JUDGMENT 1. - In the course of my presiding over the Single Bench (Criminal) of this court for considerably sufficient time it was noticed that Criminal Misc. Petitions Under section 482 and applications Under section 397/401 Cr.RC., instituted as back as in the year 1978-79 and onwards, were pending for hearing and decision by this court. In majority of such petitions and applications the proceedings before the lower courts had either been stayed or the record of the lower courts requisitioned in this court. It was experienced that day in and day out quite a large number of fresh applications Under section 397 or petitions Under section 482 Cr.RC. were listed for admission/orders consuming almost all the time of the court leaving no time for hearing old criminal appeals and other criminal applications and petitioners. It was noticed that almost each and every order passed by a trial court in a criminal case was being challenged before this court either by recourse to Section 397/401 or 482 Cr.P.C. and in majority of cases the revisional jurisdiction of the concerned Sessions Judges Under section 397/399 Cr.RC. was not only being consistently and persistently by-passed but also a state of great confusion regarding the revisional jurisdiction of this court and the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sessions Judges Under section 397 Cr.RC. has been created. More often than not second revision applications were being preferred in the garb of petitions Under section 482 Cr.RC. Instances of simultaneous challenge to the same order, passed by a Magistrates in a case, before this court as well as before the Sessions Courts were also not lacking. It was also noticed that a particular order passed by a Magistrate in a case was challenged by some of the aggrieved persons by preferring separate applications Under section 397/399 Cr.RC. before the concerned Sessions Judge and by others before this court, some preferring applications Under section 397/401 Cr.RC. and some preferring petitions Under section 482 Cr.PC. The State of affairs infact looked like that pointed out at by the Apex Court in the case of In Re Special Courts Bill (1979) 1 SCC 380 at page 442 and restated by the same court in the case of Ganesh Narain Hegde v. S. Bangrappa, ( 1995 (4) SCC 41 ) at page 50 . 2. The State of affairs infact looked like that pointed out at by the Apex Court in the case of In Re Special Courts Bill (1979) 1 SCC 380 at page 442 and restated by the same court in the case of Ganesh Narain Hegde v. S. Bangrappa, ( 1995 (4) SCC 41 ) at page 50 . 2. It was, therefore, felt that if the ever-increasing state of confusion regarding the exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction of this court and the court of Sessions Under section 397 Cr.RC. was not taken due note of timely and the concept of concurrent jurisdiction was riot clearly defined and a realistic and practical view of the problem was not taken in the context of the spirit and object behind the amended, modified and improved revisional jurisdiction of this court and the court of Sessions Judge Under section 397 Cr.RC. and the relevant provisions in the Statute are not interpreted, construed, applied and administered, keeping in mind the legislative intent and judicial trend on speedy trials and the geographical and developmental position of this state and the socio-economic and cultural conditions of the people here the entire criminal justice delivery system would break down and the judges in men would soon start to be governed by men in judges and an unconscious escapism from discharging the divine function of dispensation of justice between the oppressor and the oppressed was likely to take over them for their uneasy solace. I, therefore, discussed the problem with not only the Hon'ble Chief Justice and some of my learned colleagues but also with quite a good number of the learned members of the Bar. I must put it on record that the Hon'ble Chief Justice and my learned colleagues and a majority of the learned members of the Bar shared the anxiety of the court to decide the old criminal cases and to deal with the new ones in accordance with the rights of the parties to approach this court and the court of Sessions Judges for timely redressal of their grievances. I, therefore, invited the learned members of the Bar through a general notice to assist the court in formulating a practice and procedure which may preserve the rights of the parties concerned and at the same time promote and advance the efforts of this court as well as the subordinate courts to deliver speedy justice to the parties. 3. It was generally suggested at Bar that with a view to avoid further delay in the trials of the cases pending before the lower courts and wherein proceedings stands stayed either under the orders of this court or by reason of their records having been requisitioned here, applications Under section 397/401 and petition Under section 482 Cr.RC., instituted upto December 1976 be heard and finally disposed of by this court and in rest of the applications/petitions it be first ascertained whether they may be disposed of by the concerned Magistrates/Sessions Judges and, if so, suitable orders be passed on such applications/petitions. 4. Some learned members of the Bar, however, insisted that a person, aggrieved by a revisable order, passed by a Magistrate in a case, has a right to approach either this court of the court of the Sessions Judge and the option so available to him for exercising his right Under section 397 Cr.RC. cannot be interfered with by this court. In this behalf the learned counsel in the relevant matters relied upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Krishna v. Kishnaveni, (1997 HAD S.C. 254) and Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in the case of State of M.R v. Khizar Mohd., (1997 Cr.L.J. 549) . 5. Before adverting to the relevant provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.RC.) governing the answer to the issue on hand, it would be worthwhile to point out that the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Old Code) conferred revisional jurisdiction upon the Distt. Magistrates as well (Sec. 435 of the Old Code) in addition to the Sessions Judge. Section 438(1) provided that the Sessions Judge or the Distt. Magistrate might, if he thought fit. Magistrates as well (Sec. 435 of the Old Code) in addition to the Sessions Judge. Section 438(1) provided that the Sessions Judge or the Distt. Magistrate might, if he thought fit. on examining Under section 435 or otherwise the record of any proceeding, report for the orders of the High Court the result of such examination, and, when such report contained a recommendation that a sentence (or order) be reversed or altered, might order that the execution of such sentence (or order) be suspended and, if the accused was in confinement, he be released on bail or on his own bond. The new Code brought in certain significant procedural changes for speedy disposal of criminal matters. Besides other material changes like dispensing with the necessity of recording evidence by the Magistrate before committing a case to the court of Sessions, the revisional jurisdiction of the court concerned^was also improved. The revisional powers which were earlier there with the Distt. Magistrate in respect to the orders passed by the Executive Magistrate was taken away and for the purposes of exercise of revisional jurisdiction the court of the Executive Magistrate was made an "inferior court" to the court of the Sessions Judge. (Explanation to Section 397(1)). The necessity of reporting for the orders of the High Court the result of such examination was also dispensed with. The Sessions Judge was conferred revisional jurisdiction concurrently with the High Court. It may thus be appreciated that the amendment made in the New Code were directed to achieve the cherished goal of speedy justice. Therefore, in the understanding of the true nature of the right of a litigant to invoke the concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court and the Sessions Judge the very scheme of the new Code is required to be kept in mind for the meaningful and realistic functioning of various provisions in the Code to the advantage of both the parties to a litigation and not to the comfort for one and discomfort for the other. 6. Here I may pause for a while and refer to the pertinent observations made by the Apex Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, ( 1996(3) SCC 364 ) . Their Lordships observed that "Justice means justice between both the parties. 6. Here I may pause for a while and refer to the pertinent observations made by the Apex Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, ( 1996(3) SCC 364 ) . Their Lordships observed that "Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are but the means of achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counter productive exercise." Again, in the case of Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, ( 1996(5) SCC 125 ) the Apex Court observed that "Law is a living organism and its utility depends on its vitality and ability to serve as sustaining pillar of society. Contours of law in an evolving society must constantly keep changing as civilisation and culture advances. The customs and mores must undergo change with the march of time. Justice to the individual is one of the highest interest of the democratic State. Judiciary cannot protect interest of common men unless it would redefine the protection of the Constitution and the Common Law. If law is to adept itself to the needs of the changing society, it must be flexible and adaptable Law is the manifestation of principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Rule of Law should establish a uniform pattern for harmonious existence in a society where every individual would exercise his right to this best advantage to achieve excellence, subject to protective discrimination. The best advantage of one person could be the worst disadvantage to another. Law steps in to iron out such creases and ensures equality of protection to individuals and as well as group liberties. Mans status is a creature of substantive as well as procedural law to which legal incidence would attach " Speaking almost in the same language in the case of D.D.A. v. Skipper Construction ( 1996(1) SCC 272 ) their Lordships observed that "the Rule of procedure and/or principles of natural justice are not meant to enable the guilty to delay and defeat the just retribution. The wheels of justice may appear to grind slowly but it is the duty of all of us to ensure that they do grind steadily and grind well and truly. The justice system cannot be allowed to become soft, supine and , spineless." 7. Penal Laws including their branches of procedural laws required to be interpreted and construed strictly but since such laws are to be administered amongst the seekers of criminal justice the relevant provisions of such laws are to be so interpreted and construed that in their application they adept themselves to the changing need of the society, do not confer unmerited advantage on one and un-deserved disadvantage on one's adversary, do not render some other relevant provisions in the statute non- functional and redundant and advance and promote the aim and object of the Statute particularly in the area of speedy justice. 8. Now coming to the main issue before us it may be pointed out that Sections 6 to 23 occurring in Chapter II of the Cr.RC. deal not only with the creation of courts and their officers but also with the hierarchical set up of the courts for proper dispensation of criminal justice to the litigant public. The hierarchical set up is seen running through the entire system of administration of justice and it tries to deliver the true, real and best form of justice to a litigant and guards against possible factual and legal errors in the adjudication and determination of the rights and liabilities of the concerned litigants which errors are likely to occur due to the natural differentiation and fallibility in human faculties involved in the process of justice delivery system. Besides, the High Court and the courts constituted under any law, other than the Cr.RC., Section 6 classifies the criminal courts into four categories viz. (i) the court of Sessions (ii) Judicial Magistrate of the First Class and the Metropolitan Magistrates (iii) Judicial Magistrates of the Second Class and (iv) Executive Magistrates. In so far as the High Court is concerned it is not the creature of the Cr.RC. It is the creature of the Constitution having been conferred the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (Articles 214, 215 and 227 of the Constitution of India). In so far as the High Court is concerned it is not the creature of the Cr.RC. It is the creature of the Constitution having been conferred the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (Articles 214, 215 and 227 of the Constitution of India). In the administration of criminal justice this power of superintendence of the High Court over the courts created by and under the Cr.P.C. is clearly reflected in provisions like 397, 398, 482 and 483 Cr.RC. That being the position of the High Court in the hierarchy of courts in State Judiciary it may be noted that the doctrine of subordination of the courts seems to be governing the procedural administration of the courts in the administration of criminal justice. Every Metropolitan Magistrate, subject to the general control of the Sessions Judge, is subordinate to the Chief Metropolitan and Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is subordinate to the Sessions Judge (Sec. 19). Similarly, every Judicial Magistrate, subject to the general control of the Sessions Judge, is subordinate to the Chief Judicial Magistrate and every Chief Judicial Magistrate/Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate is subordinate to the Sessions Judge (Sec. 15). The Assistant Sessions Judge is subordinate to the Sessions Judge (Sec. 10). Likewise every Executive Magistrate (other than the Sub- Divisional Magistrate) exercising powers in a sub-division shall be subordinate to the sub Divisional Magistrate and every Executive Magistrate, including Sub-Divisional Magistrate but excluding the Addl. Distt. Magistrate, is subordinate to the Distt. Magistrate. It may be noted that in the scheme of subordination carved out in Chapter II of the Cr.RC. Executive Magistracy has not been made subordinate to the Sessions Judge. It is obviously for the reason that Chapter II speaks of administrative control and subordination of the hierarchy of courts classified under Section 6 thereof. Chapter XXIX, XXX and XXXI relating to appeals, references and revisions, transfer of criminal cases respectively and some other provisions in the Cr.RC. deal with judicial subordination of the criminal courts. 9. Having understood the hierarchical set up of the subordination of the criminal courts underlying the scheme of the Cr.RC. Chapter XXIX, XXX and XXXI relating to appeals, references and revisions, transfer of criminal cases respectively and some other provisions in the Cr.RC. deal with judicial subordination of the criminal courts. 9. Having understood the hierarchical set up of the subordination of the criminal courts underlying the scheme of the Cr.RC. question arisen as to what scheme underlies the exercise of the concurrent revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and the Sessions Judge in Section 397 Cr.P.C. for smooth, better, beneficial and un-confused functioning of the courts and for exercising such concurrent jurisdiction. In order to appreciate the scheme underlying the exercise of the concurrent revisory jurisdiction of the two courts in the context of the nature of the right of a litigant to invoke such jurisdiction of either of the two courts at his sweet will or in his option it would be profitable if the relevant provisions in the Cr.RC. be reproduced. Such relevant provisions read as under- "Sec. 397 : Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purposes of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation--All Magistrates whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-Section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. Section 398 : Power to order inquiry. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. Section 398 : Power to order inquiry. On examining any record under Section 397 or otherwise, the High Court or the Sessions Judge may direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate by himself or by any of the Magistrates subordinate to him to make, and the Chief Judicial Magistrate may himself make or direct any subordinate Magistrate to make, further inquiry into any complaint which has been dismissed under Section 203 or sub-Sec. (4) of Section 204, or into the case of any person accused of an offence who has been discharged : Provided that no court shall make any direction under this section for inquiry direction under this section for inquiry into the case of any person who has been discharged unless such person has had an opportunity of showing cause why such direction should not be made. Section 399 : Sessions Judge's powers of revision (1) In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by himself, the Sessions Judge may exercise all or any of the powers which may be exercised by the High Court under sub-Sec. (1) of Section 401. (2) Where any proceeding by way of revision is commenced before a Sessions Judge under sub-sec. (1), the provisions of sub-sec. (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 401 shall, so far as may be, apply to such proceeding and references in the said sub-sections to the High Court shall be construed as references to the Sessions Judge. (3) Where any application for revision is made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions Judge, the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon in relation to such person shall be final and no further proceeding by way of revision at the instance of such person shall be entertained by the High Court or any other Court. Section 400 : Power of Additional Sessions Judge-An Additional Sessions Judge shall have and may exercise all the powers of a Sessions Judge under this chapter in respect of any case which may be transferred to him by or under any general or special order of the Session Judge. Section 400 : Power of Additional Sessions Judge-An Additional Sessions Judge shall have and may exercise all the powers of a Sessions Judge under this chapter in respect of any case which may be transferred to him by or under any general or special order of the Session Judge. Section 401 : High Court's powers of revision-(1) In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Section 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Sessions by Section 307 and, when the Judges composing the Court of revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by Section 392. (2) No order under this Sec. shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or .y pleader in his own defence. (3) Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to covert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. (4) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. (5) Where under this Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been made to the High Court by any person and the High Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies there to and that it is necessary in the interests of justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for revision as a petitioner of appeal and deal with the same accordingly. Section 402 : Power of High Court to withdraw or transfer revision cases (1) Whenever one or more person convicted at the same trial makes or make application to a High Court for revision and any other person convicted at the same trial makes an application to the Sessions Judge for revision, the High Court shall decide, having regard to the general convenience of the parties and the importance of the question involved, which of the two courts should finally dispose of the application for revision and when the High Court decides that all the applications for revision should be disposed of by itself, the High Court shall direct that the applications for revision pending before the Sessions Judges be transferred to itself and where the High Court decides that it is not necessary for it to dispose of the applications for revisions, it shall direct that the applications for revision made to it be transferred to the Sessions Judge. (2) Whenever any application for revision is transferred to the High Court, that court shall deal with the same as if it were an application duly made before itself. (3) Whenever any application for revision is transferred to the Sessions Judge, that Judge shall deal with the same as if it were an application duly made before himself. (4) Where an application for revision is transferred by the High Court to the Sessions Judge, no further application for revision shall lie to the High Court or to any other court at the instance of the person or person whose applications for revision have been disposed of by the Sessions Judge. Section 403 : Option of court to hear parties-Save as otherwise expressly provided by this code no party has any right to be heard either personally or by the pleader before any court exercising its powers of revision; but the court may, if it thinks fit, when exercising such powers, hear any party either personally or by pleader. Section 482 : Saving of inherent powers of High Court-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 483 : Duty of High Court to exercise continuous superintendence over courts of Judicial Magistrates-Every High Court shall so exercise its superintendence over the courts of Judicial Magistrates subordinate to it as to ensure that there is an expeditious and proper disposal of cases by such Magistrate." 10. It may be noted that, in the phraseology of Section 397(1), the Legislature has used the word "inferior" and not "subordinate" while making reference to the lower court. The reason is obvious. An "inferior" court is not necessarily a "subordinate" court. The term "inferior" has, therefore, to be considered in wider perspective. It is a more comprehensive term and includes the term "subordinate". It has been seen above that the courts of the Executive Magistrates were not "subordinate" to the Sessions Judge in view of Section 23. Those were made "inferior" courts to enable the Sessions Judge to exercise his revisory powers under Sections 397/399 Cr.RC. over them. The Explanation to sub-Sec. (1) of Section 397 was, therefore, added with a specific purpose and is helpful in appreciating the relevancy of the scheme of hierarchy of courts in the exercise of the concurrent revisory jurisdiction of the High Court and the Sessions Judge Under section 397 Cr.RC. 11. Here it may be pointed out that concurrent jurisdiction means the jurisdiction of more than one authority of court, both authorised to do the same act or to deal with the same subject matter at the choice of the suitor. Conferment of concurrent jurisdiction on two authorities of courts gives an option to the suitor to make the choice of the forum for redressal of his grievance. It is an option to do or not to do an act in a particular way. It admits of a discretion of making his choice. Such direction may admit of such just and reasonable restrictions as do not deprive him of his basic right to get the same relief. The option available to the suitor thus does not create any absolute right in him to seek the redressal of his grievance from one particular forum only to the exclusion of the other. Such direction may admit of such just and reasonable restrictions as do not deprive him of his basic right to get the same relief. The option available to the suitor thus does not create any absolute right in him to seek the redressal of his grievance from one particular forum only to the exclusion of the other. If the other forum, duly authorised in law to give him the same relief with the same efficacy and efficiency, is conveniently available to him and the adoption of such forum causes no harm to his right and is also convenient to his adversary and is in accordance with the basic scheme of the statute, governing such right, then the suitor cannot insist upon adopting a particular forum which is likely to cause inconvenience and hardship to his adversary and to disturb the hierarchical setting of the courts/forums, which are no doubt having concurrent jurisdiction in the matter. In order to appreciate this statement it would be necessary to understand the nature and scope of the right of a party, aggrieved by an order of the Magistrate, to make his option in the matter of invoking the concurrent revisional jurisdiction of either the High Court or the Sessions Judge. 12. The revisory powers under Section 397 Cr.RC. may be invoked by the High Court and the Sessions Judge either suo-moto or on information which otherwise comes to their knowledge. Such information may come to them thought the application of the aggrieved person. But the power Under section 397 Cr.PC. of the High Court and the Sessions Judge to correct the mistakes of the inferior courts confers no right upon the aggrieved person. It is purely a discretionary power and is not to be exercised as a matter of fact on mere asking by the aggrieved person. It is to be exercised only to rectify any illegality, irregularity, impropriety or mistake appearing on the record to further the ends of justice. If no injustice to a party has been caused or the accused has not been prejudiced in his defence such powers are not to be exercised simply because of some mistake or error in the order or irregularity in the proceedings causing no injustice to him or depriving him of his legal right. The provisions contained in Section 460 to 466 or Chapter XXXV of the Cr.RC. The provisions contained in Section 460 to 466 or Chapter XXXV of the Cr.RC. are also to be considered while exercising such powers. Therefore, the only right of the aggrieved person in the matter of exercise of the revisory powers by the High Court and the Sessions Judge Under section 397 Cr.RC. at his option is that of bringing to the knowledge of either of the two courts any incorrectness, illegality or impropriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and any irregularity of the proceedings of the inferior court. The right to make the choice of forum for redressal of his grievance does not confer upon him the right to appear and be heard in the matter. Section 403 clearly makes it optional for the revisional court to hear or not to hear a party in the course of the exercise of its revisory jurisdiction. It is open to the revisional court to decide the matter without hearing the parties concerned. It is in fact the duty of the revisional court itself to examine the record of the inferior court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the finding, sentence or order. make or passed, and as to the regularity of proceedings of the inferior courts. It is for that reason that a revision cannot be dismissed without examination of the merits of the matter. Therefore, unlike the right of an accused Under section 303 Cr.RC. to be defended by a lawyer at his trial or of an appellant Under section 384 of being heard in appeal or of a revisionist Under section 401 (1), no party, be he a prosecutor, a complainant, or an accused, has a right to be heard in revision. The exercise of the revisory powers Under section 397 is discretionary with the revisional court, undoubtedly such discretion is to be always exercised judicially and not arbitrarily. The exercise of the revisory powers Under section 397 is discretionary with the revisional court, undoubtedly such discretion is to be always exercised judicially and not arbitrarily. It is by virtue of the nature of the discretionary power conferred upon the revisional court Under section 397 and spoken of in the later part of Section 403 that as a rule of practice and in view of the fact that the confidence reposed in the administration of justice will be shaken if a party is not allowed to argue his case and for adherence to the maxim that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done, that the parties or their counsel are heard in revisions. But such rule of practice does not restrict the power of the revisional court to limit the right of the applicant and/or his counsel of being heard only on some specified point or points and in the absence of the parties or their counsel to dispose of the revision applications by making an order on merits and not otherwise. In the matter of the disposal of the revision applications by making an order on merits and not otherwise. In the matter of the disposal of the revision application in that way the power of the revisional court seems to resemble to the power of the appellate court to dispose of the appeal on merits, if the parties to the appeal or their counsel or either of them do not appear before the court after service of the notice of the date of hearing on either the parties or their counsel and not to both (see Bani Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P., 1996 (4) SCC 720 ) . But the nature of the right of a revisionist vis a vis the right of an appellant materially differs in other respects. Whereas in an appeal the appellant has a right to demand an adjudication on a question of law and/or fact, in a revision the only right which a revisionist has is to bring his case to the knowledge of the revisional court. Whereas in an appeal the appellant has a right to demand an adjudication on a question of law and/or fact, in a revision the only right which a revisionist has is to bring his case to the knowledge of the revisional court. Whether interference in the interest of justice is necessary or not, is the function of the revisional court to see, as Sections 397, 399 and 401 conserve the power of the revisional court to see that justice is done and the inferior courts do not exceed their jurisdictions or abuse their powers. The revisory power being a discretionary power, the exercise of which power depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, the revisional courts are not bound to entertain an application in revision. 13. A further study of the provisions contained in Section 397 informs that revisional powers are not to be exercised in respect to interlocutory orders as such orders may reasonably be examined by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power Under section 482 Cr.RC. 14. Sub-Sec. (3) of Section 397 is, in my opinion, if considerable importance having a direct relevance to the mode of exercise of the option of an aggrieved person in invoking the concurrent revisory powers of either the High Court or the Sessions Judge. This provision says that if an application Under section 397 has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. The words "any person" used in the language of sub-Sec. (3), include, as held by the Apex Court in Krishnan's case (supra) the State as well. The words "same person" occurring in the later part of the sub-Section refer to the "person" who has exercised his option of informing either of the two revisional courts of his grievance against an order passed by an inferior court. The words "same person" occurring in the later part of the sub-Section refer to the "person" who has exercised his option of informing either of the two revisional courts of his grievance against an order passed by an inferior court. For the application of sub-Sec. (3) the inferior court can be the court of the Magistrate whether Judicial or Executive only, as for the purposes of revision against the order passed by a Sessions Judge the High Court and no other court can be the court of revision for exercise of the powers Under section 397(1) and after the order of the High Court in the matter of such an order there can arise no question of making a further application under Section 397 (3) by the person against whom the order is passed. He cannot approach the Session Judge Under section 397 (3) in his capacity of not being the "same person". Conversely, if an application Under section 397(1) against an order of a Magistrate had been made by a person before the Sessions Judge but dismissed by him the same person cannot make further application to the High Court. Same would be the position if the "any person", in exercise of his option, has made the application to the High Court and lost. He cannot make further application to the Sessions Judge. But that is to happen if that person succeeds in his application. His adversary would be the aggrieved person and for the purposes of sub-Sec. (3) he would not be the "same person". Since he does not happen the same person the bar created in sub-sec. (3) should not and would not come in his way to make further application. But if the person, aggrieved against the order of the Magistrate, has made his application, in the exercise of his option, to the High Court and has succeeded, his adversary, who would have the option to make further application under sub-Sec. (3) had the person aggrieved against the order of the Magistrate moved his application under Section 397(1) before the Sessions Judge, would be deprived of his remedy Under section 397(3). This would create an anomalous.-and rather an onerous situation in the operation and application of sub- Sec. (3) of Section 397 Cr.RC. Such a situation would result in denial of the right Under section 397(3) of the loosing person. This would create an anomalous.-and rather an onerous situation in the operation and application of sub- Sec. (3) of Section 397 Cr.RC. Such a situation would result in denial of the right Under section 397(3) of the loosing person. The Legislature does not appear to have intended sub-Sec. (3) to operate in that way. In the same context the functional operation of other relevant provisions may be examined. 15. It may be noted that even after conferring concurrent powers of revising the orders of the inferior courts upon the High Court and the Sessions Judge the mode and manner of exercising such revisory powers by them were separately laid down. Section 399 Cr.RC. deals with mode, manner and extent of the powers of the Sessions Court Under section 397(1) Cr.RC. and Section 401 Cr.Pc. with those of the High Court. Nothwithstanding the fact that the scope of operation of the two provisions is almost the same with some fine distinctions, there was no necessity for making different provisions for the exercise of the same concurrent power by two different course if the hierarchy of courts had not been kept in view while giving an option to the aggrieved party to choose the forum for revision against the orders of the inferior courts. If one goes by the apparently un-channelised and unregulated option of an aggrieved person in the matter of making application Under section 397(1), the provisions contained in Section 401 Cr.RC. remain operative and functional but those contained in Sections 399 and 400 Cr.RC. are likely to become redundant. Persons aggrieved against the orders of the Magistrate may opt to challenge such orders Under section 397(1) before the High Court, as has almost become the practice in this court, and the Sessions Judge may have no occasion to exercise his powers Under section 399/400 Cr.RC. However, if the order of the Magistrate are challenged Under section 397(1) before the Sessions Judge enabling him to exercise the same concurrent powers Under section 399/400, the High Court would still be exercising its same concurrent power Under section 397(1) in relation to the orders made by the Sessions Judge in his original jurisdiction and Under section 397(3) in relation to his revisional jurisdiction in the case of the loosing person not being the same person. This position would not only allow all the relevant provisions of Chapter XXX to successfully and harmoniously operate but would also be in accord with and in consonance of the scheme of Cr.P.C. and the goal of less expensive, convenient and speedy delivery of criminal justice to the litigating public. 16. It is one of the fundamental rule of construction of a statute that a provision in a statute should be so construed as permits other relevant provisions to function and does not do violence to them. The construction and interpretation, made by me, of the words used in phraseology of Section 397, in the context of the "option" of an applicant Under section 397(1), satisfies the requirement of this fundamental rule of construction of statutes and would promote and advance the object of speedy trial which now makes a part of the fundamental right of a litigant citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution and is aimed at to be achieved in the Cr.RC. by making provisions like Section 309. This would, at the same time, keep the Sessions Judge concerned informed of the correctness, legality and propriety, of the findings, sentence or orders, recorded or passed, and the regularity of the proceedings of the inferior courts, particularly the judicial Magistrate under his direct judicial and administrative control and supervision and thus help dispensation of speedy criminal justice. 17. Sub-Sec. (6) of Section 9 provides that the court of Sessions shall ordinarily hold its sitting at such place or places as the High Court may, by notification, specify. Taking into consideration the vast area covered by the territories of the State of Rajasthan, spreading over thousands of kilometers, North-South and East-West, with still not sufficient means of conveyance, travelling and transportation and its people still living much below the poverty line having no adequate facilities for cure and treatment, information and communication, learning and knowledge and even for drinking water at many places, the State Govt, has created courts of Sessions Judges in all the Revenue Districts and the High Court, in exercise of its powers Under section 9(6), has notified the head-quarters of all such Revenue Distt. as the places of the sitting of the Sessions Judges and/or the Addl. Sessions Judges. That apart, the sitting of the Sessions Judges/Addl. as the places of the sitting of the Sessions Judges and/or the Addl. Sessions Judges. That apart, the sitting of the Sessions Judges/Addl. Sessions Judges have been notified at even Tehsil Head Quarters, where even the minimum facilities of cure and treatment and education are not available. Ail such Sessions Judges/Addl. Sessions Judges have the powers Under section 397(1) Cr.RC. An applicant Under section 397(1) seeking remedy against an order of the Magistrate may, without and in-convenience to him or to his adversary, get the redressal of his grievance at his door-steps. This aspect of the geographical and developmental position of this State and the socio-economic conditions of the litigant public here cannot be lost sight of while considering the true and correct nature of the right of "option" of an applicant Under section 397(1) in the light of the Constitutional duty under Article 227 of the Constitution and statutory obligation under Section 483 Cr.RC. of the High Court. In appreciating the choice' of the revisionist Under section 397(1) to approach the High Court and not to the Sessions Judge the right of his adversary to speedy trial, which now makes a part of his fundamental right enshrined in Article 21 and his right Under section 397(3) in his not being the "same person" cannot be over-looked and by-passed. 18. Right to speedy trial, as held in the case of Abdul Rehman Antuley & Ors. v. R.S. Nayak & Ors. ( 1992(1) SCC 225 ), and elaborately discussed by this court in the case of Chotey Lai Jain v. State of Raj., (1992 RCC 167) , is a part of fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 and is reflected in Section 309 of the Cr.PC. Therefore, if the High Court in exercise of its rule making powers conferred by Section 46 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 read with Article 227 of the Constitution or, in their absence, through its decision on the judicial side, makes rules or lays down guidelines governing the procedure, which is fair, just and reasonable, for the exercise of the concurrent power Under section 397(1) by itself and also be the Sessions Judge, no harm is likely to be caused to the option' of a revisionist in the matter of selecting the revisional court of his choice. 19. 19. Coming now to the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners in favour of the status quo position it is noted that in the case of State of M.P. v. Khizar Mohd. (supra) a Division Bench of that High Court considered the conflicting views expressed by two learned Single Judges of that Court in two different cases viz. Shreedhar Shastri v. Prakashwati (1990 (2) MPWN 185) and Vijay Rao v. State of M.R ( 1993 (1) MPWN 186 ) . In the former case the learned Single Judge had held that though the High Court and the Sessions Judge both have concurrent jurisdiction of revision yet it would be profitable for an applicant to first approach the Sessions Judge for the purpose, but in the later case another learned Single Judge of that court took the view that the provisions of-Section 397 of the Cr.RC. conferred concurrent jurisdiction on the High Court and the Sessions -Judge and the option is with the aggrieved party to approach any of the two courts. After considering an earlier decision in the case of Ram Lai Sharma v. State of M.R., (1973 Cr.L.J. 1670 ), a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Kesavan v. Sreedharan ( AIR 1978 (Ker.) 131 ) and another Full Bench decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Mohan Lai v. Prem Chand, (AIR 1980 H.R 36) and the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh & Anr., ( 1979 (1) SCC 560 ) and Dharam Pal v. Ram Sri, ( AIR 1993 SC 1361 ) the Division Bench held that the option contained in Section 397(1) of the New Code is with the aggrieved party and the High Court cannot insist the party should first approach the Sessions Court before its powers of revision are invoked. With utmost respect to the learned Judges of the Division Bench I find myself unable to agree with them. 20. I have examined in sufficient detail the hierarchical set up of the court, the doctrine of subordination of courts applied and applicable to the proceedings under the Cr.RC. With utmost respect to the learned Judges of the Division Bench I find myself unable to agree with them. 20. I have examined in sufficient detail the hierarchical set up of the court, the doctrine of subordination of courts applied and applicable to the proceedings under the Cr.RC. in the matter of dispensation of criminal justice to the litigant public, the nature of the right of a revisionist Under section 397(1) and the need and necessity for regulating the exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court and the Sessions Judge Under section 397 by evolving a fair, just and reasonable procedure which may ensure preservation of the basic right of the revisionist of bringing his grievance to the notice and knowledge of the revisional court and at the same time not depriving his adversary of the same right Under section 397(3) by applying the doctrine of protective discrimination. Once it is appreciated that a Sessions Judge is as much competent as the High Court is in correcting the errors and mistakes in the orders passed by the Magistrates and in approaching the Sessions Judge in revision against the order of the Magistrate not only the right of a revisionist Under section 397(1) is fully protected but also the right of his adversary, which right might accrue to him Under section 397(3) in the case of the Revisionist succeeding in his revision before the Sessions Judge, to approach the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction is also preserved and thus no harm is likely to be done to either of the parties and also that such construction of Section 397 would harmoniously work with other relevant provisions like Section 399/400, which would otherwise become redundant, why should then the option' of the revisionist be raised to the level of the right' of an appellant particularly in the wake of the express provisions contained in Section 403 and availability of a forum of the same concurrent jurisdiction with the Sessions or Additional Sessions Judge at the door-steps of the revisionist. In my opinion, if exercise of his option' by a revisionist in a particular way is likely to result in defeating the right of his adversary but exercise of the same option' by him in another way of same smoothness, if not more, causes no harm either to revisionist's option or to the right of his adversary, instead protects and preserves the legal right of the later, the adoption of the another way' would not only be a fair, just and reasonable procedure but also would be within the permissive limits of protective discrimination' and would meet the crying needs of the litigating public for less expensive but more speedy justice. This court, I think, may not only make rules for the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction in a particular mode and manner but also, in exercise of its rule making power under Section 46 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, may also make appropriate rules for the exercise of the same concurrent revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Courts, if such rules are not already there in the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, or General Rules (Criminal). 21. In the case of Jagir Singh (supra) a father appellant had been paying maintenance to his student son from previous marriage under an order passed Under section 488 of the Old Code. On coming into force of the New Code the father appellant sought cancellation of the maintenance order Under section 127 of the New Code. The Magistrate cancelled the order and the Sessions Judge, in exercise of his revisional power Under section 397(1) of the New Code, upheld Magistrates order. The son then filed further application' in revision before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which allowed the second' revision application. Setting aside the order of the High Court and allowing the appeal of the father-appellant the Supreme Court held that "the object of Section 397(3) is clear. It is to prevent a multiple exercise of revisional power and to secure early finality to orders. Any person aggrieved by an order of an inferior criminal court is given the option to approach either the Sessions Judge or the High Court and once he exercises the option he is precluded from invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the other authority. It is to prevent a multiple exercise of revisional power and to secure early finality to orders. Any person aggrieved by an order of an inferior criminal court is given the option to approach either the Sessions Judge or the High Court and once he exercises the option he is precluded from invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the other authority. The language of Section 397(3) is clear and pre-emptory and it does not admit of any other interpretation." Their Lordships further held that "it is not permissible to regard the revision application before the High Court as one directed against the order of the Sessions Judge instead of that of the Magistrate. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly." 22. It may be appreciated that in the facts and circumstances of the case before their Lordships the limited question which arose for consideration was whether a second revision application by the same person' was maintainable Under section 397(1) or not. It was on such facts that their Lordships referred to the express provisions contained in Section 397(3) and held as above. Their Lordships had no occasion to consider the question of the exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court and the Sessions Judge in the context of the state of affairs before this court and the likely deprivation of his right by an adversary Under section 397(3) in case a Magistrate's order is challenged by a revisionist before the Sessions Judge and he succeeds there. 23. In Dharam Pal's case (supra), which has been relied upon by the Division Bench in the case of the State of M.R v. Khizar Mohd. (supra) and which related to the exercise of power to issue an order of attachment Under section 146 Cr.P.C., it was held that the inherent power Under section 482 Cr.P.C. was prohibited and a second revision application by the same person after disposal of the first cannot be entertained by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction Under section 482 Cr.RC. Not only that Dharampal's case was a case of the same person' seeking second revision of the same order Under section 397(1) but also that the view expressed in that case with regard to the scope of the inherent powers of the High Court Under section 482 in such matters was not endorsed by the Apex Court in its decision in Krishnan's case (supra). The soundness of the view expressed in Dharma Pal's case (supra) and similar view expressed in other case ( Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Kerala (1990) Suppl. SCC 132 , Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee & Chabbi Mukherjee & Anr. 1990 (2) SCC 437 and Deepti @ Aarti Rai & Ors. JT (1995) 7 SCC 175) was examined by a Larger Bench in Krishnan's case (supra) and their Lordships of the Larger Bench held that the observation of the learned Judges (in Dharampal's case) that the High Court had no power Under section 482 Cr.RC. were not correct in view of the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Madhu Limaya v. State of Maharashtra, ( 1977 (4) SCC 551 ) as upheld in V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I., ( 1980 (2) SCR 380 at R 393) . Their Lordships laid down that inherent powers of the High Court is still available Under section 482 Cr.RC. in exceptionally appropriate cases, which power is to be exercised sparingly and cautiously, to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice. 24. It is thus evident that the very foundation for the view expressed in the case of State of M.P. v. Khizar Mohd. (supra) was found infirm by the Larger Bench. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners thus do not advance their cause. 25. To conclude, it is summed up as under- (1) Section 397 (1) confers concurrent revisional jurisdiction upon the High Court and the Sessions Judge. (2) An applicant Under section 397 (1) has an option' to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of either the High Court or the Sessions Judge against an order, made by a Magistrate. (3) The option of the applicant is subject to "protective discrimination" through fair, just and reasonable procedure. (2) An applicant Under section 397 (1) has an option' to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of either the High Court or the Sessions Judge against an order, made by a Magistrate. (3) The option of the applicant is subject to "protective discrimination" through fair, just and reasonable procedure. (4) The High Court, in exercise of its rule making power, conferred upon it by Section 46 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, read with Article 227 of the Constitution and Section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, may make rules regulating the distribution of its own and its subordinate courts' business and laying down fair, just and reasonable procedure for exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction Under section 397 (i) by itself and the Sessions Judge against the orders of the Magistrates. (5) In the Hierarchical set up of the courts in the State it is considered to be a fair, just and reasonable procedure to require a person, aggrieved by a revisable order made by a Magistrate, to approach the Sessions Judge concerned first in revision Under section 397 (1) Cr.RC. The learned Sessions Judge concerned may, in his discretion, consider the necessity of staying the proceedings before the inferior court and/or call for the record of such court. He is expected to exercise his discretion in a judicial manner and not in routine as a matter of fact. He would do better if he is slow in staying the proceedings of the case before the inferior court and requisitions the record of such court at the time of hearing the application finally, so that the objective of speedy trial may be achieved. (6) No revision application Under section 397(3) by the same person can be entertained either by the High Court or the Sessions Judge against the same order of the Magistrate. For the purposes of applicability of Section 397(3) the doctrine of merger, i.e., the merger of Magistrate's order within the order of the revisional court shall have no relevance. (7) Order taking cognizance of an offence by a Magistrate may be re-considered by the Magistrate himself, if requested so by an accused at the earliest opportunity available to him after putting in appearance before the Magistrate in person or through his counsel, as held by a Division of this court in the case of Neeraj Kumar & Ors. (7) Order taking cognizance of an offence by a Magistrate may be re-considered by the Magistrate himself, if requested so by an accused at the earliest opportunity available to him after putting in appearance before the Magistrate in person or through his counsel, as held by a Division of this court in the case of Neeraj Kumar & Ors. v. State of Raj., ( 1996 (2) WLC 215 ) . Such orders and order refusing to take cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate may be challenged Under section 397(1) Cr.RC. before the concerned Sessions Judge, as held by the Division Bench of this court in the case of Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur v. Dashrath Singh, (1996 R.C.C. Page 592) . The term "Magistrate" shall not include Special Judge, considered as Magistrate under some specific provisions of a Special Act for the purposes of such special enactment. (8) Orders framing charge for an offence and/or orders refusing to frame charge for an offence by a Magistrate may be challenged Under section 397(1) Cr.RC. before the concerned Sessions Judge. (9) Till appropriate rules are made by the rule making authority for regulating the exercise of the concurrent revisional jurisdiction by the High Court and the Sessions Judge Under section 397 (1)/398 Cr.PC., the observations/instructions/ directions made herein shall be observed, followed and complied with by all concerned as if they have the force of the rules of procedure and practice of this court. (10) Criminal Misc. Applications and petitions, presented either Under section 397(1 )/(3) or Under section 482 Cr.RC. and instituted upto December 31, 1976, shall be disposed of by this court on merits. Transfer of such cases (if a revision/second revision has been filed in the garb of a petition Under section 482 Cr.RC.) to the concerned Sessions Judges may be considered only on joint request of both the parties. Transfer of such cases, instituted after 31.12.76 shall be considered as and when such a case comes up before the court for admission and/or orders, as the case may be. 26. A copy of the last paragraph of this order, containing the observations/ instructions/directions as made hereinabove, shall forthwith be forwarded to each and every court of Judicial Magistrate and Sessions/Addl. Sessions/Special Judges as also to all the Bar Associations, through their Presidents or Secretaries, throughout the territories in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction for information. 27. 26. A copy of the last paragraph of this order, containing the observations/ instructions/directions as made hereinabove, shall forthwith be forwarded to each and every court of Judicial Magistrate and Sessions/Addl. Sessions/Special Judges as also to all the Bar Associations, through their Presidents or Secretaries, throughout the territories in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction for information. 27. Since the present petition falls within the purview of instructions No. 9, above, it shall be listed for hearing on merits in the second week of September, 1997.> . *******