Judgment :- 1. Petitioner has sought for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the proceedings of the Respondents issued under Section 256 (3) of Act IV of 1919, i.e., Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, dated 23.6.1997 and quash the same, and consequently forbear the respondents from initiating or pursuing any action in respect of the works undertaken by the petitioner in the premises bearing Door No. 36 and 31-A, Poes Garden, Chennai, belonging to the petitioner, and pass such further or other orders as this Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. 2. In the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, it is stated that the petitioner is the owner of premises bearing Door No. 36, Poes Garden comprising of the land and buildings. The said property was purchased in the year 1967 and the buildings were constructed in the year 1969, in accordance with law, and eversince the construction, she has been residing there. It is also stated that the petitioner is the owner of Door No. 31-A, Poes Garden, and in between the buildings, namely, Door Nos. 31-A and 36, there is no compound wall put up. Petitioner was the Chief Minister of the State from June 1991 to May 1996, and she had been recognised as a person falling under ‘Z’ category for security purposes. She was provided with special security guards. No compound wall was put up between the two buildings in order to provide freedom of movement to the security personnel. After the petitioner ceased to be the Chief Minister, the special security given to her was withdrawn. The petitioner wanted to put u p a compound wall between the two houses, namely, houses bearing Door Nos. 31-A and 36, and she also wanted to relay the garden area besides putting up an iron grill in the first floor of her building for security purposes. She also wanted to replaster certain portions of the walls in the aforesaid premises. The above items of work, according to the petitioner, do not amount to construction or reconstruction requiring permission of the Corporation or from any other Authority. She also wanted to replaster certain portions of the walls in the aforesaid premises. The above items of work, according to the petitioner, do not amount to construction or reconstruction requiring permission of the Corporation or from any other Authority. Whileso, second and third respondents issued a notice on 13.6.1997, purporting to be one under Sec. 236 of Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, whereby she was informed that the requirements of Sections 234 to 241 of the Act were not complied with by her, and she was directed not to proceed further with the construction. On the reverse of the notice, it was simply stated that the petitioner has been carrying out some additions and alterations inside the premises without obtaining sanctioned plan from the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai, and therefore, she was asked to stop the work. No details about the alleged additions were mentioned in the aforesaid notice. After receipt of the same, a reply was sent through her counsel on 18.6.1997, stating that she was not carrying out any additions or alterations in the premises which required sanction from the corporation. Notwithstanding the reply, a provisional order under Sec. 256 (1) of the Act dated 17.6.97 was served on the petitioner. There also, on the reverse of the order, it was said that she was carrying out some additions and alterations inside the premises without obtaining sanction plan from the Commissioner. In the said notice also, there are no details about the alleged additions or alterations, and the same was the subject - matter of an earlier notice dated 13.6.1997. A detailed reply as given by her counsel on 26.6.1997, bringing to his notice that she has not done any work which requires any sanction, besides pointing out the mechanical manner in which the provisional order had been issued. Without waiting for any further enquiry, an order has been passed on 23.6.1997 under Section 256 (3) whereby the provisional order dated 17.6.1997 was confirmed, and the petitioner was asked to remove or demolish the alleged unauthorised construction within 30 days, failing which, she was informed that the Authorities will do the same and recover costs from the petitioner. In the order that confirmed the provisional order, it was only said that the explanation offered is not satisfactory. 3. The petitioner submitted that the entire proceedings of the respondents are illegal. In the order that confirmed the provisional order, it was only said that the explanation offered is not satisfactory. 3. The petitioner submitted that the entire proceedings of the respondents are illegal. Though she filed a suit, subsequently it was withdrawn since she wanted redressal expeditiously. It is the case of the petitioner that the impugned order passed by the respondents is illegal and without jurisdiction and is vitiated by legal and factual mala fides , and no useful purpose would be served even if an appeal is filed. In various grounds challenging the impugned order, it is said that the work that has been carried on does not require any licence or approval from the respondents, and the notices also do not give any details regarding the alleged unauthorised construction. Immediately on receipt of the first notice dated 13.6.1997, petitioner himself has given the details of the work that were going on and the same were not disputed by any of the respondents. Without verifying the correctness of the statement, an order has been passed mechanically as if there was some unauthorised construction. The respondents have not applied their mind, nor the provisions of law quoted by them have any relevance. It is also said that the petitioner was the Chief Minister of the State for a full term of five years, and after she ceased to be in office, all vindictive acts are taken against her only due to political vendetta, and the same are vitiated by legal mala fides. Even the entire procedure for issuing a notice under Section 256(3) of the Act was not followed. When an explanation has been given and the details of work carried out by the petitioner have been given, even without considering the same, a final order has been passed mechanically. The entire order violates the Principles of Natural Justice. It is for the above reasons, the petitioner seeks the reliefs mentioned above. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed by first respondent for himself and on behalf of respondents 2 and 3, sworn to by the first respondent. 5. In the counter affidavit, it is said that the petitioner is the owner of No. 36, Poes Garden, Chennai, and she obtained sanction plan and constructed the buildings. The property bearing Door No. 31-A, which is adjoining the petitioners building also belongs to her. 5. In the counter affidavit, it is said that the petitioner is the owner of No. 36, Poes Garden, Chennai, and she obtained sanction plan and constructed the buildings. The property bearing Door No. 31-A, which is adjoining the petitioners building also belongs to her. For constructing the building in that property also, there was a sanction plan. Thereafter, the petitioner herself has said that she has erected a compound wall between the two houses bearing Door Nos. 36 and 31-A, for which she has not obt ained permission from the respondents so far. It is further said that relaying the garden area besides putting up an iron grill on the first floor of her house also amounts to construction for which sanction is required. After extracting the definition of the word ‘building’ as provided under the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, in the counter-affidavit, it is said that the construction of compound wall, fixing a grill, etc., require sanction from the respondents. It is further averred that some time during the middle of June 1997, while the petitioner was constructing a new entrance for the premises No. 31-A, Poes Garden, Chennai, and also raising a new compound wall separating the house and premises bearing Nos. 36 and 31-A, Poes Garden, information was received by respondents about the same, and an attempt was made by the Officials of the Corporation to inspect the premises on 13.6.1997. But they were not permitted to inspect the premises to find out the actual unauthorised constructions. In spite of it, the Officials of the Corporation, with permission of the neighbour at the rear side, noticed the construction of roof with A.C. sheet at finishing stage in premises No. 36, Poes Garden, in addition to the construction of compound wall. On the very same day, a notice under Sec. 236 of the Act was issued to the petitioner, and the same was received by her on 17.6.1997. The provisional order under Sec. 256 of the Act was received by petitioners authorised representative on 19.6.1997. A reply was sent by the petitioners lawyer that she has not been carrying on any addition or alterations in the building which require sanction from Commissioner of the Corporation, and all that had been undertaken was only putting up of a compound wall in between Door Nos. A reply was sent by the petitioners lawyer that she has not been carrying on any addition or alterations in the building which require sanction from Commissioner of the Corporation, and all that had been undertaken was only putting up of a compound wall in between Door Nos. 31-A and 36, Poes Garden, which did not about the public road, and removing of earth in the garden inside the premises for putting up a lawn, a small fish tank, etc. Not being satisfied with the reply sent by the petitioner on 13.7.1997, on 23.7.1997, respondents have taken some photos by entering the neighbours house from the rear side. It is further said that since the petitioner has refused permission to the officials to inspect the premises, it is not open to the petitioner to allege that details have not been spelt out in the provisional order. It is said that proceedings are pending against the petitioner in M.P. No. 557 of 1997 in Crl.O.P. No. 1 of 1997, wherein the Court has directed that no work diminishing the value of the property should be done, and the explanation offered is only to find fault with the Officials of the Corporation. According to the respondents, even from the averments in the affidavit of the petitioner, the nature of work undertaken by the petitioner is clear. They also deny the action taken by the Corporation is vindictive in nature. According to them, there is neither illegality in their action, nor is there any oblique purpose involved. Respondents would submit that they have discharged or performed only their statutory functions under the Act, and the petitioner has made the alleged mala fide in a lighthearted fashion without specific particulars. It is further contended by them that the impugned notice does not amount to abuse of power as alleged. 6. A reply affidavit was also filed by the petitioner wherein she has reiterated her case put forward in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. She has further stated that there was neither inspection by any officials, nor did she deny permission to any of them or prevented them from inspecting the site. 7. When the Writ Petition came for admission, Standing Counsel for the respondents-Corporation took notice in the main writ petition on 12.8.1997, and on their request, the case was posted to 20.8.1997. She has further stated that there was neither inspection by any officials, nor did she deny permission to any of them or prevented them from inspecting the site. 7. When the Writ Petition came for admission, Standing Counsel for the respondents-Corporation took notice in the main writ petition on 12.8.1997, and on their request, the case was posted to 20.8.1997. An interim order was granted till that date, with a direction not to implement the impugned notice. Since the case could not be taken up on 20.8.1997, the same was adjourned to 26.8.1997, and the interim order already granted was extended, and the matter was finally heard on 9.9.97. 8. Learned Senior Counsel representing the Standing Counsel for respondents placed before Court the file on the basis of which the respondents had issued the notice to the petitioner. 9. From the file, it is seen that on 13.6.1997, the Executive Engineer of the Corporation received a telephone message from the City Engineer that some unauthorised construction is going on at Premises No. 36, Poes Garden. The Executive Engineer directed the Junior Engineer to visit the property. On 17-6-1997 the Junior Engineer has submitted to the Executive Engineer that even though he made an attempt to inspect the building on 13.6.1997, he was not allowed to do so, and he went to the neighbours house on the rear side and found that some A.C. Sheet roof construction was going on. He also said that construction of compound wall was going on through the main street gate as it was open at that time. Even then he was not permitted to enter the premises. So he was not able to measure the height of the compound wall. Since he was not in a position to enter the building he could not incorporate the details of the construction. It is also said that he attempted to serve the notice on 13.6.1997, but, it was not received by the owner of the building. But, ultimately, on 17.6.1997, it was received by one Swaminathan. On perusing the above note put up by the Junior Engineer, the Executive Engineer issued orders to proceed further. In the Note for Commissioner dated 18.6.1997, signed by the Junior Engineer, Assistant Executive Engineer, Executive Engineer and Zonal Officer, permission is sought for from the Commissioner for serving notice on the party (petitioner herein). On perusing the above note put up by the Junior Engineer, the Executive Engineer issued orders to proceed further. In the Note for Commissioner dated 18.6.1997, signed by the Junior Engineer, Assistant Executive Engineer, Executive Engineer and Zonal Officer, permission is sought for from the Commissioner for serving notice on the party (petitioner herein). In that ‘Note for Commissioner’, in the place of ‘a building’ and ‘construction’, those words have been scored out, and the words ‘additions and alterations’ have been interpolated, and the Note has been sent to the Commissioner for approval. The note has been prepared on the basis of the statement of the Junior Engineer that he has served the notice under Section 256(1) (2) of the Act and the same was received by one V. Swaminathan on 19.6.97. At page 9, there is again a Note to the Commissioner to approve the issuance of a notice under Sec. 256(3) of the Act. Page 11 of the File says that the notice was served o n V. Swaminathan. Photo copies of the plans regarding constructions originally made also form part of the file. Much information could not be received from the file submitted by the learned Senior Council for the respondents. 10. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that the initiation of proceedings under the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act is only vindictive, and that too without any basis. On 13.6.1997, when notice under Sec. 236 of the Act was attempted to be served, a note is written on the reverse side of the same, stating thus: — “Madam, It is found that you are carrying out some additions and alterations inside the premises without obtaining the sanctioned plan from the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai. Hence you are requested to stop the unauthorised construction immediately, failing which action will be taken as per CCMC Act”. It is not disputed that the same was received on 17.6.1997 by the petitioners representative, and within 24 hours, a detailed reply was sent by the petitioners counsel on 18.6.1997. It is stated therein that the petitioner is not carrying on any additions or alterations in the building within the meaning of City Municipal Corporation Act, requiring sanction from the Commissioner. It is further stated therein that the petitioner has only undertaken the work of putting up a compound wall in between Door Nos. It is stated therein that the petitioner is not carrying on any additions or alterations in the building within the meaning of City Municipal Corporation Act, requiring sanction from the Commissioner. It is further stated therein that the petitioner has only undertaken the work of putting up a compound wall in between Door Nos. 31-A and 36, Poes Garden, which does not about the public road, removing earth in the garden inside the premises, for the purpose of putting up a lawn, putting up a small fish tank, etc. It was, therefore informed to the third respondent that the allegations contained in the notice are not tenable and even the work has been completed. A reply was addressed to the third respondent who issued the notice on 13.6.1997 Thereafter, on 17.6.1997, a further notice was issued under Sec. 56(1) (2) of the City Municipal Corporation Act stating that certain constructions have been commenced without obtaining permission or in contravention of the orders of the Standing Committee, and the petitioner was asked to show-cause within seven days from the date of receipt of the provisional order, why the same should not be confirmed. In this connection, it must be noted that even the first notice dated 13.6.1997 itself was received by the petitioner only on 17.6.1997, and the provisional order dated 17-6-1997 under Section 256 (1) of the Act is also sent on the same day. The provisional order was received by the petitioners representative on 19.6.1997. Therein also, on the reverse side, there is a statement which reads thus: — “Madam, It is found that you are carrying out some additions and alterations inside the premises without obtaining the sanctioned plan from the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai. Hence you are requested to stop the unauthorised construction immediately failing which action will be taken as per CCMC Act. The provisional notice was received by the petitioners representative on 19.6.1997. As per the notice, the petitioner has got seven days to show-cause, and on the seventh day, a reply was also sent to the third respondent making reference to the earlier letter dated 13.6.1997 and also stating that she has not done any act which requires permission, nor was there any addition or alteration inside the premises. As per the notice, the petitioner has got seven days to show-cause, and on the seventh day, a reply was also sent to the third respondent making reference to the earlier letter dated 13.6.1997 and also stating that she has not done any act which requires permission, nor was there any addition or alteration inside the premises. Even before the time for giving the explanation was over, on 23.6.1997, a final notice was issued stating that no satisfactory cause has been shown and, therefore, the petitioner should demolish the unauthorised construction. It is this order that is now challenged by the petitioner in this Writ Petition. 11. Learned counsel for petitioner made the following submissions: — (1) The impugned order is null and void since the same has violated the Principles of Natural Justice, and has been passed without application of mind. (2) When seven days notice has been given as per the provisional notice before an explanation could be given within the stipulated time, an order confirming the provisional notice has been issued. That means, the respondents, under some pretext or other, wanted to demolish the building. (3 ) Even to the first notice dated 13.6.1997, a reply was sent wherein the details of the work that were carried on, were given, and in the counter affidavit, the contention is that those works also require sanction. (4) According to the petitioner, the works regarding which details have been given in the reply, do not require sanction from the Corporation, nor were there additions or alterations. (5) The statement that the officers were prevented from entering the building has been made only to cause a prejudice in the mind of the Court, and, under the Municipal Corporation Act, the Commissioner has got power to enter any premises if he has got information about any unauthorised construction even with the help of police. (6) In the counter-affidavit, it is stated that on 13.6.1997, when the petitioner prevented the officers from making an inspection, from the rear side, they saw the constructions. But in spite of the same, when a provisional notice was issued on 13.6.1997, no details have been given. That means, their statement that they attempted to inspect the building is not correct. But in spite of the same, when a provisional notice was issued on 13.6.1997, no details have been given. That means, their statement that they attempted to inspect the building is not correct. (7) Even though there is a statutory Appeal provided against the impugned order passed under Sec. 256 (3) of the Act, taking into consideration the non-application of mind, violation of Principles of Natural ‘Justice, and the manner in which the impugned order has been passed ignoring the settled legal position, an appeal cannot be said to be effective remedy, and Art. 226 of the Constitution of India has been rightly invoked by the petitioner. 12. As against the above submissions, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that even if there is any procedural error, that could be rectified in Appeal, and the petitioner who has prevented the Officers from inspecting the building, cannot complain that the details of additions or alterations have not been given in the notice. Learned Senior Counsel reiterated that the works that were admitted to have been carried out by the petitioner also require permission from the Corporation, and, on the basis of the admission itself, the action of the respondents is justified. Learned Senior Counsel also further submitted that normally when there is a statutory appeal, the Court will be very slow in exercising the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. I will first consider the factual basis, and how far the contention of the petitioner could be accepted regarding the necessity for a licence, and whether the contention of the respondents that they attempted to inspect the building and they were prevented could be accepted. 14. In the affidavit of the petitioner, it is stated that a compound wall was erected between the two houses, namely, Door Nos. 36 and 31-A, and she has also decided to re-lay the lawn and fix an iron grill in the first floor for security purpose. These are the works that are admitted, in the Writ Petition, to have been carried out in the aforesaid premises. 15. In the counter-affidavit, in paragraph 3, it is said thus: — “The petitioner has admitted that there was no compound wall between the premises Nos. 36 and 31-A, Poes Garden, Chennai-86. I submit that the petitioner herself has admitted that she has erected the compound wall between the two houses bearing Nos. 15. In the counter-affidavit, in paragraph 3, it is said thus: — “The petitioner has admitted that there was no compound wall between the premises Nos. 36 and 31-A, Poes Garden, Chennai-86. I submit that the petitioner herself has admitted that she has erected the compound wall between the two houses bearing Nos. 36 and 31-A, Poes Garden, for which she has not obtained any permission from this respondent so far. I further submit that the petitioner has also submitted that re-laying the garden area besides putting up an iron grill in the first floor for her building was done for security purposes. Erecting the grill in the first floor is a mode of construction for which permission ought to be obtained by the petitioner from this respondent The definition given in the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act in respect of ‘Building’ under Rule 3(4) reads as follows: — “Building’ includes — (a) a house, out-house, stable, latrine, godown, shed, but, wall (other than a boundary wall not exceeding eight feet in height) and any other structure whether of masonry bricks, mud, wood, metal or any other material whatsoever.” It is further stated in the counter-affidavit of the respondents that the construction of the compound-wall, grill, etc., made by the petitioner needs to be covered by sanction from the respondents. In another portion of the counter affidavit, i.e., in paragraph 5, it is said thus: — “..It is submitted by this respondent that the additions and alterations made by the petitioner are in violation of the order made in M.P. No. 557/97 in Crl.O.P. No. 1/97 and, therefore, the additions and alterations can be per se illegal. It is stated in the affidavit that the provisional order was issued in a mechanical manner to give effect to the alleged construction. This allegation “has been made with a view to find fault with the officials of the Corporation. Really the nature of work undertaken by the petitioner is mentioned in the affidavit, (emphasis supplied). So, from the admitted case, it is clear that the following works had been carried on by the petitioner: — (1) A wall separating the two walls between Door Nos. 36 and 31-A, Poes Garden, (2) Fixing an iron grill in the first floor of the house for security purpose. So, from the admitted case, it is clear that the following works had been carried on by the petitioner: — (1) A wall separating the two walls between Door Nos. 36 and 31-A, Poes Garden, (2) Fixing an iron grill in the first floor of the house for security purpose. 15 (a) In this connection, in gage 3 of the file of the Junior Engineer, it is stated that some A.C. Sheet roof construction was going on. But this has not been stated anywhere in the counter-affidavit. So, the only question that requires consideration is, whether the constructions so made require the sanction of the Corporation. 16. Under Sec. 3 (4) of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, ‘building’ has been defined as, “Building” includes — (a) a house, out-house, stable, latrine, godown, shed, but, wall (other than a boundary wall not exceeding eight feet in height) and any other structure whether of masonry bricks, mud, wood, metal or any other material whatsoever;. (b) a structure on wheels or simply resting on the ground without foundation; and (c) a ship, vessel, boat, tent, van and any other structure used for human habitation or used for keeping or keeping or storing any article or goods.” 17. Coming to Building Regulations included in Chapter XX of the Act, Section 234 says thus:— “234 Application to construct or reconstruct building (1) If any person intends to construct or reconstruct a building, he shall send to the Commissioner, (a) an application in writing for approval of the site together with a site plan of the land, and (b) an application in writing for permission to execute the work together with a ground plan, elevation and sections of the building and a specification of the work. “Explanation. ‘Building’ in this sub section shall include a wall or fence of whatever height bounding or abutting on any public street. (2) Every document furnished under sub-sec.(1) shall contain such particulars and be prepared in such manner as may be required under Rules or by laws. ” (emphasis supplied). 18. It is not disputed by either party that Door Nos. 31-A and 36 are facing the road, and for the entire length, there is already a compound wall. The construction is made in between the two buildings separating them. ” (emphasis supplied). 18. It is not disputed by either party that Door Nos. 31-A and 36 are facing the road, and for the entire length, there is already a compound wall. The construction is made in between the two buildings separating them. In such cases, whether sanction is required was considered by this Court in the decision reported in 1965 I M.L.J. 107 = 78 L.W. 109 ( Gopala Nayagar & Sons v. The Corporation of Madras ) M. Anathanarayanan, J. as he then was, held thus: — “Normally, this objection would have to prevail, for the word ‘building’ as occurring in Section 236 would be ordinarily referable to the definition in Section 3 (4) (a). But Section 234 (1) (b) of the Act, which deals with the application in writing for permission to execute a work together with a ground plan, etc., “gives a special explanation in the following terms: “Building in this sub-section shall include a wall or fence of whatever height, bounding or abutting on a public street”. Learned Counsel for the revision petitioner (Sri Damodara Rao) argues, and I think with plausibility, and force, that the special definition or explanation for ‘building’ provided in Section 234(1) (b), must be limited to that sub-section and cannot be extended to cover the use of the word ‘building’ in Section 236. That is because the explanation is specifically to the effect that the definition embodies in it related to the word ‘building’ as occurring in that sub-section, Section 234(1) (b). Where the word ‘building’ occurs anywhere else, clearly we have to refer only to the general definition in Section 3, sub-section (4) (a). I was at first rather exercised by this apparent inconsistency, or contradiction; it appeared to be a matter of a lapse on the part of the drafts man. But, I think that this could be explained or reconciled, on a different line of reasoning. Section 234 (1) (b) may conceivably relate to the situation in which a person is building a house together with the compound wall, at the same time; in that contingency, he will necessarily have to apply for permission for the construction of the house. When he so applies, he must include the particulars of the bounding wall, and obtain permission therefore though the wall may be less than 8 feet in height. When he so applies, he must include the particulars of the bounding wall, and obtain permission therefore though the wall may be less than 8 feet in height. But, where he is separately constructing a boundary wall alone, the governing definition will be that in Section3 (4) (a), and it only where the boundary wall is over 8 feet in height that the construction of it will be unauthorised, and an offence under Section 236, read with Section 362 of the City Municipal Corporation Act “. (emphasis supplied) 19. It may further be noted that the wall in between the two houses is not abutting the road or any public street, Since there is already a compound wall separating the house from the main road. 20. Learned Senior Counsel for respondent submitted that when a wall is constructed separating two houses, and when the same touches the wall separating the road at the point, there is an abutting of the wall, and, therefore, permission is required. 21. In P. Ramanatha Aiyars ‘The Law Lexicon’ 1997 Edition, meaning for the word “abut” given as follows: — “To reach; to touch at the end; be contiguous, join at a boundary”. In Whartons Law Lexicon ‘(14th Edition) 1993, the meaning for the word’ “abut” is given as, “To touch at the end, to border upon or approach.” 22. Going by the meaning for the word ‘abut’ and for which there is no definition in the City Municipal Corporation Act, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for respondents cannot be accepted. Going by the meanings as given in the Law Lexicons, the wall separating the boundary of the two houses touches, the boundary wall already in existence. Nobody has a case that the compound wall separating the two houses from the road was constructed without authority, and, going by the decision in 1965 - I.M. LJ. 107 = 78 L.W. 109, only in regard to a compound wall which is constructed along with a building, a plan or permission is required. If that be so, the contention that for constructing a compound wall separating the two houses, a sanction is required, cannot be sustained. 23. The other work for which non-obtaining of sanction is complained, is fixing of a grill in the first floor. Petitioner has said that the placing of a grill is not an addition or alteration. If that be so, the contention that for constructing a compound wall separating the two houses, a sanction is required, cannot be sustained. 23. The other work for which non-obtaining of sanction is complained, is fixing of a grill in the first floor. Petitioner has said that the placing of a grill is not an addition or alteration. It is placed there only for the purpose of security. Learned Senior Counsel for respondents brought to my notice sub-sec. (1) & (2) of Section 255 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act which reads thus: — “The provisions in the chapter and of any rules or by law made under this Act relating to construction and re-construction of buildings shall also be applicable to any alteration there of or addition thereto Provided that works of necessary repair which do not affect the position or dimensions of a building or any room therein shall not be deemed an alteration or addition foor the purpose of this section. “(2) If any question arises as to whether any addition or alteration is a necessary repair not affecting the position or dimensions of a building or room such question shall be referred to the standing committee whose decision shall be final.” (emphasis supplied) 24. In the counter affidavit, the reason why the placing of grill also requires permission is explained thus: — “..Erecting the grill in the first floor is a mode of construction for which permission ought to be obtained by the petitioner from the respondent. The general definition for the word building is also extracted thereafter. 25. The word ‘repair’ came for co-interpretation before the Supreme Court under the Income-tax Act, in 1988 (Supp.) SCC 42 ( Sir Shadi Lal & Sons, Shamli v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Kanpur ) where the lessess claimed deduction. In the rent deed executed between the lessee and the land lord, there was a provision that the lessee might repair the building, and on that basis, substantial masonry work was done. The argument was, it was in the nature of repair. In that connection, their Lordships considered what is meant by ‘repair’. From para 11 onwards, their Lorships held thus: — “Refcrring to what is implicit in and carried with the covenant for “repairs”, Halsbury states: Under a convenant to repair, a tenant is liable to repair but not to renew. The argument was, it was in the nature of repair. In that connection, their Lordships considered what is meant by ‘repair’. From para 11 onwards, their Lorships held thus: — “Refcrring to what is implicit in and carried with the covenant for “repairs”, Halsbury states: Under a convenant to repair, a tenant is liable to repair but not to renew. “Repair” in this sense means the restoration by renewal or replacement of subsidiary parts of the whole, Whereas “renewal” as distinguished from repairs, means the reconstruction of the whole or of substantially the whole. Where the demised building is erected on inherently defective foundations, the tenant is not liable to substitute new foundations. In regard to standard of repairs, Halsbury, at paragraph 286, states: If he has expressly covenanted to put a house into tenaniable repair and to keep it in such a repair, and it is not in tenaniable repair at the commencement of the tenancy, the tenant must do the necessary repairs, not withstanding that the building is thereby put in a better condition than when the landlord let it. The effect is the same if, without expressly covenanting to put it into “repair, the tenant only convenants to keep the house in tenantable repair. Such a convenant presupposes putting the house in such repair, and keeping it in repair during the term. The construction of the convenant is the same whether the convenant specifies “tenantable” or “habitable” or “good” repair. A general convenant to repair without any such words is satisfied if the premises are kept in a substantial state of repair” (emphasis supplied as in the original report) The of t-quoted observations in Lurcott v. Wakely and Wheeler as to what is meant by ‘Repairs’ are generally considered apposite. This has been referred to and relied upon by the High Court. The observations in Lurcotts case was referred to with approval by the Privy Council in Rhodesia Railways v. Income-tax Collector. “The idea of ‘repair’ may include replacement or even a renewal . But the converse may not be true. All replacements or renewals need not necessarily be ‘repairs’. In the case of a building, restoration of stability or safety of a subordinate or subsidiary part of it or any portion of it can be considered as repair while the reconstruction of the entirety of the subject matter may not be so regarded. But the converse may not be true. All replacements or renewals need not necessarily be ‘repairs’. In the case of a building, restoration of stability or safety of a subordinate or subsidiary part of it or any portion of it can be considered as repair while the reconstruction of the entirety of the subject matter may not be so regarded. The somewhat comprehensive import of the word ‘repair’ in this context is evident from the reliance by Forbes, J. in Ravenseft Properties Ltd. v. Davastone (Holdings) Ltd. and the following observations of Sir Herbert Cozens-Hardy, M.R. in Lurcotts case:— It seems to be that we should be narrowing in a most dangerous way the limit and extent of the covenants if we did not hold that the defendant were liable under covenants framed as these are to make good the cost of repairing this wall in the only sense in which it can be repaired, namely, by re-building it according to the requirements of the County Council. Having regard to some what comprehensive nature of the obligations that go with and are attached to and recognised under the tenants covenants for repair’ it must be held that the covenant in the present case is one under which the tenant has undertaken ‘substantial repairs’ and it must, accordingly, be held to fall with Section 24(1) (i) (b) of the Act and that the allowance for repairs must be one under, and limited to, that provision”. (emphasis supplied) 26. Going by the very same Section, unless the work done affected the position or dimension of the building, it cannot be said that is an alteration or addition for the purpose of the Act. Unless there is alteration or addition, which affects the position or dimension, Section 255 of the Act will have no application. Placing of grill by itself will not contravene the provisions of Section 255 of the Act. A change of dimension contemplates that there must be change in the physical characteristic of length, breadth and thickness, and unless the same is substantiated, the question of applicability of. Sec. 255 of the Act does not arise. Alteration means a change or substitution of one into another, and, in so far as the building is concerned, alteration of building should involve a structural alteration of the building. Sec. 255 of the Act does not arise. Alteration means a change or substitution of one into another, and, in so far as the building is concerned, alteration of building should involve a structural alteration of the building. In this case, so long as there is no material to show that the placing of a grill has altered the dimension of the building or physical characteristic of the building in some mode of measurement, the same can be considered only as a ‘repair’ for which no licence is required. 27. Factually, the two works carried out by the petitioner do not require any permission or sanction of the Corporation. 28. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submitted that when the officials have been prevented from inspecting the new works carried out by the petitioner, the interpretation given by the petitioner cannot be accepted. The question whether there is a change in the dimension can be raised only if there was an inspection. According to respondents, when the petitioner herself has prevented the officers from entering the premises, she cannot be heard to say about it. 29. I cannot accept this argument. Petitioner has said in the reply affidavit that there was no attempt by any of the officers to inspect the building and there was no occasion for her to prevent them from inspecting the premises. Apart from it, when the counter-affidavit states that on 13.6.1997, some work was noticed from the rear side of the building, it is not the case of respondents that they noticed the placing of grills in the first floor, and a construction was made. The note submitted by the Junior Engineer to the Executive Engineer only says that an A.C. Sheet roof was being put up in a portion. The placing of grills only the case of the petitioner, and it was never the case of the respondents. 30. Once it is found that no licence is required, that by itself is sufficient to quash the entire proceedings. But, since learned counsel on both sides argued all the points. I am bound to enter findings on these points also. 31. The main argument of learned counsel for the petitioner was that the impugned order was passed violating the Principles of Natural Justice, and it is only the result of a vindictive approach, and the same is vitiated by mala fides. I am bound to enter findings on these points also. 31. The main argument of learned counsel for the petitioner was that the impugned order was passed violating the Principles of Natural Justice, and it is only the result of a vindictive approach, and the same is vitiated by mala fides. Of Course regarding mala fides, better details are required. Except for the statement that the present Ruling Parity and herself belong to different/political parties, and, at the instance of the Ruling Party vindictive approach is being made, no details are given. In that way, the argument on the basis of mala fides cannot be accepted. 32. But, from the materials placed before this Court, it cannot be doubted that there was no application of mind, and the very order violates the Principles of Natural Justice. 33. While narrating the facts, I said that on 13.6.1997, a notice was issued and on the reverse side of it, there is some endorsement, the details of which are not stated anywhere. If from the rear side of the premises in question, the Junior Engineer had seen some construction going on, which was in violation of municipal rules, he could have stated so. On receipt of the notice dated 13.6.1997, the details of masonry work that were done, have been elaborately stated in the reply notice issued by the petitioner through her counsel. The provisional notice was received by the petitioner on 17.6.1997. Nothing has been stated in that notice about the so called inspection from the rear side, though in the file some details are there. In the Provisional Notice, seven days time was given from the date of receipt of the notice. Petitioners representative received it on 19.6.1997 and so she had time till 26.6.1997 to furnish her explanation to the show-cause. Even without waiting for the reply to the show-cause, on 23.6.1997, notice has been served on the petitioner stating that no satisfactory cause has been shown. From this, it is clear that the respondents were over-anxious to take action against the petitioner and that is why they did not wait till the time granted by them was over. This action on the part of the respondents can never be said to be bona fide. From this, it is clear that the respondents were over-anxious to take action against the petitioner and that is why they did not wait till the time granted by them was over. This action on the part of the respondents can never be said to be bona fide. When seven days notice had been given and the file also shows that the same was served on the petitioners representative on 19.6.1997 only, why the respondents issued the impugned notice on 23.6.1997 is not explained. From this, it is evident that they did not want to consider the explanation given by petitioner, and they had already determined to take action on the basis of the Provisional Notice. Again, before issuing a Provisional Notice, a duty is cast on the respondents to see whether a sanction is required under the Act for the works carried out by the petitioner, which had been explained to them in her reply. When the respondents have refused to take into consideration the reply to the show-cause, and were not prepared even to wait till the expiry of the time granted by them it follows that the basic principles of law have been violated, and they have refused to hear the petitioner on the same.. 34. In these circumstances, we have to consider the question or effective alternative remedy which was taken as a ground by the respondents to question the maintainability of the Writ Petition. 35. Learned Senior Counsel for respondents submitted that there is effective alternative remedy, and the Statute itself says that the petitioner has to exhaust that remedy, and then only she can invoke the extraordinary Jurisdiction of this Court. 36. I agree with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for respondents. But the question is, whether there are circumstances to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction. 37. It is a right of a citizen to invoke the constitutional remedy. Availability of an effective alternative remedy is not always a bar, and it is only a restriction imposed by the Court itself. In one of the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 86 ( U.P.Statev. Mohammad Nooh ), a similar question came for consideration. Their Lordships held thus:— “There is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only when there is no other equally effective remedy. In one of the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 86 ( U.P.Statev. Mohammad Nooh ), a similar question came for consideration. Their Lordships held thus:— “There is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only when there is no other equally effective remedy. Provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of interior courts subordinate “to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. The superior court will readily issue a certiorari in a case where there has been a denial of natural justice before a court of summary jurisdiction. (Para 10) If therefore, the existence of other adequate legal remedies is not per se a bar to the issue of a Writ of Certiorari and if in a proper case it may be the duty of the superior court to issue Writ of Certiorari to correct the errors of an inferior court or tribunal called upon to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial junctions and not to relegate the petitioner to other legal remedies available to him and if the superior court can in a proper case exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a petitioner who has allowed the time to appeal to expire or has not perfected his appeal, e.g., by furnishing security required by the statute, it cannot then be laid down as an inflexible rule of law that the superior court must deny the writ when an inferior court or tribunal by discarding all Principles of Natural Justice and all accepted rules of procedure arrived at a conclusion which shocks the sense of justice and fair play merely because such decision has been upheld by another inferior court or tribunal on appeal or revision. There may conceivably cases where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. If an inferior court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior courts sense of fair play the superior court may, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the court of Tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. This would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the original trial and the tribunals hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunals composed of persons belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate legal training and background and “Whose glaring lapses occasionally come to the notice of the Supreme Court”, (para 11) 38. In A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1147 ( Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana ), their Lordships held that the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion rather than rule of law, and, at any rate, it does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. While considering this point, their Lordships further said in paragraph 9 of that judgment thus: — “Before we deal with the larger issue, let me put out of the way the contention that found favour with the High court in rejecting the writ petition. The learned single Judge as well as me (Division Bench recalling the observations of this Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery Industries (1979) 4 SCC 22 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1889 ) rejected the writ petition observing that ‘the petitioner who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Art 226 of the Constitution must have exhausted the normal statutory remedies available to him. We remain unimpressed. We remain unimpressed. Ordinarily it is true that the Court has imposed a restraint in its own wisdom on its exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 where the party invoking the jurisdiction has an effective, adequate alternative remedy. More often, it ha s been expressly stated that the rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion rather than rule of law. At any rate it does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. In fact in the very decision relied upon by the High Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh 1958 SCR 595 : ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ) it is observed ‘that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there, “is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy.” It should be made specifically clear that where the order complained against is alleged to be illegal or invalid as being contrary to law, a petition at the instance of person adversely affected by it, would lie to the High Court under Art. 226 and such a petition cannot be rejected on the ground that an appeal lies to the higher officer or the State Government. An appeal in all cases cannot be said to provide in all situations an alternative effective remedy keeping aside the nice distinction between jurisdiction and merits. Look at the fact situation in this case. Power was exercised formally by the authority set up under the rules to grant contract but effectively and for all practical purposes by the Chief Minister of the State. To whom do you appeal in a State administration against the decision of the Chief Minister? The cliche of appeal from Caesar to Caesars wife can only be bettered by appeal from ones own order to oneself. Therefore this is a case in which the High Court was not at all justified “in throwing out the petition on the untenable ground that the appellant had an effective alternative remedy. The High Court did not pose to itself the question, who would grant relief when the impugned order is passed at the instance of the Chief Minister of the State. To whom did the High Court want the appeal to be filed over the decision of the Chief Minister? The High Court did not pose to itself the question, who would grant relief when the impugned order is passed at the instance of the Chief Minister of the State. To whom did the High Court want the appeal to be filed over the decision of the Chief Minister? There was no answer and that by itself without anything more would be sufficient to set aside the judgment of the High Court.” 39. In (1993) 4 SCC 269 ( Union of India v. Reddappa ), at page 274, their Lordships said thus: — “True the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Art. 226 or the tribunal is not as vide as it is in appeal or revision but once the court is satisfied of injustice or arbitrariness then the restriction self-imposed or statutory, stands removed and no rule or technicality on exercise of power can stand in way of rendering justice.” 40. Again, in A.I.R. 1961 SC 1506 ( A.V. Venkateswaran v. Wadbwani ), the same question was considered where their Lordships said thus:— “The rule that the party who applies for the issue of a high prerogative writ should, before he approaches the court, have exhausted other remedies open to him under the law, is not one which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petition or to deal with it, but is rather a rule which courts have laid down for the exercise of their discretion, (para 9) The wide proposition that the existence of an alternative remedy is a bar to the entertainment of a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution unless (1) there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take the action impugned, or (2) where the order prejudicial to the writ petitioner has been passed in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice and could, therefore, be treated as void or non est and that in all other cases. Courts should not entertain petitions under Art. 226, or in any event not grant any relief to such petitioners cannot be accepted. The two exceptions to the “normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy are by no means exhaustive, and even beyond them a discretion vests in the High Court to entertain the petition and grant the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. The two exceptions to the “normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy are by no means exhaustive, and even beyond them a discretion vests in the High Court to entertain the petition and grant the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. The broad lines of the general principle s on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the court.” (Paras 8 and 10) 41. According to me, the technical argument of alternative remedy also loses importance when both parties have argued the case on merits, both on facts and law. In such an event, it will be injustice to hold that the writ petition is not maintainable on the ground of other effective remedy. In AIR 1971 SC 33 ( Hirday Narain v. I.T. Officer, Bareilly. ), at page 36 (in paragraph 12), it was held thus: — “An order under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act is not appealable. It is true that a petition to revise the order could be moved before the Commissioner of Income-tax. But Hirday Jarain moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court entertained that petition. If the High Court had not entertained his petition, Hirday Narain could have moved the Commissioner in revision, because at the date on which the petition was moved, the period prescribed by Section 33-A of the Act had not expired. “we are unable to hold that because a revision application could have been moved for an order correcting the order of the income-tax officer under Section 35, but was not moved, the High Court would be justified in dismissing as not maintainable the petition, which was entertained and was heard on the merits.” (emphasis supplied) 42. “we are unable to hold that because a revision application could have been moved for an order correcting the order of the income-tax officer under Section 35, but was not moved, the High Court would be justified in dismissing as not maintainable the petition, which was entertained and was heard on the merits.” (emphasis supplied) 42. From the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent in this case, it is also clear that the respondents want a decision on merits, and they have also justified their action in issuing the notice under Section 256 (3) of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act. When the respondents wanted to vindicate their action and they have also placed the entire file explaining the circumstances under which action was taken and wanted a judgment on merits, it is too much on their part to contend that there is an effective alternative remedy under Sec. 366 of the City Municipal Corporation Act. According to me, this Court would be justified in interfering with the impugned order invoking its power under Article 266 of the Constitution of India, for the following reasons: — (1) The order was passed without taking into consideration the explanation already submitted by the petitioner, and the order was passed as if there was no explanation. (2) When an order is passed even before the due date, without waiting for receiving explanation from the petitioner, it implies that they do not want to hear the petitioner, which means that the order passed by respondents is in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice. (3) There is also an error apparent on the face of records, in noting the work that was done by the petitioner. That is, constructing a compound wall separating two houses, which do not abut the road and placing grill in the first floor for security purpose will not amount to additions or alterations, and they do not require permission of the Corporation. (4) From the legal position laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court, the works that were carried out by the petitioner cannot be characterised as works that required permission. The respondents without understanding the law, have taken action in spite of the fact that the same was brought to their notice. There is a patent error of law in the action of the respondents, and the same was one without jurisdiction 43. The respondents without understanding the law, have taken action in spite of the fact that the same was brought to their notice. There is a patent error of law in the action of the respondents, and the same was one without jurisdiction 43. Considering from any point of view, I do not think the respondents were justified in issuing the notice in this case, threatening demolition of the work carried out by the petitioner. 44. In view of my findings given above, I quash the notice dated 23.6.1997 issued by the respondents and forbear them from initiating or pursuing any action in respect of the works undertaken by the petitioner in the premises bearing Door Nos. 36 and 31-A, Poes Garden, belonging to the petitioner. The Writ Petition is allowed. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to suffer their respective costs W.M.P. No. 19765 of 1997 for stay is dismissed.