that the petitioners themselves have not yet filed any document relating to title. This had persuaded the trial court as well as the appellate court to hold that the point of title will be decided after taking evidence by the court at appropriate occasion. This decision also lays down that even in relation to a trespassers possession a plea of acquiescence can be taken. However, as the point is not involved, I refrain from making any observation because it may prejudice the case of the petitioners. The third case of G. M. Modi Hospital (supra) is also of no support to the petitioners because admittedly, the plaintiffs are not labourers. However, as the point is not involved, I refrain from making any observation because it may prejudice the case of the petitioners. The third case of G. M. Modi Hospital (supra) is also of no support to the petitioners because admittedly, the plaintiffs are not labourers. The construction activities have so far not been undertaken by the petitioners. The decisions referred to by the learned counsel of the opposite parties about the non-maintainability of the writ petition, have been pursued. I am in respectful agreement. The grant of injunction or refusal to grant is a discretionary order. It is seldom interested with in extra jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. FROM the facts and circumstances as well as from the conclusions of the trial court and the appellate court which has taken good care to consider the relevant case law in judgment, I am satisfied that the judgment and orders impugned in this writ petition do not suffer from any manifest error of law or substantial irregularities. 12. I am, therefore, of the view that the writ petition is legally misconceived. It is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.