Judgment : N. ARUMUGHAM, J. ( 1 ) - The above three revisions have been filed challenging the legality and propriety of the orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate No. I, Coimbatore, in Crl. M. P. Nos. 1978, 1979 and 1980 in C. C. Nos. 787 of 1993, 104 of 1993 respectively on 24. 5. 1996. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is one and the same person and respondents/complainants are different. Since common question of law identical in nature arises for consideration in all these revisions, after hearing the Bar for the respective parties, I have proposed to dispose the same by pronouncing this common order. ( 3 ) THREE different cheques as defined under the Negotiable Instruments Act were claimed to have been executed by the accused, who is the revision petitioner herein, drawn in the name of the respondents herein and who on their part presented them with their Bank for encashment but however returned as bounced, followed by the issuance of the legal notices demanding the payments of the amounts within the time as provided by the law and since the demand had not been complied with, for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, complaints had been filed before the Court below. After taking of cognizance of the same and issuance of process, the accused in all the three cases above referred to, who is one and the same person, filed petitions under Section 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the joint trial of all the three cases and in the same petition filed petitions under Section 254 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking the relief of examining the complainants as witnesses for the defence. The said petitions were resisted by the respondents and the learned Judicial Magistrate after having heard the matter fully, dismissed the above three petitions by passing the impugned orders and aggrieved, the three revisions above referred to were sought to be admitted. On ordering notice of motion, the respondents/complainants have entered appearance through the Bar. ( 4 ) I have heard Mr. C. Deivasigamani, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner challenging the impugned orders passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, and Mr. Nicholas, learned appearing on behalf of the respondents/complainants justifying the impugned orders. On ordering notice of motion, the respondents/complainants have entered appearance through the Bar. ( 4 ) I have heard Mr. C. Deivasigamani, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner challenging the impugned orders passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, and Mr. Nicholas, learned appearing on behalf of the respondents/complainants justifying the impugned orders. ( 5 ) BEFORE proceedings further, I feel it necessary to advert Sections 219 and 254 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 219 Crl. P. C. runs as follows : " (1) When a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three. (2) Offences are of the same kind when they are punishable with the same amount of punishment under the same Section of the Indian Penal Code or of any special or legal law : provided that, for the purposes of this Section, an offence punishable under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an office punishable under Section 380 of the said Code, and that an offence punishable under any Section of the said Code, or of any special or local law, shall be deemed to be an offence of same kind as an attempt to commit such offence, when such attempt is an offence. " ( 6 ) IN the context of the above Section of law, I am given to understand by the mere casual look of it that for the commission of certain overt acts of the same category, joint trial may be envisaged and to import the very purport of the above section of law to the facts of the instant case when I happened to search for the materials or grounds in the petitions filed under Section 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, they do not contain anything tangible to be countenanced. Simply because the revision petition happens to be one and the same person in all the three different cases and the respondents are holder in due course of the Negotiable Instruments, that does not mean that the transaction that took place among themselves on different dates provides a common cause of action as provided under Section 219 Crl. P. C. In short to say, the revision petitioner had deliberately avoided raising grounds to have a joint trial before the Trial Court and even looking into the factual aspects of the case, not a single limb of Section 219 of the Code has been pressed into service in the instant cases. Therefore, I am not persuaded to adopt any ground for invoking Section 219 Cr. P. C. ( 7 ) COMING to Section 254 of the Code, it reads as follows :- " (1) If the Magistrate does not convict the accused under Section 252 or Section 253, the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution, and also to hear the accused and take all such evidence as he produces in his defence. (2) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, on the application of the prosecution or the accused, issue a summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce any document or other thing. (3) The Magistrate may, before summoning any witness on such application, require that the reasonable expenses of the witness incurred in attending for the purposes of the Trial be deposited in Court. " A reading of the above Section provides that if the Magistrate has not formed his mind to convict the accused as provided under Sections 252 and 253 of the Code, then it is imperative on him to proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution and subsequently also to hear the accused and take all such evidence as he produces in his defence. It is thus, sub-Section (1) clearly mandates that all priorities and preference should be given to the prosecution first in recording all legal evidence to be produced and then record all evidence adduced on behalf of the defence. It is thus, sub-Section (1) clearly mandates that all priorities and preference should be given to the prosecution first in recording all legal evidence to be produced and then record all evidence adduced on behalf of the defence. Only after the first limb is satisfied, then the provision of law provides the option to both sides, either the prosecution or the defence, to call for any witness but subject to sub-Section (3) of the above Section. The very scheme is built by the statute is clearly on the basis of the very fabric of the criminal jurisprudence, namely, that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubts and that the accused must be in a position to give rebuttal evidence by way defence. One should not forget the fact or take the law to mean that the accused even before the prosecution opens the case, may have an opportunity to call for the witnesses cited by the prosecution to be examined on his behalf by way of adducing rebuttal evidence or to substantiate his defence theory. This synthesis if propagated should not and could not have any backing for the very construction and phraseology adopted in the above Section of law and that therefore the very same synthesis has been attempted in this case by the Bar for the petitioner. ( 8 ) IMPORTING the said ratio, it is noted that with reference to the facts of the instant case, the examination of the prosecution witnesses is yet to commence and that at this stage the prosecution, as provided by the first limb of Section 254 Crl. P. C. must have the prerogative right of producing all such evidence at its command and then only the defence can enter into the defence by summoning all its witnesses and documents as provided by the statute and to controvert the same if a petition has been filed to summon P. W. 1 or the complainant to be examined as a defence witness even before the prosecution commences, its evidence, it would then be totally alien to the very scheme of the judicial process formulated by the statute and that therefore it has no legs to stand even. Learned trial Magistrate has perfectly and justifiably arrived at his conclusion by passing the impugned orders. The revision petitions thus have no merits to consider even for a moment. Learned trial Magistrate has perfectly and justifiably arrived at his conclusion by passing the impugned orders. The revision petitions thus have no merits to consider even for a moment. As was rightly contended on behalf of the re-spondents, the whole scheme of revision was intended only to drag the proceedings with a faint attempt and nothing more could be attributed in this regard. It is under these circumstances, with a view to avoid unnecessary delay, the learned Trial Magistrate is directed to go ahead with the trial of the proceedings as expeditiously as possible and to dispose of the same in accordance with law by giving opportunity to both parties concerned. In other respects, these revisions lack merits for admission and are liable to be rejected. ( 9 ) IN the result, for all the reasonings given above, the above three revisions fail and accordingly they are dismissed even at this admission stage itself, with the directions given above. Petitions dismissed.