Judgment :- 1. The appellant in this appeal is the 2nd respondent in M.C.O.P. No. 83 of 1985 on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Sub-Court), Coimbatore, Respondents 1 to 4 are the claimants and Respondent 5 is the 1st respondent in that proceedings. In this Judgment, the parties to this appeal are referred in the same rank in which they are described in the original proceedings. 2. One Abdul Majeed died in an accident involving a lorry bearing No. TNN 5992 owned by the 1st respondent before the Tribunal and insured with the 2nd respondent before the Tribunal which is not in dispute. The accident took place on 19.11.1984 at 3.00 p.m. when the deceased was admittedly travelling in the lorry along with his goods. It is also pleaded and established and therefore, there is no dispute about the same as well. The claimants being the widow and minor children of the deceased filed a claim petition claiming compensation of Rs. 1.35 lakhs on account of the untimely death of the said deceased, Abdul Majeed. The 1st respondent before the Tribunal remained absent and he was set ex-parte. The 2nd respondent before the Tribunal contended that since the deceased is admittedly a passenger in a goods vehicle, which is not authorised to carry such a passenger, the insurance company cannot be made liable for that claim. Exs.B-1 and B-2 are the insurance polices and the defence of the insurance company was (sic) and holding that there was rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the lorry belonging to the 1st respondent before it, passed an award for a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/- together with interest at 12% per annum thereon payable from the date of the petition till the date of realisation. The correctness of this award is questioned by the 2nd respondent before the Tribunal in this appeal. 3. I heard Mr. K. Padmanabhan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in this appeal and Mr. Paul Benjamin, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal, The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that under Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 as it stood then, there is no need to cover the liability of a passenger, like the deceased in the present case, travelling in a lorry which is not authorised to carry such passengers. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, since statutorily such a risk is not to be covered, the Tribunal erred in passing the award even against them though the defence of the insurance company is established by Exs.B-1 and B-2 and the oral evidence of R.W.1 namely the Administrative Officer of the insurance company. It is no doubt true that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, on the face of it appears to be a pure question of law and deserves acceptance, yet in view of the categorical pronouncement of the two learned Judges of this Court in a judgment reported in 1997 L.W. 174 equivalent to 1997 (1) MLJ 148 , the legal submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant do not remain to be considered by me in this appeal. The facts available in the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court referred to above are as follows: “A claim petition was filed in respect of the death of an individual travelling in a lorry. The insurance company contested the claim on the ground that the deceased in that case was a passenger in a lorry which is not authorised to carry such persons and as the Motor Vehicles Act itself, as it stood then, does not require such a risk to be covered, the insurance company cannot be made liable at all for any claim. The insurance policy seems to have been marked in that case. The Tribunal overruled the le gal submission made liable at all for any claim. The insurance policy seems to have been marked in that case. The Tribunal overruled the legal submissions made by the insurance company and made them liable as well. The insurance company, thereafter, filed an appeal before this Court and a learned single Judge agreed with the insurance companys submission and held that the insurance company cannot be made liable on the facts stated above to satisfy the award. Thus, the owner of the vehicle alone was mad e liable to satisfy the award.” 4. Thereafter, the owner of the vehicle filed a batch of Letters Patent Appeals which came up for disposal before the Honble Chief Justice and the Honble Mr. Justice AR. Lakshmanan. The learned Judges went into the pleadings and evidence made available in that case. Thus, the owner of the vehicle alone was mad e liable to satisfy the award.” 4. Thereafter, the owner of the vehicle filed a batch of Letters Patent Appeals which came up for disposal before the Honble Chief Justice and the Honble Mr. Justice AR. Lakshmanan. The learned Judges went into the pleadings and evidence made available in that case. While deciding those appeals, the learned Judges held as follows: — “In our opinion, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid Sohan Lal Passis case would squarely apply to the case on hand. In the instant case, the owner of the vehicle had appointed the licensed driver to the vehicle and the accident-in-question has taken place when the vehicle was transporting goods. There is no evidence adduced by the insurer that the owner of the vehicle authorised or permitted the owners of the goods which was being transported in the vehicle at the time of the accident, to travel in the transport vehicle-in-question, nor is there any evidence to show that the driver was authorised to carry the owners of the goods along with the transport vehicle in question. There is no evidence to infer that there was even an implied consent for doing it by the owner of the vehicle. There is also no evidence to show that with the knowledge of the owner of the vehicle the owners of the goods were taken along with the goods in the vehicle. Further it is also proved that they are the gratuitous passengers. Thus, this is a case in which the driver in his own accord appears to have allowed the owners of the goods to travel in the transport vehicle along with their goods. There is no evidence to show that the owner of the vehicle wilfully allowed the transport vehicle in question to be used for the purpose which was not allowed by the permit.” On this basis, the learned Judges allowed the appeal filed by the owner of the vehicle and made the insurance company liable to satisfy the award. 5. The facts available in this case are identical to the facts available in the Judgment of the Division Bench referred to above. 5. The facts available in this case are identical to the facts available in the Judgment of the Division Bench referred to above. The legal submission raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was also raised before the Honble Judges in that case and it had been negatived relying upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court reported in (1996) 5 SCC 21 . Under these circumstances, I have no option at all in this matter to go beyond the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court referred to above. I am also informed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal, which is not disputed even by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that following the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court referred to above, a number of learned Single Judges had taken a similar view. Therefore, I am constrained to reject the legal submission made on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant. 6. As far as the quantum of compensation is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant fairly submitted that the appellant in this appeal is not questioning the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal and the only issue involved in the appeal is the liability of the insurance company on account of the breach committed by the insured. Since I have already held that the insurance company is also liable to satisfy the award, for the reasons stated by me and in view of the submission made by the learned counsel on the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, I am not deciding the correctness of the amount awarded as compensation in this appeal and the finding of the Tribunal rendered in this regard is sustained. In the view I have taken in this appeal on the legal submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant, I am of the opinion that there are no merits in the appeal and accordingly, it is dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs.