Judgment :- Karpagavinayagam, J. This is a reference for confirmation of the sentence of death awarded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Vellore, North Arcot Ambedkar District, under Sec.366, Cr.P.C, to the appellant Eswaran, who has filed an appeal in C.A.No.581 of 1996, in this Court, against the said sentence of death imposed in S.C.No.101 of 1994, for the offence under Sec.302, Indian Penal Code, on the allegation that on 9. 1993 at 5.00 p.m., the appellant caused the death of his wife Shanthi, with M.O.1 vettu kathi (knife) by cutting her neck and serving her head. 2. In support of the case of the prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 15 were examined, Exs.P1 to P23 were filed and M.Os.1 to 21 were marked. 3. Facts, in brief are: .(a) One Shanthi (the deceased) is the wife of the appellant Eswaran. The appellant belongs to Vaniyan Chettiyar community, whereas the deceased belongs to Asari community. Both were the residents of Pernampet village. The appellant is a mason by profession. .(b) Four years ago, while he was doing masonary work for construction of the house of P.W.2 Gajendran, who is the junior paternal uncle of the deceased, he developed love affairs with the deceased Shanthi. The deceased Shanthi was being bred and brought up by P.W.2. Since the parents of both the appellant and the deceased were not agreeable for their marriage, they left the place on their own, without the knowledge of both the families, went to Valathoor village and got themselves married in a temple. This marriage was celebrated 1 1/2 years prior to the date of occurrence. .(c) Six months after the marriage, the appellant and the deceased came to Thiru Vi.Ka.Nagar, Peranampet, and stayed in the house of the mother of the appellant. Some months later, both appellant and the deceased went and set up a separate family by staying in a rental house belonging to P.W.7 Mani Chettiar, at Kamarajar Nagar at Peranampet. Out of. their wedlock, a female child by name Vedanayagi was born. The child was seven months’ old at the time of occurrence. Both the appellant and the deceased lived together happily with their seven months’ child. (d) On 38. 1993, in the evening, the appellant and the deceased came along with their child to Thiru Vi.Ka.Nagar, and stayed for that night in the house of the mother of the appellant. The child was seven months’ old at the time of occurrence. Both the appellant and the deceased lived together happily with their seven months’ child. (d) On 38. 1993, in the evening, the appellant and the deceased came along with their child to Thiru Vi.Ka.Nagar, and stayed for that night in the house of the mother of the appellant. Next day, i.e., on 9. 1993, by 9.00 a.m., the appellant bought a Britannia biscuit packet for the child. At 2.00 p.m., the appellant ate half of the biscuit packet, after opening the same. The deceased got angry over this and quarrelled with the appellant questioning as to why he ate the biscuit which was bought for the child. The appellant replied that it is only a biscuit, which could be purchased again. However, the deceased scolded him. Hence, he beat her with the hands. In retaliation, the deceased bit his left hand. Then, the mother and brother of the appellant intervened and advised them, not to have any more quarrel. .(e) At 3.00 P.M. on 9. 1993, both the appellant and the deceased along with their child, returned to their home at Kamarajar Nagar. The anger of the deceased did not subside. Therefore, the appellant himself cooked the food and served her, but the deceased refused to take the food. So the appellant alone took his food. .(f) P.W.7 Mani Chettiar, while he came back to his house at Kamarajar Nagar, on the way met Lakshmi Ammal and Purusothaman, the mother and brother of the appellant, who told him that there was a quarrel between the appellant and his wife in their house and that the deceased bit the appellant on his hand. So, P.W.7 came to the house of the appellant, on the way to his home, and saw the wound in his hand. Then, he advised the appellant to go to Doctor, and take immediate treatment, otherwise it would lead to dangerous complications. The appellant had no money at that time. .(g) Hence, he went to Thiru Vi.Ka.Nagar, and requested his mother Lakshmi Ammal, to accompany him with some money to go to Doctor. Then they went to Doctor Sivamoorthy P.W.10, at about 4.00 p.m., on 9. 1993, and took treatment. After leaving his mother at her house at Thiru Vi.Ka.Nagar, he came back home at Kamarajar Nagar. .(g) Hence, he went to Thiru Vi.Ka.Nagar, and requested his mother Lakshmi Ammal, to accompany him with some money to go to Doctor. Then they went to Doctor Sivamoorthy P.W.10, at about 4.00 p.m., on 9. 1993, and took treatment. After leaving his mother at her house at Thiru Vi.Ka.Nagar, he came back home at Kamarajar Nagar. .(h) On returning home, the appellant asked the deceased to cook some more food which she refused. She further said that ‘I would not live with you, I would go away somewhere-else. Then he got irritated over this attitude. The appellant thought that he married her despite the protest of his parents, that further he was insulted in the afternoon at his another’s house and she now says that she would go away, leaving his company. When he thought over this, he got angry and decided that a wife of this sort of mentality should not be allowed to live. Having developed this idea, he took M.O.1 vettukathi, found inside the house which is intended to be used for cutting firewood and came to her exclaiming (where should you go? you die here itself), and so saying, he inflicted two or three cuts at the left side of the neck of the deceased. The head was almost severed. Since some muscle tissue alone was sticking to the neck, the appellant sawed and cut the neck again and removed the head separately from the body. Then, he put the severed head of the deceased and M.O.1 vettukathi in M.O.2 plastic wire bag. It was at about 5.00 p.m., then. .(i) P.W.3 Tamizarasan is a retired Havildhar in Indian Military, and a resident of Kamarajar Nagar at Peranampet. He is also a social worker in that local area. P.W.4 Panneerselvam, a friend of P.W.3 is also a resident of Pernampet. On the permission of Executive Officer, Panchayat Union, P.W.3 and others spent some money collected from the public for erecting water taps in the local area to help the public. .(j) On that fateful date, i.e. on 9. 1993, at about 5.00 p.m., P.Ws.3 and 4 went around Kamarajar Nagar, to see the erection work of the water taps, and then came to the house of one Elango, the Accountant at Kamarajar Nagar, which is situated next to the house of the appellant. .(j) On that fateful date, i.e. on 9. 1993, at about 5.00 p.m., P.Ws.3 and 4 went around Kamarajar Nagar, to see the erection work of the water taps, and then came to the house of one Elango, the Accountant at Kamarajar Nagar, which is situated next to the house of the appellant. .(k) Suddenly, they heard the sound of a woman, crying from the house of appellant. P.W.3 and P.W.4 immediately rushed to the house of the appellant, P.W.3 saw the appellant severing the head of the deceased with M.O.1 knife and putting the same with M.O.2 plastic wire bag. On seeing this horrible sight, P.W.3 scolded the appellant, asking him as to why he did this. The appellant replied that since he was insulted by his wife, he murdered her. Then, he took M.O.2 wire bag containing the severed head and M.O.1 vettukathi, and proceeded towards eastern side to village chavadi, where the office of the V.A.O. is situated. (1) P.W.5 Rathna, a dobi by profession was ironing the clothes, at that time in her shop situated in the same street. She saw the appellant came carrying with M.O.2 bag, containing the severed head of the deceased and M.O.1 vettukathi. When she asked him about this, the appellant told her that he was insulted by his wife and so, he severed her head. P.W.6 Vanaja is a resident of Pandiyan street, at Thiru. Vi.Ka.Nagar. At. 5.15 P.M. while she was talking with one Selvi, the elder sister of the appellant, the appellant came there and told his sister Selvi, in her presence that he murdered his wife Shanthi, and requested his sister to go to his house and take his child to her house. P.W.6 also saw the severed head and vettukathi (M.O.1) in the plastic wire bag (M.O.2) (m) By about 5.30 p.m., while P.W.1 Kanniyan Village Administrative Officer and P.W.8 Arjunan, Thalayari (village Menial) were in their chavadi office at Peranampet, the appellant came with M.O.2 wire bag with M.O.1 knife and the severed head of his wife, and informed P.W.1 V.A.O., that he committed murder of his wife and therefore wanted to give a statement, P.W.1 recorded the statement given by the appellant, and obtained his signature therein. Ex.P.1 is the statement of the appellant. P.W.1 prepared his own report Ex.P.2. Ex.P.1 is the statement of the appellant. P.W.1 prepared his own report Ex.P.2. .(n) Then, At 6.00 p.m., he took the appellant to the Peranampet Police Station, and handed over the Ex.P.1 statement of the appellant, And his report Ex.P.2 along with the appellant to the Sub-Inspector of Police P.W.14, who registered the case in Cr.No.452 of 1993, for the offence under Sec.302, I.P.C. The printed FAR. is Ex.P.19. then he recovered the blood stained vettukathi M.O.1, the plastic wire bag M.O.2 and the severed head with nose screws found on her hand mahazar Ex.P.3, attested by P.W.1 V.A.O., and P.W.8 Thalayari, at 6.30 P.M. .(o) At 7.00 p.m., P.W.15, Munisamy, the Inspector of Police, came to the police station and received the F.I.R., and took up the investigation. Then he interrogated the appellant and recorded the confessional statement given by him, the admissible portion of which is Ex.P-4, He recovered M.O.3 -bloodstained lungi, M.O.4 shirt worn by the appellant under Ex.P-5 Mahazar. In the mean time. Ex.P. 1 the statement of me appellant and Ex.P-10, the printed F.I.R. were despatched to the Court, which were received by the Court in the mid-night at 1.00 A.M. .(p) On 9. 1993, at 8.45 p.m., P.W.15 prepared Ex.P-6 observation mahazar at the place in the police station, where the severed head was kept. He also prepared Ex.P.20 - rough sketch, He conducted inquest over the severed head and examined P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.7 and others. Ex.P.21 is the inquest report. (q) The appellant in pursuance of his confession Ex.P-4 took P.W. 15 and others to the place of occurrence, and pointed out the headless body -the trunk of the deceased at his house. P.W.15 prepared Ex.P-22 rough, sketch. At 12.30 midnight he prepared Ex.P-7 observation mahazar at the house of the appellant. Between 1.00 A.M. and 3.30 A.M. on 9. 1993, he held inquest over the trunk and examined P.W.2, P.W.3 to P.W.7 and others. Ex.P.23 is the inquest report. Thereafter, at about 3.30 a.m., on 9. 1993, he sent the dead body with the severed head through P.W.12-Police Head Constable-Perumal, along with the req-uisition-Ex.P-10 to Doctor for post-mortem. .(r) In the mean time, P.W.9-Photographer took photographs of the severed head and trunk of the deceased separately and again he took photographs of the body by joining the head. M.0.13 series is the photographs and M.O.14 series is the negatives. .(r) In the mean time, P.W.9-Photographer took photographs of the severed head and trunk of the deceased separately and again he took photographs of the body by joining the head. M.0.13 series is the photographs and M.O.14 series is the negatives. .(s) At 4.00 A.M. on 9. 1993, P.W.15 recovered M.0.5-blood stained korai mat (big size) M.O.6-blood-stained korai mat (small size) M.0.7-pillow M.0.8-milk bottle with nipple, M.O.9 series-earrings M.0.10-bloodstained cement plasters, and M.0.11-sample cement plaster under Ex.P.8 mahazar. (t) In the early morning on 9. 1993, P.W.12-Head Constable, handed over the severed head and trunk of the deceased with Ex.P-10 requisition, to P.W.11-Doctor, for postmortem. At 10.30 a.m., P.W.11 conducted the post-mortem and found the following injuries: "1. An incised wound measuring about 2 cm x 1 cm x 1/2 cm of the left side of face lateral to the left eye. 2. An incised wound measuring about 7 cm x 3 cm x 3 cm on the nape of the neck of the level of the 5th cervical vertebra. 3. An incised wound measuring about 1 cm x 2 cm x 2 cm in the nape of the neck at the level of 6th cervical vertebra. 4. Head severed at the level of 7th cervical vertebra with exposed muscle nerves. Blood vessels vertebra bone trachea and esophagus extending from the 7th cervical vertebra at the posterior and to the lower jaw measuring about 12 cm x 8 cm. Body: 1. A severed body through and through at level of the 7th cervical vertebra to the sternum in front to the medial end of clavicle on both sides with exposed muscles, cut and of main blood vessels nerves trachea, oesophagus and vertebra bone measuring about 12 cm x 20 cm + 20 cm/ 12 cm. The severed neck portion of the head and the severed neck portion of the body coincide with each other in all parts. When the head approximated with the body, they tally with each other and the head appears to belong to the concerned body. On opening the thorax and abdomen, found normal. Heart 250 gm. pale Lungs (R) 350 gm (L) 300 gms. pale. Hyoid bone injured. Stomach empty. Liverpale 1000 gms. Spleen 75 gms. pale each kidney 100 gms. pale Bladder empty. Uterus normal. On opening the thorax and abdomen, found normal. Heart 250 gm. pale Lungs (R) 350 gm (L) 300 gms. pale. Hyoid bone injured. Stomach empty. Liverpale 1000 gms. Spleen 75 gms. pale each kidney 100 gms. pale Bladder empty. Uterus normal. Brain pale 1100 gms.“ She issued Ex.P-11-post-mortem certificate, stating that the death would appear to have occurred due to stab injury with head severed and separated from the body with injuries to the main blood vessels and spinal card and trachea, 18 to 20 hours prior to the pose mortem. (u) After post-mortem, P.W.12-Head Constable, recovered M.0.15-saree, M.O.16-pettycoat, M.O.17-blouse, M.O.18-nost-screw, M.O.10 series-mettis, M.O.20-thali, and M.O.21 series-silver kundus, from the body of the deceased and handed over the same in the police station with his separate report-Ex.P-13, which were recovered by P.W.15, under Ex.P. 14-form No.95. (v) Meanwhile, at 6.00 a.m., on 9. 1993, P.W.15 along with others, went to the house of the appellants mother at Thiru. Vi.Ka.Nagar and recovered the opened Britannia biscuit packet, containing 8 biscuits M.O.12, under Ex/P-9 mahazar. At 2.30 p.m., since P.W.15 found a biting wound on the left hand of the appellant, he sent him to hospital for examination along with a police memo. .(w) At about 3.00 p.m., P.W.11 -Doctor, on receipt of the police memo sent by P.W.15, examined the appellant and found a bite mark measuring about 1 cm x 2 cm on the middle of the left fore-arm. She issued the Accident Register-Ex.P-12. The Doctor was informed by the appellant that he was bitten with teeth by his wife when they were quarrelling with each other on 9. 1993, in his mother’s house. (x) On 29. 1993, P.W. 15 on receipt of all the material objects sent the same to the Court along with Ex.P. 15 requisition for sending the same to forensic laboratory for chemical examination. P.W.13, the Head Clerk of the Judicial Magistrate’s Court, Gudiyatham, on receipt of Ex.P-15-requisition sent by P.W.15, sent M.Os.1 to H, and M.Os.l5 to 17 for chemical analysis along with the covering letter of the Judicial Magistrate - Ex.P-16, on 29. 1993. On 24. 1994, the Court received the chemical analyst’s report-Ex.P-17 and on 28. 1994, the Court received the Serologist’s re-port-Ex-P.18. .(y) After finishing the investigation, on 33. 1994, P.W.15 filed the charge-sheet against the appellant for the offence under Sec.302, I.P.C. 4. 1993. On 24. 1994, the Court received the chemical analyst’s report-Ex.P-17 and on 28. 1994, the Court received the Serologist’s re-port-Ex-P.18. .(y) After finishing the investigation, on 33. 1994, P.W.15 filed the charge-sheet against the appellant for the offence under Sec.302, I.P.C. 4. On committal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, framed charged against the appellant for the offence under Sec.302, I.P.C, and questioned him. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. After examining all the witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge, questioned the appellant under Sec.313, Cr.P.C. to explain the incriminating circumstances found against him in evidence brought on record, the appellant choose to deny his complicity in the crime. 6. However, in addition to his plea of denial, he filed a statement with the following contents. ”The appellant and the deceased loved each other and got married, without the consent of their parents. After the marriage, there were frequent quarrels, between them, since the appellant did not have a regular job. Initially they stayed at the house of the appellant’s mother, but at the instance of the deceased, separate family was set up in a rented house belonging to P.W.7 - Mani Chettiar, at Kamarajar Nagar. Even then, the deceased was always quarrelling with him, by saying that her entire life had been spoiled by him. On the evening of 38. 1993, they went to the house of the appellant’s mother and stayed there for a night. On 9. 1993, since he ate half packet of biscuit, bought for the child, she picked up quarrel, with him and both of them came back to their home along with their child. At 4.00 p.m., the appellant cooked and asked his wife to take food, which was refused by her. The child who was then sleeping woke-up and cried. The appellant asked the deceased to take the child. She scolded (you look after the child, why you all should have the child? what happiness I had from you?). She further said (I can live by sharing my bed with someone, anywhere, instead of living with you). Immediately, the appellant with his right hand caught hold of the tuft of the deceased and pulled her. Then the deceased bit on his right hand. So he pushed her aside. She fell down and again she stood up saying and then she took a knife and attempted to cut the appellant. Immediately, the appellant with his right hand caught hold of the tuft of the deceased and pulled her. Then the deceased bit on his right hand. So he pushed her aside. She fell down and again she stood up saying and then she took a knife and attempted to cut the appellant. The appellant also got angry and snatched the knife, but suddenly he swooned and fell down fainted and became unconscious. Only at 5.00 p.m., the police came and took him to the police station, and then arranged for the treatment for his bitting wound through Doctor, and thereafter he was sent for remand." However, he did not opt to examine any witness on his side to substantiate the above statement. 7. On termination of trial, the Sessions Court on elaborate consideration of the evidence of the evidence, oral and documentary, came to the conclusion that the appellant committed this heinous crime of murdering his wife, by severing her head, and convicted him for the offence under Sec.302, I.P.C., and imposed the extreme sentence of death on him. The trial Court, while imposing the sentence, discussed in detail about the reasons as to why the extreme penalty of death should be imposed on the appellant. Hence this reference and the appeal. 8. Mrs.Parameshwari, learned counsel for the appellant meticulously took us through the entire evidence and strenuously contended that there are various infirmities, which have been over-looked by the trial Court, that the prosecution failed to prove its case by adducing acceptable materials, and that the evidence by the witnesses are all artificial, which deserves total rejection. The learned counsel also pointed out various contradictions and contended that these contradictions, being vital which would go to the root of the matter, the benefit of doubt that accrues from those vital contradictions must be given to the appellant, and as such, he is entitled to be acquitted. 9. Mr.Shanmugasundaram, learned Public Prosecutor, effectively refuted all those submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant, by pointing out the various materials available on record, and contended that apart form the extra-judicial confession made by the appellant before P.W.1 -V.A.O., there are number of other materials available to corroborate the statement-Ex.P1 made by him before the V.A.O., besides the evidence of P.W.3, being the eye-witness. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the contradictions referred to by learned counsel for the appellant are so minor or trival in nature, which would not affect the core of the case of the prosecution. In short, the submission made by learned Public Prosecutor is that the verdict given by the Sessions Court, with regard to the guilt of the appellant was quite correct and unassailable and the same has to be confirmed by this Court. 10. Let us at the outset discuss and appreciate the materials available in this case. The prosecution relied upon various pieces of evidence to prove the case against the appellant, which could be categorised as follows: .(i) Ex.P.1-statement made by the appellant confessing his guilt to P.W.1-V.A.O., and P.W.8-Thalayari. P.Ws.1 and 8 speak about the receipt of Ex.P-1 and preparation of Ex.P-2 report and handing over the same along with the appellant to P.W. 14-Sub.Inspector of Police. .(ii) P.W.3 saw the appellant severing the head of the deceased and Putting it along with M.O.1 weapon in the M.O.2 plastic wire-bag. The appellant also made an extra-judicial confession to P.W.3. (iii) The appellant made Extra-Judicial confession, to P.Ws.4 and 5, while he was proceeding to chavadi. On the way to village chavadi, the appellant requested his elder sister Selvi in the presence of P.W.6 Vanaja to take care of his child in his house, confessing that he committed the murder of his wife. .(iv) P.W.7-Mani Chettiar asked the appellant to go to Hospital for taking treatment for the biting wound caused by his wife on his left hand, two hours prior to the occurrence, and then P.W. 10 Doctor gave treatment for the same. .(v) P.W. 11, the Doctor who conducted the postmortem gave evidence corroborating the account of the ocular witnesses, relating to the manner of occurrence. .(vi) The evidence of P.Ws.14 and 15, regarding the registration of case and prompt investigation. (vii) The blood group of the deceased tallied with the group of blood found on M.O.1, the weapon of offence recovered from the appellant. 11. .(vi) The evidence of P.Ws.14 and 15, regarding the registration of case and prompt investigation. (vii) The blood group of the deceased tallied with the group of blood found on M.O.1, the weapon of offence recovered from the appellant. 11. Out of these materials, the statement-Ex.P-1 given by the appellant before the V.A.O - P.W. 1, at 5.30 p.m., on the date of occurrence itself plays a vital role in this case, Of course, it is only an extra-judicial confession made by the appellant to the V.A.O. However, this Court, as well as the Apex Court, often held that if the extrajudicial confession is reliable and acceptable, the conviction can be based in a case of murder. In the light of this dictum laid down by the Courts, we have to consider, whether Ex.P-1, the earliest document, viz., the statement given by the appellant to P.W.1, in the presence of P.W.8 could be relied upon. 12. At this juncture, it must be borne in mind that it is not, as if, the said extra-judicial confession-Ex.A-1 alone is available in this case, to prove the case of prosecution. Apart from Ex.P.1, there are number of other materials to prove the case, including the evidence of P.W.3, the eye-witness. So, in order to find out, whether Ex.P-1 is credible and trustworthy, it is better to find out, whether we can get any corroboration for this statement-Ex.P.1, from the other materials., This process, we feel would lend assurance with reference to the genuineness of the contents of Ex.P.1. 13. On perusal of the entire documents and the evidence on record, it is quite clear, that every aspect of the contents of Ex.P.l is fully corroborated by the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses in this case. Let us see, such evidence one by one: .(i) (a) The appellant/husband and the deceased/wife, belong to two different castes. Four years ago, when the appellant was doing the mason work in the house of the junior paternal uncle of the deceased, he developed love affairs with the deceased, which ultimately ended in their marriage, 1 1/2 years prior to the occurrence, in a temple at Valathur village, despite the objection raised by both families 7 months prior to the occurrence, a female child was born to them. This is the preamble portion of Ex.P.1. This is the preamble portion of Ex.P.1. (b) P.W.2 Gajendra Babu, the junior paternal uncle who brought up the deceased, would say that while he was constructing his house, the appellant was engaged as a mason and during that period, love developed between the deceased and the appellant, and he objected to the said affair. But even then, the deceased left from his guardianship and went away with the appellant and they themselves got married at Valathyoor. In fact, since he was aggrieved over the conduct of the deceased, he severed his connection with the deceased. He went to the extent of deposing in his cross-examination that when he heard from the neighbours that the appellant cut and removed the head of the deceased and was proceeding to the chavady, he did not take interest, since the deceased left his custody without heeding to his words. Even in the statement under Sec.313, Cr.P.C, the appellant would admit that he loved and married the deceased, though the parents of both the party did not agree for the same. .(ii) (a) The next aspect in Ex.P1 is that on 38. 1993 evening, the appellant and the deceased along with their child went to Thiru.Vi.Ka.Nagar, and stayed for a night at the house of the appellant’s mother. On 9. 1993 at 9.00 a.m., the appellant bought a biscuit packet for the child. Out of hunger, at 2.00 p.m., he ate half of the biscuit packet, and due to the same there was a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased. The appellant beat her with his hand and the deceased in turn bit on the left hand of the appellant. Then, both of them returned to their house at Kamarajar Nagar. Thereafter, on the advice of P.W.7, the landlord the appellant went to P.W.10-Doctor, and took treatment for the biting wound and came back home. .(b) P. W.7-Mani Chettiar, the landlord, would confirm this by saying that when he came back home at about 2.30 p.m., on 9. 1993, on the way he happened to meet the mother and brother of the appellant, who informed him about the biting incident, and that when he came to the house of the appellant, he advised him to take immediate treatment from a Doctor. .(c) P.W.10 Doctor also would say that he examined the appellant on 9. 1993, on the way he happened to meet the mother and brother of the appellant, who informed him about the biting incident, and that when he came to the house of the appellant, he advised him to take immediate treatment from a Doctor. .(c) P.W.10 Doctor also would say that he examined the appellant on 9. 1993 at about 4.00 p.m., and gave treatment for the biting wound found on his left hand. .(d) P.W.11, another Doctor, who also examined the appellant, on the basis of the police memo issued by P.W.15, after examination of the appellant, issued Ex.P-12 Accident Register. As per Ex.P-12, and the evidence of P.W.11, it is made clear that the appellant told the Doctor that he sustained the biting injury while his wife had bitten him, when they quarreled with each other on 9. 1993 at 2.00p.m., in the house of his mother. It is also mentioned in Ex.P.12, that there was a bite mark measuring about 1 cm x 2 cm. on the middle of the left fore-arm. .(e) P.W.15, the Inspector of Police also would say that after the appellant was arrested at 2.45 p.m., on 9. 1993, he found the wound on his left hand and so he sent him to the Hospital with the police memo for the treatment. At 6.00 p.m., P.W.15 went to the house of the appellant’s mother, and recovered the opened Britannia biscuit packet-M.0.12, containing only 8 biscuits under Ex.P-9 mahazar, attested by P.W. 1 and another. Even in the statement under Sec.313, Cr.P.C, the appellant admitted that he made such a statement shown in Ex.P-12 Accident Register, to the Doctor P.W.11. At 6.00 p.m., P.W.15 went to the house of the appellant’s mother, and recovered the opened Britannia biscuit packet-M.0.12, containing only 8 biscuits under Ex.P-9 mahazar, attested by P.W. 1 and another. Even in the statement under Sec.313, Cr.P.C, the appellant admitted that he made such a statement shown in Ex.P-12 Accident Register, to the Doctor P.W.11. (iii) (a) With reference to the main occurrence, as per Ex.P1, it is stated that the appellant asked the deceased to prepare food for which she refused and she further said that "I would not live with you, I would go somewhere-else’, and on hearing the same the appellant got angry, as he was not only insulted by her at his mother’s house, against whose protest he married her, but also, now she had the audacity to say that she would not live with him and would go away from him and this thought made him to decide to kill her, and then he took M.O.1-vettukathi, and gave two or three cuts on her neck and removed the head from the body and put the same in the M.O.2 wire bag and proceeded to V.A.O.-P.W.1, for surrendering before him. .(b) Both P.W.1, the Village Administrative Officer and P.W.8, Thalayari, would consistently say about his narration, which was reduced in writing in Ex.P.1 by P.W.1, At the same time, Ex.P.2, a separate report also was prepared by P.W.1. Both these documents were handed over by P.W.1 to P.W.14, Sub-Inspector of Police. P.W.14, wrote in these documents that he received the same along with severed head of the deceased and M.O.1-vettukathi in M.O.2 wire bag at 6.30 P.M. on 9. 1993. Ex.P3, the observation mahazar prepared by P.W.14, attested by P.W.1 also would show that all these things were recovered at about 6.30 P.M. .(c) P.W.11, the doctor who conducted the postmortem would say that the severed head and the trunk matched with each other in all parts and that when the head was approximated with the body, they tallied with each other. She also would say that the injuries found on the deceased were possible, if M.O.1 weapon was used in force. .(d) One more corroborative circumstances in this case is that even inspite of the request of the appellant, the deceased did not take food. P.W.11-Doctor would say that the stomach of the deceased was found empty, as per Ex.P.11 Post-mortem certificate. .(d) One more corroborative circumstances in this case is that even inspite of the request of the appellant, the deceased did not take food. P.W.11-Doctor would say that the stomach of the deceased was found empty, as per Ex.P.11 Post-mortem certificate. .(e) P.W. 15, on receipt of F.I.R., went to the spot along with the appellant, who pointed out the trunk of the deceased. There, P.W.15 prepared Ex.P.7 observation mahazar attested by P.Ws.1 and 8. A reading of Ex.P-7 and the evidence of P.W. 15, P.Ws.1 and 8, would show that inside the house of the appellant there was a trunk found in a pool of blood, and that when the head was approximated and fixed with the trunk, it was found that both would match with each other. This fact is also confirmed by the evidence of P.W.11-Doctor, who issued Ex.P-11 Post-mortem certificate, as referred to earlier. Thus, each and every material found in Ex.P-1, the statement made by the appellant before P.W.1, is well corroborated with the other substantial materials, as discussed above. .(f) P.W.1-V.A.O., P.W.8-Thalayari, P.W. 14-Sub-In-spector of Police and P.W.15-Inspector of Police, all would speak about the recording of Ex.P.l statement, preparation of Ex.P.2 report of V.A.O., Ex.P-19 F.I.R., and recovery of weapon and other materials and further investigation. On 9. 1993 at 5.30 p.m., P.W.1 recorded Ex.P-1 statement given by the appellant and prepared Ex.P-2 report. At 6.00 p.m., P.W. 1 went along with the appellant and handed over the documents and weapon along with the severed head of the deceased to P.W.14. P.W.14, prepared Ex.P.19 printed F.I.R., at 6.30 p.m., on receipt of these documents. .(g) At 7.00 p.m., P.W. 15-Inspector of Police, received the intimation and came to the police station at 7.30 p.m., and took up further investigation. Then, he arrested the appellant, recovered the bloodstained clothes from him. Thereafter, he went to the spot and conducted inquest between 1.00 a.m., and 3.30 a.m., on 9. 1993. Even before the holding of this inquest, Exs.P-1, P-2 and P-19, reached the Judicial Magistrate concerned, at 1.00 A.M. mid-night on 9. 1993. The inquest reports as well as the statements of the witnesses also reached the Magistrate at 6.00 p.m., on 9. 1993. From the spot, P.W.15 recovered bloodstained objects, viz., M.Os.5 to 11. Thereafter he went to the house of appellant’s mother and recovered M.O.12-Britannia biscuit packet under Ex.P-9. (h) All these M.Os. 1993. The inquest reports as well as the statements of the witnesses also reached the Magistrate at 6.00 p.m., on 9. 1993. From the spot, P.W.15 recovered bloodstained objects, viz., M.Os.5 to 11. Thereafter he went to the house of appellant’s mother and recovered M.O.12-Britannia biscuit packet under Ex.P-9. (h) All these M.Os. were sent to the Court by P.W.15 along with Ex.P-15-requisition for causing all these M.Os., to be sent to forensic laboratory, without any delay. Ex.P.17-chemical analyst’s report and Ex.P-18-serologist’s report received by the Court would reveal that the blood group found in the lungi M.O.3 recovered from the appellant and the blood group found in the clothes of the deceased tallied with each other. They contained ‘B’ group blood. Thus, all these would show that there are abundant materials to corroborate the statement-Ex.P-1, and as such, there is no difficulty in accepting Ex.P-1 statement, as it does not suffer from any infirmity. .(iv) (a) Besides these materials, there are other sub-stantive evidence to show that the appellant, and the appellant alone is the culprit in this case. P.W.3 Tamizarasan, a retired Havildhar from Military service, is a social worker and a local resident. He along with P.W.4 want around the area in order to find out, whether the water pipes have been correctly erected at the respective places. Then, they went to the house of one Elango, and conversed with him. He is the neighbour of the appellant. On hearing the sound of a woman, from the house of appellant, P.W.3 rushed to the place of occurrence, and saw that the appellant was in the process of servering and removing the head of the deceased and putting the same in M.O.2 wire bag. He shouted at him. Then the appellant told him that he killed his wife, the deceased, since she insulted him. His evidence has also been corroborated by the evidence of P.W.4, who accompanied him. P.W.3 was examined at the spot, during the course of inquest on the head and the trunk as per Exs.P.21 and P.22. The statements of P.Ws.3 and 4 recorded by the Police Officer were received by the Court at 6.00 p.m., on 9. 1993, itself. P.Ws.3 and 4 are independent witnesses. There is no necessity for them to speak falsehood against the appellant. The statements of P.Ws.3 and 4 recorded by the Police Officer were received by the Court at 6.00 p.m., on 9. 1993, itself. P.Ws.3 and 4 are independent witnesses. There is no necessity for them to speak falsehood against the appellant. So, there is no difficulty in holding that the testimony of P.W.3 and P.W.4 is highly credible, (b) P.W.5 Rathna, a dobi, who is having her laundry shop in the same street, happened to see the appellant, carrying with him a wire bag M.O.2 containing the M.O.1 weapon and a severed head and proceeding to the chavadi. She also would say that the appellant told her that he murdered his wife as he was insulted by her. P.W.6-Vanaja, also would say that on the way to chavadi, the appellant came to the place in which she was conversing with the elder sister of the appellant Selvi, and informed his sister, that he committed the murder of his wife and so, he asked her to got to his house and take the child to her house. At that time, P.W.6 found bloodstains in his shirt and lungi. She was also able to see the M.O.1 vettukathi and a severed head in M.O.2 wire-bag carried by him. So, all these materials would lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant, and the appellant alone, did commit the brutal murder of his wife and surrendered to the V.A.O-P.W.1, who in turn, produced the appellant to the police. 14. We shall now come to the divergent contentions urged by the learned counsel on either side. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out various discrepancies between the evidence of P.Ws.l and 8, viz., P.W.1 would say that the appellant came to chavadi at 5.00 p.m., whereas P.W.8 would say as 5.30 p.m., that P.W.1 would say that the child was aged about 7 months’ old, but P.W.8 would say that the child was 1 1/2 years old, that P.W.1 would say that he came to the police station at 6.00 p.m., whereas P.W. 14 would say that he registered the F.I.R., at 6.30 p.m., Learned counsel has also submitted that P.W.8-Thalayari is also a stock-witness. Learned counsel further brought to our notice, the decision reported in Thangaraj v. State, by Inspector of Police, Kottampatti Police Station, 1993 L.W. (Crl) 34 (Journal Section -Short Notes) to show that the statement made to V.A.O., is a weak piece of evidence and it should not be acted upon. 15. Learned counsel for appellant would also point out the variation of time at which the inspection was made at the spot. All these variations as pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant cannot be taken to be vital one, since the timings as referred to by the prosecution witnesses are only approximate. However, the timings shown in the records like Exs.P-1, P-2 and P-3 have been correctly referred to by the witnesses. All these documents have reached the Court, without any delay. 16. As discussed above, most of the portions of the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses have been admitted by the appellant himself, in his statement under Sec.313, Cr.P.C. Even according to him, the appellant and the deceased alone were available inside the house during the occurrence. It is not the case of the appellant, that somebody other than himself was also available. In such a situation we cannot believe the defence theory which is not even suggested to the witness and that the appellant suddenly swooned and fell down, and he did not know as to who attacked the deceased. In view of the fact situation, as referred to above, the only conclusion that could be arrived at is that the appellant alone has committed his brutal murder of his wife. The citation referred to Thangaraj In re. 1993 L. W. (Crl.) 34 would not be applicable to the facts of the present case, since there are abundant materials available in this case to prove the case, apart from the statement made by the appellant to P.W.1/V.A.O. 17. In order to further substantiate the submission, that the extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence, learned counsel for the appellant cited some more decisions in Kheraj Ram v. The State of Rajasthan, 1955 Crl.L.J. 3113; Kailash v. State of Rajasthan, 1955 Crl.L.J. 3111 and Mandesan v. State of Kerala 1955 Crl.L.J. 61 and contended that the extra-judicial confession cannot be acted upon. This contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant may not be correct, in view of the observation made in the first decision Kheraj Ram In re. 1955 Crl.L.J. 3113 (supra), wherein it is observed, that the evidence of extra-judicial confession, though a weal type of evidence, can form the basis for conviction, if the confession made by the accused is voluntary, true and trust-worthy, and that it can be acted upon, if the evidence of the person, before whom the extra-judicial confession has been made by the accused, inspires confidence. The other decisions referred to by learned counsel, would relate to the extra-judicial confession made to the police officer in the form of F.I.R., or to the other witnesses belatedly. As such, those decisions would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 18. In reply to this learned Public Prosecutor, cited the Judgment in Murugan v. State, 1991 Crl.L.J.1680, wherein, a Division Bench of this Court has observed as follows: "The initial objection of the learned counsel for the appellant is that this extra-judicial confession is not admissible in view of R.72 of the Criminal Rules of Practice framed by this Court, which prohibits the Village Magistrate from recording confession from the accused after the commencement of investigation. This contention cannot be upheld in view of the consistent view taken by this Court, the last of which is expressed in Valonjiya Chinnamal v. State, 1987 L.W.(Crl) 375 by a Division Bench, referring to and relying upon the earlier decisions to the effect that a combined reading of the above rule as well as Sec.26 of the Indian Evidence Act would show that, the confession made by the accused before he comes into the custody of the Police Officer, if made to a village munsif is admissible... In the instant case... the extra-judicial confession has been reduced to writing and it is corroborated by an independent witness of some status, name P.W.8. The confession is spoken to not only by P.W.7 but also by P.W.8. P.W.8 is the Secretary of a Milk Cooperative Society and had gone to see P.W.7 in connection with the function of that society. He is totally an independent witness, whose evidence cannot be rejected on any account. The confession is spoken to not only by P.W.7 but also by P.W.8. P.W.8 is the Secretary of a Milk Cooperative Society and had gone to see P.W.7 in connection with the function of that society. He is totally an independent witness, whose evidence cannot be rejected on any account. The value to be attached to an extrajudicial confession would depend upon the reliability of the person to whom it is made, the interval between the occurrence and the confession, the reproduction of the exact words of the accused confessing to the crime and the follows up action, which the person to whom the confession is made and other factors. It cannot be said as a proposition of law that an extra-judicial confession as always a weak piece of evidence.... The extra-Judicial confession is reduced to writing and M.0.1 is also seized and the appellant is taken into custody by P.W.7. Copy of Ex.P.4 has been sent to the Executive Magistrate as well.... In Smt.Basanti v. State of Himachal Pradesh, A.I.R.1987 S.C. 1572: 1987 Crl.L.J. 1869 already referred to, the Supreme court based its conviction for offences under Secs.302 and 201 also on the Extra Judicial confession made by the wife." 19. In Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2274: 1977 Crl.L.J. 1941 the Apex Court observed as hereunder: "The learned Sessions Judge regarded the extra judicial confession to be a very weak type of evidence and therefore refused to rely on the same. Here the learned Sessions Judge committed a clear error of law. Law does not require that the evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated. In the instant case, the extra judicial confession was proved by an independent witness who was a responsible officer and who bore no animus against the appellants. There was hardly any justification for the Sessions Judge to disbelieve the evidence of Balbir Singh particularly when the extra judicial confession was corroborated by the recovery of an empty cartridge from the place of occurrence." 20. In State of U.P. v. M.K.Anthony, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 48 the Supreme Court observed thus: "There is neither any rule of law nor of prudence that evidence furnished by extrajudicial confession cannot be relied upon unless corroborated by some other credible evidence. The Courts have considered the evidence of extra-judicial confession a weak piece of evidence. In State of U.P. v. M.K.Anthony, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 48 the Supreme Court observed thus: "There is neither any rule of law nor of prudence that evidence furnished by extrajudicial confession cannot be relied upon unless corroborated by some other credible evidence. The Courts have considered the evidence of extra-judicial confession a weak piece of evidence. If the evidence about extra-judicial confession comes from the mouth of witness/witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused; the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and un-mistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it, then after subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, if it passes the test, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be basis of a conviction. In such a situation to go in search of corroboration itself tends to cast a shadow of doubt over the evidence. If the evidence of extra judicial confession is reliable, trustworthy and beyond reproach the same can be relied upon and a conviction can be founded thereon.“ In the instant case, there is not only the extra judicial confession - Ex.P.1 , as spoken to by P.W.1 and P.W.8, hut also there are other materials available to clichingly prove the complicity of the appellant in the crime of causing the death of his wife. 21. The next interesting question that arises for consideration would be that while these facts are held to be proved, whether the same would attract Sec.302, I.P.C. Learned Public Prosecutor would submit that clause thirdly of Sec.300, I.P.C, is made out in this case, since the materials would reflect the intention of the appellant to cause death and the injuries inflicted by the appellant would be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. He also would contend that the act of the appellant in cutting, severing and removing the head with M.O.1 vettukathi and cooly proceeding to the chavadi, to surrender would itself show his intention, and therefore, the appellant is liable to be punished under Sec.302, I.P.C. 22. He also would contend that the act of the appellant in cutting, severing and removing the head with M.O.1 vettukathi and cooly proceeding to the chavadi, to surrender would itself show his intention, and therefore, the appellant is liable to be punished under Sec.302, I.P.C. 22. Though the facts of the case would attract clause thirdly of Sec.300, I.P.C, the prosecution is duty bound to prove, that his case does not come under anyone of the exceptions, as provided in Sec.300, IPC. 23. As per the evidence of P.W.7 and Ex.P.1 statement of the appellant, there was quarrel whatever, between the appellant and the deceased previously. Only on the earlier day to the date of occurrence, there was a quarrel, since the appellant ate half of the biscuit packet bought for the child. Since the deceased scolded the appellant, he beat her with hands. In retaliation, the deceased bit his hand, with her teeth. This seems to be the genesis of the crime. After they returned home, the appellant asked the deceased who was still angry, to prepare food, which was refused by her. She, however, told him that she would not live with him any more and she would go away somewhere else. Due to this, he got provoked and decided to kill her, as he thought that he was not only insulted by her at his mother’s house, but she became emboldened to say that he would go away somewhere else, leaving him alone, even though he married her against the wishes of his parents. In the light of the above facts, the question as to whether Exception 1 to Sec.300, I.P.C. would be attracted in this case, has to be considered. 24. In this context, it will be appropriate to extract the Exception 1 to Sec.300. In the light of the above facts, the question as to whether Exception 1 to Sec.300, I.P.C. would be attracted in this case, has to be considered. 24. In this context, it will be appropriate to extract the Exception 1 to Sec.300. I.P.C ”Exception 1: When culpable homicide is not murder: culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, Whilst deprived of the power of self control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.“ So, under this Exception, culpable homicide is not murder, if the following conditions are complied with: .(1) The deceased must have given provocation to the offender; .(2) The provocation must be grave; .(3) The provocation must be sudden; .(4) The offender, by reason of the said provocation, shall have been deprived of his self-control; .(5) The offender should have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation; and .(6) The offender should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control. The question that this Court has to consider is whether a reasonable person placed in the same position as the accused was, would have provoked and reacted to the statement of his wife exposing her decision to go away from him, in the manner in which the appellant did? 25. The following decisions would throw light on this, In Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecution L.R., (1942) A.C.19, the scope of the doctrine of provocation is given as follows: ”It is not all provocation that will reduce the crime of murder of manslaughter. Provocation, to have that result, must be such as temporarily deprives the person provoked of the power of self-control, as the result of which he commits the unlawful act which causes death.... The test to be applied is that of the effect of the provocation on a reasonable man, as was laid down by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex Lesbini, (1914)3 K.B. 1116 so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious individual is not entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led an ordinary person to act as he did. In applying the test, it is of particular importance to (a) consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since the provocation to allow a reasonable man time to call, and (b) to take into account the instrument with which the homicide was effected, for to retor, in the heat of passion induced by provocation, by a simple blow, is a very different thing from making use of a deadly instrument like a concealed dagger. In short, The mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship of the provocation if the offence is to be reduced to manslaughter." It is further stated in the said decision that "The whole doctrine relating to provocation depends on the fact that it causes or may cause, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, whereby malice, which is the formation of an intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm, is negatived. Consequently, where the provocation inspires an actual intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harms, the doctrine that provocation may reduce murder to manslaughter seldom applies." 26. In yet another decision in Duffy’s case, (1949) 1 All.E.R. 932 the provocation is defined thus: "Provocation is some act, or series of acts done by the dead man to the accused which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused to subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his mind .... Similarly .... Circumstances which induce a desire for revenge, or a sudden passion of anger, are no enough. Indeed, circumstances which induce a desire for revenge are inconsistent with provocation, since the conscious formulation of a desire for revenge means that the person has had time to think, to reflect, and that would negative a sudden temporary loss of self-control which is of the essence of provocation. Provocation being.... as I have defined it, there are two things, in considering it, to which the law attaches, great importance. The first of the is, whether there was what is sometimes called time for cooling, that is for possion to cool and for reason to regain dominion over the mind... Provocation being.... as I have defined it, there are two things, in considering it, to which the law attaches, great importance. The first of the is, whether there was what is sometimes called time for cooling, that is for possion to cool and for reason to regain dominion over the mind... Secondly in considering whether provocation has or has not been made out, you must consider the retaliation in provocation - that is to say, whether the mode of resentment bears some proper and reasonable relationship to the sort of provocation that has been given." 27. In Dhula v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1956 Crl.L.J. 241: A.I.R. 1956 M.B.94, the Gwalior Division Bench, while considering the similar facts, observed thus: "The prosecution stated that on returning home Dhulla (Husband/accused), asked Bali (wife/deceased) to cook his meals. She declined saying that she would rather die in a sweeper’s house than cook meals for him. On hearing this reply of Bali, the appellant picked up an axe and dealth several blows with it on Bali’s head... Learned counsel for the appellant also made a plea that the reply which Bali gave to the appellant when she was asked to cook meals was such as to constitute "grave and sudden provocation" for the appellant and that, therefore, the act amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. This plea must be rejected. In my judgment, Bali’s answer to the appellant cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated as a provocation which would have led an ordinary and reasonable man the act in the manner that the appellant did." 28. In K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 605: (1962) 1 Supp.S.C.R. 567 the Apex Court held as follows: "The Indian Law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus: (1) The test of "Grave and sudden" provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first Exception to Sec.300 of the Indian Penal Code. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first Exception to Sec.300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation." 29. In Chet Ram v. Union of India, (1963) 1 Crl.L.J. 120 the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, while interpreting the words "sudden and grave provocation" observed as follows: "The question as to whether the provocation given to the offender is grave and sudden or not is one of fact and has to be decided on the circumstances of each case. As to whether a provocation is sudden is not a question of difficulty and it may at once be stated that the provocation given to the appellant was sudden. The other question as to whether a provocation is grave or not is sometimes not easy to decide. Generally the gravity of the provocation is judged by the reaction to it of a reasonable man. Oak, J. has observed in the case of Mahmood v. State, A.I.R. 1961 All. 538 that a reasonable man is not the ideal or the perfect being but a normal and average man’ and that a Judge should not impose his personal standards in this matter as by training’ he is a patient man’. With respect, I agree with the aforesaid observations and will add as an attribute of a reasonable man that he is not hypersensitive or easily excitable. More often than not sudden and grave provocation makes one lose the balance of mind and the power of self-control. Applying the aforesaid test to the circumstances of the instance case, it is clear that the refusal on the part of the Smt. Teja to cook the meals or threatening to leave the house on the following morning or refusal to spread the beds should not normally have deprived the appellant of the power of self-control so as the cause her death." 30. In Akhtar v. State, (1964) 1 Crl.L.J. A.I.R. 1964 All. 262, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, has elaborately dealt with the interpretation of Exception I to Sec.300, I.P.C. The relevant observation of the Court is as follows: "In determining whether an accused person was overwhelmed by a grave and sudden provocation, the Courts in this country and must investigate whether the offender acted reasonably or normally or properly, as an average person in the position and circumstances of the offender may be expected to do, until the point of time at which the offender is actually deprived of his power of self-control.... The mode in which an offender has exhibited his anger after loss of self-control may be taken into account in awarding sentence, but to require that mode to be reasonable even after the offender has been proved to have lost control over himself would not, in our opinion, be itself reasonable... The only test which the case has to pass generally, in order to enable an accused person to get the benefit of Exception No. 1 to Sec.300, I.P.C., is that the provocation, proceeding from the victim, must be reasonably capable of being considered grave and sudden according to the outlook and standards of persons belonging to the section of society to which the accused belongs. No further test of a reasonable conduct, during the short interval of time in which the accused has temporarily lost self-control, is required by our law. And, in our opinion, no such additional test can be laid down without removing the very basis upon which the doctrine of grave and sudden provocation rests. Of course, there may be cases in which, even though the provocation is grave and sudden, the cool and calculating conduct of the offender, either before or immediately after the provocation, may reveal that his acts were not the result of an uncontrollable impulse which had ever-powered him but were committed in pursuance of a plan to take revenge, and such offenders could not invoke the law’s benignity. " In these exceptional cases, the plea of grave and sudden provocation would fail due to an additional test, which is not whether the conduct of the offender was reasonable but which requires that the accused must be shown to have been deprived of self-control when he committed homicide. 31. " In these exceptional cases, the plea of grave and sudden provocation would fail due to an additional test, which is not whether the conduct of the offender was reasonable but which requires that the accused must be shown to have been deprived of self-control when he committed homicide. 31. The Apex Court in Gnanendra Kumar v. The State of U.P., A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 502: 1972 Crl.L.J. 308 has held as follows: "It was next-contended...The learned Sessions Judge has rejected this contention. It may be that he appellant had an irritable temper.....much less of sudden provocation. After all, during the course of the meeting, all that Bankey Lal had said was that Mehtab Rai and Raja Ram were monopolising all seats of authority and they were dishonest. The appellant being a near relation may certainly resent such derogatory words addressed to his father and uncle. But they can hardly be said to be grave provocation having regard to the station in life Mehtab Rai and Raja Ram occupied on the one hand, and Bankey Lal, or the other. It is true that what is grave provocation in one set of society may not be grave provocation in another. But the words uttered by Bankey Lal to the effect that they were dishonest cannot be regarded as grave provocation under the circumstances. In any case the provocation was far from being sudden." 32. In Ganesan In re, 1974 Crl.L.J. 381 another Division Bench of this Court, observed thus: "Accused killed his wife by inflicting several cuts on her with a koduval. That prior to that wife threw the vegetable cutter on the accused and caused him injury held constituted grave and sudden provocation in the circumstances of the case which deprived him of the power of self-control within the meaning of exception 1 to Sec.300, I.P.C.... It is significant to note immediately after inflicting injuries on his wife the accused came out with a rope with/the intention of hanging himself was sufficient to show that he had committed the act of violence in a fit of uncontrollable anger and immediately felt remorse for it after his temper had cooled down. The deceased has been refusing him conjugal relationship and seems to have been carrying on with P.W.6. The deceased has been refusing him conjugal relationship and seems to have been carrying on with P.W.6. On the day in question she had declined to allow the appellant to send P.W.1 on an errand and on the top of it she had thrown the vegetable cutter on him twice and it even caused him injury. Viewed in that background culminating in her act of throwing the vegetable cutter, the appellant had grave and sudden provocation from his wife and Exception 1 to Sec.300 would apply to this case." .33. In Rajvinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1982 Cr.L.J. 975, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held as follows: ."To come within Exception I to Sec.300, Penal Code, which reduces an offence of capital nature to merely a minor one, it has to be show not only that the provocation was sudden but that it was also so grave that the accused lost self-control as a result thereof... As I view the law, a mere exchange of unsavoury language, without more, is not what Exceptional envisages as grave and sudden provocation thus reducing an offence of capital nature to merely a minor one. Equally, there seems to be less than nothing here to indicate that the appellant had been driven into such an excruciating rage so as to be deprived of the power of self-control altogether. Therefore, neither of the essential pre-requisites deliberately stipulated by the language of Exception-1 to Sec.300, I.P.C. seems to be satisfied." .34. In Vasanta v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 361(1): 1983 Crl.L.J. 693, the observation of the Supreme Court reads thus: ."Mr. Lalit, however, submits that the case falls under Sec,304, Part 2, I.P.C., in view of serious altercations between the parties as held by the trial court. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention because there is nothing to show that the altercation was of such a serious nature which could cause sudden provocation. Secondly the nature of injury, namely, the stab on the chest with resulted in the fracture of the 6th rib and injured the heard and the lung and which according to the doctor was given with great force showed that it was most cruel and therefore the case squarely falls under Sec.302, I.P.C." 35. Secondly the nature of injury, namely, the stab on the chest with resulted in the fracture of the 6th rib and injured the heard and the lung and which according to the doctor was given with great force showed that it was most cruel and therefore the case squarely falls under Sec.302, I.P.C." 35. In Balasahib Ramrao Lankar v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 Crl.L.J. 1014, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, has held as follows: "We feel that the objective test must be applied as was done by the Privy Council in Philips v. R, (1969)2 A.C. 130 at 137, the question ... is not merely whether in their (i.e., Lordships’) opinion the provocation would have made a reasonable man lose his self-control but also whether having lost his self-control, he would have retaliated in the same way as the person charged in fact did." An argument was addressed at the Bar before the Privy Council that a person who has lost his self-control acts with more or less faro according to the degree of provocation which caused the loss of self-control. The Privy Council rejected the argument: "...that loss of self-control is not a matter of degree but is absolute; there is no intermediate stage between icy detachment and going berserk. This premise, unless the argument is purely semantic, must be based upon human experience and is, in their Lordships’ view, false." The two questions which require affirmative answers are: .(1) would a reasonable man have lost his self-control? .(2) would he then have retaliated as the offender did? Shades of temper... from phelgmatic to vitriolic... would then become irrelevant in such an exercise.” .36. In Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 Crl.L.J. 1423, it is observed by the High Court of Rajasthan, as follows: ."Provocation is an external stimulus which should be objectively gained. Merely uttering abusive words would not amount to grave and sudden provocation. It is true that at time words and gestures may under certain circumstances causes rave and sudden provocations, but in the instant case none of the three eye-witnesses stated that the victim addressed any abusive word to the accused any of them was cross-examined in this light." .37. Merely uttering abusive words would not amount to grave and sudden provocation. It is true that at time words and gestures may under certain circumstances causes rave and sudden provocations, but in the instant case none of the three eye-witnesses stated that the victim addressed any abusive word to the accused any of them was cross-examined in this light." .37. In Munfatt v. State of U.P., 1995 S.C.C. (Crl.) 898, the Supreme Court has observed as under: ."The learned counsel for the appellant sought to contend that there was a sudden and grave provocation caused to the appellant by the deceased which would, therefore, bring the offence under Exception 1 to Sec.300, I.P.C. Therefore, it is offence under Sec.304, Part 2, I.P.C. and not under Sec.302, I.P.C. There is absolutely no substance in this contention. The deceased went to the appellant’s house and asked to when he would let water in to his field. Obviously, having become unsuccessful in the civil litigation and the deceased going to the house of the appellant and asking as to when the would let/the water in to his field must have infuriated him and being unable to swallow the defeat in the civil litigation, he went inside the house, brought the gun and shot the deceased five times. This is a self-sought provocation. The deceased did not cause any provocation much less a sudden and grave provocation. .38. In Sulaiman Pillai v. State of Kerala, 1995 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1149, the Apex Court has held as follows: ."On the other hand, there is ample evidence to show that both he and the deceased were teaching Arabic and that he suspected the chastity of his wife and both of them were going to the school to draw salary. As a matter of fact, on the day of offence, the accused followed the deceased to the school to help her draw her salary and it is only after their return to the house that some thing happened and the accused mercilessly killed the deceased. It is in this context, perhaps, the trial court took the view that there must have been sudden and grave provocation but that benefit also cannot be given because of merciless inflication of number of injuries on the deceased. It is in this context, perhaps, the trial court took the view that there must have been sudden and grave provocation but that benefit also cannot be given because of merciless inflication of number of injuries on the deceased. Exception 1 is subject to many limits and the way the crime was perpetrated by the accused, it would not, in any manner satisfy the requirements of the exception." 39. A complete reading of the various decisions, relating to the Exception I to Sec.300, I.P.C. would disclose the following factors: (i) to bring the case under Exception 1 to Sec.300, I.P.C. the act of causing death should have been done by the accused under the influence of some factor depriving him of all self-control engendered by a provocation which is grave and sudden; .(ii) Loss of self-control must be shown to have been caused by grave and sudden provocation conduct of the victim; (iii) The provocation must be such as will upset even a person of ordinary sense and calmness; .(iv) The move of resentment must have a reasonable relationship to the provocation there must be some proportion between the provocation and the resentment, in determining whether the provocation is so grave and sudden as to deprive the offender of the power of self-control; .(v) The word ‘sudden’ involved two elements. Firstly, the provocation must be unexpected and secondly, the interval between the provocation and the homicide should be as brief as possible; .(vi) The reaction must be proportionate to the provocation. The extent of retaliation should not be grossly disproportionate to the offence given; (vii) The test of grave and sudden provocation under Exception I must be whether a reasonable person belonging to the same class of society as the accused placed in a similar situation would be so provoked as to lose his self-control; (viii) A mere wordy duel in that context could hardly be termed as provocation, and if at all, it certainly was not one which can either be labelled as grave or sudden in the special context of the capital crime of murder. A mere exchange of unsavoury language without more was not what Exception 1 to Sec.300, I.P.C. envisaged as a grave and sudden provocation; .(ix) Something which is done suddenly and in the heat of passion caused by provocation is done impulsively and at a time when there is as temporary suspension of reason and an act so done is not controlled or planned or perceived or deliberate; .(x) An unusually excitable or pugnaceous individual is not entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led and ordinary person to act as he did; .(xi) A reasonable man is not the ideal or perfect being but a normal and average man. A judge should not impose his personal standards in the matter, as by training, he is a patient man; (xii) Even though the provocation is grave and sudden, the cool and calculating conduct of the offender either before or immediately after the provocation may reveal that his acts were not the result of an uncontrollable impulse which had overpowered him but were committed in pursuance of a plan to take revenge; (xiii) Immediately after inflicting injuries on the deceased, if the conduct of the accused shows that he felt remorse for his act after his temper has cooled down, it is sufficient to show that he committed the act of violence under the loss of self-control or in a fit of uncontrollable anger; (xiv) Though words and gestures at times may, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocations, merely uttering abusive words would not amount to grave and sudden provocation since provocation is an external stimulus which should be objectively gained; (xv) Exception 1 to Sec.300 is subject to many limits and the benefit should not be given when there is merciless infliction of number of injuries on the deceased. The way in which the crime was perpetrated is also to be taken into account in order to find out whether the requirements of exception are satisfied. 40. In the light of the above legal principles called out from various decisions referred to above, we have to see the facts in this case, in order to decide whether the act of the appellant causing the death of the deceased, was under loss of self-control, due to the grave and sudden provocation. .41. 40. In the light of the above legal principles called out from various decisions referred to above, we have to see the facts in this case, in order to decide whether the act of the appellant causing the death of the deceased, was under loss of self-control, due to the grave and sudden provocation. .41. Of course, when the wife/ deceased refused to cook as requested by the husband/ appellant naturally, any husband would feel aggrieved. She not only refused to act upon the request of the appellant, but she further exclaimed that she would go away, leaving his custody. Naturally, this remark also would make the appellant angry. 42. In this situation, as per the prosecution case, on hearing those words, the appellant felt insulted and thought over various past incidents, that despite the protest from his parents, he married her, that only at her instance he came out of the joint family, by severing his connection with his parents, and set up a separate family by taking a rental house from P.W.7, that in the afternoon of the date of occurrence, in his mother’s house, the appellant was bitten by the deceased with her teeth and lastly she further insulted him by saying that she would go away somewhere else. After thinking all these circumstances, he took a decision, that this kind of woman should be de-served to be killed. Only, then he took the wood cutting knife from inside the house and attacked the deceased. He gave indiscriminate cut on her neck, causing merciless infliction of injuries. Neck was almost severed. She died. Even without satisfying with that, the appellant further sawed her neck with M.O.1 knife and severed the head and cooly put both the knife (M.O.1) and the head in the M.O.2 wire bag and proceeded to the village chavadi to surrender before P.W.1 - V.A.O. Moreover he gave a clear and consistant extrajudicial confession to the witnesses, as discussed above, that he was insulted and so, he severed her head. He also informed his elder sister Selvi to go to his house and take his child to her house. 43. The above factors would reveal that he was provoked by the words uttered by the wife, that she would go away, leaving his custody. These materials also would disclose that he felt insulted. It is also clear from above, that he got wild... 43. The above factors would reveal that he was provoked by the words uttered by the wife, that she would go away, leaving his custody. These materials also would disclose that he felt insulted. It is also clear from above, that he got wild... Only then the appellant committed this cold-blooded murder. But can it be said that it was done under the grave and sudden provocation? Can it be said that it was done when he lost his self-control? Can it be said, a reasonable man would have retaliated like this, as the appellant did? These question our answer is “emphatic no.” .44. The loss of self-control means, is a loss of thinking faculty temporarily. The sudden and grave provocation should be such to cause in the accused, a reasonable person, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering him so subject of passion as to make him for the moment not master of his mind. In this case, the circumstances which the appellant thought induced a desire for revenge. Conscious formulation of a desire for revenge means that the appellant has had time to think to reflect. This would negative a sudden temporary loss of self control, which is the essence of provocation. In this case, he thinks of the past incidents, formulates the desire for revenge and then takes decision to wipe her out. 45. Moreover, the conduct of the appellant, immediately after the commission of the crime, in removing the severed head and taking V.A.O., at the Village chavadi and informing the other witnesses, would show that his act was not the result of an uncontrollable impulse or under the loss of self-control, but was committed in pursuance of a plan to take revenge. Further more, he never felt remorse for his act of causing the death of his wife. On the contrary, he met the witnesses at various places and cooly told them, as to why the committed the said cruel act. This also would reveal that the act of the appellant was deliberate one. 46. May be he committed the act of violence in a fit of anger, but definitely it cannot be said that the anger did cause the loss of self-control, as altercation between the appellant and the deceased was not of such a serious nature, which would cause sudden, and grave provocation. 46. May be he committed the act of violence in a fit of anger, but definitely it cannot be said that the anger did cause the loss of self-control, as altercation between the appellant and the deceased was not of such a serious nature, which would cause sudden, and grave provocation. Further more, a reasonable husband of his status, would never go to the extent of severing the head of his wife, simply because she declared that she would leave him away. 47. At the risk of repetition, we would refer the decision of Dhula In re., A.I.R. 1956 M.B. 94 wherein the Gwalior Division Bench, while dealing with the similar facts of the case held that the wife’s refusal to cook the meals as per the request of her husband/ appellant and declared saying that she would die in a sweeper’s house than cook meals for the husband, would not by any stretch of imagination, be treated as a provocation which would have led an ordinary and reasonable man to commit the murder of his wife. .48. In Chet Ram, In re., (1963)1 Crl.L.J. 120, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, also would deal with the similar facts and said that the refusal on the part of the wife to cook the meals or threatening to leave the house on the following morning, should not normally be deprived the accused of power of self-control, so as to cause her death. In yet another decision In Ganesan In re., 1974 Crl.L.J. 381 a Division Bench of this Court observed, that since the accused, after causing the death of his wife came out with a rope, with intention of hanging himself was sufficient to show that he caused her death in a fit of uncontrollable anger, and immediately felt remorse for it, after his temper had cooled down. 49. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the appellant perpetrated this brutal crime in a very cruel and deliberate manner, after taking the considered and firm decision and so, the said act of the appellant would not fall under the Exception I to Sec.300, I.P.C., and it would certainly attract clause thirdly of Sec.300, I.P.C. Therefore, we conclude that the verdict given by the learned sessions Judge, that the appellant is liable to be convicted under Sec.302, I.P.C, is quite correct. .50. .50. Regarding the sentence, both learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Public Prosecutor in fairness cited various authorities and submitted that the case on hand may not come under the category of ‘rarest of rare cases’ warranting death sentence. In Selvaraj v. State, 1985 L.W. (Crl.) 23 (J.S.), a Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with the similar facts of the case where the accused severed the head of deceased, and surrendered held as follows: ."In Bachan Singh’s case, 1980 Crl.L.J. 639 (S.C.), the Supreme Court pointed out that a real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life though law’s instrumentality and that ought not be done save the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed. The learned Sessions Judge has used certain adjuctives such as "cruel" "shocking" and "terrifying" In our view, the more usage of these words do not form the special reasons contemplated under Sec.354 (3) of the Crl.P.C, for imposition of the penalty of death. In this case, there is evidence of estrangement of feelings between the accused and the deceased and there are also materials on record to show that the accused was be rated in a "filthy language" by the deceased. From the materials on record, it is clear that the accused was smarting under the insult of being berated in abusive language by his step mother and the accused must have been brooding over the incident for three days and should have taken the extreme step of murdering his step-mother. In the circumstances, we are of the view that extreme penalty of death is not called for." 51. In Shankar alias Gowri Shankar v. The State, (1994) 4 S.C.C. 470: 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1254, the Supreme Court observed thus: "The court should see the choice as to which one of the two punishments provided for murder is the proper one in a given case will depend upon the particular circumstances of that case and the court has to exercise its discretion judicially and on well-recognised principles after balancing all the litigating and aggravating circumstances of the crime. The court also should see whether there is something uncommon about the crime which renders sentence of imprisonment) of life in adequate and calls for death sentence. The court also should see whether there is something uncommon about the crime which renders sentence of imprisonment) of life in adequate and calls for death sentence. The nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender should be so revealing that the criminal is a menace to the society and the sentence of imprisonment of life would be inadequate. The sentence of death should be reserved for the rarest of rare cases after a due consideration of both mitigating and aggravating circumstances." 52. In Jasu alias Jaswant Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1995 Crl.L.J. 1160, the Rajasthan High Court, following the decision in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 936, observed as follows: "We must always have the brooding thought that there is a divinity in every man and that none is beyond redemption. But death penalty, still on our code, is the last step in a narrow category where, within a reasonable spell, the murderer is not likely to be cured and tends to murder others, even within the prison or immediately on release, if left alive a king cobra which by chronic habit, knows only to sting to death unless defanged if possible. The patience of society must be tempered by the prudence of social security and that is the limited justification for deprivation of fundamental rights by extinguishment of the whole human being. The extreme penalty can be invoked only in extreme situations...." Applying the test for imposing extreme penalty of death laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad’s case, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 936 in our considered opinion that accused appellant has not committed any crime against the society although his commission of offence is brutal. Nothing has been brought to our notice that accused appellant is a member of an organised mafia or is an habitual offender. The accused appellant admittedly belongs to a very poor family of a labour class. In our humble opinion he is entitled to be given an opportunity to become a reformed member of society in keeping with the concern for the dignity of human life which is basis concept of our Indian culture. With the passage of time deterrent theory of punishment in civilized society is lossing its importance and reformative theory is getting universal acceptance.” 53. With the passage of time deterrent theory of punishment in civilized society is lossing its importance and reformative theory is getting universal acceptance.” 53. Having regard to the ratio decidendi of the citations referred to above, and also having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not think that this is a fit case in which the extreme penalty of death is called for. While we agree with the judgment of the trial court, imposing conviction on the appellant for the offence under Sec. 302, I.P.C., since we feel, that the appellant is entitled to be given an opportunity to become a reformed member of the society in keeping with concern for the dignity of human life, and having regard to the fact that he was slightly provoked, which drove him to commit the murder of his wife, we would, commute the sentence of death to that of imprisonment for life, for the offence under Sec.302, I.P.C. 54. Except the above extent of modification in sentence, the appeal, in other respects, shall stand dismissed. The reference is answered accordingly.