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1996 DIGILAW 993 (ALL)

I. T. C. Limited v. Rakesh Behari Srivastava

1996-09-04

S.K.PHAUJDAR

body1996
Judgment : S.K. Phaujdar 1. THIS revision application under Section 115 is directed against an order dated 24.5.1996 passed by the Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Gorakhpur, in Suit No. 208 of 1995. The suit was filed by the present three respondents against the present revisionist and the defendant-revisionist filed an objection that the plaint was to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. The suit was valued at more than Rs. 1 lakh but did not extend to Rs. 5 lakhs. The application of the defendant-revisionist was rejected by the impugned order and hence this application. 2. A preliminary objection was raised by the plaintiff-respondents on the ground that the revision-application is not maintainable in the High Court as the suit was valued at Rs. 1 lakh and odd and it should have been presented before the District Judge, Gorakhpur. The revisionist objected to this point and stated that under Section 115, C.P.C, as amended in Uttar Pradesh upto date, the revision-application is beyond the jurisdiction of the district court as it is valued at more than Rs. 1 lakh. It was contended by Sri Naithani for the respondent that by a notification dated 6th May, 1995, the High Court had enhanced the appellate jurisdiction of the district court from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 5 lakh. It was argued that this notification would cover the pecuniary jurisdiction regarding revision- applications also. Sri Naithani traced the history of the legislation culminating in the present amendment of Section 115, C.P.C. for the State of Uttar Pradesh. It was argued that the very purpose of giving the district courts a right of revision was to give more powers to them and till before the notification dated May 6, 1995, the pecuniary limits of appellate and revisional jurisdictions were coextensive. Initially, it was Rs. 20,000 both for appeals as well as revisions for the district courts. Subsequently, it was raised to Rs. 1 lakh and it could only be interpreted that the notification of 6th May, 1995, was applicable not only for the appellate Jurisdiction of the district court but also for the revisional jurisdiction. It was contended that if at all the notification was intended for enhancing the pecuniary limit only of the appellate jurisdiction of the district courts, it will be ultra vires the purpose of creation of the revisional Courts at the districts. 4. It was contended that if at all the notification was intended for enhancing the pecuniary limit only of the appellate jurisdiction of the district courts, it will be ultra vires the purpose of creation of the revisional Courts at the districts. 4. IT is in this context that Sri Naithani argued that when the two powers to extend the pecuniary limit of appeal and revision flow from the same amending Act, this must be read as co-extensive. To reiterate his argument, it may be stated that it was his contention that the amendment in Section 115, C.P.C. was made for the purpose of giving more powers to the district courts. In this connection, a decision of the Supreme Court was placed before me by the other side as in (1980) 2 SCC 378 . The amendment of Section 115 as enforced by virtue of the amending Act of 1978 was in question before the Supreme Court and the main question was whether a second revision would lie before the High Court against a revisional order made by the district court. In this connection, it was observed in paragraph 8 of the judgment that "it seems to us that to recognise a revisional power in the High Court over a revisional order passed by the District Judge would plainly defeat the object of the legislative scheme. The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction-to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court-would be frustrated." IT was also observed in this very paragraph of the Judgment after considering the legislative history, that the consistent object behind the successive amendments (in Section 115 C.P.C.) was to divide the work-load of revision petitions between the High Court and the district courts and decentralise that jurisdiction. IT cannot, therefore, be stated that the purpose of creating revisional courts at the districts was to give more powers to the District Judges. IT was solely for the purpose of distributing the work-load and not for any other thing. IT is true that a certain point of time the pecuniary limits of these two Jurisdictions were co-extensive but from that alone, it may not be inferred that the Legislature always wanted that the district courts would be entitled to receive any revision in cases of such valuation where appeals would lie before them. IT is true that a certain point of time the pecuniary limits of these two Jurisdictions were co-extensive but from that alone, it may not be inferred that the Legislature always wanted that the district courts would be entitled to receive any revision in cases of such valuation where appeals would lie before them. IT was argued by Sri Naithani that an anomaly would be created if the revision lies before this Court and an appeal lies before the district court on a particular valuation of a suit. That was the situation prior to 1970 when the district courts enjoyed no revisional powers and the theory of anomaly would not stand to reason. The purpose of the legislation has already been indicated in the judgment of the Supreme Court. The legislations as they stand now are two distinct ones concerning appeals and revisions. Jurisdiction of appellate courts is determined by the provisions of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act while revisional jurisdiction is covered by the C.P.C. Had it been the intent of the Legislature that the same pecuniary limits will be covering the jurisdiction of the district courts, so far the appeals and revisions are concerned, there was no bar for the Legislature to say in one line that the revisional court would enjoy the same pecuniary jurisdiction as it was enjoying in receiving appeals. Although similar words have been used in Section 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act and Section 115, C.P.C. (for the State of Uttar Pradesh) and although both these provisions empower the High Court to enhance the respective jurisdictions of the district courts, one provision cannot be read as subordinate to the other. The High Court had been given the power in two different legislations and exercise of the power under one legislation should not and cannot be deemed to be an exercise of the power under the other legislation. 5. IT was argued by Sri Naithani that the notification enhancing the pecuniary limit of the appellate Jurisdiction of the district court without reference to the revisional Jurisdiction in ultra vires the provision of the amending Act of 1991. This argument was met nicely by Sri Yashwant Verma appearing for the other side. 5. IT was argued by Sri Naithani that the notification enhancing the pecuniary limit of the appellate Jurisdiction of the district court without reference to the revisional Jurisdiction in ultra vires the provision of the amending Act of 1991. This argument was met nicely by Sri Yashwant Verma appearing for the other side. IT was argued that if the notification is ultra vires, as submitted, then it is non-existent and the absence of the notification may affect the appellate jurisdiction no doubt, but its absence may not affect the revisional jurisdiction. IT was left to the High Court by the amended Section 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act and Section 115, C.P.C. to determine as to when such Jurisdictions for the district courts could be enlarged. The High Court thought it proper only to enlarge the appellate jurisdiction and did not exercise the option for revisional jurisdiction and the notification must be read as it stands. 6. SRI Naithani relied on a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1979 All 218 . It was his argument that the words in the notification "in any proceeding arising out of the decree or order was made" should include a revision. I am unable to accept this contention. On a plain reading of the notification dated 6.5.1995, it appears that only the appellate jurisdiction was proposed to be enlarged. The case-law under consideration was on a different point. The Full Bench held on an interpretation of the words of Section 115, as amended in Uttar Pradesh, that a revision is open only in respect of orders passed in a suit or in respect of matters arising out of it but no revision would lie against an order on appeal or revision. From whatever angle we look to the problem, the contention of the respondents touching the preliminary objection is not sustainable. 7. THE preliminary objection stands rejected. THE matter shall be heard on 19.9.1996 at 10.00 a.m. as already indicated in the order dated 3.9.1996.