Manmohan Sarin, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant has filed this Letters Patent Appeal challenging the order dated 13-8-1990, passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No. 362/81, setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent dated 29. 4. 1977, after an enquiry and as confirmed by the Labour Court vide its award dated 27. 11. 1980. Learned Single Judge found the findings of the Labour Court with regard to the alleged "pilferage and embezzlements" to be perverse and found the order of dismissal to be too harsh. However, the learned Single Judge held that the misconduct committed by the respondent was only an irregularity in the observance of departmental procedures. Learned Single Judge accordingly, held that it would meet the ends of Justice if the respondent in the appeal/petitioner in the writ petition, was given punishment of stoppage of three increments without future effect. He ordered the reinstatement in service of the respondent, with arrears of wages, allowances and other benefits. ( 2 ) ON 20-9-1990 notice in the appeal was issued but limited to the question, "whether the respondent was entitled to back wages as ordered by the learned Single Judge. " The order of the learned Single Judge to the above extent was stayed. ( 3 ) THE respondent has since then been reinstated in service, but has not been paid full wages from the date of suspension till reinstatement, pending disposal of this Letter Patents Appeal. ( 4 ) WE may at this stage, briefly notice the essential facts. The respondent was employed in the Super Bazar Cooperative Store Ltd. and was placed under suspension in September, 1976. The Manager (Stores) during the course of inspection had found that petitioner had issued demand and issue voucher in respect of some "slip pads" to the Selling Department against the signatures of one Ms. Batra, Junior Supervisor in the Selling Department, even though the goods had neither been received by the Store nor by the Selling Department. The case of the respondent was that Ms. Batra had made a requisition for issuance of some items. The Purchase Officer told the respondent that the supplier of the slip pads had brought these items. Accordingly, she gave the control number and issued the invoice voucher on 6-9-1976. It was the respondent s case that on being informed by Ms. The case of the respondent was that Ms. Batra had made a requisition for issuance of some items. The Purchase Officer told the respondent that the supplier of the slip pads had brought these items. Accordingly, she gave the control number and issued the invoice voucher on 6-9-1976. It was the respondent s case that on being informed by Ms. Batra, that the slip pads and supplies had not been given by the supplier, she immediately reported the matter to the Manager (Stores ). ( 5 ) THE learned Single Judge found that it was the respondent herself, who had reported the matter to the Mangaer (Stores ). Learned Single Judge also disbelieved the statement of the Purchase Officer, Mr. I. S. Aggarwal. Learned Single Judge accepted the version of the respondent that she had acted in good faith and at the instance of the Purchase Manager. Further, she had herself reported the irregularity to Mr. Sharma, which fact was even admitted by the latter. On these facts, the learned Single Judge held that the finding of "pilferage and embezzlement" against the respondent were "perverse". The only misconduct on the part of the respondent was violation of departmental procedure. Learned Single Judge also observed that Ms. Batra, who was equally involved in the transaction and had pleaded the same defence of acting at the instance of Mr. I. S. Aggarwal was awarded a much lesser punishment and reinstated in service in 1977 itself. Considering the nature of misconduct, and the totally of the circumstances and past conduct of the respondent being good, the order of dismissal was found to be too harsh and set aside. The learned Single Judge accordingly, held that, it would meet the ends of justice if the petitioner was given punishment of stoppage of three increments. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant, Mr. R. M. Bagai, submitted that the order of dismissal had been passed after due enquiry and following the principles of natural justice. The Labour Court in its judgment dated 27. 11. 1980, upheld the dismissal of the respondent upon a reference under Section 10 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The learned Single Judge exceeded his jurisdiction by substituting the order of the disciplinary authority as well as that of the Labour Court by his own order. The Labour Court in its judgment dated 27. 11. 1980, upheld the dismissal of the respondent upon a reference under Section 10 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The learned Single Judge exceeded his jurisdiction by substituting the order of the disciplinary authority as well as that of the Labour Court by his own order. He urged that the respondent had been charged with serious misconduct and the High Court should not have interfered in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by characterising the order of dismissal as "perverse" and that the learned Single Judge could not have set aside the dismissal and directed payment of back wages. ( 7 ) WHILE attempting to assail the judgment on merits, learned counsel for the appellant cited certain decisions, viz. Railway Board, New Delhi Vs. Niranjan Singh ( AIR 1969 SC 966 ), State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. Chitra Venkata Rao ( AIR 1975 SC 2151 ) and Radhakrishnadas Vs. Kalu Ram (1963 SCR Suppl. I 648 ). It was pointed out to Mr. Begai that in the instant case vide order dated 20. 9. 1990, notice had been issued, confined to the limited question of back waged and, therefore, he should confine his submissions to the said question. The order dated 20. 9. 1990 had not been assailed and had become final. Accordingly, it is not necessary to advert to the other authorities cited by Mr. Bagai. ( 8 ) MR. Bagai, thereupon, submitted that the award of back wages in the instant case was not justified. He argued that the appellant was a Cooperative Society established for the protection of the interests of the consumers at large and it would be burdensome to foist the liability on the appellant, especially when the respondent was charged with serious misconduct. ( 9 ) AS regards the question of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to consequentially grant reinstatement and back wages and whether, it was necessary for the High Court to remit the matter to the Labour Court, we may notice Rajinder Kumar Vs. Delhi Administration ( AIR 1984 SC 1805 ). ( 9 ) AS regards the question of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to consequentially grant reinstatement and back wages and whether, it was necessary for the High Court to remit the matter to the Labour Court, we may notice Rajinder Kumar Vs. Delhi Administration ( AIR 1984 SC 1805 ). A Division Bench of this Court had refused to examine the contention that the Award was "perverse" and dismissed the matter in limine, observing that the matter depended upon assessment of evidence and the Court could not re-appraise the same under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High Court and observed that the High Court should have gone into such a contention. Their lordships observed: "17. It is equally well settled that where a quasi Judicial tribunal or arbitrator records findings are either his ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated. The industrial tribunal or the arbitrator or a quasi-judicial authority can reject not only such findings but also the conclusion based on no legal evidence or if it is merely based on surmises and conjectures unrelated to evidence on the ground that they disclose total non-application of mind. Viewed from either angle, the conclusion of the enquiry officer as well as of the arbitrator Mr. Kakkar are wholly perverse and hence, unsustainable. The High Court, in our opinion, was clearly in error in declining to examine the contention that the findings were perverse on the short, specious and wholly untenable ground that the matter depends on appraisal of evidence. " ( 10 ) WE are also of the view that this Court can, in writ petitions arising from Labour Court/industrial Tribunal, exercise powers stated in Section 11-A, of the Industrial Disputes Act, in appropriate cases. In Workmen of Bharat Fritz Werner (P) Ltd. ( AIR 1990 SC 1054 ), the learned Single Judge set aside the award as being illegal but instead of remanding the matter to the Industrial Tribunal, himself directed grant of compensation to the workmen towards compensation. Both sides filed appeals and the Division Bench observed that for those acts of misconduct, the said five men did not deserve extreme penalty of dismissal and directed payment of one half of back wages. Both sides filed appeals and the Division Bench observed that for those acts of misconduct, the said five men did not deserve extreme penalty of dismissal and directed payment of one half of back wages. In further appeals to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court were in issue. The Supreme Court observed in matters coming from the Industrial Tribunal/labour Court, that it was open to the High Court under Article 226 to exercise powers under section 11 (A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which could have been exercised by the Tribunal/labour Court. Their Lordships observed (See para 17): MOREOVER, in view of the provisions contained in Section 11-A of the Act, which empowers the industrial tribunal to go into the question whether the order of discharge or dismissal passed against a workman is justified or not and permits the tribunal to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal as the Circumstances of the case may require, it was open to the High Court to consider what would be adequate punishment for the misconduct found to have been committed by these workmen and take the view that the acts of misconduct found proved against these five workmen were not such as to warrant dismissal and denial of one half of the back wages for the period of about six years was adequate punishment for the misconduct found to have been committed. We do not find any infirmity in the aforesaid view expressed by the Appellate Bench of the High Court. " THEREFORE, in Article 226 proceedings, it is open, in appropriate circumstances, for the High Court to exercise the powers which the Industrial Tribunal/labour Court could have exercised under Sections 11-A of the Act. We, accordingly, hold that there is no merit in the submission of Mr. Bagai that the learned Single Judge did not have jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to hold that the findings of the Labour Court were perverse and to set aside the dismissal of the respondent and also reduce the punishment to stoppage of three increments. ( 11 ) COMING to the question of reinstatement and grant of back wages, even in the decision in U. P. Warehousing Corporation Vs. Vijay Nadir ( AIR 1980 SC 840 ). relied upon by Mr. ( 11 ) COMING to the question of reinstatement and grant of back wages, even in the decision in U. P. Warehousing Corporation Vs. Vijay Nadir ( AIR 1980 SC 840 ). relied upon by Mr. Bagai for the appellant holds that the High Court, in matters arising from the Industrial Tribunal/labour Court has powers to go into the question of punishment though, in other cases, it will not ordinarily exercise such powers. The Apex Court in this case observed that in matters of employment while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution over the orders and quasi-judicial proceedings to the administrative authority, not being proceedings under the Industrial/labour Tribunal, culminating in dismissal of employee, the High Court, should ordinarily, in the event of dismissal being found illegal, simply quash the same and should not give a positive direction for payment to the employee of full back wages. The Supreme Court said : "such peculiar powers can be exercised in a case where the impugned adjudication or award has been given by an Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court. " ( 12 ) ANOTHER point arising from the same judgment is that the High Court in matters other than those coming from the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court, will not, while ordering reinstatement, ordinarily, grant back wages. Therefore, the above decision of the Supreme Court in U. P. Warehousing Corporation case (supra) cannot held the appellant as it accepts that the High Court can grant back wages in matters coming from the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. The other decision in Uma Shankar Chatterjee Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Supra) relied upon for the appellant also uses the word ordinarily while dealing with the powers of the High Court and cannot, therefore, help the appellant. ( 13 ) RELIANCE was placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the decision in the case of Union of India Vs. Parmanand (JT 1989 (2) 132 ). The Apex Court in the said case held that the discretion of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of an Enquiry Officer or a Competent authority when these are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. The said case does not help the appellant. The Apex Court in the said case held that the discretion of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of an Enquiry Officer or a Competent authority when these are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. The said case does not help the appellant. ( 14 ) RELIANCE was also placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the case Central Bank of India Vs. C. Bernard (JT 1990 (4) SC 152 ). The Apex Court in this case held that the inquiry conducted was incompetent and without jurisdiction and since it was conducted after the superannuation and, accordingly, the punishment imposed by the Enquiry Officer, who was not competent, was quashed. The Apex Court held that since the order of punishment was quashed on a mere technicality and on a contention belatedly raised, the respondent be paid 50 per cent of the consequential benefits and not all the consequential benefits, as directed by the High Court. The said case is clearly distinguishable on facts. ( 15 ) MR. Bagai, learned counsel for the appellant, also placed reliance on the case M/s Mukand Engineering Works Vs. Bansi Purshottam (1995 II LLJ 62) and State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Nand Kishore Shukla and another (1996 (11) LLJ SC 68 ). In Mukund Engineering (Supra) the Apex Court held that once the misconduct alleged against the workman stood proved, no reinstatement could be ordered and that too with back wages. The Court had found this to be a situation of gravity. The Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, felt that the respondent should be bound to opt for either of the two, i. e. he shouldeither get reinstatement with no back wages or just back wages without reinstatement. The employee before the Court accepted the back wages plus the additional sum of Rs. 20,000. 00. The said case is clearly distinguishable as in the instant case before us the findings of pilferage and embezzlement were found to be perverse and not sustainable. ( 16 ) STATE of U. P. and Ors. Vs. Nand Kishore Shukla (Supra) was a case of removal of a government servant where the Enquiry Officer held that five charges had been proved against the employees relating to sale of immovable property. ( 16 ) STATE of U. P. and Ors. Vs. Nand Kishore Shukla (Supra) was a case of removal of a government servant where the Enquiry Officer held that five charges had been proved against the employees relating to sale of immovable property. It is in these circumstances that the Apex Court observed that the Court is not a Court of appeal to go into the question of imposition of punishment and it is for the disciplinary authority to consider what would be the nature of punishment to be imposed on a government servant, based upon the proven misconduct against the government servant. Its proportionality also cannot be gone into by the Court. The Court further held that if the charges are held proved and sufficient for imposition of penalty by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority, the Court would be loath to interfere with that part of the order. The Court held that the order of removal does not cast any stigma. The facts in the case before us are completely difference wherein the findings of misconduct, viz. pilferage and embezzlement, have been held to be perverse and only procedural irregularity has been found. ( 17 ) MR. Dayal, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, placed reliance on the judgment in the case Scooters India Ltd. Vs. Labour Court, Lucknow reported as AIR 1989 SC 149 . In this case the Labour Court had set aside the order of termination of services of the employee and passed an order of reinstatement together with 75% back wages. The employer as were as employee moved the High Court. The former challenging the order of reinstatement and the latter claiming full back wages instead of 75 per cent. The High Court dismissed both the petitions. The Apex Court, thereafter, held that the approach of the Labour Court in taking the view that justice must be tempered with mercy and the erring workman be given an opportunity to reform himself and prove to be a loyal and disciplined employee of the petitioner company was not interfered with and held in conformity with Section 6 (2a) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, which is analogous to Section 11a of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. ( 18 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent also relied on Ramakant Mishra Vs. ( 18 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent also relied on Ramakant Mishra Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another ( AIR 1982 SC 1552 ). This was a case where the allegation against the delinquent workman was use of indiscreet, improper and abusive language in threatening postures. The Apex Court held that even though misconduct is proved and penalty has to be imposed, the extreme penalty of dismissal or discharge was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case, meaning thereby that the punishment was either disproportionately heavy or excessive. However, this is a case relating to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India by the Apex Court. ( 19 ) COMING to the facts of the present case it has been seen, as discussed in preceding paras, there is no bar in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to order reinstatement and grant back wages. The learned Single Judge in this case, for good reasons, came to the conclusion that the finding of alleged pilferage and embezzlement were perverse. This was especially so since the respondent herself had reported to the Manager In-charge of the incident wherein she had, at the instance of the Purchase Officer, released the demand and issue vouchers on the representation that the supplier had brought the items. Besides, another employee who was equally involved in the transaction and had the same defence as the respondent and who had been issued a charge sheet in respect of the same transaction was reinstated, whereas the petitioner had been dismissed from service. ( 20 ) DURING the course of the hearing, as we wanted to satisfy ourselves that the respondent had not been gainfully employed, we directed the respondent to file an affidavit with regard to her not being gainfully employed or not having worked during the period after her suspension till her reinstatement. Mr. Bagai opposed the filing of the affidavit. The affidavit was necessary for the Court to satisfy itself that the respondent was not gainfully employed during the relevant period and was, thereby, not receiving any additional benefit. The affidavit has since been filed and taken on record. Mr. Mr. Bagai opposed the filing of the affidavit. The affidavit was necessary for the Court to satisfy itself that the respondent was not gainfully employed during the relevant period and was, thereby, not receiving any additional benefit. The affidavit has since been filed and taken on record. Mr. Maheshwar Dayal, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the respondent s husband was a Development Officer with the Life Insurance Corporation of India and respondent remained unemployed during the relevant period and was looking after the family and sustaining herself on the income of the husband. We are satisfied that the respondent was not gainfully employed during the relevant period. ( 21 ) WE are in agreement with the finding reached by the learned Single Judge regarding the finding of the Enquiry Officer and the Tribunal being perverse and the misconduct of the respondent, at best, being a procedural irregularity. In these circumstances, the learned Single Judge has correctly exercised his discretion in awarding full back wages. The learned Single Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was justified in imposing the punishment of stoppage of three increments and ordering reinstatement with full back wages. We confirm the same. ( 22 ) THE appeal has no merit and the same is dismissed.