A. M. Ahmedi ( 1 ) [ed. facts : Govt. by notification dt. 15. 3. 79 granted total exemption from duty to PVC upto 31. 3. 81. Govt. withdrew same by notification dt. 16. 10. 80 stating that duty would be 40%. Appellant challenged this on the ground that on the basis of earlier notification, it had ordered import and Govt. could not withdraw the same and was estopped. High Court dismissed the petition and appeal was carried to the Supreme Court]. After detailing above, Judgement is:. ( 2 ) THE same impugned Notification No. 205 came to be challenged in another set of appeals decided by this Court in Kasinka Trading vs. Union of India JT. 1994 (7) S. C. 362. The Notification was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court comprising of M. N. Venkatachaliah, CJI and A. S. Anand, J. It is, however, contended before us that the judgment in Kasinka Trading in not correct. ( 3 ) IT is not necessary for us to go into a historical analysis of the case law relating to promissory estoppel against the Government. Suffice it to say that the principle of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government but in case there is a supervening public equity, the Government would be allowed to change its stand; it would then be able to withdraw from representation made by it which induced persons to take certain steps which may have gone adverse to the interest of such persons on account of such withdrawal. However, the Court must satisfy itself that such a public interest exists. The law on this aspect has been emphatically laid down in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 2 S. C. R. 641. However, the Court must satisfy itself that such a public interest exists. The law on this aspect has been emphatically laid down in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 2 S. C. R. 641. The portion relevant for our purpose is extracted below :- "it is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the Government, the overriding public interest requires that the Government should not be held bound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government, for it is the Court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government to show that the pubic interest in the Government acting otherwise than in accordance with the inequitable to hold the Government bound by the promise and the Court would insist on a highly rigorous standard of proof in the discharge of this burden. But even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be competent to the Government to resile from the promise "on giving reasonable notice which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position" provided of course it is possible for the promisee to restore status quo ante. If however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable. Vide Emmanuel Ayodeji Ajayji vs. Briscoe, [1964] 3 AII. E. R. 556. " ( 4 ) TWO propositions follow from above analysis: (1) The determination of applicability of promissory estoppel against pubic authority/government hinges upon balance of equity or "public interest". (2) It is the Court which has to determine whether the Government should be held exempt from the liability of the "promise" or "representation". In the present case, the first Notification exempting tee customs duty on PVC itself recites ". . . . central Government being satisfied that it is necessary in public interest to do so. . . ". In the Notification issued later which gave rise to the present cause of action, the same recitation is present. ( 5 ) IN Kasinka, the the Court has actually gone into this aspect. In para 19, the Court says: "pvc resins, it is not disputed, is manufactured in India and is also imported from abroad. . . ". In the Notification issued later which gave rise to the present cause of action, the same recitation is present. ( 5 ) IN Kasinka, the the Court has actually gone into this aspect. In para 19, the Court says: "pvc resins, it is not disputed, is manufactured in India and is also imported from abroad. In the counter to the Writ Petition filed by the Union of India in the High Court, the justification for the issuance of the exemption Notification No. 66/79 in the "public interest" was spelt out by the respondents. It was stated that it was with a view to equalising sale prices of the indigenous and the imported material and to make the commodity available to the consumer at a uniform price, keeping in view the trends in the supply of the material, that the Cabinet had decided to issue the exemption Notification No. 66 fo 1979 under Section 25 (1) of the Act. Subsequently, when it was found and realised that the international prices of the product were falling and consequently the import prices had become lower than the ex-factory prices of the indigenous material, the material was examined by the Government of India and it was decided in "pubic interest" to withdraw the exemption Notification. Thus, the Union of India has disclosed the circumstances under which the exemption was initially granted as well as the change of circumstances which warranted the withdrawal of the exemption notification. The reasons given by the Union of India justifying withdrawal of the exemption notification, in our opinion, are not irrelevant to the exercise of the power in public interest nor are the same shown to be insufficient to support the exercise of that poser. From the material on the record it is apparent that the exemption Notification issued under Section 25 (1) of the Act, in "public interest", was designed to off set the excess price which the local entrepreneurs were required to pay for importing PVC resin at a time when difference between the indigenous product and the imported product was substantial. No importer could be expected to import PVC resins after paying duty and incur losses. The exemption Notification, was therefore, issued with a view to set off those losses to the extent possible. The Notification was not issued as potential source of extra profit for the importer. No importer could be expected to import PVC resins after paying duty and incur losses. The exemption Notification, was therefore, issued with a view to set off those losses to the extent possible. The Notification was not issued as potential source of extra profit for the importer. Again, at the time when the Notification was withdrawn by the Government there was no scope for any loss to be suffered by the importers as was clearly stated in ten counter filed by the Union of India and which contention has remained unrebutted. From the counter filed by the Union of India in the High Court it is abundantly clear that the necessity for the continuation of the exemption, in view of the changed circumstances, was no longer necessary". It can be seen that the High Court in the case of Bombay Conductors 1986 (23) ELT. 87 has also noticed a similar public interest in withdrawing the Notification of exemption. The appellants in the present case have not disclosed any facts which could show the existence of better equity in their favour. All that they have alleged is that they would not have imported the PVC resin without the exemption as that would have been imported the PVC resin without the exemption as that would have been "unviable" and "unceconomical" and further that many persons took full advantage of the exemption; moreover, the exemption accorded preferential treatment to some persons, but not to the appellants. The facts of the economic situation explained in the judgment of Kasinka have not been controverted. Nor is it alleged by the appellants that public interest did not call for supercession of Notification No. 66. ( 6 ) THE next question is whether the fact that the Notification No. 66 mentioned the period during which it was to remain in force, would make any difference to the situation. In other words, could it be said that an exemption notified without specifying the period within which the exemption would remain force, would be withdrawn in public interest but not the one in which a period has been so specified? Once public interest is accepted as the superior equity which can override individual equity, the principle should applicable even in cases where a period has been indicated. Once public interest is accepted as the superior equity which can override individual equity, the principle should applicable even in cases where a period has been indicated. The government is competent to resile from a promise even if there is no manifest public interest involved, provided, of course, on one is put in any adverse situation which cannot be rectified. To adopt the line of reasoning in Emmanuel Ayodeji Ajayji vs. Briscoe (1964) 3 All. E. R. 556 quoted in M. P. Sugar Mills (supra) even where there is not such overiding public interest, it may shall be For Govt. to resile after giving notice time to promisee to resume his position, if latter not possible, promise would be irrevocable. In the present case there is no such interest requiring notice. Appeal dismissed.