B. K. SHARMA, J. ( 1 ) TEJ Bahadur Yadav, petitioner has filed this writ petition for issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus and for quashing the order of detention dated 29-2- 1996 passed by the Districtmagistrate, Gorakhpur, respondent No. 3, under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980, which was confirmed by the State Government, respondent No. 2 vide its order dated 23-4-1996. The petitioner was served with the detention order dated 29-2-1996 (Annexure 1) to the writ petition on 29-2-1996 itself. The grounds of detention were also served on him the same day. The grounds related to the single incident dated 8-12-1995. On that day am Parkash Paswan Ex M. L. A. lodged a written report at police, station that at 12. 00 noon he was going alongwith his party associates, Ex M. L. A. Virendra Pratap Shahi and other workers in Maruti Car and Tata Mobile vehicle from his residence to party office in Tamkuhi Kothi. Gorakhpur, that in Mohalla Basaratpur near Nehru Yuva Kendra on the main road going from Gorakhpur city toward Medical College, the petitioner Tej Bahadur Yadav alongwith Rakesh Yadav, Brahma Yadav, Sant Lal. Ram Samujh, Lalji Laddoo Yadav and Sripat Dadhi acting in concert started indiscriminate firing and attack by Katta, Bombs and Revolvers on him and his supporters due to which the traffic got stranded, the shops were closed, people started running helter skelter and the public order was disturbed. In the occurrence, am Prakash Paswan, Virendra Shahi and 7 others were badly injured and both the vehicles were badly damaged. On the F. I. R. of am Prakash Paswan, Crime No. 782 of 1995 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 325, 506 and 427, I. P. C. and Section 5 (2) (5) of the S. C. S. T. Act, 1989, was registered, Chargesheet was submitted on 23-12-1995 against the petitioner and the other accused in the case which was pending. The grounds of detention further state that the present petitioner was in custody in District Jail, Gorakhpur in that case and that the report of the Senior Superintendent of Police. Gorakhpur indicated that the was every possibility of his being released on bail and his release on bail, would be injurious to the general public and he would put the public order in jeopardy. ( 2 ) FROM the side of the respondent No. 1. Gorakhpur indicated that the was every possibility of his being released on bail and his release on bail, would be injurious to the general public and he would put the public order in jeopardy. ( 2 ) FROM the side of the respondent No. 1. Union of India, counter affidavit of Ishwar Singh, Desk Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs was filed. Narendra Bahadur Singh, Upper Division Assistant in the Civil Secretariat, Lucknow filed his separate counter affidavit on behalf of the State of U. P. , respondent No. 2 Udai Pratap, Deputy Jailor of the District Jail filed his affidavit on behalf of the Superintendent, District Jail, respondent No. 4. Rahul Bhatnagar, District Magistrate Gorakhpur, Respondent No. 3 has also filed his counter affidavit, Rejoinder Affidavits have been filed on behalf of the petitioner. ( 3 ) WE have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned A. G. A, appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 4. None appeared for the Union of India at the hearing of this writ petition. ( 4 ) THE first point canvassed before us by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that since the detention orders passed in respect of Sant Lal, Ram Samujh and Lalji co-accused were revoked by the State Government, on principle of parity, the detention orders in respect of the petitioner also should be quashed. However, this plea cannot be sustained in view of the fact that the learned A. G. A has pointed out that the detention order in respect of the co-accused was revoked because there was a patent defect in the language of the detention order in respect of them passed prior to the present detention order and that there is no corresponding defect in the present detention order. Benefit of parity cannot, therefore, be given to the present petitioner. ( 5 ) THE next contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that there was violation of the provisions of Section 10 of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). Section 10 or the Act says. Benefit of parity cannot, therefore, be given to the present petitioner. ( 5 ) THE next contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that there was violation of the provisions of Section 10 of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). Section 10 or the Act says. Where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, placed before the Advisory Board constituted by it under Section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 3, also the report by such officer under sub-section (4) of that section. Thus it imposes an obligation that the following shall be placed before the Advisory Board within 3 weeks, i. e. , 21 days from the date of detention: (i) the ground on which the order of detention has been made; (ii) the representation, if any, made by the person affected by order; and (iii) where the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 3, the report by the such officer under sub-section (4) of that section. The petitioner has, claimed in para 11 of the writ petition that the representation of the petitioner was not produced before the Advisory Board within 3 weeks from the detention order. It further said that the detention order was dated 29-2-1996 and the representation was made on 14-3- 1996. In reply to this paragraph, it was said in the affidavit of Udai Pratap, Deputy Jailor of District Jail, Gorakhpur in paragraph No. 7 that the representation was submitted on 14-3-1996 and it was forwarded to the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur. In paragraph No. 5, it was said that the representation was forwarded to [he District Magistrate on the same day. The date of representation has been given in this paragraph as 4-3-1996 but about this date, there is no controversy that it is a misprint and that the date of the representation was 14-3-1996 and not 4- 3-1996. So the accepted position is that the representation was made on 14-3-1996. The date of representation has been given in this paragraph as 4-3-1996 but about this date, there is no controversy that it is a misprint and that the date of the representation was 14-3-1996 and not 4- 3-1996. So the accepted position is that the representation was made on 14-3-1996. It has been stated in the counter affidavit of Narendra Bahadur Singh, Upper Division Assistant in the U. P. Civil Secretariat made on behalf of the State of U. P. respondent No. 2, in paragraph No. 4 that a reference has to be made within 3 weeks to the Advisory Board, that the representation of the petitioner alongwith the comments of the District Magistrate was received on 20-3-1996 which was sent to the Advisory Board alongwith the comments on 26-3-1996. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has claimed that the breach of Section 10 was made inasmuch as the petitionerts representation was not placed before the Advisory Board within 3 weeks of the date of detention order. Section 10 of the Act categorically provides that the representation, if any, made by the detenu shall be placed before the Advisory Board within 3 weeks of the date of detention. It is correct that section 10 of the Act does not oblige the detenu to file his representation against the order of detention, he may not file any but in case he chooses to file his representation at any time within that period of 3 weeks, then Section 10 of the Act makes it obligatory that it be placed before the Advisory Board within 3 weeks from the date of detention. The period of 3 weeks is not to be counted from the date of submission of the representation by the detenu but from the date of detention. ( 6 ) IT has been claimed by the Counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of Section 10 of the Act are mandatory. Reliance has been placed in this regard on a Division Bench authority of this Court. Kartar Singh v. State of U. P. and others, in which the parallel provisions of Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act (7 of 1980) were interpretated. Reliance has been placed in this regard on a Division Bench authority of this Court. Kartar Singh v. State of U. P. and others, in which the parallel provisions of Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act (7 of 1980) were interpretated. The relevant observations are extracted below: In order to appreciate the argument raised by the petitioner it would be convenient to extract the provisions of Section 10 of the Act which reads, thus: 1. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act. In every case where a detention order, has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under Section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer reference to in sub-section (2) of Section 3, also the report by such officer under subsection (3) of the Section. A perusal of Section 10 shows that if a representation has been received by the State Government, the State Government is obliged to place not only the grounds on which the order of detention was made but also the representation if received from the detenu before the Advisory Board within a period of three weeks of his detention which admittedly came to an end on 10th August, 1981. Undoubtedly, the representation of the petitioner has been received on 7th of August, 1981 well before 10th August, 1981, and there was apparently no difficulty in the way of State Government in placing the same before the Advisory Board within the time limit laid down in Section 10 of the Act. 5. It cannot be doubted that the provisions contained in Section 10 of the Act are mandatory in nature and that, if any, safeguard mentioned therein is contravened, it will have the effect of rendering the detention of a detenu under the provisions of the Act, illegal. T Both the provisions are identical and so this authority supports this contention, Section 10 of the present Act is held mandatory and consequently its breach renders the detention of the detenu invalid. T Both the provisions are identical and so this authority supports this contention, Section 10 of the present Act is held mandatory and consequently its breach renders the detention of the detenu invalid. ( 7 ) HERE it may be placed on record that Article 22 (5) of the Constitution enacted as follows: When any person is detained in. pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. The right of representation under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India is a valuable constitutional right and the object of the provision is the most speedy consideration of his representation be the authorities concerned. When it is emphasised and reemphasised by a series of decisions of the Honble Supreme Court (For instance Abdul Karim v. state of West Bengal Vijay Kumar v. State of Jammu and Kashmir Rais Uddin v. State of U. P. Mohi Uddin v. District Magistrate Ram Dhaidu Board v. V. K. Saraf Aslam Ahmad Zahire Ahmad Shaik v. Union of India Ghazi Khan v. State of Rajasthan Kundan Bhai Dula Bhai Shaik v. District Magistrate, Ahmedabad and others, that a representation should be considered with reasonable expedition, if is imperative on the part of the every authority, whether in merely transmitting or dealing with it, to discharge that obligation with all reasonable promptness and diligence without giving any room for any complaint of remissness, indifference or avoidable delay because the delay caused by slackness on the part of any authority, will ultimately result in delay in dis posal of the representation which in turn may invalidated the order of detention as having infringed the mandate of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution in may Kumarts case (supra) the Supreme Court observed that The jail authority is merely a communicating channel because the representation has to reach the Government which enjoys power of revoking the detention order. The intermediary the authorities, who are communicating authorities have also to move with an amount of promptitude so that the statutory guarantee of affording earlier opportunity of making the representation and the same reaching the Government is translated into action. The intermediary the authorities, who are communicating authorities have also to move with an amount of promptitude so that the statutory guarantee of affording earlier opportunity of making the representation and the same reaching the Government is translated into action. The corresponding obligation of the State to consider the representation cannot be whittled down by merely saying that much time was lost in the transit. If the Government enacts a law like the present Act empowering certain authorities to make the detention order and also simultaneously makes a statutory provision of affording the earliest opportunity to the detenu to make his representation against his detention, to the Government and not the Detaining Authority, of necessity the State Government must gear up its own machinery to see that in these cases the representation reaches the Government as quickly as possible and it is considered by the authorities with equal promptitude. Any slackness in this behalf not properly explained would be denial of protection conferred by the State and would result in invalidation of the order. In the case of Aslam Ahmad Zahire Ahmad Shaik v. Union of India (supra), it was observed that, the Jail Superintendent to whom the representation was handed over by the detenu for forward transmission, kept it unattended and pending with him for 7 days. The Jail superintendent gave no explanation as to why the representation was retained, though opportunity was afforded to him. In the circumstances it was held that supine indifference, slackness and callous attitude on the part of the Jail Superintendent who had unreasonably delayed in transmitting the representation as an intermediary, had ultimately caused undue delay in the disposal of the detenuts representation by the Government which received the representation 11 days after it was handed over to the Jail Superintendent by the detenu. This avoidable and unexplained delay has resulted in tendering the continued detention of the detenu illegal and constitutionally impermissible. In the present case, the three weeks period mentioned in Section 10 of the Act has been crossed. The representation of the detenu dated 14-3-1996 was forwarded by the jail authorities to the District Magistrate on the same day i. e. 14-3-1996 but the District Magistrate steps over it upto 24-3-1996. The representation was received in the office of Civil Secretariat, Lucknow on 25-3- 1996. The representation of the detenu dated 14-3-1996 was forwarded by the jail authorities to the District Magistrate on the same day i. e. 14-3-1996 but the District Magistrate steps over it upto 24-3-1996. The representation was received in the office of Civil Secretariat, Lucknow on 25-3- 1996. Of course, there is explanation for a period of one day taken by the State Government in sending it to the Advisory Board with the comments on 26-3-1996. But there is complete silence on the part of the District Magistrate for the period 14-3-1996 till 24-3-1996. The learned A. G. A. has argued that once the representation is received by the District Magistrate, he has to call for the comments of the sponsoring authority and it would as of necessity take some time. He has also argued that the explanation for the delay was not given since there was no categorical averment in the petition on the point. Here the following observation of the Apex Court in the case of Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana and others , are material: Whenever a question is raised regarding the illegal detention of citizen in a writ of, Habeas Corpus and the Court issues the rule of Nisi a duty is cast on the State, through its functionaries and particularly those who are arrayed as respondents to the writ petition, to satisfy the Court that the detention of the citizen was legal and in conformity not only with the mandatory requirements of the law but also with the requirements implicit in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. It is obligatory on the part of the respondent State to place before the court all relevant facts relating to the 1. U. P. Cr. R. 1995 S. C. 525. impugned detention truly, clearly and with utmost fairness through an affidavit. An affidavit in reply is required to be filed by the respondents not as a mere formality but to truly assist the Court in drawing permissible inference from the rival contentions. The right of personal liberty of citizen is all too precious and no one can be permitted to interfere with it except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The State, owes an obligation to the Courts to place all relevant facts before the Court in all cases where interference is alleged by a citizen with his fundamental rights. The right of personal liberty of citizen is all too precious and no one can be permitted to interfere with it except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The State, owes an obligation to the Courts to place all relevant facts before the Court in all cases where interference is alleged by a citizen with his fundamental rights. Respondents 1 and 2 were, therefore, under a legal obligation to inform this Court of the facts regarding the alleged detention of Shri Dhananjay Sharma and Shri Sushil Kumar, since notice had been issued to them in the writ petition. Thus, it was for the respondent to show that they have dealt with the representation with utmost promptitute at every stage. If any, explanation was furnished in the affidavit of the District Magistrate or of anybody else swearing on his behalf the same could be scrutinised and conclusion could be drawn whether in the circumstances stated, the delay can be taken as suitably explained. But here on the point, there is nothing except silence. Consequently, it is held that there is breach of the mandatory provisions of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and also the mandatory provisions of section 10 of the Act which renders the detention of the petitioner illegal. ( 8 ) THE writ petition is allowed. The impugned detention order is hereby quashed. The petitioner be set at liberty unless required in connection with some case. Petition allowed. .