Judgment :- ABDUL HADI, J. 1. The common applicant in O.A. Nos. 452 to 457 of 1996 and 50 of 1996 has preferred these Original Side Appeals against the common order dated 26-8-1996 in the said Original Applications, whereby, interim orders granted on 19-7-1996 have been vacated on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to try the said Orginal Application filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), which (Act) repealed the earlier Arbitration Act, 1940 (Central A ct 10 of 1940) and came into force on 25-1-1996. 2. , As per Section 9(ii)(d) and (e) of the Act, under which clauses alone these Original Applications are said to have been filed, a party may even “Hefore” arbitral proceedings, apply to a “Court” for interim injunction or such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. The term “Court” referred to in the said Section 9, as per Section 2(e) of the Act inter alia, includes “the High Court in exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration, if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit.”. Further, as per clause 12 of the Letters Patent (which may be relied on, alone would apply in the present case and not Section 20, C.P.C. in view of Sec. 120 C.P.C., even if a part of the cause of action for a suit has arisen within the Original Jurisdiction of this Court the s aid suit, if leave of this Court is obtained, can be filed in this court. 3. The impugned order, apart from vacating the injunction as stated above, directs return of the abovesaid Original Applications to the applicant on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to try them. The impugned order has further directed the applicant to pay a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as exemplary costs to the respondents. 4. So, the only question to be gone into in these Original Side Appeals is whether the decision of the learned trial Judge that this Court has no jurisdiction to try those applications, is correct. 5. The impugned order has further directed the applicant to pay a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as exemplary costs to the respondents. 4. So, the only question to be gone into in these Original Side Appeals is whether the decision of the learned trial Judge that this Court has no jurisdiction to try those applications, is correct. 5. The appellant is a party to a contract with the 1st respondent-Hospital in Periyaram in Kannur District, Kerala State, under which it has to put up certain buildings in the said Kannur District, Kerala. The value of the contract is said to be 58.86 crores. Though the formal contract was entered into between the said parties on 21-12-1994, it is not in dispute that the said contract was concluded earlier by correspondence between the parties, and that the letter of acceptance by the 1st respondent, addressed to the appellant, accepting the offer made by the appellant for putting up the said construction was posted from the abovesaid Kannur District to the appellant at Manapakkam, Madras 600089. It appears that the contract was to have been completed in 16 months, but that the contractor (appellant) has also been given 8 months extension of time for completing the work and that the work is still incomplete. It also appears that according to the contractor, there have been delays on the part of the 1st respondent in paying the bills, supplying steel and cement, etc. It also appears that the contractor has removed most of its materials from the site and sought to withdraw from the contract. The 1st respondent has subsequently on 28-6-1996 issued a notice to the contractor to show cause why the contract should not be terminated on the ground that the contractor had failed to complete the work and committed breach of contract. The bank guarantees furnished by the contractor for a total sum of Rs. 6.14 crores were also sought to be invoked by the 1st respondent. At that stage, these Original Applications came to be filed, as the contract between the parties contains an arbitration clause. 6. The 2nd respondent-bank, of Madras 600089-branch, has furnished four of the abovesaid bank guarantees, one dated 10-12-1994 for Rs. 1,22,15,200/- another dated 28-12-1995 for Rs. 75 lakhs, another dated 20-12-1994 for Rs. 75 lakhs and yet another dated 20-12-1994 for Rs. 69,30,400/-, subsequently reduced to Rs. 47,76,935/-. 6. The 2nd respondent-bank, of Madras 600089-branch, has furnished four of the abovesaid bank guarantees, one dated 10-12-1994 for Rs. 1,22,15,200/- another dated 28-12-1995 for Rs. 75 lakhs, another dated 20-12-1994 for Rs. 75 lakhs and yet another dated 20-12-1994 for Rs. 69,30,400/-, subsequently reduced to Rs. 47,76,935/-. The branch at Guindy, Madras 600 032 of the 3rd respondent-bank has furnished the bank guarantee dated 28-12-1995 for Rs. 85 lakhs. The Bombay branch of the 4th respondent-bank has furnished bank guarantee dated 22.3.1996 for Rs. 2,09,78,068/-. 7. Now, it is also not in dispute that the above said formal contract was signed at Tiruvanandapuram, Kerala State, though learned counsel for the appellant before the learned trial judge, initially maintained that the said contract was signed at Madras and later only admitted that it was executed at Tiruvanandepuram. 8. The reasoning of the learned trial Judge may be gathered from the following passages in the impugned order:— “Learned counsel contended that even if a part of cause of action arises within the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of this Court, a party to an arbitration agreement can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.. This Judgment ( A.B.C. Laminart PVT. Ltd. and another v. A.P. Agencies, Salem AIR 1989 SC 1239 = 1989-1-L.W. 449) sets out the law in the most unambiguous terms that the place where the contract is made, and the place of performance are the places at which the suit or other action is to be brought, when the suit is on the contract. Even according to the applicant, the letter of acceptance was posted at Kerala before the formal agreement was signed and thereafter, a formal contract was signed .. On the facts of this case, it is clear that no part of cause of action has arisen at Madras, and the applicant has wrongly invoked the jurisdiction of this Court. While directing the return of the application, I must record my strong disapproval of the manner in which the applicant invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by wrongly stating that the contract has been executed at Madras even when it had not been (so executed). While directing the return of the application, I must record my strong disapproval of the manner in which the applicant invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by wrongly stating that the contract has been executed at Madras even when it had not been (so executed). Counsel for the applicant, at the time of seeking an ex parte order of injunction, as also throughout the final hearing on the application and till the respondent produced the copy of the brochures issued by the applicant - relevant part of which has been extracted in para 1 above - maintained that the execution was at Madras even when the applicant and presumably its counsel know full well that it was not so. These applications would have been rejected at the threshold had the fact of execution of contract at Tiruvananthapuram been stated at the outset. The applicant has misled the Court to obtain an ex parte order which has had the effect of denying the respondent for over a month, Rs. 6.14 crores. Applicant which is said to be multinational company and has executed large number of contracts of high value, should have shown a much higher degree of responsibility when approaching the High Court in its original jurisdiction. I consider it appropriate to direct the applicant to pay a sum of Rs. 15,000/- (Rs. Fifteen thousand) as exemplary costs to the respondents”. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant initially submits that since the abovesaid acceptance letter by the 1st respondent to the applicant was received at Madras, this Court will have jurisdiction to try the abovesaid applications. But, this contention cannot be accepted for various reasons. The contract is concluded by the abovesaid letter as against the applicant-offeror, once the said letter is posted by the 1st respondent at the abovesaid Kerala address of the 1st respondent. The law is, the contract by correspondence is made at the place where the letter of acceptance is posted so far as the offerer is concerned. (Vide Manilal v. Venkata Chalapathi (AIR 1943 Madras 471 = 56 L.W. 242) (DB) and G. Venkatesha v. Kamlapat (AIR 1957 Madras 201)). The following observation in AIR 1957 Madras 201 (supra) (paragraph 11) is significant:— “A contract by correspondence is made at the place where the letter of acceptance is posted; and it is repudiated at the place where the letter is received. The following observation in AIR 1957 Madras 201 (supra) (paragraph 11) is significant:— “A contract by correspondence is made at the place where the letter of acceptance is posted; and it is repudiated at the place where the letter is received. The communication of the acceptance of the proposal only affects the coming into force of the contract and not the place of making the contract”. (emphasis supplied) So, in the present case, the contract is concluded only in Kerala, outside the jurisdiction of this Court. No doubt, learned counsel for the appellant relies on the following observation in the above referred to AIR 1989 SC 1239 = 1989-1-L.W. 449:— “Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer and its intimation result in a contract and “hence a suit can be filed in a court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was communicated”. But, it must be noted that the abovesaid expression “the acceptance was communicated” would only mean, in the case of contract by correspondence, “acceptance was posted or sent”. 9 A. That apart, it must also be noted that the abovesaid acceptance letter was received by the applicant only at its abovesaid office at Manapakkam, Madras 600089, which is obviously outside the Original Side Jurisdiction of this Court. 9 B. Further, the succeeding observation of the Supreme Court in the abovesaid decision itself runs as follows:— The performance of a contract is part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where the contract should have (been) performed or its performance completed. If the contract is to be performed at the place where it is made, the suit on the contract is to be filed there and nowhere else”. In the present case, the contract has to be performed only in Kerala. Further, in Baroda Oil Cakes Traders v. Parshottam (AIR 1954 Bombay 491) Gajendragadkar, J., (as he then was) and Vyas, J., held that a contract is complete when it is accepted and the communication thereof is not part of the cause of action. 10. We may also point out here that though Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, on its terms, would only apply to “suits”, the principles therein may be applied to the present Original Applications also. 11. 10. We may also point out here that though Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, on its terms, would only apply to “suits”, the principles therein may be applied to the present Original Applications also. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant also relies on Order 7, Rule 10A(1), C.P.C., which runs as follows:— “Where in any suit, after the defendant has appeared, the Court is opinion that the plaint should be returned, it shall, before doing so, intimate its decision to the plaintiff”. According to the said learned counsel, even before giving such intimation, the impugned order has been passed. But, this contention has no merit since, first of all, the said Rule will apply only to suits and not to such application under Section 9 of the Act. That apart, Order 7, Rule 10, C.P.C., which is subject to the abovesaid Rule 10A, is stated to be not applicable to this Court in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Jurisdiction, as per Order 49, Rule 3, C.P.C. On that footing it was also argued by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent that Order 49, Rule 3, would cover even Order 7, Rule 10A, C.P.C. In our view, since both Rule 10 and Rule 10A are to be read together it is clear to us that Order 7. Rule 10A, C.P.C. will not apply to the Original Side of this Court. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant also argues that these applications only relate to said bank guarantees, since they in essence seek to prevent the encashment of the abovesaid bank guarantees. According to him, one of those bank guarantees, viz., the bank guarantee furnished by the 3rd respondent-bank (Guindy branch) was furnished at Madras (i.e. Guindy) and so this Court will have jurisdiction. This contention also, according to us, has no merit. First of all, the fundamental or material cause of action for filing the abovesaid applications in July, 1996 is that the 1st respondent issued the abovesaid show cause notice dated 28-6-1996 asking the applicant to show cause why the abovesaid contract should not be terminated. (We also understand from both the counsel that the 1st respondent has also subsequently terminated the contract). (We also understand from both the counsel that the 1st respondent has also subsequently terminated the contract). If according to the applicant, the abovesaid show cause notice is not proper on the ground that the 1st respondent alone has committed breach of contract and not the applicant, a suit by the applicant regarding the same could not be tried on the Original Side of this Court since the show cause notice was issued in Kerala State and received by the applicant at the abovesaid Manapakkam, which is also outside the Original Side Jurisdiction of this Court. Looking at the abovesaid Section 2(e) of the Act, where the expression, “having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit” has been used, we are of the view that the abovesaid applications under Section 9 of the Act also, cannot be filed in this Court. Further, even as per the supporting affidavit to these applications the applicant says that these applications are not in the nature of a suit and that hence the leave required under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, is not required. 13. That apart, admittedly all the above referred to bank guarantees other than the abovesaid bank guarantee furnished by the Guindy branch of the 3rd respondent, have been furnished only by the relevant branches of banks, which are situate outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Further, it is not in dispute that the bank guarantee furnished by the 3rd respondent bank (Guindy branch) had already been encashed and so the Original Applications in relation to that bank guarantee, would have become infructuous; and hence there is no case for our interference at this appellate stage. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant also argues that the abovesaid applications have been filed inter alia , on the ground that the said bank guarantees have not been sought to be enforced as per the very terms of the bank guarantees, since the alleged loss of the 1st respondent due to the alleged breach of contract committed by the applicant has not been quantified at all. This contention also has no merit since no such specific plea has been taken in the affidavit in support of the Original Applications (and also in the present grounds to these Original Side Appeals). This contention also has no merit since no such specific plea has been taken in the affidavit in support of the Original Applications (and also in the present grounds to these Original Side Appeals). What learned counsel points out in paragraphs 14 and 16 of the said affidavit does not bring out this aspect specifically and in the manner in which it is put before us now.