Judgment : R. H. Zaidi, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent. 2. THIS petition arises out of proceedings under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, for short 'the Act'. The landlord applied for release of the building in question on the ground of personal need and hardship. It is not necessary to state the facts as pleaded in the release application in detail as they have already been given in the judgment of the appellate authority. It will suffice to state that the Prescribed Authority dismissed the release application filed by the landlord vide its judgment and order dated 27.7.1994. Ag grieved by the said order the Landlord filed an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority taking into consideration the materials on the record recorded clear and categorical findings on the question of need and hardship in favour of respondent No. 2 vide its judgment and order dated 22.2.1996 allowed the appeal and release application. 3. THE petitioner, who was the opposite party in the courts below and the tenant in the building in question, filed present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 22.2.1996. Shri B. D. Madhyan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently urged that the need as set up by the landlord in his application for release cannot be said to be genuine and bona fide. It is asserted that the dispute between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law cannot form reasonable basis for determination of the need and hardship in favour of the landlord. It is simply the wish and desire to get the building vacated and not the bona fide need. He has also asserted that the accommodation in possession of the landlord was more than his residential requirements. THE findings recorded by the appellate authority were stated 10 be perverse. 4. ON the other hand learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent submitted that the findings recorded by the appellate authority are findings of fact which are based on relevant evidence on the record and are not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. ON the other hand learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent submitted that the findings recorded by the appellate authority are findings of fact which are based on relevant evidence on the record and are not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He has further urged that it is well settled in law that the strained relationship between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law can form the basis of need referred to in cl. (a) of sub- section (8) of Section 21 of the Act. In support of his submission he has relied upon the decision in the following cases: (1). Shri Dau Dayal v. Vth Addl. District Judge, Aligarh and another, 1981 ARC 503. (2) Dr Jamuna Datt Tewari v. The 2nd Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, 1982 ARC (1) 92. (3) Savitri Devi v. IXth Addl. District Judge, Allahabad and another, 1989 ARC (J) 138. (4) Pyare Lal v. XIIth Addl. District Judge, Allahabad and others, 1990 ARC (1) 157. I have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties, 5. IN the aforesaid decision this Court consistently rules that the strained relations between the mother- in-law and daughter-in-law may furnish reasonable ground for the bona fide need for getting the additional accommodation released u/s. 21 (l) (a) of Act. 6. IN Shri Dau Dayafs case (supra), it was held as under:- "8. The question whether permission should or should not have been granted on the ground of strained relation between the mother and his wile, will have to be decided on the facts of each case. The totality of the circumstances will have to be examined and then the appropriate authority will have to decide the matter. The appropriate authority was entitled to take this factor into consideration while deciding the application. It cannot be said that the factor taken into account was extraneous to the decision. " In Dr Jamuna Duct Tewari's case (supra), it was ruled as under by this Court:- "the jurisdiction to allow an application u/ S. 21 depends on the bona fide need in a given circumstances cannot be defined with certainty. Strained relations between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law and between wives of brother is not an unusual feature of our society. There the differences arise the mental peace of male members is disturbed, cannot be disputed. Strained relations between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law and between wives of brother is not an unusual feature of our society. There the differences arise the mental peace of male members is disturbed, cannot be disputed. It, there fore, may furnish reasonable ground for allowing an application for release of an independent accommodation. A landlord may not have the luxury of selecting accommodation but inability to live with, brother's family due to differences between brothers' wives and mother-in-law and daughter-in-law is certainly ground on which he may seek vacation of his own house occupied by a tenant. Partition of ancestral house cannot be forced on landlord. Nor can it in any manner minimise the bona fide requirement of landlord to own independent accommodation within meaning of section 21 of the Act. " 7. AGAIN in Savitri Devi's case the same view has been taken by this Court. In paragraph No. 9. of the judgment, it was held as under:- "strained relations between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law necessitating the need to pro vide separate accommodation for the daughter-in-law in order to keep mental peace in the family has been held by this Court to be a bona fide need justifying the release of an independent accommodation for the daughter-in-law. " 8. FROM the aforesaid decision, it is apparent that the dispute of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law may furnish a reasonable ground for allowing a release application of the landlord. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the contrary, therefore, is not acceptable to me. In Pyare Lal's case (supra) this Court relied upon the decision in Savitri Devi's case (supra) and was pleased to rule that the strained relations between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law may necessitate the need to provide separate and additional independent accommodation for the daughter-in-law. 9. SO far as the house in possession of the sons are concerned, it has been held by the appellate authority that the sons have been living separately and independently and, therefore, the house in occupation of those sons cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of present case and for determining the need and hardship of respondent No. 2. 10. THE findings recorded by the appellate authority on the question of need and hardship are findings of fact which are based on relevant evidence on the record and cannot be said to be perverse. 10. THE findings recorded by the appellate authority on the question of need and hardship are findings of fact which are based on relevant evidence on the record and cannot be said to be perverse. It has also been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent No. 2 has also filed a suit numbered as 701 of 94 for ejectment of the petitioner wherein he has denied the relationship of the landlord and tenant between parties. However, the said point was neither raised nor pressed before the authorities below. Therefore, at this stage, I am not inclined to permit the petitioner to raise the said point. Legally the suit and the proceedings u/s. 21 of the Act may go on simultaneously. 11. LASTLY learned counsel for the petitioner offered to furnish an undertaking in writing to vacate the house in dispute if he is granted reasonable time. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent only formally objected to the said prayer. 12. UNDER the facts and circumstances of the present case and in view of the statement of the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to above, I permit the petitioner to vacate the house in question immediately on expiry of 4 months subject to the conditions that he furnishes an under taking in writing before the prescribed authority within 4 weeks from today, to the effect that he shall deliver vacant possession of the house in dispute (building) immediately on expiry of aforesaid time and shall also pay the rent for the period of his occupation to landlord. Subject to what has been stated above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.