Honble MUKHERJI, CJ.–This special appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 16.1.95 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2294/1987 whereby the writ application as filed by the writ petitioner appellant impugning the penal order of removal from service, dated 27.7.84 (Anx. 4 to the writ application) passed by the Supdt. of Police, Anti Corrup- tion Department (I), Jaipur and as confirmed by the appellate order dated 3.8.85 Annexure-5 to the writ application) as passed by the Inspector General of Police, Anti Corruption Deptt., Jaipur and the review order dated 1.10.86 (Anx.7 to the writ application) as passed by the respondent No. 1, stood rejected. (2). The writ petitioner appellant who was a Constable in Anti Corruption De- partment of Police posted at Jaipur and was governed by the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (in short `the Rules of 1958), was served with a memorandum and charge-sheet dated 26.3.83. There were two charges levelled against him-one was for his being remaining wilfully absent from duty for six days without information from 5.1.83 to 10.1.83 and the second charge was with regard to his absence in the past wherefrom it could be inferred that he was a habitual wilful absentee and despite warning given for wilful absence, he did not make any improvement. It was stated in the charge-sheet itself that the conduct of the writ petitioner appellant for being wilfully absence from duty without any cause and without any information, was apparent from a chart annexed to the charge-sheet which fell within the definition of carelessness, indiscipline and misconduct and as such was punishable. A departmental enquiry was conducted against him by an Inspector of Police Satya Bhan Singh. (3). His defence inter-alia was that while coming from his Village Udaipuria near Chomu, he fell ill and consulted a doctor at Chouhan Clinic at Chomu who advised him to take rest for six days. Hence, he sent an application for his leave through his brother Birbal since he was not in a position to attend to his duties at Jaipur. His leave was indispense. His brother submitted the leave application but it was not accepted. He went to join his duties on 11.1.1983 after taking illness certificate from the said doctor of Chomu. In the departmental enquiry he applied for recording of the evidence of Dr. His leave was indispense. His brother submitted the leave application but it was not accepted. He went to join his duties on 11.1.1983 after taking illness certificate from the said doctor of Chomu. In the departmental enquiry he applied for recording of the evidence of Dr. Chouhan of Chomu as a defence witness who could have explained about his illness but this material witness was not summoned in the departmental enquiry despite is repeated requests before the Enquiry Officer. His further contention was that casual leave was in his credit and even such a casual leave was not granted to him despite the clear indication made by him that it was required on medical grounds. As regards the second charge, his contention inter-alia was that he had submitted application for leave for absence which have already been granted by the authorities and hence, this charge could not be attributed to him. Leave already granted by the authorities could not be the subject matter of charge. That apart, the said charge itself was not clear and definite and not worthy of making any effective representation against. As regards the other periods mentioned, his contention inter alia was that a separate sheet was not clearly served on him and that after 11.1.83 he was continuously present till 21.1.83. He again applied for leave on 22nd and 23rd January, 1983 and then on 31.1.1983. From 1.2.1983 onwards, till 28.2.83 he was not allowed to attend to his duties and there was no occasion for him to take leave as indicated. On the basis of the Enquiry Report, an order of removal from service was passed against the writ petitioner appellant by the Disciplinary Authority on 27.7.84 (Anx.4) and his departmental appeal filed before the respondent No.2 was also dismissed by order dated 3.8.85 (Anx.5) as passed by the respondent No.3 and review application as filed by the writ petitioner before the respondent No.1 also stood rejected on 1.10.86 (Anx.7). (4). In the writ application which he filed, impugning the aforesaid orders, the learned Single Judge expressed a view that there was nothing harsh and disproportionate as regards the punishment inflicted on the writ petitioner appellant. (4). In the writ application which he filed, impugning the aforesaid orders, the learned Single Judge expressed a view that there was nothing harsh and disproportionate as regards the punishment inflicted on the writ petitioner appellant. It was further observed, erroneously though, that he was required to give explanation for his wilful absence w.e.f. 5.1.83 to 28.2.83 but he having given his explanation only about his absence for six days on account of his illness and there having been no explanation, whatsoever, in respect of the remaining 31 days, it did make out a case where invoking the provisions of Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 he could be removed from service. Learned Single Judge held on an interpretation of sub- rule (1) of Rule 86, Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 that when a government servant is absent from duty without leave or before leave applied for has been sanctioned by the Competent Authority, he shall be treated to have remained wilfully absent from duty and such wilful absence is to be visited with the conseque- nce that it would amount to interruption in service involving forfeiture of his past services. On satisfactory reasons being furnished, the authority competent to sanction leave, could regularise it by grant of leave due or can commute it in extraordinary leave. Interpreting sub-rule (3) of Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 inserted vide amendment notification dated 22.2.79 which started with a non-obstante clause and empowered the Disciplinary Authority to initiate a departmental proceeding against the government servant who filfully remained absent from duty for a period exceeding one month, the learned Single Judge held that the petitioner was required to give explanation about his wilful absence from 5.1.83 to 28.2.83 which period was admittedly exceeding one month and therefore, the Disciplinary Authority had rightly initiated departmental proceedings against him under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 and for the charge of wilful absence from duty for the period exceeding one month proved against him, he has rightly been removed from service. Learned Single Judge held that in his reply to the charge-sheet, the writ petitioner nowhere explained his wilful absence for at least 31 days and he could give his explanation for his absence only from 5.1.83 to 10.1.83 i.e. for six days. Learned Single Judge held that in his reply to the charge-sheet, the writ petitioner nowhere explained his wilful absence for at least 31 days and he could give his explanation for his absence only from 5.1.83 to 10.1.83 i.e. for six days. Since he has not given any explanation, whatsoever for his absence for 31 days and could not be able to demonstrate circumstances which forced him to remain absent at least for 31 days, the Supreme Court decisions holding the field did not apply in a case when the only punishment that could be passed in his case, was removal from service. Learned Single Judge directed to circulate a copy of the judgment to all the District Headquarters as well out lying courts of each district to ensure the strict compliance of the newly inserted sub- rule (3) of Rule 86 of the Rules of 1951 in letter and spirit. (5). In Surath Chandra vs. State of West Bengal (1), a three Judges bench of the Supreme Court observed inter-alia that a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending himself has to be given to a delinquent employee. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are, on which the charges preferred against him are founded, he cannot possibly, by approaching his own imaginations, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in contemplation of the autho- rities to be established against him, while the object of furnishing a statement of allegations is to give all the necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up a proper defence. If it is found that there was denial of proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself in complete disregard to the principles enshrined in the Rules conforming to the principles of natural justice, the charge cannot be sustained against the delinquent. (6). In Union of India and Others vs. Giri Raj Sharma (2), relying on a decision of this court in AIR 1965 Rajasthan 140, the Supreme Court held that the punishment of dismissal on the ground of over staying leave period by an employee subsequent to an order of rejection of his application for extension of leave where there was no wilful intention to flout the order, is not just and proper. It was further held that the punishment is harsh and disproportionate. It was further held that the punishment is harsh and disproportionate. In the facts of the said case, relief of reinstatement with all monetary service benefits was granted with liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to impose an appropriate minor punishment. (7). In State of U.P. vs. Ashok Kumar Singh (3), where a delinquent Police Constable absented himself from duty without leave on several occasions, was given punishment of removal from service, it was held by the Supreme court that the High Courts exercise of power under Article 226 on the ground that it does not run commensurate with the gravity of the offence, is improper. But that was a case where the High Court held that the findings as made by Disciplinary Authority were made correctly, but it only sought to interfere with the quantum of punishment. (8). In Mandeep Kumar and Others vs. State of Haryana and Another (4), where on account of misconduct occasioned by a marginal lapse, where the period of absence ranged between one day to 2 days on a few (three or four) occasions, a fresh opportunity for improvement was directed to be given by the Supreme Court with liberty granted to the Disciplinary Authority to discharge him in case of unauthorised absence even on a single occasion during the next two years, by way of interference with the punishment. (9). In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Others vs. Shri Ram Yadav (5), a Division Bench of this court held that it is the duty of the Disciplinary Authority to apply his mind to various alternative penalties which are to be imposed on the delinquent and it is also one of the basic requirements to indicate good and sufficient reasons for chosing any particular penalty. The nature and magnitude of the charge, desirability or undesirability of retaining a delinquent in service and adequacy of penalty lesser than dismissal or removal and other aspects constitute vital considerations while imposing penalty. It was also held in this case that it is the duty of the Competent Authority to apply his mind in making selection of penalty for good and sufficient reason, taking into account all vital considerations as gravity of charge, its consequences, working conditions of delinquent and circumstances related to commission of misconduct. The essence of the principles of service jurisprudence was elaborated in this case. The essence of the principles of service jurisprudence was elaborated in this case. We quite appreciate that this was in respect of an industrial workman in the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpora- tion and in the instant case, we are dealing with the matter of a Police Constable where he was taking unauthorised leave. (10). In Babu Lal` vs. State of Rajasthan & Another (6), which was a case of removal from service on ground of wilful absence from duty, leave for relevant period of alleged absence was not applied for and also was not sanctioned. There was wilful absence from 4.10.80 till 31.12.80 exceeding the period of one month. It was held in this case that even though the charge was said to have been proved under sub-rule (3) of Rule 86 of the RSR, 1951, but as regards the removal on ground of wilful absence from duty for a period exceeding one month, the penalty of removal was altered into that of with-holding six grade increments. It was held in this case, however, that the non speaking nature of the order was inconsequential. (11). In State Bank of India and Others vs. Samrendra Kishore Endow and Others (7) on the question as to whether the removal from service was appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case and whether a punishment was within the discretion and judgment of the Disciplinary Authority alone where the Appellate Authority could also interfere with the same it was held that neither the High Court nor the Administrative Tribunal had any power to substitute its own discretion for that of the Disciplinary Authority. In the facts of the case, the Supreme Court exercised equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 but the High Court and the Tribunal had no such power or jurisdiction and in facts of the said case, the Appe- llate Authority was directed to consider whether a lesser punishment was called for in the facts and circumstances of the case which it was directed to do within a period of four months of the receipt of the copy of the order. In this case, however, the observations in State of Orissa and Others vs. Vidhya Bhushan Mahapatra (8), were quoted with approval so as to hold that the Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the Enquiry Officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour but to direct the Authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all, it appears that there has been violation of the rules of natural justice, it was further observed that the adequacy of the penalty, unless it is malafide, is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to be concerned with. Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer or the Competent Authority are based on evidence, even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter. Quoting the obser- vations in Bhagat Ram vs. State of H.P. (9) it was further held that the Supreme Court could exercise its equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 which the High Court and the Tribunal could not. In Union of India vs. Sardar Bahadur (10) it was observed that the Court is not concerned to decide whether the punishment imposed provided ( it is justified by the rules) is appropriate, having regard to the misdemeanour established. However, in Union of India vs. Tulsi Ram Patel (11) it was observed that the Court can interfere when the penalty imposed is arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of proportion to the offence committed or unwarranted by the facts and circumstances of the case or requirements of the particular government service. It was observed in State of Bank of India vs. Somendra Kumar Endow (ibid) that these observations in Tulsi Ram Patel (ibid) are not relevant to cases of penalty imposed after a regular enquiry. In Shankar Das vs. Union of India (12), also, a view was taken approving that the High Court or the Supreme Court can interfere in appropriate cases regarding the quantum of punishment. (12). In State of A.P. vs. S. Sree Rama Rao & Ors. In Shankar Das vs. Union of India (12), also, a view was taken approving that the High Court or the Supreme Court can interfere in appropriate cases regarding the quantum of punishment. (12). In State of A.P. vs. S. Sree Rama Rao & Ors. (13) it was held that the High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case, or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or whether the conclusions on the very face of it are so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion or on similar grounds but if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the departmental authorities are the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, adequacy or reliability of their evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding in the nature of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was also a case where their was statement of facts accompanying a charge sheet which formed part of a single document on the basis of which proceedings were started against the delinquent. It was observed that it would be hypocritical to proceed on the view that though the delinquent was expressly told in the statement of facts which formed part of the charge-sheet about the ground of his reprehensible conduct, that ground of reprehensible conduct was not included in the charge. The ground of misconduct was stated in the statement but not in the charge-sheet. It was held in this case that proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is expected to be there in a criminal court, does not apply in respect of a departmental proceeding, but still then, the High Court under Article 226 is not competent to declare an order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. It is only to see about the procedure prescribed in this behalf and whether the rules of natural justice have been violated or not. It is only to see about the procedure prescribed in this behalf and whether the rules of natural justice have been violated or not. If there is some evidence which the Disciplinary Authority has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent is guilty of the charges, it is not the function of the High Court under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on that evidence. The High Court can undoubtedly interfere where the proceedings against a delinquent has been held in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules regarding mode of enquiry or there were any other procedural lapes on account of considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or the conclusions are wholly arbitrary and capricious which no reasona- ble man can ever have arrived at. (13). We have also considered the decision in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others (14) where it was observed that the High Court would be within its jurisdiction to modify the punishment/penalty by moulding the relief in a case where the punishment/penalty awarded shocks the judicial conscience. It was fur- ther observed that the High Court in such cases can direct the authority to reconsider the punishment and in order to shorten litigation, impose punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. (14). Having heard the submissions of learned counsel or the parties and having considered the authorities cited before us, we are constrained to hold that the approach of the learned Single Judge was grossly erroneous. Learned Single Judge failed to appreciate along with all the authorities that passed the order of dismissal or upheld the same in their respective capacities, that Charge No.2 taken as a whole was too vague an allegation unworthy of making effective representation against. Item Nos. 1 to 15 of the said Chart shows different charges for which the writ petitioner appellant availed of leave and which were duly sanctioned, and that being so, they could not form a subject matter of any charge at all. Item Nos. 1 to 15 of the said Chart shows different charges for which the writ petitioner appellant availed of leave and which were duly sanctioned, and that being so, they could not form a subject matter of any charge at all. That apart, Item No. 16 to 24 of the said Chart are for different periods and they do not make out any continuous period of wilful absence of more than thirty days unless we compute that taken along with 31.1.83, the period from 1.2.83 to 28.2.83 would come to 29 days even though covering the entire month of February, 1983. The period from 5.1.83 to 10.1.83 was for six days, period from 22.1.83 to 23.1.83 was two days, 31.1.83 was an isolated day and the period from 1.2.83 to 28.2.83 was for 28 days. Thus, there was no continuous leave availed of which stood unexplained, which could be taken as continuous period of thirty days or more than a month. There was a gross misappreciation of facts by all the authorities including, unfortunately, the learned Single Judge. Learned Single Judge also misinterpreted and misconstrued subrule (3) of Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules taken with the non-obstante clause in conjunction with the notification dated 22.2.79 so as to read that the only punishment that the departmental authorities could inflict on a delinquent employee, taking leave for more than thirty days, would be to remove him from service. The rules never implied such maximum sentence provided in the said rule postulating the maximum sentence which could amount to removal from service. Just because the maximum sentence is delineated in a particular rule, it does not mean and imply that the maximum has always to be applied in the facts of each case. That is indeed a grossly distorted interpretation which at least we, as the court of appeal, cannot approve of. In our humble opinion, it was not at all necessary for the learned Single Judge to have directed the circulation of his opinion far and wide in the entire periphery of Rajasthan. That is the distorted view of interpretation of the Rules and we disapprove of the same. The words `remaining absent from duty for a period exceeding one month would be taken to be the period of continuous one month and not different break ups constituting a total period of one month. That is the distorted view of interpretation of the Rules and we disapprove of the same. The words `remaining absent from duty for a period exceeding one month would be taken to be the period of continuous one month and not different break ups constituting a total period of one month. That apart, the words `may be removed from service do not always mean and imply that he must have to be removed from service but that is only the maximum sentence as provided under law. (15). We fail to appreciate as to what prevented the Enquiry Officer from calling for the Doctor who is said to have testified about the genuineness of the writ petitioners ailment which over the period from 5.1.83 to 10.1.83. For non examination of the said doctor and not giving the writ petitioner an efficacious opportunity to examine the said doctor of Chomu, we think, there has been a gross failure of justice. That apart, so far as the rolled up charges as contained in Charge No.2, part of which is a non existing charge and the remaining part was not very much clear and unworthy of effective representation, we think that the writ petitioner appellant was incapable of making a proper representation as regards the second charge. (16). We are of the considered opinion that malice was writ large in the charge itself, in so far as second charge is concerned. We think that instead of directing the Disciplinary Authority to hold a departmental enquiry over again, we should not disturb the finding as to guilt or misconduct as regards charge no 1 whatever slender materials it may be based upon, but we should interfere in this matter by way of setting aside the order of removal from service holding the punishment to be shocking to conscience and direct the Disciplinary Authority to consider the question of imposition of some other sentence on the writ petitioner appellant with restoration of his service without any back wages. (17). With these observations, we allow the special appeal to the extent as indicated above, set aside the orders impugned and direct the Disciplinary Authority to pass an appropriate order in accordance with law in the light of our observations made hereinabove. No order as to costs.