ORDER S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This revision is filed by the plaintiff, challenging the order dated 1.11.95, whereby the trial Court has directed the applicants to pay Court-fee on the amount of Rs, 1, 50, 101/- in civil Suit No. 298-A of 1995. 2. The applicants filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the non-applicant. Their claim was based on the fact that the applicant had constructed a building on the plot situate at Baijnathpara Ward, Raipur. The construction was made after obtaining permission of the non-applicant, Municipal Corporation, Raipur. It was claimed that there was some compromise dated 23.9.95, according to which, the applicants constructed a building for the purpose of residence as well as for a showroom. It was claimed that since the map was properly sanctioned, and the unauthorised construction was also permitted under Section 307 (4) of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, it cannot be said that the applicants had construced the building illegally. It was further claimed that the Municipal Corporation had no right and authority to proceed under Section 307 (2) of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act against the applicants. The applicants further alleged that despite the explanation given by them to the notice dated 20th of October, 1995, on 24th of October, 1995, the non applicant threatened to demolish the structure raised by the applicants. The applicants, therefore, filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction restraining the non-applicant from interfering with the possession of the suit property. 3. The applicants paid the court-fees under Article 17 (iiii) of the Schedule II of the Court fees Act, of Rs. 30/- for the relief of declaration. They valued the relief of injunction at Rs. 300/- under Section 7 (iv) (d) of the Court fees Act and paid Rs. 30/- on the valuation. However, for the purpose of jurisdiction, the applicants claimed that the property was worth Rs. 1, 50, 101/-, therefore, the suit was filed in the Court of VI Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Raipur. 4. By the impugned order, the trial Court has held that the applicants have not valued the suit property properly and, therefore, they should revise the valuation and pay the court-fee in accordance with law. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicants is that the suit was rightly valued and, therefore, the impugned order has to be set aside. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicants is that the suit was rightly valued and, therefore, the impugned order has to be set aside. According to the learned counsel for the applicant, this was a suit for declaration and injunction covered by Clause 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act and, therefore, the valuation on the relief of injunction put by the applicants at Rs. 300/- was correct. The learned counsel for the applicants further submitted that the relief of injunction was consequential to the relief of declaration and, therefore, the valuation made by the applicants was covered by Clause 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. In the alternative, it was contended by the learned counsel for the applicants that the valuation put by the applicants is proper because a fixed Court fees of Rs. 30/- was required to be paid on a relief of declaration under Article 7 (iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act and the relief of injunction was valued at Rs. 300/-by the applicants in accordance with law. There was further submission that in this case there was no relief of declaration involved as the suit is filed merely for permanent injunction. 6. The learned counsel for the applicants relied on the case of Mahant Purshottam Dass and others Vs. Har Narain and others (1) and submitted that the applicants could pray for injunction without necessity of praying for declaration. In this case the prayer for declaration was mere surplusage. The plaintiff could get the relief of injunction as there was no obstacle to the title of the applicants. Therefore, the suit is covered by Section 7 (iv) (d) of the Court Fees Act. The learned counsel for the applicants also referred to a decision in parties being Sanik Nagar Durga G.N. 5 Samiti Vs. Indore City Improvement Trust, (2) and to another decision in parties being Raipur Development Authority Vs. Dr. S.K. Ahuza, (1). The learned counsel for the applicants also drew the attention of this Court to the case of Shamsher Singh Vs. Rajinder Prashad and others,(2) 7. The learned counsel for the non-applicant, however, supported the impugned order, passed by the Court-below. 8. After hearing learned counsel for both the parties, this Court is of the opinion that this revision is liable to be rejected. Rajinder Prashad and others,(2) 7. The learned counsel for the non-applicant, however, supported the impugned order, passed by the Court-below. 8. After hearing learned counsel for both the parties, this Court is of the opinion that this revision is liable to be rejected. However, we must remember certain principle involved in a case of this kind. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act says that the Valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction in cases falling under section 7 (iv) of the Court fees Act shall be the same as that for payment of court fees. Therefore, the problem is how should we determine the question of payment of court fees under Clause 7 (iv) (c) and 7 (iv) (d) of the Court Fees Act. A suit for declaration and injunction covered by Clause 7 (iv) (c) or (d) of the Court Fees Act is to be judged on the basis of the entire plaint. It is well established that if a party prays for relief of permanent injunction, which is so intimately connected with the relief of declaration claimed by him, then the relief of permanent injunction is a consequential relief. It is sometimes said that the relief of permanent injunction should flow directly and essentially from the relief of declaration in such cases. On the other hand, a party is entitled to sue for the relief of declaration simplicitor without claiming the relief for injunction. In such a case, the suit for declaration is not covered by any of the clauses of Section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act would also not apply to such a suit. This suit would be governed by Article 17 (iii) of Schedule II of the Court fees Act for the purpose of court fees. The plaintiff shall be required to pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 30/- on the relief of declaration. Since the aforesaid suit is not covered by Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction shall be governed by Sections 3 and 4 of the Suits Valuation Act. In cases of urban property the valuation under the Suits Valuation Act under Section 3 read with Section 4 thereof, would be market value of the property and that value the plaintiff can put for the purpose of jurisdiction of the Court. In cases of urban property the valuation under the Suits Valuation Act under Section 3 read with Section 4 thereof, would be market value of the property and that value the plaintiff can put for the purpose of jurisdiction of the Court. However, there may be a third kind of suit in which the plaintiff may claim suit for declaration unrelated to the relief for permanent injunction. In such a case, the suit for declaration will be governed by Article 17 (iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act for the purpose of payment of court fees and for the purpose of jurisdiction the valuation would be in accordance with Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act. So far as the relief for permanent injunction is concerned, which is an independent relief apart from the relief for declaration, it shall be governed by section 7 (iv) (d) of the Court Fees Act. Its valuation would be u/s. 7 (iv) (d) of the Court Fees Act and the plaintiff shall be entitled to put his own valuation in accordance with the value he puts to the relief claimed. It may not be forgotten here that a suit u/s. 7 (iv)(d) of the Court Fees Act is directly related with Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act and, therefore, the valuation put by the plaintiff for the purpose of Court Fees is likely to affect the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. However, in such a case so far as urban properties are concerned, the plaintiff cannot avoid valuing the suit for the purpose of Court fees at market value of the property in case, he has valued the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction in respect of declaratory relief at market value. That value shall be the value of suit for jurisdiction u/s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act for relief of injunction. Thus the jurisdictional value in such a case would be identical for both the reliefs. In certain cases, the relief of permanent injunction may not be related to the property affected. In such a case plaintiff can value the relief of permanent injunction at the rate less than the market value. However, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court shall be determined by the value of the property put by the plaintiff on the declaratory relief for the purpose of jurisdiction. 9. In such a case plaintiff can value the relief of permanent injunction at the rate less than the market value. However, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court shall be determined by the value of the property put by the plaintiff on the declaratory relief for the purpose of jurisdiction. 9. We have already seen the main allegations in the plaint. It appears to this Court that the relief of declaration made in this plaint is to the effect as follows :- 10. The relief of declaration does not involve in the relief of injunction. It appears to be a mere surplusage. The real relief is the relief for permanent injunction and, therefore, the suit is covered by Section 7 (iv) (d) of the Court Fees Act. The applicants were not required to claim any other relief except that the permanent injunction under the facts and circumstances of the case, as they had alleged in the plaint that they had made constructions on the suit property after getting sanction of the Municipal Corporation. According to them, the matter was compounded as per the provisions of Section 307 (4) of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act after payment of compounding fee. They were, therefore, aggrieved by the action of the Municipal Corporation that threatened to demolish the construction made by them within 24 hours. Looking to the plaint as a whole, the applicants were bound to value the suit according to section 7 (iv) (d) of the Court Fees Act. It could not be disputed by the counsel for the applicants that the applicants were bound to put a proper value to the relief claimed by them under the last line of Section 7 (iv) of the M.P. Court Fees Act :- 7 (iv) In Suits - *** In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought. The trial Court has found that the valuation for injunction at the rate of Rs. 30/- is arbitrary and, therefore, the trial Court has asked the applicants to revise the valuation. The trial Court has no-where observed that the applicants have not paid proper court fees and for this reason, the Court cannot proceed with the case. The applicants were, therefore, directed to put proper valuation on the relief of injunction. 11. The question is whether the applicants were bound to value the relief of injunction at Rs. The trial Court has no-where observed that the applicants have not paid proper court fees and for this reason, the Court cannot proceed with the case. The applicants were, therefore, directed to put proper valuation on the relief of injunction. 11. The question is whether the applicants were bound to value the relief of injunction at Rs. 1,50,101/- or could they value the relief of injunction at the rate of Rs. 30/- only as claimed by them. It is not disputed that the plaintiffs are claiming only that the Corporation be restrained from demolishing the structure. It is well established that a plaintiff has to value the relief claimed by him. Normally, if the relief sought has the money value which can be objectively ascertained, that value of the relief and any other value attached to it is arbitrary and unreasonable. However, this is a general and not an absolute rule. In certain cases a question may arise that the value of the relief sought may not be the same as the things affected. In these cases, the plaintiff may put the valuation on his own and the Court may not interfere with it. 12. Therefore, looking to the allegation made in the plaint it is clear that whatever be the value of the property, the applicants are claiming that the Corporation shall not demolish the Superstructure raised by them. Such a relief cannot be said to be incapable of valuation. The structure raised on the land belonging to the applicants must have a real value in money. It can be objectively ascertained. For this reason, it does not matter whether such a suit is covered by Section 7 (iv) (c) or Section (7) (iv) (d) of the Court Fees Act, because in either clause the plaintiff is required to put his own valuation. The plaintiff must put his valuation after concentrating his attention to the value of relief sought. The value of relief sought is the value of constructing and raising the superstructure. It has a real money value. The plaintiff need not value the relief of injunction on the entire value of the property that is to say the value of superstructure as well as the value of land on which the superstructure was raised by him. 13. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the applicants in the case of Mahant Purshottam Dass. The plaintiff need not value the relief of injunction on the entire value of the property that is to say the value of superstructure as well as the value of land on which the superstructure was raised by him. 13. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the applicants in the case of Mahant Purshottam Dass. (supra) supports the view of this Court that in this case the relief of declaration was mere surplusage and the real relief was the relief of of permanent injunction. The other case relied on by the learned counsel for the applicants is Raipur Development Authority Vs. Dr. S. K. Ahuza, (surpa) which is distinguishable for the reason that in that particular case it was not necessary to claim any permanent injunction, nor does the case of Shamsher Singh, (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the applicants, help the decision of this Court. The facts of that case are entirely different. In that case the relief was for declaration and injunction; and it was found that it was necessary for the parties to get the decree set aside for claiming the relief of declaration. Therefore, it was necessary to pay advalorem court-fee. The case was thus covered by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. Another case of Sanik Nagar Durga G. No. 5 Samiti, (supra), relied on by the learned counsel for the applicants, is also distinguishable for the reason that in that case, the plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration that he was the owner of the suit property and was in possession. The prayer for injunction was to the effect that the defendants to restrained from starting any construction scheme over the suit land. Since the plaintiff was alleged to be the owner of the land and claimed that he was in possession of the land, there was a threat of the defendants that they would start construction on this land. It was held that such a relief for injunction was incapable of valuation. This case is therefore, distinguishable because, here, the Corporation has issued notice for demolition of an illegal superstructure raised by the applicants It has already been held that this relief is capable of being valued according to the value of superstructure. 14. It was held that such a relief for injunction was incapable of valuation. This case is therefore, distinguishable because, here, the Corporation has issued notice for demolition of an illegal superstructure raised by the applicants It has already been held that this relief is capable of being valued according to the value of superstructure. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, the direction given by the learned Additional District Judge in the impugned order to the effect that the applicants shall revise their valuation, cannot be said to be wrong. The applicants are, threfore, directed to put their own valuation in accordance with the market value of the superstructure and pay the court fees thereon. The Court-below shall then proceed in accordance with law. Thre is no merit in this revision. The revision is, therefore, dismissed subject to the observations made above. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed