This revision petition, moved under Article 227 of the Constitution read with section 151 CPC is directed against award dated 17.6.92 as passed by Special Judicial Officer, Shillong on a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Act) registered as LA Case No.37 (K) to 105 (K) of 1990. 2. The petitioner Oil & Natural Gas Commission (for short the Commission) is a statutory corporate body established under the Oil & Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959 has its head office at Dehradun while its Eastern Regional Business Centre is at Nazira with projects at different places in eastern States of Assam, Nagaland and Meghalaya. The Commission located a spot for drilling for estima-ting oil reserve, in the bed of river Khasimara in village Chirakapa (East Khasi Hills) situated at a distance of about 130 Kms from Shillong the State Capital. 3. In 1987, the Collector, East Khasi Hills was approached by the Commission for acquisition of land measuring 1,56,040 sq.metres for the proposed drill site asking for possession pending acquisition proceedings. There was urgency for making approach road to the drill site about 6.5 Kms from the village Chirakata, so that construction of bridges, culverts and crossings by cutting the hills could be undertaken. A joint verification of the land was made on 21.12.87 by the Sirdar (tribal head) and representative of the Collector and the Commission. Finally, an agreement was arrived at and signed by them on 5.4.88 whereby the land owners agreed to handover possession of the land from the day the Commission deposited cash compensation with the Collector. The agreement has been filed as Annexure II to this petition. The petitioner deposited Rs. 10,33,347/-on 13.6.88, out of Rs.25,26,703.76 the approximate cost and compensation for acquisition of the land as fixed by the Collector. On the same day i.e. on 13.6.88 the land was formally handed over to the Commission who began its construction work. It was followed by a notification under section 4 of the Act on 9.3.89. The total area of land as notified, was reduced to 1,50,163 sq. metres from 1,56,040 sq. metres as originally fixed. The estimated compensation as determined by the Collector was Rs.25,47,585.89 at the rate of Rs.3/- per sq.metres as for 'Tilla land', Rs.9/- for paddy land, Rs. It was followed by a notification under section 4 of the Act on 9.3.89. The total area of land as notified, was reduced to 1,50,163 sq. metres from 1,56,040 sq. metres as originally fixed. The estimated compensation as determined by the Collector was Rs.25,47,585.89 at the rate of Rs.3/- per sq.metres as for 'Tilla land', Rs.9/- for paddy land, Rs. 10/- for fishery land as per prevailing market rate, added to it was additional compensation of Rs.4,18,551.90 under section 23 (2) of the Act being 30% of the value of land and the trees. Additional compensation was also awarded under section 23 (3) of the Act at the rate of Rs. 12% per annum for three years from the date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act. 4. Notification under section 6 of the Act was published on 21.12.89. The petitioner started working on the project in full swing. Some of the landowners who were not satisfied with the compensation as determined and fixed by the Collector, approached the civil Court, under section 18 of the Act, The Collector by his letter dated 21.12.92 informed the Commission of the enhancement of compensation as done by the civil Court and called, upon the Commission to deposit the enhanced amount of compensation. Fifty four cases were decided on reference for enhancement of compensation as per judgment dated 17.6.92 Annexure IX which has been challenged in the present petition on several grounds. 5. It would not be out of place to note here itself at mis stage that a learned Single Judge of this Court by his judgment and order dated 5.10.93 (1993 (2) GLJ 323) allowed the petition, inter alia, on the ground that there was no reference sought by the claimants and made by the Collector, hence the Special Judicial Officer had no jurisdiction to pass the award for enhanced compensation as he did. The above judgment dated 5.10.93 was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.4238 of 1996, wherein the following order was passed on 1.3.96. "It is clear from the order dated 17.6.92 passed by the Special Judicial Officer (at page 43 of the paper book) that all the claimants had received the amount of compensation under protest alleging that it was too low and they had filed separate petitions for a reference under section 18 of the Act. "It is clear from the order dated 17.6.92 passed by the Special Judicial Officer (at page 43 of the paper book) that all the claimants had received the amount of compensation under protest alleging that it was too low and they had filed separate petitions for a reference under section 18 of the Act. This being so, the impugned order made by the High Court on the premise that no application for reference was made by the claimants is obviously incorrect. Accordingly, the impugned order made by the High Court allowing the CR filed by respondent No.1 ONGC and consequently dismissing the claim of enhancement made by the land owners is set aside; and the CR would be heard and decided afresh in accordance with law on all points raised therein except the one concluded by this order." Now, under special order dated 16.8.96 the matter has been listed before me after fresh notices to all parties, affording full opportunity of hearing, for which purpose the matter was listed on several dates, but hearing concluded on 10.1.97. 6. Mr. Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Commission, raised the following points: (1) that the petitioner was not noticed by the civil Court, although the Corporation was undoubtedly a person interested, before passing the impugned award; (2) that the impugned judgment enhancing compensation is violative of elementary rules of natural justice, inasmuch as it has been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to me petitioner Commission; (3) that the enhancement as made has no legal support, the award as made by the reference Court suffers from manifest anomalies; the reference Court has erred both in law as in facts resulting in the impugned award which is patently erroneous and illegal. It was straneously urged that the entire proceedings of award of enhanced compensation stand vitiated for non-compliance of section 19 (b) and 20 (b) of the Act resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. 7. Mr. Lyngdoh, learned counsel for the claimant respondents has on the other hand questioned the maintainability of the petition itself as according to him a right of appeal under section 54 of the Act is available to the petitioner, he also raised the question of limitation contending that the petition is barred by time. 7. Mr. Lyngdoh, learned counsel for the claimant respondents has on the other hand questioned the maintainability of the petition itself as according to him a right of appeal under section 54 of the Act is available to the petitioner, he also raised the question of limitation contending that the petition is barred by time. The petition for condonation of delay itself was filed after eight months of filing the petition which is liable to be dismissed on the ground alone. Lastly, it was urged that the petitioner had in fact appeared through its agent, the Collector before the Supreme Court, as such no grievance can and should be allowed to be made by the Commission on the ground of absence of notice. The Commission was informed of reference under section 18 of the Act by the Additional Deputy Commissioner as per Memo dated 23.5.90 as endorsed to Project Co-ordinator, Khasimara ONGC, Laitumkhrah, Shillong for information. A photostat copy of this memo has been placed on record by the learned counsel who also produced a register for Court's inspection in order to show an entry made therein about sending of copy to the Project Co-ordinator. He contended that a revision does not lie and should be dismissed with costs. 8. Before dealing with rival contentions as avanced at the Bar, it would be pertinent to note that the question of making a reference under section 18 of the Act, stands concluded by order of the Supreme Court as quoted above. Taking up the first objection as raised by learned counsel for the respondents, relating to the maintainability of the petition in face of statutory remedy of appeal under section 54 of the Act and the bar of limitation, it cannot be gainsaid that section 54 of the Act provides for an appeal, but the applicability of the provision cannot be considered in disregard of the facts of the case, and one such prominent fact is, that the petitioner against whom the objection is sought to be raised for non-availing of the right of appeal, and filing a petition under Article 227, was not made party to the proceeding before the reference Court and it is contended that the Commission had no notice of the proceedings as contemplated by section 20 (b) of the Act. It is not a matter of pure academics that in face of statutory right of appeal, a petition under Art 227 of the Constitution would not be maintainable. It will have to be seen whether the petitioner could have avail of the right of appeal and can it be insisted against it. It would not be out of place to note here, that the Govt Advocate had advised the Collector to file an appeal, but he has not chosen to file one. One of the grounds taken by the petitioner is that both the Collector as well as the reference Court has motivatedly avoided the obligatory requirement of giving due notice to the petitioner, who was the most 'interested person' for acquisition of land on payment of compensation. It is in this background that the filing of petition under Article 227 of the Constitution should be viewed. 9. A two fold argument has been advanced. Firstly, in face of right of appeal available, no revision under section 115 CPC was maintainable and secondly such a revision petition under section 115 CPC cannot be allowed to be converted into a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reliance has been placed on (i) Vishesh Kumar vs. Shanti Prasad, AIR 1980 SC 892 , (ii) Major SS Khanna vs. Brig SS Dhillon, AIR 1964 SC 497 , (iii) Ganpat Lodha vs. Sashikanta Sindhe, AIR 1978 SC 955 . Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that none of the abovenoted cases has any bearing on the facts of the present case. Relying on (i) Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmed Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 , (11) Himalaya Tiles and Marbel (P) Ltd vs. Francis Victor Countinho, AIR 1980 SC 1118 and (iii) Ranbir Yadav vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1995 SC 1219 , he tried to explain the Court's jurisiction under Article 227 of the Constitution and the legal effect of noticing the petitioner who was undoubtedly interested person, and urged that the petition should be allowed. 10. The first case Vishesh Kumar (supra) was a case where a second revision was preferred under section 115 CPC before the High Court against revisional order passed by the District Court under section 115 CPC as amended by section 3 of the UP Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970. A second revision to the High Court was clearly barred. 10. The first case Vishesh Kumar (supra) was a case where a second revision was preferred under section 115 CPC before the High Court against revisional order passed by the District Court under section 115 CPC as amended by section 3 of the UP Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970. A second revision to the High Court was clearly barred. It was in this background when the appellant's counsel urged that in case the Court was of opinion, that a revision petition was not maintainable under section 115 CPC, the case be remitted to the High Court for being heard as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution but the Supreme Court held "We are unable to accept that prayer. A revision petition under section 115 is a separate and distinct proceeding from a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, and one cannot be identified with the other". The position obtaining in the instant case is altogether different, the petition Was filed is one under Article 227 read with section 151 CPC. It is not a case of conversion under Article 227. Above all there is no such legal bar as in case of Vishesh Kumar (supra). Khanna's case (supra) traces the evolution of powers of the High Court, Supervisory jurisdiction and considers the meaning of the expression 'case' and case decided, in which no appeal lies, the nature and power of the Court under section 115 CPC vis-a-vis a writ Certiorari. 11. Analysing the section 115 CPC the Supreme Court *9t pointed out that it consists of two parts, the first prescribes the conditions in which the jurisdiction of the High Court arises i.e. there is a case decided by a subordinate Court in which no appeal lies to the High Court and the second part sets out the circumstances in which the jurisdiction may be exercised. It is for the first part that learned counsel for the claimant respondent has cited this judgment. There can be no quarrel with the proposition. Incidentally, this very case also deals with the scope and power under section 115 CPC and the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Hidayatullah J. as he then was, has noted : "33. The power given by section 115 of the Code clearly limited to the keeping of the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Incidentally, this very case also deals with the scope and power under section 115 CPC and the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Hidayatullah J. as he then was, has noted : "33. The power given by section 115 of the Code clearly limited to the keeping of the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. It does not comprehend the power exercisable under the writ of Prohibition or Mandamus. It is also not a full power of Certiorari inasmuch as it arises only in a case of jurisdiction and not in case of any error. It has been ruled by the Judicial Committee and also by this Court that the section is concerned with jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone involving a refusal to exercise jurisdiction where one exists or an assumption of jurisdiction where none exists and lastly acting with illegality or material irregularity. Where there is no question of jurisdiction in this manner the decision can not be corrected for it has also been ruled that a Court has jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. But once a flaw of jurisdiction is found the High Court need not quash and remit as is the practice in English Law under the writ of Certiorari but pass such order as it thinks fit. "(emphasis supplied) This is exactly what has been urged by Mr. Goswami relying on AIR 1955 SC 233 , which I will presently deal with. But before coming to it, one more case Ganpat Lodha (supra) as relied upon by the respondents need to be considered. It was also a case relating to eviction arising out of Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. Considering the nature of protection afforded to a tenant, under section 12 (3) (b) of the 'Bombay Act', the Supreme Court held that it does not create any discretionary jurisdiction of the Court, therefore, the interference by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, on a finding of fact, was held to be grossly erroneous. 12. In the case at hand, the petitioner has raised a point which goes to the root of the matter. The rule of 'Audi alteram partem' and it is strictly to this extent that the question of interference is being considered and certainly not on any finding of fact recorded by the reference Court. 13. 12. In the case at hand, the petitioner has raised a point which goes to the root of the matter. The rule of 'Audi alteram partem' and it is strictly to this extent that the question of interference is being considered and certainly not on any finding of fact recorded by the reference Court. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has placed on record a photostat copy of a memo dated 23.5.90 which reads as follows: “To, The Assistant District & Sessions Judge, and Special Judicial Officer, Sub: Acquisation of Land for construction of an approach road to Khashimara Location No. 1 Sir, I am sending herewith 10 (ten) applications under section 18 of the LA Act alongwith copy of the Award for favour of taking necessary action: Yours faithfully, Sd/-23:5.90 Additional Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills Dist, Shillong. Memo : T\L. 14/5 (35) 90/23-A Dated Shillong the 23rd May 1990 Copy to : The Project Co-ordinator, Khashimara, ONGC, Laithumukhra, Shillong for information. Additional Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills Dist, Shillong." Keeping aside the question of an application for belated production or summoning of document, taking it on its face value, it was asked whether the copy was in fact forwarded to the Project Co-ordinator as endorsed. Next day after conclusion of hearing, learned counsel produced the register for Court's inspection, Entry No.322 showing that some communication was addressed to the Project Co-ordinator on 23.5.90. This easy access to, and availability of governmental record, is to a certain extent indicative of the willingness of the powers that be, to help out the claimant respondents. The allegation, therefore, as made against the Collector as quoted above, cannot be said to be wholly without substance. Be that as it may, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Goswami, whether this forwarding copy to the Project Co-ordinator does not meet the requirements of section 19 (1) (b) and section 20 (2) (b) of the Act. The memo cannot be said to be a notice as required by law. Section 19 (1) (b) reads as follows : "(b) the names of the persons whom he has reason to think intereste in such land." Section 20 specifically provides for service of notice by the Court. It reads : "20. The memo cannot be said to be a notice as required by law. Section 19 (1) (b) reads as follows : "(b) the names of the persons whom he has reason to think intereste in such land." Section 20 specifically provides for service of notice by the Court. It reads : "20. Service of notice: The Court shall thereupon cause a notice, specifying the day on which the Court will proceed to determine the objection, and directing their appearance before the Court on that day, to be serviced on the following persons, namely: (a) the applicant; (b) all persons interested in the objection, except such (if any) of them as have consented-without protest to receive payment of the compensation awarded; and (c) if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of the compensation, the Collector." It would be too late in the day for anyone to dispute the interest of the petitioner Corporation. The Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles (supra) has categorically held: "7. It seems to us that the definition of 'a person interested' given in section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrance all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the lands were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the company under the agreement entered into between the company and the Government. Thus, it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. Thus, it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this purpose, the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantum of compensation." Except for the memo dated 23.5.90 which has now been placed on record, there is no other material to show that any notice as contemplated by section 20 " (I) (b) of the Act was issued by the Court, the question of its service does not arise since it is nobody's case that such a notice was issued. Right of hearing and participation in the proceedings before the reference is undoubtedly a valuable right which has been denied to the petitioner. Of course, such hearing has to be within the narrow ambit and scope only, as is permissible under the law. 'Audi alterant partem' is the first principle or rule of mode of administering justice. It is this rule which has been vitiated by the Court, and it is this maintainability of the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is being considered. 14. I am fully conscious of the strictly narrow scope of interference by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 227 as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Md Yunus vs. Md Mustaquim, AIR 1984 SC 38 , and in a very recent judgment as reported in Laximikant Revchand Bhojwani & another vs. Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCO 576. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the case Hari Vishnu Karnath (supra), wherein the Supreme Court held : "We are also of opinion that the Election Tribunals are subject of the superintendence of the High Corts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that superintendence is both judicial and administrative. That was held by this Court in 'Waryam Singh vs. Amarnath' AIR 1954 SC 215 (K), where it was observed that in this respect Article 227 went further that section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, under which superintendence was purely administrative, and that it resorted the position under section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. That was held by this Court in 'Waryam Singh vs. Amarnath' AIR 1954 SC 215 (K), where it was observed that in this respect Article 227 went further that section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, under which superintendence was purely administrative, and that it resorted the position under section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. It may also be noted that while in a 'certiorari' under Article 226 the High Court cannot only annul the decision of the Tribunal, it can, under Article 227, do that, and also issue further direction in the matter. We must accordingly hold that the appellant for a writ of 'certiorari' and for other reliefs was maintainable under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution.'' The same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in SS Khanna's case (supra) as quoted above and relied upon by the respondents although for a different proposition. Is this not a material irregularity on the part of the reference Court, not to issue notice to the petitioner, and still fasten it would mandatory burden to the tune of lakhs, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to meet the case of any enhancement in compensation. 15. One more point relating to limitation as raised by learned counsel for the claimant respondents still remains to be considered, Mr. Goswami har argued that really speaking no such question arises. The petition has been filed with all promptitude on coming to know of the reference Court's order through the Collector's letter Annexure II. It has been already held as a fact that no notice as required under section 20 (1) (b) of the Act was issued to the petitioner by the reference Court. The petitioner was undoubtedly a 'person interested'. It was also pointed out that while a petition can be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner, there is no prescribed time limit for filing writ petition. This writ petition was filed on 28th April, 1993 challenging the judgment and order dated 17.6.92 as passed by the Special Judicial Officer, Shillong in Reference Case Nos.37(K)to 105 (K) of 1992. The Collector's letter informing the Project Co-ordinator about the Reference Court's judgment is dated 21.12.92. This writ petition was filed on 28th April, 1993 challenging the judgment and order dated 17.6.92 as passed by the Special Judicial Officer, Shillong in Reference Case Nos.37(K)to 105 (K) of 1992. The Collector's letter informing the Project Co-ordinator about the Reference Court's judgment is dated 21.12.92. In this view of the matter, a petition filed on 28.4.96 within four months and one week can hardly be said to be barred by time, for it is inordinate unexplained delay in making the motion for a writ, may afford an adequate ground to the Court to refuse the discretionary relief as writ jurisdiction is essentially discretionary. No time limit is prescribed by law for moving the Court. As has been pointed out by the Apex Court in Chandra Bhusan vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1967 SC1272, "the primary question is whether the applicant has been guilty of laches or undue delay. A rule of practice cannot prescribed a baiding rule of limitation it may only indicate, how discretion will be exercised by the Court, in determining whether having regard to the circumstances of the case the applicant has been guilty of laches or undue delay. 16. The objection of limitation as raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, is structured on two premises. Firstly, a petition under Article 227 is not maintainable, and in case of appeal under section 54 of the Act, even if the petitioner is treated to be so, it is apparently barred by time. Having held the petition to be maintainable, any further consideration, of the objection on question of limitation from the stand point of an appeal would really speaking be purely academic. But even on such examination, considering the judicial trend, in the matter of condonation of delay, as reflected in several judgments of the Supreme Court, the delay caused if any, would merit condonation. 17. Going through the case law, (i) G. Ramegowda vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1988 SC 897 , (ii) Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 ,(iii) Ajit Singh vs. State of Gujrat, AIR 1981 SC 733 and (iv) State of UP vs. District Judge, AIR 1984 SC 1401 on the point a striking feature which one cannot escape noticing. A common thread running through all such cases is discernible, these were the cases arising out of land acquisition proceedings on cases involving payment of compensation by the State. Without imputing motives, in the instant case, the petitioner has specially alleged that the Collector and the reference Court motivatedly avoided issuance of notice to the petitioner, as required by law and this allegation has remained uncontroverted although the Collector is a party. This aspect of the matter cannot be lost sight of while considering the question of condonation of delay. There is yet another reason why the petitioner could not file an appeal and why the Collector who was a party before the reference Court was asked to file one. The Collector by this letter dated 15.3.93 Annexure X expressed his inability as huge expense of Court fee to the tune of Rs. 9 (nine) lakhs was involved and the State Government was not prepared to incur such expenses. The petitioner Corporation in face of this Court's judgment in Hindustan Paper Corporation vs. Bijay Kumar Sarkar, (1990) 1 GLR11, which then held the field, holding that a company or corporation for whose benefit land is acquired, cannot file an appeal under section 5 4 of the Act as its interest is well protected by the Collector. In the circumstances, there was the corporation, but it filed a petition as it did, and the same has been promptly filed and is also maintainable. The question of limitation does not arise. 18. Mr. Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed strong reliance on a recent judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Cyan Devi, AIR 1995 SC 727, an contended that ONGC has a right to participate in the proceeding before the Collector or before the reference Court. 18. Mr. Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed strong reliance on a recent judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Cyan Devi, AIR 1995 SC 727, an contended that ONGC has a right to participate in the proceeding before the Collector or before the reference Court. The Supreme Court in the case of UP Awas Vikash Parishad (supra) has held that: "Thus on an interpretation of the provisions of section 50 (2) of the LA Act is must concluded that, subject to the limitation contained in the proviso, a local authority for whom land is being acquired has a right to participate in the proceedings for acquisition before the Collector as well as the reference Court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation and the said right imposes an obligation on the Collector as well as the reference Court to give a notice to the local authority with regard to the pendency of those proceedings and the date on which the matter of determination of amount of compensation would be taken up. The recognition of this right, raises the question whether the local authority, feeling aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collctor or the reference Court, can take recourse to any legal remedy. Before dealing with this question we would take note of the decision of this Court having a bearing on the issue." Expressing its agreement with the view propouned by the Supreme Court in Nellagangabai vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 4 990 SC 1321, wherein section 20 of the Act as amended by the Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension Amendment) Act, 1961 came up for consideration, arid the Court observed as follows : "Admittedly the land was acquired for the purpose of the respondent-corporation and the burden of payment of the compensation is on the corporation. In this back ground the High Court has held that it was mandatory for the Court of reference to have caused a notice to be served on the respondent-corporation before proceeding to determine the compensation claim. In this back ground the High Court has held that it was mandatory for the Court of reference to have caused a notice to be served on the respondent-corporation before proceeding to determine the compensation claim. Since no notice was given to the respondent-corporation and it was thus deprived of an opportunity to place its case before the Court, the judgment rendered in the reference case was illegal and not binding on the corporation." It may be noted that the Municipal Corporation had moved the High Court by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the civil judgment and the High Court allowed the writ petition which was affirmed on appeal. Apart from Himalaya Tiles (supra), the Supreme Court has also referred to with approval of its earlier judgments in - (1) Krishi Upaj Mandi Samity vs. Ashok Singhal, 1991 (Supp) 2 SCC 419; (ii) Union of India vs. Sher Singh, (1993) 1 SCC 608 and (iii) Union of India vs. Kolluni Ramath, AIR 1994 SC 1149 , and explained as follows : "In case where no notice is given to the local authority the position of the local authority is not different from that of the Municipal Corporation in Neelagangabhai vs. State of Karnataka ( AIR 1990 SC 1321 (supra). In that case there was an express provision in section 20 of LA Act as modified by Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension Amendment) Act, 1961 provided for service of notice on the person or local authority for whom the acquisition is made. On a construction of section SO (2) we have found that service of such a notice is implicit in the right conferred under section 50 (2) of the LA Act. On a construction of section SO (2) we have found that service of such a notice is implicit in the right conferred under section 50 (2) of the LA Act. Since the failure to give a notice would result in denial of the right conferred on the local authority under section 50 (2) it would be open to the local authority to invoke the jurisiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the award made by the Collector as was done in Neelagangabai (supra)." Dealing with the question whether a local authority is a necessary and/or proper party, the Supreme Court has held : "A local authority for whom land is being acquired has a right to participate in the acquisition proceeding in the matter of determination of the amount of compensation while they are pending before the Collector and to adduce evidence in the said proceedings. While it is precluded from Seeking a reference against the award of the Collector, it can defend the award and oppose the enhancement of the amount of compensation sought before the reference Court by the person interested in the land. Moreover the local authority has a right to appear and adduce evidence before the reference Court. Having regard to the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the opinion that the presence of the local authority is necessary for the decision of the question involved in the proceedings before the reference Court and it is a proper party in the proceedings. The local authority is, therefore, entitled to be impleaded as a party in the proceedings before the reference Court." And, lastly in paragraph 25 of the said judgment the Supreme Court concluded as follows : "1. Section 50 (2) of the LA Act confers on a local authority for whom land is being acquired a right to appear in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector and the reference Court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. 2. The said right carried with it the right to be given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the reference Court before whom acquisition proceedings are pending of the date on which the matter of determination of compensation will be taken up. 3. 2. The said right carried with it the right to be given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the reference Court before whom acquisition proceedings are pending of the date on which the matter of determination of compensation will be taken up. 3. The proviso to section 50 (2) only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprived the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector or by the reference Court to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the LA Act. 4. In the event of denial of the right conferred by section 50 (2) on account of failure of the Collector to serve notice of the acquisition proceedings the local authority can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Artick 226 of the Constitution. 5. Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226. 6. The local authority is a proper party in the proceedings before the reference Court and is entitled to be impleaded as a party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the. Collector and oppose enhancement of the said amount and also adduce evidence in that regard. 7. In the event of enhancement of the amount of compensation by the reference Court, if the Government does not file an appeal the local authority can file an appeal against the award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the Court. 8. In an appeal by the person having an interest in land seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the reference Court, the local authority should be impleaded as a party and is entitled to be served notice on the said appeal This would apply to an appeal in the High Court as well as in this Court. 9. Since a company for whom land is being acquired has the same right as a local authority under section 50 (2) whatever has been said with regard to a local authority would apply to a company too. 10. The matters which stand finally concluded, will however, not be reopened." 19. 9. Since a company for whom land is being acquired has the same right as a local authority under section 50 (2) whatever has been said with regard to a local authority would apply to a company too. 10. The matters which stand finally concluded, will however, not be reopened." 19. Following the above principle and in view of the foregoing 'discussion, this petition deserves to be allowed, it is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment and award dated 17.6.92 as passed by the Special Judicial Officer, Shillong in Reference Case Nos.37 (K) to 105 (K) of 1990 are set aside, there shall be no order as to cost. The Special Judicial Officer, Shillong is directed to proceed expeditiously with the reference case and dispose of the same in accordance with law, after giving all reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties say within a period of 4 (four) months from the date of this order. Parties are directed to appear before the Special Judicial Officer, Shillong on 3rd February, 1997.