JUDGMENT A.S. Tripathi, J. This Letters Patent Appeal has been directed against the order passed in writ petition No. 1918 of 1996 on 10th October, 1996. By this order, the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India treating it as premature. The Appellant claims to have obtained a gun licence. The Appellant had obtained the gun licence from the district of Kurukshetra in the State of Haryana. The Appellant claims to be permanent resident of Gwalior. The licensing authority, the District Magistrate, Gwalior found that the Appellant had obtained the licence by playing fraud upon the authority of the district Kurukshetra, Haryana, and directed that the said licence be suspended and arm be deposited with some Arms Dealer. This order has been passed by the District Magistrate, Gwalior by order dated 6th July, 1996. This order is on the file of the writ petition as annexure P/I. The District Magistrate of Gwalior found that deliberately the Appellant had concealed certain facts and obtained the licence from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Thaneshwar in the district Kurukshetra, Harayana, by playing fraud. On an preliminary enquiry, it was found that no licence was issued in the name of the Appellant from the office of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Thaneshwar, district Kurukshetra, Haryana. The final enquiry is still pending. The licence of the Appellant is suspended and a direction was given to deposit the Gun (arm) with some Arms Dealer at Gwalior. The Appellant preferred a writ petition. The learned single Judge dismissed it summarily on the ground that the petition was premature in view of the fact that final orders have not yet been passed by the enquiring authority, District Magistrate, Gwalior. After examining the provisions of Section 2(1) Clause (f) of the Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) where the "licensing authority" has been defined. In this case, the original licensing authority was said to be Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Thaneshwar, district Kurukshetra, Haryana. But, the same licence was renewed by the District Magistrate, Gwalior, at a particular time. The licensing authority includes the authority which had renewed the licence at any particular time. In this way, the point raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the District Magistrate, Gwalior, had no authority to suspend the licence u/s 17 of the Act is not tenable. The licensing authority includes the authority which had renewed the licence at any particular time. In this way, the point raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the District Magistrate, Gwalior, had no authority to suspend the licence u/s 17 of the Act is not tenable. In Section 17 of the Act, the words used are that the licensing authority has been empowered to variation, suspension and revocation of licences. The next point raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant was that no final enquiry has been made by the Respondents and the direction for depositing the arm with Arms Dealer is not called for. After perusal of Section 17 of the Act, we find that there is a mandatory provision in Sub-section (10) of Section 17 of the Act that once licence is suspended by the licensing authority, the licence holder is bound to deposit the arms either with the Police Station or with any of the Arms Dealer as directed by the licensing authority. In this case, the licensing authority, District Magistrate, Gwalior, has directed the Appellant to deposit his arm with Arms Dealer in the city of Gwalior. Therefore, in view of the mandatory provision contained in Section 17, Sub-section (10), there is no point to interfere with the order passed by the licensing authority directing to deposit the arm with the Arms Dealer. At this stage, therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the authority and the learned single Judge. We, however, direct that the licensing authority/District Magistrate, Gwalior, shall hold final enquiry and pass final order in accordance with the provisions of Section 17 of the Act within a period of two months from the date of production of the certified copy of this order by the Appellant. After passing of the final order, if aggrieved, the Appellant would be free to approach this Court in accordance with law. Disposed of accordingly.