ORDER T.S. Doabia, J. 1. The litigation which has come to this Court arose more than two decades back. The way parties have proceeded in this case it becomes apparent that the end of this litigation is no where in sight. An effort was made to bring about some settlement. Case was adjourned from time to time. The parties have expressed their inability to meet a meeting point. 2. Original tenant Babu Lal has since died. He is now represented by his legal heirs who figure as respondents no. 1 to 7. The petitioners and his brothers along with their mother filed a civil suit. This suit was filed seeking eviction. It was staled that the respondent tenant was in arrears, and therefore, he was entitled to decree for possession. A counter claim was also filed. In this a prayer was made that the plaintiff be restrained from illegally dispossessing the petitioner. In the mean time the Municipal Council, Shivpuri formed an opinion mat the building in question is in a dilapidated addition and this building was 'demolished. On the happening of this event an application was filed. It was sought to be urged that as the shop in question no longer exists this suit has been rendered in fructuous. This was also stated that the counter chain filed by the respondent-tenant Babulal is also not worth further trial. 3. Babu Lal tenant however, filed an application seeking interim injunction. An order on this was passed on 27th October, 1977. Parties were directed to maintain status quo. A further direction was also given that the present petitioner who figured as a plaintiff would not interfere with the possession of the tenant Babu Lal. When this order was passed a pica was taken by the petitioner that Babu Lal is not in possession and is trying to reestablish himself in the garb of the interim order passed on 27th October, 1977. It is said that he placed a rehire or hand-cart moving on tour-wheels. The matter was taken up by the Addl. District Judge on the revision side. It was pleaded that there exists a wall which is likely to fall any time and there-lore, it should be ordered to be demolished. An order to this effect was passed. It is however, submitted that when the wall was demolished the hand-cart, lying by the side of the wall was also removed. District Judge on the revision side. It was pleaded that there exists a wall which is likely to fall any time and there-lore, it should be ordered to be demolished. An order to this effect was passed. It is however, submitted that when the wall was demolished the hand-cart, lying by the side of the wall was also removed. The respondent-tenant filed an application in which he sought restoration of his hand-cart being placed on the same place. His prayer was that whatever was the situation prior to 21.9.1991 should be ordered to be restored. This prayer was opposed on the following grounds. (i) that the hand cart in question was kept in breach of the order of status quo; (ii) the tenant is not entitled to an order that the wall be restored; (iii) that in the counter claim it was no where asserted by Babu Lal that he is in possession and therefore, he is not entitled to restoration of possession: 4. Another factor which is required to be taken note of is that in the meantime on the site in question shops have been constructed. These shops abut on road to Dharmshala road and the other side abuts on the road described as approach road to Gandhi Chowk. It has accordingly been pleaded that it is not possible to restore the possession. 5. The trial Court came to the conclusion that as the hand-cart was removed in breach of the order passed by the Court directing the parties to maintain status quo and as a building has been erected thereafter the heirs of respondent Babu Lal are entitled to relief of restoration and building should be demolished. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 6. The sequence of events may again be noticed in brief. (i) a suit was filed for eviction on 5.4.1974; (ii) written statement was filed on 30.4.1974 (iii) during the pendency of the litigation the Municipal Council demolished the property on 5.10.1976. It is the case of the respondent tenant that this was done in collusion with Municipal Council Shivpuri. 6. The sequence of events may again be noticed in brief. (i) a suit was filed for eviction on 5.4.1974; (ii) written statement was filed on 30.4.1974 (iii) during the pendency of the litigation the Municipal Council demolished the property on 5.10.1976. It is the case of the respondent tenant that this was done in collusion with Municipal Council Shivpuri. (iv) a petition in the nature of counter claim filed on 11.10.1976; (v) a direction given by the trial Court that the parties would maintain status quo this happened on 27th October, 1977; (vi) the suit filed by present petitioner was dismissed on 21.3.1978; (vii) the matter having been taken before the Court of revision a direction was given to remove the standing walls. This was done in the presence of court's nazir on 6.7.1988. 7. Thus it is the case of the respondent tenant that notwithstanding the order passed by the Courts below directing the demolition of wall the order of status quo continue to operate and the plaintiff petitioner Mohan Lal and others were not within their rights to demolish the building or to raise any construction. 8. The Courts below has come to the conclusion that as order of status quo was given and as during the pendency of the petition an order of status quo was passed therefore, the petitioner was not within their rights to raise any building. It has accordingly been directed that whatever was the situation when the order of statutes quo was passed be restored. The above decision given by the trial Court has maintained by the Court below. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents have argued that the appeal filed before the Court below was not competent. According to the learned counsel the matter could be challenged in revision. It was also argued that revision was maintainable in this Court alone. 10. I am of the opinion that this technical objection cannot be of any avail to the learned counsel for the respondent. Even if the revision was not competent this Court could have entertained a revision merely because a remedy has been perused before a wrong forum would not be ground to deprive the present petitioner from seeking his remedy in this Court. If revision was not maintainable before the Court below this revision would be definitely maintainable in this Court. Even if the revision was not competent this Court could have entertained a revision merely because a remedy has been perused before a wrong forum would not be ground to deprive the present petitioner from seeking his remedy in this Court. If revision was not maintainable before the Court below this revision would be definitely maintainable in this Court. A perusal of remedy in a wrong forum cannot stand in the way of petitioners. 11. Coming to the merits of the controversy if a technical view is taken then there can be dispute to the proposition that the parties should respect the orders passed by the Courts. The question further arises whether any useful purpose would be served by directing that the building which has been raised to be demolished. This is more so when the litigations is still pending. In case ultimately it is found that the counter claim filed by the respondent tenant represented by his heirs was not competent or it is without any merit then getting the building demolished would not help any of the parties. The ego of the parties might be satisfied but one cannot loose sight of the fact that the amount spent and the metrical used in the building would go waste. The respondent tenant was occupying a part of the land where he had kept a hand-cart. One way of looking at the matter would be to see that, that much space is made available to the respondent-tenant. The question still remains as to how the petitioner should be dealt with for breach of order of injunction requiring the parties of maintain status quo. 12.1 am of the opinion that the ends of justice would be met if instead of getting the building demolished a direction is given to hand over possession of three shops shown as C-1. C-2 and C-2 in the plan annexure "C" to this petition, to the respondent-tenant. Earlier he was in possession of a place on which he was keeping his hand-cart. In addition to this the petitioner would also pay compensation to the respondent. This compensation would be to the tune of Rs. 30,000/-. 13. The above is an interim arrangement. The parties may adopt it as a final arrangement as well. As indicated in the beginning there is no meeting point between the parties. In addition to this the petitioner would also pay compensation to the respondent. This compensation would be to the tune of Rs. 30,000/-. 13. The above is an interim arrangement. The parties may adopt it as a final arrangement as well. As indicated in the beginning there is no meeting point between the parties. It is precisely for this reason aforementioned direction has been given. This would lead to restoration of the tenant to possession of land measuring more than what his hand-cart was occupying. As a matter of fact this will be in terms of the decision by the Supreme Court in the case reported as Samir Sobhan Synal v. Tracks Trade (P) Ltd. AIR 1966 SC. 2102 and the decision of this Court reported as Managing Committee of Masjid Sikandar Khan v. Chotte Ram 1981 MPRCJ. 6. 14. In case the respondent tenant expresses his desire to settle the matter with the petitioner he may do so in the Court below. The parties would be at liberty to adopt the arrangement suggested in this order or any other arrangement they may wish to enter into. In case the respondent tenant wishes to continue with the proceeding which have arisen out of a counter claim then the petitioner would also be at liberty to seek revival of suit and contend that the respondent tenant is otherwise liable to be eviction on account of arrears having not been paid or any other ground. 15. Before parting with this judgment one thing is still required to be said. In case the respondent chooses to occupying the shops marked C-1, C-2 and C-3 then the Court below would determine the standard rent of the premises and that would be the rent of the shops C-1, C-2 and C-3 and this would be payable by the respondents. In case the respondents refuses to accept the compensation the petitioner shall deposit the same in the Court to be further deposited in a fixed deposit account payable either to the respondents or in the event of his refusal to accept, this amount be deposited in the fund maintained by the legal aid committee.