Honble JAIN, J. – The appeal is directed against the order of Shri Mohd. Yasin, RHJS, learned District Judge, Bikaner dated 19.4.1990 passed in Civil Misc. Application No. 12/90 by which the learned Distt. Judge allowed the application filed by the respondent-plaintiff u/O.39, Rr. 1 & 2 CPC and ordered for maintenance of status quo till the disposal of the above suit. (2). The case has got somewhat chequered history. The dispute relates to the property known as ``Khinchi House situated in Halal Kharan Mohalla, Bikaner. The patta of this house was issued in the name of Jugal Singh. Jaswant Singh is the only son of Jugal Singh. Jugal Singh sold part of the above house to Abdul Sattar by a registered sale-deed dated 29.10.1969. It appears that Abdul Satar who purchased part of the above property could not get possession of the above part of the property because there were tenants who refused to vacate the above property. Abdul Satar, therefore, sold the purchased part of the property to one Shri Madan Lal by a Sale-deed dated 17.4.1971. Madan Lal also faced the same problem and could not get possession of the purchased property. He, therefore, filed a suit (59/70) in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Bikaner against Jaswant Singh, Abdul Satar and Severn tenants. The suit was contested by the defendants and all the issues (issues nos. 3 & 4) framed in the above suit were read as follows :– ¼3½ vk;k izfroknh la[;k 8 us viuh Lo;a dh mikftZr eqrukek tk;nkn oknh ds gd esa cspdj c;ukek rgjhj o rdehy dj fn;kA ¼4½ vk;k tk;nkn eqnk;ysge ua- 1 o 8 dh ekS#lh tk;nkn gS\ vxj gkWa rks mldk nkosa ij D;k vlj gS\ (3). The learned Civil Judge decided both the issues holding that Jaswant Singh was the sole owner of the whole property and that Jugal Singh had no right or authority to dispose of the property. The learned Civil Judge, therefore, dismissed the above suit No. 59/1970 by his judgment dated 27.1.1987. Only a decree for Rs. 7,500/- was passed in favour of Madan Lal. (4). Jugal Singh further sold the other part of the property to Girdhari Singh vide sale-deed dated 6.10.1972. It appears that Girdhari Singh also felt the same difficulty that he could not get possession of the property. He tried to re-construct the building. It was opposed by the tenants. 7,500/- was passed in favour of Madan Lal. (4). Jugal Singh further sold the other part of the property to Girdhari Singh vide sale-deed dated 6.10.1972. It appears that Girdhari Singh also felt the same difficulty that he could not get possession of the property. He tried to re-construct the building. It was opposed by the tenants. Jethmal and Trilok Singh filed a suit for permanent injunction against Girdhari Singh and Jarina Begum as also some other persons. The suit was decreed and the defendants were restrained to dispossess the above plaintiffs vide judgment dated 11.2.1982. Jarina Begum, the respondent in the appeal preferred an appeal but it was later on withdrawn by her. It may be mentioned that Jarina Begum, respondent, purchased the property from Girdhari Singh vide sale-deed dated 11.6.1973. (5). It appears that Jarina Begum filed a civil suit (No. 48/88) for recovery of possession and mean profits against Jethmal. This suit was decreed on 15.9.1992. However, Jethmal filed an appeal against the above judgment and decree and this Court allowed the same vide judgment dated 11.11.1994 and the case was remanded to trial Court with certain directions. Pursuant to the above directions, the trial Court again decided the suit and dismissed the same by judgment dated 5.6.1995. Against the above judgment, an appeal has been filed by non-petitioner Jarina Begum which is still pending before this Court. It may further be mentioned that Jarina Begum, respondent also filed one more civil suit No. 70/90 for declaration and permanent injunction against Jethmal and she also moved an application for temporary injunction u/O. 39, Rr. 1 & 2 CPC. The application was contested by the appellant but the learned trial Judge after considering the respective case of the parties and the documents produced by them came to the conclusion that since a serious dispute exists between the parties, a prima facie case was made out in favour of the plaintiff. Learned trial Judge further observed that in case if the defendant is restrained from going ahead with construction for some time, he was not likely to incur any inconvenience. On the contrary, if the defendant is allowed to raise construction that will cause irreparable injury to the plaintiffs case. Learned trial Judge further observed that in case if the defendant is restrained from going ahead with construction for some time, he was not likely to incur any inconvenience. On the contrary, if the defendant is allowed to raise construction that will cause irreparable injury to the plaintiffs case. The trial Court also recorded that the defendant has given undertaking that in case the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff, he will not claim any compensation for the construction made on the disputed property. Aggrieved by the above order, the appellant has filed this appeal. (6). I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent. (7). Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the order of the learned trial Judge on the ground that the learned trial Judge did not appreciate the facts and the documents in correct perspective and came to a wrong conclusion. The documents placed on record by the appellant, it was prima facie established that Jugal Singh alone was an owner of the disputed property. Hence, the plaintiff-respondent had no title in her favour because even according to her own averment she purchased the disputed plot of land from Girdhari Singh, who in term purchased the same from Shri Jugal Singh. Jugal Singh had no right title or interest in the above property. Hence, he was not authorised to alienate the sell to anybody. Learned counsel has specifically made a reference to the finding recorded by the learned Civil Judge in civil suit No. 59/70 which was filed by Shri Madan Lal against Shri Jaswant Singh. Learned counsel has also emphasised that the plaintiff herself purchased some portion from Jaswant Singh and thereby directly admitting the fact that Jaswant Singh was the owner of the whole property including the disputed plot. In the sale-deed, the plaintiff herself has shown defendant as her neighbour of the property. Hence the prima facie case was in favour of the appellant and not in favour of the respondent- plaintiff. He also argued that the defendant-appellant was ready to furnish a guarantee in the court that in case he is allowed to make construction over the plot, he would not claim any compensation for its demolition if it is held that the property belonged to the defendant. (8). He also argued that the defendant-appellant was ready to furnish a guarantee in the court that in case he is allowed to make construction over the plot, he would not claim any compensation for its demolition if it is held that the property belonged to the defendant. (8). Learned counsel has then referred to the principles which must guide the Court in deciding the matter falling u/O. 39, Rr. 1 & 2 CPC. He referred to the following cases :– (9). Gambhri Singh & Ors. vs. Narayan Singh & Ors. (1), Ghanshyam Das. vs. Murlidhar (2), Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & Ors. vs. Dr. N.V. Rajgopalan (3), Shajuddin & Ors. vs. Nagarpalika Parishad & Anr. (4) and Thomus Ban vs. Parvathy (5). (10). Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has supported the order of the learned trial Court and invited my attention to the well established principles which the appellate Court must keep in view while adjudicating the appeal filed in respect of a matter relating to O. 39, Rr. 1 & 2 CPC. He referred to the well- known case of this Court in Smt. Vimla Devi vs. Jang Bahadur (6). According to him interference by the appellate Court is justified when the impugned order is perverse or capricious or in total violation of legal principles. Learned counsel has also sub- mitted that the property belonged to Jugal Singh. It is, therefore, clear that Smt. jarina Begum acquired right title and interest as a result of the above sale. According to the learned counsel, the plaintiff-respondent was able to show that she has got a fair question to raise and it was, therefore, necessary in the interest of justice to preserve the said property till the disposal of the suit. Hence, the learned trial Court was right in its opinion that the plaintiff-respondent had a good prima facie case. The balance of convenience naturally was also in her favour. (11). I have considered the rival contentions. It is now well established that before issuing a temporary injunction, pending disposal of a suit, the plaintiff has to make out, firstly, that he has got a prime facie title to the properties. Secondly, he must establish that he will suffer irreparable injury which cannot be adequately compensated for by damages. (11). I have considered the rival contentions. It is now well established that before issuing a temporary injunction, pending disposal of a suit, the plaintiff has to make out, firstly, that he has got a prime facie title to the properties. Secondly, he must establish that he will suffer irreparable injury which cannot be adequately compensated for by damages. Thirdly, he must prove that the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff, who is likely to suffer substantial loss if the injunction is refused when compared to the mis-chief which might be caused to the defendant if the injunction is granted. The Court has to keep in view that above principles before granting a temporary injunction which is a matter of discretion. In the instant case, it would be seen that the property has been subjected to various transfers and apparently there was rival assertion of title over the property between Jugal Singh and his son Jaswant Singh. In this regard the important fact that cannot be glossed over is that in the civil suit No. 59/70 which was instituted by Madan Lal as the successor-in-interest of Jugal Singh against Jaswant Singh S/o Jugal Singh and Ors, it was held that the property in dispute exclusively owned by Jaswant Singh. The learned trial Court was, therefore, in error in holding that the plaintiff has got a prima facie case, inasmuch as the trial Court ignored the sale-deed dated 25.9.1951, which was executed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent by Jawant Singh himself giving details of facts under which he claims to be the exclusive owner of the property including the disputed property. The present appeal moved on 20.1.90. In view of these important facts it cannot be said that the plaintiff had a prima facie case warranting indulgence of the exercise of discretionary remedy like the temporary injunction in her favour by the Court. I am aware of the note of caution voiced in Smt. Vimla Devi vs. Jang Bahadur Singhs case (supra). In the above case it was stated that the order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. Ordinarily Court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discre- tion by the trial Court and substitute for it its own discretion. In the above case it was stated that the order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. Ordinarily Court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discre- tion by the trial Court and substitute for it its own discretion. The interference with the discretionary order, however, may be justified if the lower Court acts arbitrarily or perversely, capriciously or in dis-regard of sound legal principles or without considering all the relevant record. (12). It may also be stated that the defendant-appellant was even ready to offer an undertaking that if the suit of the plaintiff ultimately succeeded, he would not claim any compensation for the improvement made by him. (13). For the above reasons I allow the appeal, set aside the order of the learned trial Court and dismissed the application filed by the plaintiff-respondent. However, I would like to make it clear that in terms of the statement made in the trial Court, the appellant-defendant will furnish an undertaking in the trial court, that he will not claim any compensation for any construction, that he might raise during the pendency of the suit, in case the suit of the plaintiff succeeds before raising any construction. Costs is made easy.