A. R. TIWARI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has filed this writ petition for the under noted reliefs:"it is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue: (a) a writ, direction or order in the nature of CERTIORARY or other suitable writ quashing the impugned order bearing No. Sthapana/86/87/4009 dated 11-14/2/1987 (Annexure-'b') purporting to compulsorily retire the petitioner w. e. f. 18. 2. 1987 and to send for the records; (b) a writ, direction or order in the nature of CERHORARY/mandamus or other suitable writ declaring the resolutions Nos. 14 to 17 (particularly No. 17) as per annexure 'b-2' purportedly passed at the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 31. 1. 1987, as of no legal effect whatsoever and to quash the same; (c) a writ, direction or order in the nature of MANDAMUS or other suitable writ declaring the petitioner as continuing in service and directing the respondent to sectors to the petitioner all the benefits of service which he might have lost as a result of his wrongful compulsory retirement; (d) a writ, direction or order awarding the costs of the present petition to the petitioner; and (e) such other writ, direction or order which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the circumstances of the present case. " ( 2 ) RESPONDENTS No. 1 and 2 have filed the return with objection that an alternative efficacious remedy was available to the petitioner by way of dispute under section 55 (2) of the M. P. Co- operative Societies Act, 1960 (for short 'the Act') and as such the petition is liable to fail on that short ground as well. ( 3 ) PETITIONER filed the rejoinder. ( 4 ) THE controversy in this petition is about the order No. Sthapana/86-87/4009 dated 11-14/1987 (Annexure-'b') whereby retiring the petitioner from service com-pulsorily under Rule 72 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Ke Jila sahakari Bank Karmchari seva (Niyojan, Nibandhan Tatha Unki Karyasthiti) niyas (Annexure-'c ). The petitioner is retired on completion of the age of 55 years. In normal course he could have continued till completion of age of 58 years. The order has been made effective from 18. 2. 1987. This order is challenged as arbitrary, capricious and mala fide on the linchpin that it was engineered by respondent No. 2 (Chairman of the Bank ). In normal course he could have continued till completion of age of 58 years. The order has been made effective from 18. 2. 1987. This order is challenged as arbitrary, capricious and mala fide on the linchpin that it was engineered by respondent No. 2 (Chairman of the Bank ). At the relevant time the petitioner occupied the post of Senior most branch Manager. ( 5 ) I have heard Shri Shckhar Bhargava, learned Counsel for the petitioner and shri U. M. Nimgaonkar, learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2. None appeared for respondent No. 3. ( 6 ) THE counsel for the respondents no. 1 and 2 has raised two preliminary objections against the tenability of this petition: (a) Respondent No. 1, the employer, is not the 'state' within the meaning of article 12 of the Constitution of India and as such the recourse to extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not proper. (b) The petitioner had the alternative efficacious remedy under Section 55 (2)of the aforesaid Act and as such this petition is not maintainable on this ground also. ( 7 ) ON merits he has submitted that the rules permitted the issuance of the order of compulsory retirement and the power is exercised bona fide in the interest of the bank and as such the petition deserves to fail even on merits. The counsel has placed reliance on 1996 SCW 2780. ( 8 ) THE counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order is passed in violation of the statutory rules and as such the petition is maintainable. On merits he submitted that the order is dubbed as arbitrary, capricious and mala fide and as such the power is abused and misused and such orders cannot be defended only on the ground of availability of service rules permitting the retirement compulsorily. ( 9 ) 1 proceed to consider the worth of rival contentions. ( 10 ) LAW is luculent. Employer's dominion over his employees was in tune with rustic simplicity of by-gone days, but is incompatible with current pattern. Lord denning put it elegantly in Breen v. Amalgamated engineering Union, (1971) 1 All RR 148 and Supreme Court stated in Khudi Ram's case, (1975) 2 SCR 832 : AIR 1975 sc 550 that in a Government of laws "there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability. Lord denning put it elegantly in Breen v. Amalgamated engineering Union, (1971) 1 All RR 148 and Supreme Court stated in Khudi Ram's case, (1975) 2 SCR 832 : AIR 1975 sc 550 that in a Government of laws "there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability. " Fairness, founded on reason, is the essence of the quarters of review exercised improperly or mistakenly so as to impinge unjustly on legitimate rights of interests of the subject, then Courts must so declare. The courts stand between the executive and the subject alert, alert to see that discretionary power is not exceeded or misused. Lord Atkin high-lighted that aspect. Liver Sidge v. Anderson, (1942) AC 206, is instructive and indicator of the amplitude of the power available with the Courts. ( 11 ) IT is, thus, clear that mere availability of relevant rules is not the sufficient answer. ( 12 ) HOWEVER, as regards the objection on the fulcrum of Article 12 of the constitution of India and on the ground of existence of alternative efficacious remedy, the objections raised by the counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 are held to be substantial and deserves to be permitted to prevail. ( 13 ) IN P. . Vijaya Rajan v. State of Tamilnadu and others, 1992 Supp (2) S. C. C. 104, it is held as under:"counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the question is as to whether a sponsored and taken over society by government is State within Article 12 of the Constitution. In the case before us it is not the petitioner's allegation that the society in question was sponsored by government though admittedly its administration had been taken over within the frame-work of the Co-operative societies Act. According to us the ambit of reference made on May 8,1989 to a Constitution Bench by the Vacation Judge does not apply to the facts of this case. We would accordingly decline to refer it to a Constitution Bench or even link it up with that case and direct that the petition be dismissed. It is open to the petitioner to seek such relief as is open to him under law and to plead for condonation of delay. We would accordingly decline to refer it to a Constitution Bench or even link it up with that case and direct that the petition be dismissed. It is open to the petitioner to seek such relief as is open to him under law and to plead for condonation of delay. " ( 14 ) IN State of U. P. and another v. Labh Chand, AIR 1994 SC 754 , it is held as under:"when a statutory Forum or Tribunal is specially created by a statute for redressal of specified grievances of persons on certain matters, the High Court should not normally permit such persons to ventilate their specified grievances before it by entertaining petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution is a legal position which is too well settled. " ( 15 ) IN view of the aforesaid position, it is not disputed that the alternative remedy was available to the petitioner. The contention is that Assistant Registrar was hostile to the petitioner. However, it is conceded that the Assistant Registrar of that period is now no more in office and as such there is no such hurdle at present. ( 16 ) SHRI Bhargava submitted that in case this petition is held hit by Article 12 and by the existence of the alternative remedy, then reasonable time be granted to resort to alternative remedy with condonation of delay. The prayer for condonation of delay is not opposed before me. ( 17 ) THE order impugned in this petition is dated 11-14. 2. 1987, made effective from 16. 2. 1987 and the petition was filed in this Court on 3. 3. 1987 i. e. within the period of limitation available for raising the dispute under Section 55 (2) of the Act. ( 18 ) THE counsel for the petitioner is unable to show that respondent No. 1 is the state in terms of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, He is also unable to show as to why the alternative remedy was not properly resorted to. ( 19 ) THIS Court has taken the view in Misc. Petition No. 28 of 1987 (Mohansingh s/o Jagaanathsingh v. Jila Sahakari Kendriya Bank Maryadit, khargone and others), decided on 27. 9. 1996 and in Misc. Petition No. 176 of 1984 (Mulchand slo Metharan assudeni v. The Madhya Pradesh Rajya sahakari Bank Maryadit,bhopal and another), decided on 24. 9. ( 19 ) THIS Court has taken the view in Misc. Petition No. 28 of 1987 (Mohansingh s/o Jagaanathsingh v. Jila Sahakari Kendriya Bank Maryadit, khargone and others), decided on 27. 9. 1996 and in Misc. Petition No. 176 of 1984 (Mulchand slo Metharan assudeni v. The Madhya Pradesh Rajya sahakari Bank Maryadit,bhopal and another), decided on 24. 9. 19% that in such cases petition should not be entertained but the petitioner should be left to resort to the remedy available under Section 55 (2) of the aforesaid Act with condonation of delay. ( 20 ) IN my view the similar order deserves to be passed in the present petition. ( 21 ) EX-CONSEQUENT, I dispose of this petition with directions as under: (a) The petition is disposed of without expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter. The points raised in the petition as also in the return are left open and made litigable in other proceedings. (b) The petitioner is granted liberty to resort to Section 55 (2) of the aforesaid act to seek redressal of his grievance within a period of one month from today. If recourse is taken within this period, the application raising the dispute shall not be opened on the ground of limitation and shall not fail on this ground in view of the fact that this petition was filed within the period of limitation provided for such recourse. In such proceedings all points shall be available to the petitioner as are permissible under the law. ( 22 ) THE petition is, thus, disposed of with liberty as noted above but without any orders as to costs. ( 23 ) SECURITY cost, if deposited, shall be refunded to the petitioner after the verification. .