Honble NAOLEKAR, J. – The plaintiff-respondent filed suit against the defendant- appellant for ejectment from the suit premises on the allegations that the appellant is tenant of the respondent in the suit premises for monthly rent of Rs. 35/-; the tenancy-month commences from the 9th of each calendar month; he purchased the suit premises by registered sale-deed dated 17.06.77 from one Jai Chand for a consideration of Rs. 14,000/-; the suit is filed on the grounds of default in payment of rent, sub-letting and reasonable and bona fide necessity of residence of the plaintiff. The defendant-appellant denied the grounds alleged by the plaintiff for ejectment. After decision of the suit by the trial Court, the defendant-tenant moved an application before the lower appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 27, CPC for bringing certain documents on record. The said application was rejected by he lower appellate Court. Both the Courts below have decreed the suit of the plaintiff on the ground of sub-letting which is a ground provided under Section 13 (1) (e), Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (in short, referred to hereinafter as `the Act) and on the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity provided under Section 13 (1) (h) of the Act. (2). On appeal being preferred this Court has framed the following substantial questionS of law : "1. Whether without specific plea regarding want of consent of landlord for sub-letting the suit premises, no foundation for ground of eviction under Sec. 13 (i)(e) of the Act of 1950, is laid, in view of Sec. 108 (j) of the Transfer of Property Act. 2. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the lower appellate Court erred in law in rejecting application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC filed by the defendant-appellant for leading evidence concerning bona fide and reasonable necessity by holding that the document sought to be produced are not relevant, if so what is its effect on the finding on issue no. 3? 3. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the present suit for seeking a decree for eviction against the appellant was not maintainable, on the ground set-forth in Clause (h) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the Act of 1950 in view of Sec. 14 (s) of the said Act?" (3). 3? 3. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the present suit for seeking a decree for eviction against the appellant was not maintainable, on the ground set-forth in Clause (h) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the Act of 1950 in view of Sec. 14 (s) of the said Act?" (3). I will take up question No. 1 and 3 framed by this Court first. To obtain a decree under Section 13 (10(e) of the Act it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead and prove that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without the permission of the landlord. Under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act there is no constraint on the lessees right to sub-lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property. Therefore, the lease under the Transfer of Property Act could sub-let the premises let out. It is only by virtue of sub-section 13(1)(iii) and (v) that restriction is imposed on the lessee to sub-let the premises without the permission of the landlord. Thus the landlord can obtain a decree on this ground if he alleges and proves that the tenant has, (i) assigned, (ii) sub-let, or (iii) otherwise parted with, the possession of the whole or any part of the premises, (iv) without the permission of the landlord. Therefore, assignment, sub-letting, or otherwise parting with the possession should be without the permission of the landlord. In Hasmat Rai & Others vs. Raghunath Prasad & Others (1), the Apex Court has laid down that the burden of establishing any of the grounds for ejectment of the tenant under the Act is on the landlord. Before an allegation of fact to obtain the relief required is permitted to be proved, the law of pleading requires that such facts must be alleged and, thereafter, proved. It is well established proposition that any amount of proof offered without the pleading is generally of no relevance. To make out a ground under Section 13 (1)(e) of the Act it is necessary for the landlord not only to plead and prove that the property had been sub-let by the tenant but also to plead and prove that such sub-letting was without the permission of the landlord. (4). To make out a ground under Section 13 (1)(e) of the Act it is necessary for the landlord not only to plead and prove that the property had been sub-let by the tenant but also to plead and prove that such sub-letting was without the permission of the landlord. (4). The plaintiff has alleged in para 7 of the plaint that the defendant-tenant has sub-let the premises to some other person and he is serving in the Railways. The pleading is completely missing as to whom the accommodation has been sub-let by the tenant and the major defect in the pleading is that it has not been alleged that the sub-letting was effected without the permission of the landlord. According to me, to make out a ground under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Act it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead and prove that sub-letting was done without the permission of the landlord. After going through the evidence of the landlord. P.W. 1 Narain Lal, I do not find a word that the tenant has sub- let the premises without the permission of the landlord. Therefore, there is not only the absence of the plea- ding but also the proof. The Courts below have committed a grave error of law in granting decree against the tenant for ejectment under Section 13. (5). It has been contended by learned counsel for the appellant that as the tenancy was for a commercial or business purpose the tenants possession was protected for five years under Section 14 (3) of the Act and as such no suit could be filed by the plaintiff for ejectment under Section 13 (1)(h) of the Act. Certain facts have to be noted which have emerged on appreciation of the evidence and which have also been arrived at by the Courts below. Admittedly, as per the tenant, the shop was let out to Jagdish Prasad in the year 1974 and the suit was filed in the year 1978. It is alleged by the plaintiff in para 3 of the plaint that the defendant has taken the suit accommodation on rent of Rs. 35/- per month for residential purpose. In the written- statement filed by the defendant, he has not specifically denied that the suit property was not let out for residential purpose. It is alleged by the plaintiff in para 3 of the plaint that the defendant has taken the suit accommodation on rent of Rs. 35/- per month for residential purpose. In the written- statement filed by the defendant, he has not specifically denied that the suit property was not let out for residential purpose. It is said in reply to para 3 that the suit property was given on rent of Rs. 30/- for shop and for residence. Thus it is not the case of the defendant that the suit accommodation was given exclusi- vely for the commercial or business purpose. Had the accommodation been given for commercial purpose this fact would have been pleaded specifically, particularly so when in the additional pleading it is said that in view of Section 14 (3) of the Act no suit could be decreed before the expiry of five years. P.W. 4 the Labour Inspector examined by the plaintiff has proved that Minakshi Studio was registered under the Shops & Commercial Establishments Act in the year 1976. The tenant-appellant has also stated that the studio was started on a latter date. On appreciation of the evidence on record both the Courts have arrived at the conclusion that the shop was started sometime in the year 1976 and I do not find any infirmity in the finding arrived at by the Courts that the shop was started in the year 1976. (6). Section 14(3) of the Act reads as under : "14(3).-Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant." Thus the section prohibits eviction of the tenant from the premises for five years on the ground set forth in Section 13(1)(h) if the premises to let out for commercial or business purpose. It is the protection guaranteed to the tenant to whom the premises has been let out for commercial or business purpose. As such it is for the tenant to plead and prove that the premises was letout to him for the purpose of his carrying on commercial activity or business activity therein. It is the protection guaranteed to the tenant to whom the premises has been let out for commercial or business purpose. As such it is for the tenant to plead and prove that the premises was letout to him for the purpose of his carrying on commercial activity or business activity therein. The protection can be only sought and given under Section 14(3) of the Act if it is proved that originally the premises was let out for commercial or business purpose. The premises was let out in the year 1974 for residential purposes. To seek protection under Section 14(3) of the Act it has to be pleaded and proved that the original letting out of the premises was for commercial or business purposes. If the premises is let out for residential purpose and, later on, the use is changed to non-residential purpose without the express permission of the landlord by the tenant, he cannot take advantage of the protection under Section 14(3) of the Act. As the premises was originally let out for residential purpose and later on the user has been converted into business purpose in the year 1976 the tenant is not entitled for protection, particularly when there is nothing on record to show that the change in the user was expressly permitted by the landlord. Thus the suit instituted in the year 1978 shall not be debarred by virtue of the provisions of Section 14 (3) of the Act. (7). Now, I take up substantial question No.2. The plaintiff has alleged bona fide need of the suit accommodation on the ground that he is staying with his brother Udai Ram and as Udai Ram wants the house for his personal need and, therefore, naturally required him to vacate the house and occupy his own premises. The defendant moved application under order 41 Rule 27, CPC on 16.08.91 at the appellate stage i.e., after 13 years of the institution of the suit, and prayed for production of the true copy of the `abadi register contending that on 14.08.91 he came to know that the house which was stated by the plaintiff to be of his brother is a jointly owned property of the plaintiff and his brother. The premises consisted of 8 to 9 rooms and one shop. The plaintiffs son has started business in that shop. The said application was opposed by the plaintiff. The premises consisted of 8 to 9 rooms and one shop. The plaintiffs son has started business in that shop. The said application was opposed by the plaintiff. The defendant-tenant withdrew the same as not pressed on 27.09.91. The defendant again moved an application on 27.09.91 under Order 41 Rule 27, C.P.C. that he came to know that the house where the plaintiff is presently residing does not belong to his brother Udai Ram and this fact has come to the knowledge of the defendant when the plaintiff produced the `patta of the house dated 30.08.91. On patta being produced by the plaintiff he made enquiries from the Municipal Board and has come to know that the said house stands in the name of the plaintiffs father and the house-tax is recovered from him. The plaintiffs father has preferred an appeal against the order of assessment, therefore, he be permitted to produce those documents showing the house to be in the name of the father of the plaintiff and the copy of the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs father. In all fairness, it is clear that by the subsequent application the defendant wanted to show that the hose where the plaintiff has been residing and which was said to be plaintiffs brothers house does not belong to his brother. In the first application he had stated that the house was jointly owned by the plaintiff and his brother. Later on, he wanted to show that the property does not belong to his brother but to his father. The first application was withdrawn by the defendant. By the second application he wanted to produce the documents to show that the property belongs to the plaintiffs father. One fact is thus certain on the defendants own case that the property does not belong to the plaintiff exclusively. Therefore, the production of the documents by the defendants after such a long lapse of time if held by the appellate Court not to be required to enable it to pronounce the judgment that finding cannot be said to be a finding contrary to law. The mere discovery of a fresh evidence subsequent to the decision of the lower Court is not a ground for its admission in appeal at the appellate stage unless the appellate Court requires that evidence to enable it to pronounce the judgment. The mere discovery of a fresh evidence subsequent to the decision of the lower Court is not a ground for its admission in appeal at the appellate stage unless the appellate Court requires that evidence to enable it to pronounce the judgment. The requirement of the appellate Court is sine qua non for the admissibility of the document. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, if the lower appellate Court has not thought it fit that the document is required for adjudication of the question in dispute that decision of the Court cannot be termed as illegal. Secondly, on the facts alleged in the application, I am of the opinion that the lower appellate Court has not committed any error of law in refusing the admission of the additional evidence at the appellate stage. (8). For the aforesaid reasons, although the landlord respondents has failed to prove the ground of sub-letting the decree granted by the lower appellate Court stands on the ground under Section 13(1)(h) of the Act. (9). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with cost.