Judgment : There is no representation for the respondent, even though he has been served. Heard Mr.P.Pandi, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 10. 1991 made in I.A.No.273 of 1991 in unnumbered Motor Accident Claims Original Petition on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Principal District Judge), Ramnad at Madurai, condoning the delay of 804 days in filing the claim petition under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. 3. Respondents herein has filed a claim petition on the file of the said Tribunal claiming a compensation of Rs.30,000 in respect of certain injuries alleged to have been sustained by him in a motor accident. According to him, the accident took place on 24. 1988 between Peria Maya Kulam and Pudhu Maya Kulam and he was not then aware that he should file the claim petition within six months from the date of accident. He was under the impression that the police authorities would get him compensation after the disposal of the criminal case filed against the driver. Under the said circumstances, he filed I.A.No.273 of 1991 to condone the delay of 804 days in filing the claim petition. 4. The petition was opposed by the petitioner- Corporation contending inter alia that under the new Act of 1988, the Tribunal cannot entertain an application to condone the delay after 12 months from the date of the accident, which is a mandatory provision and hence, the petition should be dismissed. It is also contended that in any event, there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 4A. The Tribunal has, however, allowed the application on the ground that under Sec.6(c) of the General Clauses Act, there is no limitation for entertaining such application. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal below, the present revision petition has been preferred. .5. Under Sec. 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the “old Act”), an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made by the person who has sustained the injury within six months from the date of accident. The Claims tribunal may, however, entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. The Claims tribunal may, however, entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. Under Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the new Act”), an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-sec.(l) of Sec.165 may be made by the person who has sustained injury and no application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident and that such application may be entertained by the Claims Tribunal after the expiry of the said period of six months, but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. However, the said Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.166 of the new Act fixing the time-limit for entertaining the application has now been omitted under Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 111. 1994. Proviso to Sub-sec.(3) of Sec. 166 of the new Act in so many terms provides that a claims tribunal can entertain an application for compensation not above the period of 12 months from the date of occurrence of the accident provided sufficient cause is shown. This clearly means that if an application for compensation is filed beyond a period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident, the claims tribunal shall not be entitled to entertain it or in other words, the tribunal shall have no power to condone the delay. There is thus an express provision in proviso to Sub-sec.(3) of Sec. 166 that delay in making an application for compensation shall be condonable only if it is not beyond 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident and that proviso expressly excludes the applicability of Sec.5 in cases where an application for compensation is delayed by more than 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. Thus, the tribunal acting under the new Act has no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. 6. Thus, the tribunal acting under the new Act has no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. 6. The period of limitation for filing claim petition both under the old Act and the new Act is six months from the date of the accident. The difference in the two Acts is in regard to the provisions relating to condonation of delay. In view of the proviso to Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.166 of the new Act, the maximum period of delay which can be condoned is six months, "Sufficient cause" as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is distinct from "cause of action" for the claim itself. The question of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new Act. .7. In the instant case, the accident took place on 24. 1988. The petition was filed on 11. 1991 to condone the delay of 804 days. However, the Tribunal has allowed the application by applying the provisions of Sec.6 (c) of the General Clauses Act. The order of the Tribunal, in my opinion, is contrary to law and vitiated by material irregularities. The Tribunal has failed to note that the provisions of Sec.6(c) of the General Clauses Act is not attracted in this case, in that the right or privilege to claim the benefits under a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of filing of the petition to condone the delay, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Tribunal has also failed to note that "sufficient cause" as a ground for condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from the "cause of action" for’ the claim itself. The Tribunal has also failed to note that the liberty to apply for the condonation of delay in filing the claim is not in itself an accrued right or privilege. 8. The case on hand is governed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 1991 A.C.J. 1060 which squarely applies to the facts of this case. In that case, the appellant was injured in a road accident and his claim petition has been dismissed as being barred by limitation. The accident took place in that case on 21. 1989. Ltd., 1991 A.C.J. 1060 which squarely applies to the facts of this case. In that case, the appellant was injured in a road accident and his claim petition has been dismissed as being barred by limitation. The accident took place in that case on 21. 1989. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was repealed by Sec.217(l) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which came into force on 7. 1989. The period of limitation both under the old Act and in the new Act being six months expired on 27. 1989 and the claim petition in that case was, however, filed belatedly on 13. 1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of sub-Sec.(3) of Sec. 166 of the new Act, the delay of more than six months could not be condoned and accordingly, the application was dismissed and the same was confirmed by the High Court on appeal. It has been contended that since the accident took place when the old Act was in force, the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal must be held to be governed by the old Act and the petition cannot be dismissed on the basis of the provisions of the new Act. The question, therefore, before the Supreme Court was as to which Act is applicable. The Supreme Court in paragraph 13 of its judgment held as follows: "In the case before us the period of limitation for lodging the claim under the told as well as the new Act was same six month which expired three weeks after coming in force of the new Act. It was open to the appellant to file his claim within this period or even latter by 27. 1989 with a prayer to condone the delay. His right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise. So far the question of condonation of six months’ delay was concerned, there was no change in the position under the new Act. In this background the appellant’s further default has to be considered. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise. So far the question of condonation of six months’ delay was concerned, there was no change in the position under the new Act. In this background the appellant’s further default has to be considered. If in a given case the accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant had actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force but after a period of one year, the position, could be different. Having actually initiated the proceeding when the old Act covered the field a claimant could say that his right which had accrued on filing of the petition could not be taken away. The present case is different. The right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay. Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enactment when the need arises to take its benefit. In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law. Obviously the ground for condonation set up as sufficient cause’ also relates to the time after the repeal. The benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore, be available simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before appeal. "Sufficient cause’ as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from "cause of action’ for the claim itself. The question of condonation of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law. We accordingly hold that the High Court was right in its view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned. The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs." 9. As rightly pointed out by counsel for the petitioner, so far as the condonation of six months’ delay was concerned, there was no change in the new Act and therefore, the delay or default on the side of the respondent has to be considered in this background. The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs." 9. As rightly pointed out by counsel for the petitioner, so far as the condonation of six months’ delay was concerned, there was no change in the new Act and therefore, the delay or default on the side of the respondent has to be considered in this background. His right to claim compensation was not affected at all by substitution of one Act with the another. In this case, as already stated, the accident took place on 24. 1988. The period of limitation for filing the claim petition under the old Act and the new Act expired by 24. 1989. However, the claim petition was filed belatedly on 11. 1991 with the prayer to condone the delay. Therefore, the right or privilege to claim condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at that time. In the present case, the occasion to have the benefit of seeking condonation of delay in filing the claim petition arose only after the repeal of the old Act. Though the cause of action for the claim petition, namely, the accident took place on 24. 1988 before repeal, the question of condonation of delay is governed by the new Act, which came into force on 7. 1989.I, therefore, held that the Tribunal was not right in its view that the delay of 804 days in filing the claim petition could be condoned by applying the provisions of the General Clauses Act. The Civil Revision Petition is, therefore, allowed and the order of the Court below is set aside. The application I.A.No.273 of 1991 is dismissed.