Judgment :- Janarthanam, J. One Tmt.Sundarambal is the detenu. On 30.12.1995, at about 18.00 to 18.30 hours, one Sundaram went to Sennimalaipalayam for consumption of arrack. After reaching the spot, he noticed the detenue Tmt.Sundarambal of Sennimalaipalayam selling arrack near a live fence situate on the eastern side of the said village. The said Sundaram was stated to have approached the detenue and enquired about price of arrack per tumbler. The detenue, it is said, told him that it was a special kind of arrack and a tumbler of arrack was Rs.10 The said Sundaram was stated to have purchased 50 ml. of arrack for Rs.5 and consumed the same. Immediately after the consumption he felt irritation in his throat, eyes and stomach. He, however, managed to return to his house at 20.00 to 20.30 hours and explained his discomforts to his wife Tmt.Saraswathi. She was stated to have administered to him tamarind juice. After consuming, if the said victim Sundaram, vomited several times and spent the night with giddiness. He realised that the detenue. Sundarambal should have mixed some poisonous substance with the arrack, which was injurious to health. He also felt that if he had consumed more than 50 ml. of the said arrack, it was very likely he would have lost his life. He also heard the same complaints from his neighbours, who consumed arrack from the said detenue Sundarambal. If the detenue, he felt was allowed to continue to sell such arrack, it will endanger human beings, who would consume such arrack. .2. So on the morning of 312. 1995 he appeared before P.E. Wing Tiruppur and gave an oral complaint. After recording the said complaint the Sub Inspector of Police, Mr.V.Palaniappan, along with Police personnel and private Witnesses went and reached the spot where the said detenu was usually found selling arrack at about 11.45 hours. At that time, the detenue was holding a white colour plastic can and from the said plastic can she was stated to have filled up a liquid in a glass tumbler and handed over the same to a male person, aged about 30 years, standing in front of her. On seeing the police party, the male person dropped the glass tumbler on the ground, ran and escaped. On seeing the police party, the male person dropped the glass tumbler on the ground, ran and escaped. The detenue also tried to escape, but she was some how or other secured by the said Sub Inspector of Police, and party. When questioned by the said Sub Inspector of Police she gave voluntarily a confession statement, which was recorded by him and the same was attested by witnesses Anbarasu and Abbas Manthiri. In her confession, the detenu admitted that she had mixed Datura poison, in the arrack sold. Thereafter, the said Sub Inspector of Police seized the contraband arrack, glass tumbler and cash of Rs.25 under a cover of mahazar. He then returned to the police station and registered a case against the detenue in Tiruppur P.E. Wing Crime No.1731/95 for alleged offences under Secs.4(1)(i) and 4 (I)(A) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937, She was arrested and on the same day she was produced before learned Judicial Magistrate, Palladam, who in turn remanded her to Judicial custody and subsequently she was lodged at Central prison, Coimbatore. He also complied with the requisite formalities of sending the seized contraband to chemical analysis and also obtained a certificate from the Assistant Director of Regional Forensic Laboratory, Coimbatore. The certificate so issued was to the effect that the sample liquid contained Ethyl Alcohol, Acids, Easter, Higher Alcohol, Aldehydes and Atropine. The sample liquid was also found to contain 9.0 Mg/100 Ml of atropine, a poisonous alkaloid found in datura. 3. One Dr.D. Baskaran, M.D., Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government Head Quarters Hospital, Tiruppur also opined that irritation in stomach, throat and eyes blurring of vision and symptoms of fainting and vomiting will occur if the illicitly distilled arrack mixed with atropine is consumed. He also opined that the atropine poison will affect the human body and pose grave danger to human life, if any one consumes the illicit arrack mixed with atropine. 4. Apart from the ground case as stated above, the detenue had come to adverse notice in seven other cases for various offences, under the relevant provisions of Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937. 5. 4. Apart from the ground case as stated above, the detenue had come to adverse notice in seven other cases for various offences, under the relevant provisions of Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937. 5. The sponsoring authority placed all the relevant materials before the District Collector and District Magistrate, Coimbatore District, Coimbatore/2nd respondent detaining authority with a request for an order of detention to be passed under the relevant provisions of, the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1983, provided he derived the subjective satisfaction therefor. 6. The second respondent detaining authority after taking into consideration the relevant materials placed and deriving; the solidified subjective satisfaction that there was impelling or compelling need to clamp the impugned order of detention upon the detenue, passed in fact, the impugned order of detention in his proceedings Cr.M.P.No.1 of 1996 dated 11. 1996 under the relevant provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 with a view to preventing her from indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and public health. 7. One Karuppasamy-Petitioner, who is none else than the: son of detenue resorted to the present action in H.C.P. No.254 of 1996 challenging the impugned order of detention. .8. 7. One Karuppasamy-Petitioner, who is none else than the: son of detenue resorted to the present action in H.C.P. No.254 of 1996 challenging the impugned order of detention. .8. Mr.G.R.Swaminathan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would raise manifold points in the process of assailing the impugned order of detention and he, in fact, commenced his arguments in a flamboyant style on the various points so raised and in the course of his arguments, perhaps feeling that the arguments if pressed into all the points so raised, could not yield any dividend, ultimately thought fit in abandoning all the other points and was rest contents in pressing the one and the only point, placing implicit reliance on four decisions viz., Raziya v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1751, Chaju Ram v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 263: (1971)1 S.C.J. 129, Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra and others, 1962 S.C.R. (Supp.) 948 and Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India, (1981)2 S.C.C. 427 , that though the copies of the impugned order of detention, the grounds of detention and the documents relied upon for the formulation of the grounds of detention had been furnished to the detenue in Tamil, a language known to her, yet in view of the fact that she is an illiterate woman, mandate of Art.22(50 of the Constitution requires reading and explaining to her all relevant materials furnished to her in order to enable her to make an effective and purposeful representation and such a reading and explaining of the relevant documents cannot at all be stated to have been complied with on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. He would elucidate the further by stating that the booklet of documents where intrinsic and in built material in the shape of an endorsement found contained on the outer cover of the booklet of documents besides endorsement on the first page of the impugned order of detention as well as the grounds of detention shows that the same had been furnished to the jail authority on 11. 1996 at 15.55 hours and the competent jail authority was stated to have explained the contents of the booklet of documents to the detenue between 15.55 hours and 16.10 hours i.e., to say within a period of 15 minutes and such a fact, he would say is rather humanly impossible and such being the case, he would further say that there is no other go for this Court except to set aside the impugned order of detention, to which course Mr.Syed Fasuiddin, learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the respondents would strike a vehement discordant note by placing reliance on Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, 1975 Crl.L.J. 446, Icchu Devi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, Prakash Chandra v. Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala, 1986 Crl.L.J. 786 and Ibrahim Ahmad v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1500. 9. Before we enter into area of discussion in finding an answer to the moot questions so posed, we rather feel that it is better to relate to the relevant factual matrix. Which will enable us to find out an answer to such a question with ease and grace and without any difficulty whatever. No doubt true it is, that the impugned order of detention and the grounds of detention had been penned down by the second respondent detaining authority in English. This apart, certain other relied upon documents were originally in English. The impugned order of detention, the grounds of detention and certain documents which were in English had been translated in Tamil a language known to the detenue and all the requisite and necessary documents in the form of a booklet in Tamil had been furnished to the detenue within a period of five days from the date of her detention. Every copy of the document available in the booklet of documents furnished to the detenu contained an endorsement to the effect that the said document was explained to the detenu in Tamil. After understanding the contents of each and every one of the documents furnished to the detenue, the detenue also affixed her thumb impression underneath the endorsements so made. This apart, as already adverted to, the booklet of documents was made available to the jail authorities on 11. 1996 at 15.55 hours. After understanding the contents of each and every one of the documents furnished to the detenue, the detenue also affixed her thumb impression underneath the endorsements so made. This apart, as already adverted to, the booklet of documents was made available to the jail authorities on 11. 1996 at 15.55 hours. The affixture of thumb impression under the endorsement in each one of the documents as available in the booklet of documents furnished to the detenue, was stated to have taken place on 11. 1996 at about 16.10 hours, i.e., to say in effect the contents of each and every one of the documents contained in the booklet of documents had been explained within a period of 15 minutes had been obtained in each and every one of the documents contained therein. It is permissible to presume that the detenue is an illiterate woman from the factum of her affixing thumb impression in each and every one of the documents in token of having understood the contents of the said documents. We are of the view that such a presumption is not always irrebutable. There is nothing on record available to point out that she is a literate woman. Added to this, a specific averment had been made in the affidavit filed by the son of the detenue in support of the application that the detenue is an illiterate woman. Apart from production of any material by the respondents showing that she is a literate woman, they had not countered the same and rebutted the same in the counter affidavit filed by them. In such a circumstances we can safely take it for granted that the detenue is an illiterate woman. 10. In the back drop and setting of the fact situation, we shall make an endeavour, as already stated to find out an answer to the question so posed. 11. The answer to the question so posed in the light of the factual matrix as stated above, would depend upon the sweep and amplitude of the right inhering in favour of a detenu under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India and also Sec.8 of Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities, of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) which is after all, in tune with the salient provisions as adumbrated under Art.22(5) of the Constitution. It is not as if the sweep and amplitude of the right ushering in favour of a detenu under Art.22(5) of the Constitution had not at all come up for consideration before superior courts of jurisdiction-High Courts and Apex Courts of this country and the plain fact is such a question came up for consideration on innumerous occasions more than one. In the precedents as relied upon by both the sides, such a question came to be considered. Let us endeavour to refer in seriatim the various decisions relied upon by them. 12. What their Lordships of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court said in the case of Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, 1975 Crl.L.J. 446 in paragraphs 5 and 6 pages 450 and 451 is quite relevant for present purpose and the same is reflected as below: 5. We will first consider the constitutional background against which the Act has been enacted and then refer to the material provisions of the Act. The relevant article of the constitution having a bearing on this question is Art.22. This article has been analysed in more cases than one by this Court and it is clear from the decided cases that this article provides various safeguards calculated to protect personal liberty against arbitrary restraint without trial. These safeguards cannot be regarded as substantial. They are essentially procedural in character and their efficacy depends on the care and caution and the sense of responsibility with which they are regarded by the detaining authority. Two of these safe guards, which relate to the observance of the principles of natural justice and which a fortiori are intended to act as a check on arbitrary exercise of power, are to be found in Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. Two of these safe guards, which relate to the observance of the principles of natural justice and which a fortiori are intended to act as a check on arbitrary exercise of power, are to be found in Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. This provision of the Constitution introduces two procedural requirements embodying the rule of audi alteram partem to a limited put a crucial and compulsive extent by providing that: “When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order,” The constitutional imperatives enacted in this article are two fold: (1) the detaining authority must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable after the detention, communicate to be detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and (2) the detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. These are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person and thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public good and social security. But, what is the content of these safeguards? What does the word ‘grounds’ mean? Does it mean only the final conclusions reached by the detaining authority on which alone the order of detention can be made; or does it include the basic facts and materials from which conclusions justifying the order of detention are drawn by the detaining authority? What is the inter-relation between the requirements of the first and the second safeguards? In the efficacy of the second safeguard violated by non-observance of the requirement of the first safeguard? If all the ‘Grounds’ which weighed with the detaining authority are not communicated to the detenu, does it constitute merely a breach of the first safeguard or does it also involve the violation of the second? 6. The answer to these questions does not present any serious difficulty if only we consider the reason why the grounds are required to be communicated to the detenu “as soon as may be” after the detention. Obviously the reason is two-fold. 6. The answer to these questions does not present any serious difficulty if only we consider the reason why the grounds are required to be communicated to the detenu “as soon as may be” after the detention. Obviously the reason is two-fold. In the first place, the requirement of communication of grounds of detention acts as a check against arbitrary and capricious exercise of power. The detaining authority cannot whisk away a person and put him behind bars at its own sweet will. It must have grounds for doing so and those grounds must be communicated to the detenu, so that, not only the detenu may know what are the facts and materials before the detaining authority on the basis of which he is being deprived of his personal liberty, but he can also invoke the power of judicial review, howsoever limited and periphnel it may be. Secondly, the detenu has to be afforded an opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. But if the grounds of detention are not communicated to him, how can be make an effective representation? The opportunity of making a representation would be rendered illusory. The communication of the grounds of detention is, therefore, also intended to subserve the purpose of enabling the detenu to make an effective representation. If this be the true reason for providing that the grounds on which the order of detention is made should be communicated to the detenu, it is obvious that the ‘grounds’ mean all the basic facts and materials which have been taken into account by the detaining authority in making the order of detention and on which, therefore, the order of detention is based. To quote the words of one of us (Sarkaria, J) in Golam alias Golam Mallick v. The State of West Bengal, W.P. No.270 of 1974, dated 19. 1974 (S.C.). “...In the context ‘grounds’ does not merely mean a recital or reproduction of a ground of satisfaction of the authority in the language of Sec.3 of the Act; nor is its connotation restricted to a bare statement of conclusions of fact. It means something more. 1974 (S.C.). “...In the context ‘grounds’ does not merely mean a recital or reproduction of a ground of satisfaction of the authority in the language of Sec.3 of the Act; nor is its connotation restricted to a bare statement of conclusions of fact. It means something more. That ‘something’ is the factual constituent of the ”grounds’ on which the subjective satisfaction of the authority is based, The basic facts and material particulars, therefore, which are the foundation of the order of detention, will also be covered by ‘grounds’ within the contemplation of Art. 22(5) and Sec.8, and are required to be communicated to the detenu unless their disclosure is considered by the authority to be against the public interest.” This has always been the view consistently taken by this Court in a series of decisions. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with citation of all these decisions. It would be sufficient if we quote the following observations of Patanjali Sastri, C.J., in Dr.Ram Krishnan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi, 1953 S.C.R. 708.A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 313. “....the petitioner has the right under Art.22(5), as interpreted by this Court by a majority, to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him’. We are of opinion that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained.” Venkatarama Ayyar, J., also pointed out in Shamrao Vishunu Pamlekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana, 1956S.C.R. 644: A.I.R. 1957 S. C. 23, that construing the words ‘grounds on which the order has been made’ in their natural and ordinary sense, “they would include any information on material on which the order was based. The Oxford Concise Dictionary gives the following meanings to the word ‘ground’. ‘Base, foundation, motive, valid reason.‘On this definition, the materials on which the District Magistrate considered that an order of detention should be made could properly be described as grounds therefor.” [Italics supplied] It is, therefore, clear that nothing less than all the basic facts and materials which influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention must be communicated to the detenu. That is the plain requirement of the first safeguard in Art.22(5). That is the plain requirement of the first safeguard in Art.22(5). The second safeguard in Art.22(5) requires that the detenu shall be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. No available delay, no short fall in the materials communicated shall stand in the way of the detenu in making an early, yet comprehensive and effective, representation in regard to all basic facts and materials which may have influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention depriving him of his freedom. These are the legal bulwarks enacted by the constitution-makers against arbitrary or improper exercise of the vast powers of preventive detention which may be vested in the executive by a law of preventive detention such as the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971.” 13. In Icchu Devi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, what their Lordships of the Supreme Court said in paragraph 6 (at pages 1988 and 1989)is quite relevant and it reads as under: “6. We must therefore now proceed to examine whether there was any breach of the requirements of Art.22, clause (5) of the Constitution and Sec.3, Sub-sec.(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, for that is the breach which is claimed by the petitioner as invalidating the continued detention of the detenu. We must therefore now proceed to examine whether there was any breach of the requirements of Art.22, clause (5) of the Constitution and Sec.3, Sub-sec.(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, for that is the breach which is claimed by the petitioner as invalidating the continued detention of the detenu. Clause (5) of Art.22 of the Constitution reads as follows: “Art. 22(5): When any person in detained in pursuance of an order made under any Jaw providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.” Sec.3, Sub-sec.(3) of the COFEPOSA Act provides as under: “For the purposes of clause (5) of Art.22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order, of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made, as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later than fifteen days for the date of detention.” The true meaning and import of clause (5) of Art.22 of the Constitution was explained by this Court in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal A.I.R. 1975 S.C.550: “The constitutional imperative enacted in this article are two-fold: (1) the detaining authority must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable after the detention, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and (2) the detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. These are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person and thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public good and social security.” It will be seen that one of the basic requirements of clause (5) of Art.22 is that the authority making the order of detention must, as soon as may be, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and under Sub-sec. (3) of Sec.3 of the COFEPOSA Act, the words “as soon as may be” have been translated to mean “ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention". The grounds of detention must therefore be furnished to the detenu ordinarily within five days from the date of detention, but in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, the time for furnishing the grounds of detention may stand extended but in any event it cannot be later than fifteen days from the date of detention. These are the two outside time limits provided by Sec.3, Sub-sec. (3) of the COFEPOSA Act because unless the grounds of detention are furnished to the detenu, it would not be possible for him to make a representation against the order of detention and it is a basic requirement of clause (5) of Art.22 that the detenu must be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against his detention. If the grounds of detention are not furnished to the detenu within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, the continued detention of the detenu would be rendered illegal both on the ground of violation of clause (5) of Art.22 as also on the ground of breach of requirement of Sec.3, Sub-sec.(3) of the COFEPOSA Act. Now it is obvious that when clause (5) of Art.22 and Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.3 of the COFEPOSA Act provide that the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, what is meant is. that the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenu. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without mem. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without mem. It would not therefore be sufficient to communicate to the detenu a bare recital of the grounds of detention, but copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention must also be furnished to the detenu within the prescribed time subject of course to clause (6) of Art.22 in order to constitute compliance with clause (5) of Art.22 and Sec.3, Sub-sec.(3) of the COFEPOSA Act. One of the primary objects of communicating the grounds of detention of the detenu is to enable the detenu, at the earliest opportunity, to make a representation against his detention and ,it is difficult to see how the detenu can possibly make an effective representation unless he is also furnished copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention. There can therefore be no doubt that on a proper construction of clause (5) of Art.22 read with Sec.3, Sub-sec.(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is necessary for the valid continuance of detention that subject to clause (6) of Art.22 copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in. the grounds of detention should be furnished to the detenu along with the grounds of detention or in any event not later man five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of detention. If this requirement of clause (5) of Art.22 read with Sec.3, Sub-sec.(3) is not satisfied, the continued detention of the detenu would be illegal and void." 14. In Prakash Chandra v; Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala, 1986 Crl.L.J. 786, their Lordships of the Supreme Court said at paragraph 63 (at pages 796 and 797) as below: "63. We may here notice the first decision upon which reliance was placed - a decision in the case of Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, (1962)2 S.C.R. (Supp.) 918:A.1.R. 1962 S.C. 911. We may here notice the first decision upon which reliance was placed - a decision in the case of Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, (1962)2 S.C.R. (Supp.) 918:A.1.R. 1962 S.C. 911. This Court reiterated that the provisions of Art.22(5) of the Constitution required that the grounds should be communicated to the detenu as soon as may be and that he should be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. This Court reiterated that communication meant bringing home to the detenu effective knowledge of the facts and the grounds on which the order was based. To a person who was not conversant with the English language, in order to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution, the detenu must be given grounds in a language which he can understand and in a script which he can read, if he is a literate-person, in that case it was held that mere oral translation at the time of the service was not enough. In that case the detenu was served with the order of detention and the grounds in English. He did not know the language and asked for a translation in Hindi. The request was refused on the ground that the grounds had been orally translated to him at the time these were served upon him and that English was still being the official language, communication of the order and grounds in English was in accordance with the law and the constitution. This Court observes at pages 925-926 of the report as follows: "If the, detained person is conversant with the English language, he will naturally be in a position to understand the gravamen of the charge against him and the facts and circumstances on which the order of detention is based. But to a person who is not so conversant with the English language, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution the detenu must be given the grounds in a language which he can understand, and in script which he can read, if he is a literate person. The Constitution has guaranteed freedom of movement throughout the territory of India and has laid down detailed rules as to arrest and detention. The Constitution has guaranteed freedom of movement throughout the territory of India and has laid down detailed rules as to arrest and detention. It has also, by way of limitations upon the freedom of personal liberty, recognised the right of the State to legislate for preventive detention, subject to certain safeguards in favour of the detained person, as laid down in Cls.(4) and (5) of Art.22. One of those safeguard is that the detained person has the right to be communicated the grounds on which the order of detention has been made against him, in order that he may be able to make his representation against the order of detention. In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case, it has not been shown that the appellant had the opportunity, which the law contemplates in his favour, making an effective representation against his detention. On this ground alone, we declare his detention illegal, and set aside the order of the High Court and the order of detention passed against him." 15. In Ibrahim Ahmed v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1500, their Lordships said in paragraph 8 (Page 1507) as below: "8. Apropos the true connotation of the expression ‘communicate’ the latest decision of this Court in Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel’s case, (1981)2, S.C.C. 427: A.I.R.1981 S.C.728, is significant. In that case the detenu did not know English while the grounds of detention were drawn up in English and an affidavit filed on behalf of the detaining authority stated that the Police Inspector while serving the grounds of detention fully explained the grounds in Gujarati to the detenu but the court held that was not a sufficient compliance with the mandate of Art.22(5), which required, that the grounds of detention must be communicated to the detenu. The court bserved: "communicate" is a a strong word which means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the ‘grounds’ to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the ‘grounds’ to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. The court bserved: "communicate" is a a strong word which means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the ‘grounds’ to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the ‘grounds’ to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If the ‘grounds’, are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Art 22(5) is infringed.", In taking this view the court relied upon its three earlier decisions, namely, Harikrishan’s case, (1962)2 S.C.R. (Supp.) 918: A.I.R. 1962 S.C.911, Hadibandhu Das’s case, (1969)1 S.C.R. 227 : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 43 and Smt. Raziya Umar Bakshi’s case, 1980 S.C.C (Supp.) 195: A.I.R. 1980 S.C.1751. In Hadibandhu’s case, (1968)1 S.C.R. 227: A.I.R. 1969 S.C.43 this Court specifically held that mere oral explanation of the detention order which ran into 14 typed pages, without supplying the detenu a translation in script or language which he understood, amounted to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making a representation against the order. It would thus follow that if the grounds together with copies of all documents, statements and other materials incorporated in the grounds by reference on which the detaining authority has replied are required to be communicated to the detenu under Art.22(5) read with Sec-3(3) of COFEPOSA within the prescribed time then not merely the grounds of detention but also the copies of all incorporated documents, statements and other materials must be supplied to the detenu in a script or language which he understands and failure to do so would amount to a breach of the mandate contained in Art.22(5) read with Sec.3(3) of the COFEPOSA". 16. The core idea running through the fabric of the various decisions referred to above is that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which the understands. 16. The core idea running through the fabric of the various decisions referred to above is that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which the understands. Such imparting of the knowledge to tried detenu is effectively done by furnishing him copies of impugned order of detention, grounds of detention and the documents on the basis of which the grounds had been formulated in the language known to the detenu, and nothing further is required to be done, in compliance with the procedural formalities expected of to be complied with by the salient provisions adumbrated under Art.22(5) of the Constitution. 17. In the case on hand, as already adverted to admitted fact it is, the copies of the impugned order of detention, grounds of detention and the various documents relied upon for the formulation of the grounds of detention had been furnished to the detenu in Tamil a language known to her. Beyond this what has been done is that the detenu had been explained the contents of the booklet of documents furnished to the detenu; which contained all relevant materials in Tamil, such as the impugned order of detention, the grounds of detention and the relied upon documents for the formulation of the grounds of detention by the competent jail authority, as evidenced by the endorsement available in each one of the documents contained in the booklet of documents furnished to the detenu. Perhaps this has been done taking into account the fact that the detenu is an illiterate. This fact of the explanation of the contents of the booklet of documents furnished to the detenu was stated to have been performed within a span of time of 15 minutes commencing from 15.55 hours and ending at 16.10 hours on 11. 1996. This sort of a feat learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend, is rather humanly much impossible. To such a vociferous contention, we are unable to affix our seal of approval, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. 1996. This sort of a feat learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend, is rather humanly much impossible. To such a vociferous contention, we are unable to affix our seal of approval, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. The explanation of the contents of the booklet of documents furnished to the detenu by the competent jail authority does not mean literally reading word by word of the contents of the booklet of documents to the detenu, and in a case of this nature, what is normally expected of the competent jail authority is to explain to the detenu, in pith and substance, the contents of the booklet of documents, in the sense of basis of the relevant information of her being detained under the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 and the various grounds, on which she has been so detained. This sort of a feat we rather feel is capable of being achieved or performed within a short span of time of 15 minutes, as had been done by the said competent jail authority. When we say this, we should not be misunderstood, that we are laying down a proposition of law that in case a detenu happens to be an illiterate, it behoves upon the authorities concerned to see that such a detenu is explained the contents of the booklet of documents furnished to him or her, or otherwise the detention order passed is liable to be set aside. What the salient provision adumbrated under Art.22(5) of the Constitution and the relevant provisions under the relevant detention law in tune with the said Article as interpreted by the Apex Court of the Country is the factum of bringing home to the detenu the effective knowledge of the facts and the ground, on which the order; of detention was passed and if this is done, there is an end of the matter in the sense of satisfying the procedural safeguards under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, a rather feel on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, such a procedural safeguard, as enshrined under Art.22 (5) of the Constitution of India, had more than enough been amply complied with. 18. In the instant case, a rather feel on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, such a procedural safeguard, as enshrined under Art.22 (5) of the Constitution of India, had more than enough been amply complied with. 18. Now we shall enter into the arena of .discussion on various decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the argument to that effect. In Raziya v. Union of India, A.I.R 1980 S.C. 1751, the detenu was detained under Sub-sec(1) of Sec.3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (in short COFEPOSA Act) by the Government of Gujarat by its order dated January 30, 1980. The detenu had been served with the impugned order of detention and the grounds of detention in English, a language not known to the detenu at all. Therefore, a specific ground as below had been taken: "That the detenu does not know English. The grounds of detention and the order of detention were in English. No vernacular translation of the grounds was given nor they were explained to the detenu in a language known to him." .(a) This sort of a specific ground seems to have been denied by the respondents in paragraph 14 of the affidavit of Mr.P.M.Shah, on behalf of the detaining authority, where he stated that the grounds were explained to the detenu in the ‘language know to him. It was also averred in paragraph 5 that one Mr.A.K. Sharma, Police Inspector C.I.D., (Crime Branch), Ahmedabad had explained to the detenu the order of detention and the grounds communicated to him on January 30,1980. .(b) Dealing with such a question, the Supreme Court said in paragraph 3 thus: "This affidavit, in my opinion, is wholly inadmissible in evidence. If it was a fact that Mr.Sharma had personally explained the grounds to the detenu then the respondents should have, filed an affidavit of Mr.Sharma himself to show that he had actually explained the contents of the grounds to the detenu by translating the same in the language which he understood. No such affidavit is forthcoming. No contemporaneous record has been produced to show that Mr.Sharma had actually explained or translated the grounds to (he detenu. No such affidavit is forthcoming. No contemporaneous record has been produced to show that Mr.Sharma had actually explained or translated the grounds to (he detenu. The service of the ground of detention on the detenu is a very precious constitutional right and where the grounds are couched in a language which is not known to the detenu, unless the contents of the grounds are fully explained and translated to the detenu, it will tantamount to not serving the grounds of detention to the detenu and would thus vitiate the detention ex facie." (c) Their Lordships further said in paragraphs 4 and 5 (pages 4 and 5) as below: "4. In case of Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack, (1969)1 S.C.R. 227 : A.I.R. 1969 S. C. 43, it was clearly held that merely oral explanation of an order without supplying him a translation in a script or language which the detenu understood amounted to a denial of right of being communicated the grounds. In the instant case, it is not even alleged in the affidavit of Mr.Shah that any translation or translated script of the grounds was furnished to the detenu. 5. In this view of the matter, the detention becomes invalid on this ground alone. I would however like to observe that in cases where the detaining authority is satisfied that the grounds are couched in a language which is not known to the detenu, it must see to it that the grounds are explained to the detenu, a translated script is given to him and the grounds bear some sort of a certificate to show that the grounds have been explained to the detenu in the language which he understands. A bare denial at the stage when habeas corpus petition is filed in the court by the detaining authority that these formalities were observed would be of no consequence particularly when it is not supported by any document or by any affidavit of the person who had done the job of explaining of translation. We have pointed out in several cases that the courts frown on detention without trial and insist on the strick compliance of the constitutional safeguards enshrined in Art.22(5) to the letter of the law, because a non-compliance of these safeguards would itself by sufficient to vitiate the order of detention. We have pointed out in several cases that the courts frown on detention without trial and insist on the strick compliance of the constitutional safeguards enshrined in Art.22(5) to the letter of the law, because a non-compliance of these safeguards would itself by sufficient to vitiate the order of detention. Despite our repeated observations, unfortunately, however the detaining authority continues to pass orders of detention in a casual or cavalier fashion with the result that the courts are compelled to release the detenus. We hope and trust that in future the detaining authorities should fully apply their mind so as to result in a strick compliance of the constitutional safeguards contained in the Constitution, more particularly because the liberty of the subject is in peril." 19. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case above, on a fact-situation of this case, cannot at all be stated to be applicable to the case on hand. Therefore, we are of the view that this decision is of no help in advancing the case of the petitioner to any extent whatever. 20. In Chaju Ram v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 263, the petitioner Chaju Ram was detained under the orders of the District Magistrate, Jammu passed under Sec.5 of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964 on March 30, 1969. The order was served on him on the same day and on the original order there was an endorsement by the Station House Officer..... to the effect that in compliance with the District Magistrate’s order, he arrested Chaju at 6.30 p.m. and that the contents of the order were explained to him in Urdu, by reading over the same to him, in token of which, his thumb impression was obtained, on the face of the order. Beneath this endorsement, there is a thumb impression although it is not stated there, whose thumb impression it is. In any event, this was in compliance with the direction given in the order itself that notice of the order should be given to Chanju by reading over the same to him. .(a) In the affidavit filed by Chaju Ram, he alleged that he was not explained the grounds of detention and therefore, he was deprived of his right of making a representation under the statute. .(a) In the affidavit filed by Chaju Ram, he alleged that he was not explained the grounds of detention and therefore, he was deprived of his right of making a representation under the statute. He also alleged that the grounds, on which his detention had been ordered, were vague and were not sufficient for him to make a representation, if he cared. .(b) In answer to the averments as above, the Under Secretary to the Government stated in his affidavit that the grounds were duly served upon the detenu and in token of his having understood the same, he affixed him thumb impression. The claim of the Government, therefore, was that on both the occasions, i.e., to say, when the detention order was served on him and also when the grounds were handed over to him, the contents of the documents were read over to him and translated to him in the language, he understood (Urdu) and therefore, there was compliance with the provisions of the law. (c) What their Lordships of the Supreme Court said, in dealing with the contentions of the respective parties, is getting reflected in paragraphs 6 to 9, which read as under: "6. Now, if we accept the affidavit of the Government, it is obvious that the affidavit of the detenu must be false. Contrariwise, if we accept the affidavit of the detenu, we must reject the material placed before us on behalf of the Government. In view of the contradictory nature of these two affidavits, we went into the matter very closely and satisfied ourselves which of the two affidavits is acceptable, giving all the benefit of doubt to the detenu. To begin with, the order of detention, had an endorsement on it that the order should be communicated to Chaju by reading over the same to him. This was probably done because we find an endorsement of the Station House Officer that he had read it over to him in Urdu, The thumb impression on this document does not state that it is the thumb impression of Chaju, but as he has not raised a controversy about it, we accept it as his. 7. In contrast to this order, the grounds of detention did not have an endorsement that the ground should be explained to Chaju in the language he understood.. 7. In contrast to this order, the grounds of detention did not have an endorsement that the ground should be explained to Chaju in the language he understood.. In the affidavit in answer to the first petition, the grounds were filed but there was no endorsement on the copy of the grounds showing that it had been so read to him in Urdu and that he was explained the contents. Mr.Sachthey, however, brought to our notice the original file in which the copy of the grounds which was served upon the detenu has an endorsement in Urdu that they had been read over and fully explained to him in Urdu. There is a thumb impression and against the thumb impression is noted that it is that of Chaju. The date April 6,1969. 8. The question is whether in view of this endorsement we must held that Chaju was properly explained the grounds of detention in Urdu which he understands. In our judgments we cannot accept these documents at their face value. To begin with, the three endorsements on the copy, that is. to say, (a) that the document was read over to him in Urdu, (b) the thumb impression and (c) the note that it is the thumb impression of Chaju, are in two different inks if not three. This raised a suspicion, that these might have been written later around the thumb impression taken form Chaju as was done when the order of detention was served on him. It may be recalled that at that time also there was an endorsement in English that it had been read over to him, but nothing had been written around the thumb impression of Chaju whether in Urdu or otherwise to show that the thumb impression was that of Chaju. We looked carefully at the affidavit filed in this Court which is a cyclostyled document. We find in para 6 a correction in a very significant place. This correction has been made by typing certain words in the place between two lines with an oblique showing that it is an omission. The words beneath these added words have been erased although some of them in part still appear. We find in para 6 a correction in a very significant place. This correction has been made by typing certain words in the place between two lines with an oblique showing that it is an omission. The words beneath these added words have been erased although some of them in part still appear. Now it is significant that the words which have been added are as follows: "understood the same he", and the para now reads as follows: "Referring to para 7 of the petition, I say that the grounds were duly served upon the detenu and in token of having understood the same he affixed his thumb impression thereon" (Italics by us). The Italic words are the words which have been added in the place between the two lines. It appears that what has been erased must be some other words appropriate to what preceded and what followed. In our opinion the paragraph must have read; "Referring to para 7 of the petition I say that the grounds were duly served upon the detenu and in token of having received the same he-affixed his thumb impression thereon". The Italic words were erased and others substituted. There would be no occasion to erase one set of writing and write another if the words were there. 9. Of course, Mr.Sachthey ingeniously suggests that this may be a case of erroneous typing necessitating the correction; but this correction comes at a significant spot after the detenu has sworn an affidavit that he was not explained the grounds of the detention in the language which he understood, and further the original document which is produced does not seem to bear authenticity because of the changes of ink, In these circumstances and regard being had, to the fact that on the previous occasion in the affidavit there was no mention of having, read over the grounds to him in the language he understood, we are constrained to hold that we should not go by the affidavit of the Under Secretary, but the preference accept the affidavit of the detenu. The detenu is an illiterate person and it is absolutely necessary that when we are dealing with a detenu who cannot read or understand English language or any language at all that the grounds of detention should be explained to him as early as possible in the language he understands so that he can avail himself of the statutory right of making a representation. To handover to him the document written in English and to obtain his thumb impression on it is token of his having received the same does not comply With the requirements of the law which gives very valuable right to the detenu to make a representation which right is frustrated by handing over to him the grounds of detention in an alien language. We are therefore compelled to hold in this case that the requirement of explaining the grounds to the detenu in his own language was not complied with.” 21. The factual metrix of case, if gone through, there is a doubtful circumstances as to whether the; detenu, in fact, had been explained the grounds of detention and in consequence thereof he had understood the same. The doubtful circumstances consisted of certain erasures and substitutions by way of interlineation, and that apart, no translated version had been furnished to the detenu in the language known to him so as to make an effective and purposeful representation pursuant to the invaluable right inhering in his favour under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India. It is on those grounds, their Lordships of the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of detention. In such state of affairs, we are of the view that this case also cannot at all be stated to render any sort of assistance in advancing the case of the petitioner to any extent whatever. 22. In Harikisan v. The State of Maharashtra and others, 1962 S.C.R: (Supp) 918, the detenu was served with the order of detention and the grounds in English. He did not know English and asked for a translation of these in Hindi. This request was refused on the ground that the order and the grounds had been orally translated to him at the time they were served upon him and that English, still being the official language communication of the order, the grounds in English were in accordance with the law and the Constitution. This request was refused on the ground that the order and the grounds had been orally translated to him at the time they were served upon him and that English, still being the official language communication of the order, the grounds in English were in accordance with the law and the Constitution. (a) In the context of such a situation, what their Lordships of the Supreme Court said had been summarised in the headnote, which reads as under: “... the provisions of Art.22(5) of the Constitution were not complied with and the detention was illegal Art.22(5) required that the grounds should be communicated to the detenu as soon as may be and that he should be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Communication in this context meant bringing home to the detenu effective knowledge of the facts and grounds on which the order was based. To a person who was not conversant with the English language, in order to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution, the detenu must be given the grounds in a language which he can understand and in a script which he can read, if he is a literate person. Mere oral translation at the time of service was not enough.” 23. The fact situation and the conclusion arrived at by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that case are so eloquent to speak for themselves and no more elucidation is necessary, to say that this case is also of no help to the petitioner. 24. In Lallubhai Johibhai Patel v. Union of India, (1981)2 S.C.C. 427 , the petitioner Lallubhai was detained under Sec.3 of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short COFEPOSA Act) by an order of detention dated 30th January, 1980 passed by shri P.M.Shah, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat (Home Department). The petitioner-detenu admittedly does not know English. The grounds of detention, which were served on the detenu, have been drawn up in English. One Shri C.L.Antali, Police Inspector, who served the grounds of detention of the detenu, has filed an affidavit stating that he had fully explained the grounds of detention in Gujarati to the detenu, and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language, which he Understands. One Shri C.L.Antali, Police Inspector, who served the grounds of detention of the detenu, has filed an affidavit stating that he had fully explained the grounds of detention in Gujarati to the detenu, and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language, which he Understands. In that context, the Supreme Court said in paragraph 20 (page 436) as below: “But, that is not a sufficient compliance with the mandate of Art.22(5) of the Constitution, which requires that the grounds of detention must be “communicated” to the detenu. “Communicate” is a strong word. It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the “grounds” should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the “ground” to the. detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If the “grounds” are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Art. 22(5) is infringed. If any authority is needed on this point, which is so obvious from Art. 22(5), reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, (1962) 2 S.C.R. (Supp.) 918: A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 911: (1962)1 Crl. L.J. 797 and Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack, (1969)1 S.C.R. 227 : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 43: 1969 Crl. L.J. 274. 25. It is thus crystal clear that in that case, the detenu had been verbally explained the grounds and nothing is left with him in a language, which he understands. But in the case on hand, all the documents, viz., copies of the impugned order of detention, grounds of detention and the documents relied upon for formulating the grounds of detention had been furnished to the detenu, as already indicated, in Tamil, a language known to the detenu and that apart, the same had been explained to her taking into account the fact that she is an illiterate. In such circumstances, it cannot be stated that this decision is also of any use in rendering any assistance in advancing the case of the petitioner. 26. In such circumstances, it cannot be stated that this decision is also of any use in rendering any assistance in advancing the case of the petitioner. 26. We are ultimately of the view that the factual matrix of the case on hand, if sifted, analysed and scanned in the broad spectrum analysis, in the light of the principles evolved in various decisions emerging from the Apex Court of this country, referred to above, will lead to the one and only conclusion that the procedural safegaurds inherring in favour of the detenu under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India had been duly and fully complied with and in that view of the matter, there is not other go for us except to reject outright the argument, as projected by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the same is, accordingly, rejected. 27. In view of what has been stated above, it goes without saying that this H.C.P. deserves to be dismissed and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.