JUDGMENT R. L. Kurana, J—This petition for revision has been directed against the order dated 5-8-1995 of the Special Judge (Forests), Shimla, whereby he petitioner has been ordered to be charge-sheeted for the offence under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 408 read with section 120-B, Indian Penal Code and under section 5 (!) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 corresponding to section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case, which popularly came to be known as Sintex Water Storage Tanks case are these. On 30-1-1985, the Controller of Stores invited tenders for 45 litres high density polythene barrels amongst other items whose rate contract was to expire on 31-3-1985. The last date for submission of the tenders was 12/13th March, 1985 The Controller of Stores on 7-3-1985 submitted the file to the Senior Technical Officer (Chemical) for the preparation of tender schedule in respect of High density polythene barrels (45 litres). However, while preparing such tender schedule, water storage tanks of the capacity of 500 litres and 1000 litres were also included, though the same did not figure in the notice inviting tenders. Two tenders in respect of water storage tanks of the capacity of 500 litres and 1000 litres were received respectively from M/s Gupta Pipes Dharampur and M/s. National Steel Works Dharampur. 3. The tenders so received came to be scrutinised by the Technical Committee comprising of Shri P. C. Gupta, Senior Technical Officer and Sh. P. C. Singh, a representative of Director of Horticulture, Shimla. The tender submitted by M/s. National Steel Works, Dharampur, was not considered for want of brand name of the manufacturers and literature. The tender submitted by M/s, Gupta Pipes Dharampur was recommended for acceptance since the party had quoted reputed brand aiongwith authorisation letter from the Principal Manufacturers M/s. Sintex Plast Works. The tender was approved by the Additional Controller of Stores, A rate contract was accordingly entered on 6-5-1985 with M/s. Gupta Pipes, Dharampur, for the supply of high density polythene water storage tanks of Sintex Brand at the following rates :— 1. 500 litres capacity Rs. 2,470. 2. 1000 litres capacity Rs. 5,430. On the basis of the rate contract, M/s, Gupta Pipes approached the Director of Horticulture, who purchased 102 tanks for a sum of Rs, 5,97,814.70 paise. 500 litres capacity Rs. 2,470. 2. 1000 litres capacity Rs. 5,430. On the basis of the rate contract, M/s, Gupta Pipes approached the Director of Horticulture, who purchased 102 tanks for a sum of Rs, 5,97,814.70 paise. Similarly, the Chief Conservator of Forests through his department purchased 666 tanks of 1000 litres capacity and 18 tanks of 500 litres capacity for total value of Rs. 38.21 lakhs. 4. It appears that on the basis of some complaints, the State Government appointed Sh. I. K. Sun, the then Divisional Commissioner, Shimla to enquire into the matter. The enquiry revealed that the approved rates were highly inflated and exhorbitant and far in excess of the prevailing market rates of Rs 1,900 for 500 litres capacity tank and Rs. 3,800 for 1000 litres capacity tank of the same brands. Such rates were quoted by M/s Khandelwal Agency (P) Ltd. to the Director of Horticulture, H. P. in response to a classified advertisement which appeared in the newspapers in March 1985. 5. The Divisional Commissioner after holding the necessary enquiry, inter alia, made the following recommendations :— "(1) A criminal case may be registered in regard to the purchase of the polythene water storage tans by the Forest and Horticulture Departments from M/s. Gupta Pipes, Dharampur and the award of the rate contract to this firm at rates much is excess of the prevailing market rates. The case may registered with the Enforcement Department so that investigation can be carried out expeditiously. The Investigating Officer should be asked to complete the investigation within two or three months ; (2) Shri P. C. Gupta, Senior Technical Officer in the office of the Controller of Stores, who appears to be the main culprit in the above case, should be placed under suspension immediately.” On the basis of the above recommendations, a case under sections 420, 467, 471, 511 and section 120-B, Indian Penal Code and under section 5 (2) (0(d) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, corresponding to section 13 (1) (d) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 came to be registered vide F. I. R. No. 4/S6 on 15-3-J 986 with Enforcement Branch, South Zone, Shimla. 6. 6. Insofar as the present petitioner is concerned, the investigation revealed that at the relevant time he was working as Chief Conservator of Forests, Himachal Pradesh Shri P. L. Gupta of Messrs Gupta Pipes brought the copy of the rate contract as also the copy of the letter written by Director of Horticulture to his field officers, by hand to him, The petitioner got these diarised in his office and thereafter he got the same endorsed to all the Conservators of Forests and Divisional Forest Officers in the State. This endorsement was followed by the letter dated 30-8-1985 advising the Conservators of Forests and the Divisional Forests Officers to purchase the Sintex Tanks subject to their requirements and availability of funds. The petitioner also issued oral directions on telephone in this regard. In the meeting held on 14/15-9-1985 he again directed all the Conservators of Forests to purchase these tanks. The repeated directions issued by the petitioner through letters and verbally for the purchase of Sintex Tanks show the special interest taken by him in the matter. This resulted in large scale purchase of tanks from Messrs Gupta Pipes, Dharampur, at a higher rate. The investigation further revealed that the petitioner had conspired with Shri P. L. Gupta of Messrs Gupta Pipes and by misusing his official position as a public servant had caused wrongful loss to the State Government and wrongful gain into himself and/or to Shri P. L. Gupta It was also revealed during the course of investigation that when the purchase of Sintex Tanks was banned and the rate contract cancelled pursuant to some complaints having been received, the petitioner changed his stand and he refused to accord expenditure sanctions to the Conservators of Forests in respect of the tanks purchased by them. This change in the stand by the petitioner shows his guilty mind and dishonest intention on his part. 7. The investigation has shown that in all 711 High Density Polythene water storage tanks, that 2 of 2000 litres, 680 of 1000 litres and 29 of 500 litres capacity worth Rs. 39,49,483-32 paise were purchased by the Forest Department under the directions of the petitioner, Payment of Rs 35,84,301.25 paise stands released in favour of Messrs Gupta Pipes. 7. The investigation has shown that in all 711 High Density Polythene water storage tanks, that 2 of 2000 litres, 680 of 1000 litres and 29 of 500 litres capacity worth Rs. 39,49,483-32 paise were purchased by the Forest Department under the directions of the petitioner, Payment of Rs 35,84,301.25 paise stands released in favour of Messrs Gupta Pipes. The balance amount of Rs, 3,65,390.40 paise representing the cost of 60 tanks of 1000 litre capacity, that is 30 tanks of Solan Division and 30 tanks of Bilaspur Division, has been withheld, 8. It was also revealed that as against 711 water storage tanks, as detailed above, shown to have been purchased by the Forest Department, the record of the firm Messrs. Gupta Pipes show the supply of only 696 tanks. 9. It also came to light that Shri P. L Gupta of Messrs Gupta Pipes is an ex-Stenographer of the office of the petitioner and as such, was personally known to him. They had conspired together to arrange for the sale of large number of storage tanks to the Forest Department in order to provide wrongful gain to the above said Shri P. L, Gupta. 10. Thus, on a case under sections 420, 468r 467, 408 and section I20-B, Indian Penal Code and under section 5 (2) (i) (d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, corresponding to section 13 (1) (d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, having been found against the petitioner, he was arrested, challaned and sent up for trial alongwith 35 other accused. 11. At the time of hearing for the purpose of charge, the following two contentions were raised on behalf of the petitioner before the learned Special Judge :— (i) The prosecution of the petitioner is bad for want of sanction under section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure and/or under section 19, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ; (ii) The allegations made in the final report submitted under section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure coupled with the evidence collected during the course of investigation, do not make out a prima facie case against the petitioner. 12. The learned Special Judge, vide impugned order dated 5-8-1995, upon consideration of the material placed before her, has held as under on the question of sanction :— “......It is not disputed that Dr. M. P. Gupta had reached the age of superannuation when cognizance was taken in the case. 12. The learned Special Judge, vide impugned order dated 5-8-1995, upon consideration of the material placed before her, has held as under on the question of sanction :— “......It is not disputed that Dr. M. P. Gupta had reached the age of superannuation when cognizance was taken in the case. Therefore, there was no requirement of taking prosecution sanction under the P. C. Act and since the case is being tried under a Special Act, there was no need of taking sanction under section 197, Cr. P. C......." 13. Insofar as the second contention of the petitioner is concerned, the learned Special Judge has held :— “.......I think I will be travelling beyond my jurisdiction if I start meticulously examining and weighing the material which has been placed before me at this stage because a grave suspicion at this stage is sufficient to frame charge as has been held by various High Courts and Supreme Court. So the circumstances of this case which emerge from the material collected are sufficient prima facie to frame charge against Dr. M. P. Gupta that he conspired with other co-accused persons and abused dishonestly his public office to cause wrongful loss to the State of Himachal Pradesh and corresponding gain to Messrs Gupta Pipes, Dharampur, and himself. Hence I direct that he be charge-sheeted under sections 420/120-B of I. P. C. read with section 5 (1) (d) of P. C. Act corresponding to section 13 (1) (d) of the new Act." 14. Pursuant to this order dated 5-8-I99S, the petitioner came to be charged for trial for the offences under sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with section 120-B, Indian Penal Code and under section 5 (2) (i) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, corresponding to section 13 (I) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, on. 15-11-1995 15. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 5-8-1995 the petitioner has come up before this Court by virtue of the present petition under sections 397, 401 and 482, Code of Criminal Procedure read with section 22 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for setting aside and quashing of the said order and the charge framed against the petitioner in case No. 4-S/7 of 1991, State v. Purshotam Lal and others 16. The same two contentions which were raised by the petitioner before the learned Special Judge, have been raised before this Court by Shri S. S. Kanwar, Senior Advocate for the petitioner. It has been contended that the learned Special Judge has erred in arriving at the conclusion that no sanction for prosecution of the petitioner was required and that a prima facie case was made out from the material placed on record. 17. Shri Vasudeva, the learned Additional Advocate General, on the other hand, has supported the impugned order on the grounds and for the reasons stated therein 18. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. 19. At the very outset it may be stated that the charge framed against the petitioner by the learned Special Judge on 15-11-1995 in respect of the offences under sections 467, 468 and 471, Indian Penal Code is liable to be set aside and quashed 20. The learned Special Judge in para 65 of the impugned order dated 5-8-1995 has come to a specific conclusion that a prima facie case under sections 420 and 120-B, Indian Penal Code read with section 5 (2) (i) (d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, corresponding to section 13 (1) (d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, only has been made out against the petitioner. The learned Special Judge accordingly had directed that the petitioner be charged for the said offences 21. Inspite of such specific finding and direction, the petitioner has also come to be charged for the offences under sections 467, 468 and 471, Indian Penal Code Since no prima facie case under these sections was found against the petitioner, the charge framed against the petitioner to this extent is bad. 22. Even if it be assumed that a prima facie case for the offences under sections 467, 468 and 471, Indian Penal Code, is made out against the petitioner, no charge for these offences could be framed against him for want of necessary sanction under section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 23. It is admitted case of the parties that the petitioner was a public servant at the relevant time and he has ceased to be a public servant since 30-4-1987 consequent upon his retirement from service on having attained the age of superannuation. 23. It is admitted case of the parties that the petitioner was a public servant at the relevant time and he has ceased to be a public servant since 30-4-1987 consequent upon his retirement from service on having attained the age of superannuation. It is well settled that section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure, as it stands after 1973, extends protection even to a retired public servant as is clear from the use of words "is or was" provided the accusation is in respect of an act or omission done or purported to have been done when such public servant was in office The apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao. (1993) 3 SCC 339, has held that by legislative fiction the officer is deemed to be a public servant under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure irrespective of his retirement if the accusation against him are for act or omission done by him when he was in service. The purpose is to avoid exposing a public servant or vexatious or frivolous prosecutions merely because he has demitted his office. To the similar effect, it has been held in R* Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala and another, AIR 1996 SC 90L 24. The learned Special Judge has, therefore, erred in holding that no prosecution sanction was required for the prosecution of the petitioner since he had ceased to be a public servant as on the date of the taking of the cognizance of the case by the Court, 25. A perusal of the record shows that sanction under section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure for the prosecution of the petitioner was accorded by the State Government vide office order No Per (A-l)-B (3)-25/ 82 dated 13th of June, 1990. Para 2 of the said order reads as under :— "AND WHEREAS, the above said acts of Dr. M, P; Gupta constituted offences punishable under section 420/120-B, I. P. C. and section 5 (2) (i) (d) of P. C Act, 1947, AND WHEREAS, the State Government being the authority competent, after fully and carefully examining the material before it in regard to the said allegations as referred in the challan and circumstances of the case, considers that the said Dr. M. P. Gupta should be prosecuted in a Court of Law for the said offences. M. P. Gupta should be prosecuted in a Court of Law for the said offences. NOW, THEREFORE, the State Government does hereby accord sanction under section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) for the prosecution of the said Dr M. P. Gupta, Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (Retired) for the offences under section 420/120-B, I. P. C. and any other offence(s) punishable under other provisions of law in respect-of the acts aforesaid and for taking cognizance of the said offence(s) by a Court of Competent jurisdiction." 26. A reading of this order whereby sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner was accorded shows that no sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner for the offences under sections 467, 468 and 471, Indian Penal Code was accorded. Therefore, for want of request sanction, the learned Special Judge could not have taken the cognisance of the case under sections 467, 468 and 471, Indian Penal Code against the petitioner. 27. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has next contended, while not conceding the validity of the sanction dated 13-6-1990, that though there is sanction for prosecution of the petitioner for the offences under sections 420 and 120-B, Indian Penal Code, there is no sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner for the offence under section 5 (2) (i) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, corresponding to section 13 (!) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, the court below could not have taken cognizance of the case under the said offence against the petitioner and, as such charge dated 15-1M995 pertaining to the offence under the provisions of Corruption Act is bad and liable to be quashed, 28. On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate General has contended that since the petitioner had ceased to be a public servant as on the date of taking of the cognizance of the case by the learned Court below, no sanction under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 corresponding to section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was required. 29. 29. While dealing with the question whether a sanction under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 corresponding to section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was required for the prosecution of a person who has ceased to be a public servant, the apex Court in R S Nayak v. A R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684, has held that the relevant date with reference to which a valid sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of an offence committed by a public servant as required by section 6 is the date on which the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence of which he is accused. It was observed in para 18 of the judgment in the following terms : ".......the terminus a quo for a valid sanction is the time when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence If, therefore, when the offence is alleged to have been committed, the accused was a public servant but by the time the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence committed by him as public servant, he has ceased to be a public servant, no sanction would be necessary for taking cognizance of the offence against him. This approach is in accord with the policy underlying section 6 in that a public servant is not to be exposed to harassment of a frivolous or speculative prosecution. If he has ceased to be a public servant in the meantime, this vital consideration ceases to exist As a necessary corollary, if the accused has ceased to be a public servant at the time when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed by him as public servant Section 6 is not attracted.........” 30. The well settled principle which, therefore, emerges is that no sanction under section 6, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 corresponding to section 19, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is required if on the date of taking of the cognizance of the case by the Court, accused has ceased to be a public servant 31. The well settled principle which, therefore, emerges is that no sanction under section 6, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 corresponding to section 19, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is required if on the date of taking of the cognizance of the case by the Court, accused has ceased to be a public servant 31. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that even though a sanction under section 6, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, corresponding to section 19, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is not required, a sanction under section 19% Code of Criminal Procedure for the prosecution of the petitioner even for the offence under the provisions of Corruption Act would be required, 32. Countering the contention put forth on behalf of the petitioner, it has been argued by the learned Additional Advocate General that) Prevention of Corruption Act is a special law, therefore, the provisions contained in the general law, that is, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with regard to sanction for prosecution would not be attracted In support of his contention, the learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Rajinder Kumar Sood v The State of Punjab, 1982 Cr LJ 1718, wherein it was held that the special provisions of sanction contained in section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 would exclude the application of general provisions of section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure and that section J97, Code of Criminal Procedure is not attracted to trial of offences before the Special Judge. The learned Additional Advocate General has further placed reliance on the decision of Kerala High Court in R Balakrishna Pillai . The State and another, 1995 Cr LJ 963, wherein it was held that for the prosecution of a public servant who has ceased to be such a public servant, for the offence under section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, provisions of section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure are not attracted, 33. The State and another, 1995 Cr LJ 963, wherein it was held that for the prosecution of a public servant who has ceased to be such a public servant, for the offence under section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, provisions of section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure are not attracted, 33. R Balakrishna Pillai’s case (supra), was carried in appeal before the Honble apex Court, where the decision of the Kerala High Court was partly set aside on another question Insofar as the question of necessity of a sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the prosecution of a public servant for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act is concerned, no opinion was expressed since the said point never came to be agitated before the apex Court. Similarly no opinion was expressed by the apex Court on this question in S A. Venkataraman v-State, 1958 Cr LJ 254, though their Lordships elaborately considered section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, visa-vis section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and had even adverted in detail to the precedents under the later provisions Again in State of Bengal v. Manmal Bhutoria, 1977 Cr LJ 1164, the apex Court while reiterating the ratio laid down in Venkataraman s case (supra), had expressed no opinion on the question whether a sanction under section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure would be required for the prosecution of a public servant for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act after he had ceased to be such a public servant on the date of taking cognizance of the case by the Court. 34. A Single Bench of this Court in B. D. Sharma v. State of H P. and others, ILR 1985 HP 786, had the occasion of examining the question of necessity of sanction under section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure for the prosecution of retired public servant for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. In the said case, the petitioner therein, who was a member of Indian Administrative Service had retired from service in the year 1982. In the said case, the petitioner therein, who was a member of Indian Administrative Service had retired from service in the year 1982. A case for the offences under sections 409, 420, 469, 468, 120-B, 167, 218, 109, Indian Penal Code read with section 5 (2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, came to be registered against him and 12 other persons on 3 11-1977 for some acts or omission alleged to have been committed by him during the period 14-11-1974 to May 1977 when he remained posted as Deputy Commissioner, Una. On the completion of the investigation, on a case having been found against the said petitioner, a reference was made to the Government for accord of sanction to prosecute him for the various offences mentioned in the first information report. The State Government refused to accord the sanction on the ground that no prima facie case was found made out against the said petitioner. The matter rested there till the said petitioner retired from Government service on attaining the age of superannuation in the year 1982. It was only in the year 1983 that a formal charge-sheet was filed in the court of Special Judge, Una. The petitioner B, D Sharma, however, was not named as an accused in that charge-sheet. It was later on 1-4-1985 that the public prosecutor moved an application before the Special Judge praying that the said petitioner be also impleaded as an accused in the case as he too was involved in the commission of the offences mentioned in the first information report. In the application so made by the Public Prosecutor it was explained that the petitioner could not be prosecuted earlier for want of sanction of the Government and that since he had retired from service the sanction was no more required for his prosecution. In the application so made by the Public Prosecutor it was explained that the petitioner could not be prosecuted earlier for want of sanction of the Government and that since he had retired from service the sanction was no more required for his prosecution. The Special Judge on the application so made by the Public Prosecutor passed an order impleading the petitioner B. D. Sharma as an accused in the case On the matter having been carried before this Court by way of a criminal revision petition, it was held by Handa, J. that a public servant accused of an offence can successfully claim protection against his prosecution except with the prior sanction of appropriate authority when the following two conditions are satisfied, namely:— (i) The accused is a public servant of the kind mentioned in section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure, that is, a Judge, a Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office except by or with the sanction of the appropriate Government ; and (ii) The offence is committed by the accused while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. It was held that once the above two conditions are satisfied, it is immaterial whether the offence for which the prosecution is sought falls under the Indian Penal Code or under any special Act since the term "offence” as defined in section 2 (n) of the Code of Criminal Procedure means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. It is also immaterial whether the accused continues to hold his public office or stands removed therefrom since all that law requires is that he should have been a public servant of the category stated above at the time of the commission of the offence and the offence has been committed in the discharge of his official duty. 35. It was observed in para 14 of the judgment in the following terms:— "True, that the protection against prosecution as afforded to a public servant by section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not available to a person after he ceased to be a public servant but this section 197, Cr. P. C is independent of section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. P. C is independent of section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Whereas section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is applicable to all types of public servants, section 197, Cr. P. C. is intended to protect a special category of public servants who are either Judges, or Magistrates or public servants not removable from office save by or with the sanction of the appropriate Government. Otherwise also both section 197, Cr P. C and section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act operate independent of each other and neither of them overrides the provisions of the other. Merely because the petitioner after his retirement was no more entitled to the protection against his prosecution as afforded by section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is no ground to hold that he was not entitled to similar protection available to him under section 197, Cr. P C.” 36. During the course of arguments, the learned Additional Advocate General has not been able to bring any law to the contrary laid down by the Honble apex Court. Therefore, following the ratio laid down in B D Sharmas case (supra), 1 hold that even though sanction for prosecution of a public servant who has ceased to be a public servant for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act is not required under section 6, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1^47, corresponding to section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,, such a sanction under section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure is required even for his prosecution for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act 37. As stated above, the necessary sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner, was accorded by the State Government on 13-6-1990. On reading ofpara2ofthe said sanction order, as quoted above, shows that the sanctioning authority after having applied its mind to the facts of the case had come to the conclusion that prima facie case existed against the petitioner for the offence under sections 120-B and 420. Indian Penal Code as also under section 5 (2) (i) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Accordingly sanction under section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure was accorded for the prosecution of the petitioner for the offences under sections 420 and 120 B, Indian Penal Code and any other offence(s) punishable under other provisions of law in respect of the acts complained of. 38. Accordingly sanction under section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure was accorded for the prosecution of the petitioner for the offences under sections 420 and 120 B, Indian Penal Code and any other offence(s) punishable under other provisions of law in respect of the acts complained of. 38. Be it stated that the learned Special Judge has not gone into the question of validity or otherwise of the said sanction dated 13-6-1990. The learned Special Judge has left the matter simply by holding that no sanction was required in the present case in view of the fact that the petitioner had ceased to be a public servant as on the date of taking of cognizance of the case by the Court. In view of the fact that there is a sanction order in the present case, the question of its validity or otherwise will, therefore, have to be gone into by the trial Court at the first instance. At this stage, I refrain myself from going into the question of validity or otherwise of the sanction dated 13-6-1990 and leave the question to be decided by the trial Court in accordance with law. 39. Insofar as the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the allegations made in the first information report, charge sheet submitted under section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure and the evidence collected during the course of investigation do not make out a prima facie case against the petitioner, is concerned, it is well established principle of law that in exercise of its revisional power the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the case is reliable or not. It is only where the allegations made in the F. I R or the complaint taken at face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged, the High Court is empowered to quash the proceedings. 40. It is equally well settled that while framing the charge, the Court is not required to scrutinise the evidence and to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case as if it were to record a finding of conviction or acquittal. 40. It is equally well settled that while framing the charge, the Court is not required to scrutinise the evidence and to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case as if it were to record a finding of conviction or acquittal. The only requirement is to see whether the allegations made in the F. I, R., charge-sheet submitted under section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure and the statement of witnesses recorded under section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, make out a prima facie case against the accused or not. 41. In the present case, the learned trial Court after consideration of the material placed before it, has come to the conclusion that there existed a prima facie case against the petitioner. There is nothing on the record to show that the impugned order suffers from any illegality or impropriety. 42. The apex Court in a series of cases has held that the inherent powers of the court under section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure should be very sparingly and cautiously used only when the court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the process of the Court, if such power is not exercised. So far as taking cognizance by the trial Court is concerned, the inherent power can be exercised when the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint together with the other materials collected during investigation taken at their face value, do not constitute the offence alleged, At that stage it is not open for the court to sift the evidence or appreciate the evidence and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out. 43. The apex Court recently in State of H. P. v, Pirthi Chand and another, 1996 SCC (Cri) 210, following its earlier decision in Rupan Deol Bajaj(Mrs.) and another v. Kanwar Pal Singh GUI and another, (1995) 6 SCG 194, has held ;— "It is thus settled law that the exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an exceptional one. Great care should be taken by the High Court before embarking to scrutinise the F. I. R, charge-sheet/complaint. In deciding whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception. Great care should be taken by the High Court before embarking to scrutinise the F. I. R, charge-sheet/complaint. In deciding whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception. it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations constitute the offence It must be remembered that F. I. R. is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into cognizable offence. After the investigation is conducted (sic concluded) and the charge-sheet is laid the prosecution produces the statements of the witnesses recorded under section 161 of the Code in support of the charge-sheet, At that stage it is not the function of the court to weigh the pros and com of the prosecution case or to consider necessity of strict compliance of the provisions which are considered mandatory and its effect of non-compliance. It would be done after the trial is concluded. The court has to prima facie consider from the averments in the charge-sheet and the statements of the witnesses on the record in support thereof whether court could take cognizance of the offence on that evidence and proceed further with the trial. If it reaches a conclusion that no cognizable offence is made out, no further act could be done except to quash the charge-sheet. But only in exceptional cases, i. e., in rarest of rare cases of mala fide initiation of the proceeding to wreak private vengeance process of criminal is availed of in laying a complaint or F. I. R. itself does not disclose at all any cognizable offence— the court may embark upon the consideration thereof and exercise the power." 44. The apex Court went on to observe in para 13 of its judgment in the following terms :— “.......When the court exercises its inherent power under section 482, the prime consideration should only be whether the exercise of the power would advance the cause of justice or it would be an abuse of the process of the court. When investigating officer spends considerable time to collect the evidence and places the charge-sheet before the court, further action should not be short-circuited by resorting to exercise inherent power to quash the charge-sheet. The social stability and order requires to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. When investigating officer spends considerable time to collect the evidence and places the charge-sheet before the court, further action should not be short-circuited by resorting to exercise inherent power to quash the charge-sheet. The social stability and order requires to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon exercising inherent power. The accused involved in an economic offence destablises the economy and causes grave incursion on the economic planning of the State When the legislature entrusts the power to the police officer to prevent organised commission of the offence or offences involving moral turpitude or crimes of grave nature and are entrusted with power to investigate into the crime in intractable terrains and secretive manner in concert greater circumspection and care and caution should be borne in mind by the High Court when it exercises its inherent power. Otherwise, the social order and security would be put in jeopardy and to grave risk. The accused will have field day in destablising the economy of the State regulated under the relevant provisions." 45. Further, in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar and others, 1994 (2) SCALE 973, the question was whether the High Court was justified in quashing the F. I. R., after the challan had been presented to the Court and after the court had not only taken cognizance there but also framed charges. It was held that once the charges had been framed, the High Court was not justified in invoking the inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the same. It was further held that such inherent powers could be invoked only in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. 46. In the present case, on a prima facie case having been found against the petitioner, he stands charged accordingly. Therefore, since a prima facie case exists against the petitioner, the proceedings are not liable to be quashed in exercise of revisional power or the inherent powers. 47. As a result, the present petition is partly allowed. The charge framed against the petitioner on 15-11-1995 for the offences under sections 467, 468, 471, Indian Penal Code is set aside and quashed. 47. As a result, the present petition is partly allowed. The charge framed against the petitioner on 15-11-1995 for the offences under sections 467, 468, 471, Indian Penal Code is set aside and quashed. The charge against the petitioner for the other offences, namely, under sections 420 and 120-B, Indian Penal Code and under section 5 (2) (i) (d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, corresponding to section 13 (I) (d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is maintained The learned Special Judge shall proceed to dispose of the case accordingly after amending the charge framed against the petitioner. The learned Special Judge shall also decide the question of validity of the sanction dated 13-6-1990 in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 1st of July, 1996. The record of the court below be returned immediately so as to reach well before the date fixed. Petition partly allowed.