A. PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) KARAN alias Pradeep Sagar (hereinafter referred to as Tdetenu) interned in the Circle Jail, Sambalpur pursuant to the order of detention passed on 3-7-1996 (Annexure-1) by the District Magistrate, Sambalpur in purport of exercise of powers conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act 1980 (in short, the Act) has filed this application for writ of habeas corpus. ( 2 ) BY the order of detention dated 3-7-1996 detention of the detenu was directed. The ground of detention inter alia indicate various acts, which according to the detaining authority affected public tranquillity. The acts were labelled to be violent and activities of the detenu were described to be murderous which seriously affected the public order, peace and tranquillity of the locality paralysing the normal life of the people. By indulging in antisocial activities and using brutal force he tried to take away lives of innocent persons on many occasions, and has in fact committed murder in two instances. The Officer-incharge of Ainthapali Police Station, who is the law enforcing officer of the area was assaulted in a crowded area which created panic and disturbed even tempo of life. With a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it was felt necessary to direct his detention. ( 3 ) CHALLENGING the order of detention essentially two points have been urged. Firstly, it is submitted that the incidents highlighted in the detention order at the most depict law and order situation, and cannot be labelled as public order situation. Secondly, the detenus representation was not sent to the State Government thereby violating protection provided under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short, the Constitution ). ( 4 ) MR. P. K. Ray, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the detaining authority submitted that the representation was made long after the period prescribed for sending it to the Advisory Board, and therefore, it was not initially acted upon. However, subsequently that was sent to the appropriate authority and has been rejected. He has submitted that the incidents detailed affected public order. ( 5 ) WE shall first deal with the question relating to distinction between law and order and public order. However, subsequently that was sent to the appropriate authority and has been rejected. He has submitted that the incidents detailed affected public order. ( 5 ) WE shall first deal with the question relating to distinction between law and order and public order. While the expression law and order is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, public ordert has a narrower ambit, and public order would be affected by only such contravention, which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of law and ordert and Tpublic ordert is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community, which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise the problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that help to distinguish it as an act affecting public order from that concerning Tlaw and order. The question to ask is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed? This question has to be faced in every case of its facts. Considered in the above background, there can be no manner of doubt that the seven incidents related to a public order situation. The facts described are diabolic and gory. The first plea therefore fails. ( 6 ) THE residual and crucial question is whether the representation of the detenu was dealt with due expedition mandated under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. The writ of habeas corpus was called by Blackstone as T1the great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement. It really represents another aspect of due process of law. ( 6 ) THE residual and crucial question is whether the representation of the detenu was dealt with due expedition mandated under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. The writ of habeas corpus was called by Blackstone as T1the great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement. It really represents another aspect of due process of law. As early as 1839 it was proclaimed by Lord Denman that it had been for ages effectual to an extent never known in any other country, Lord Halsbury L. C. stated in Cox v. Hakes, that the right to an instant determination as to the lawfulness of an existing imprisonment is the substantial right made available by this writ. Article 22 of the Constitution confers four Fundamental Rights on every person, except in two cases mentioned in Clause (3), as essential requirements and safeguards to be followed when it is necessary to deprive any person, for any cause whatsoever and for, however, brief a period of his personal liberty by placing him under arrest or keeping him in detention. Those are (i) to be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds of such arrest; (if) not to be denied the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice; (iii) to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the Magistrate; (iv) not to be detained in custody beyond the said period of twenty-four hours without the authority of a Magistrate. Clauses (1) and (2) contain the guarantee of the four Fundamental Rights enumerated above. Clause (3) contains two exceptions and provides that the constitutional guarantees do not apply to (a) enemy aliens, and (b) persons arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. Clauses (4) to (7) are devoted to laying down certain fundamental principles as to preventive detention and guaranteeing certain Fundamental Rights to persons who are arrested under any law for preventive detention. Clauses (4) to (7) are devoted to laying down certain fundamental principles as to preventive detention and guaranteeing certain Fundamental Rights to persons who are arrested under any law for preventive detention. The Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Clauses (4) to (7) to persons detained under any law for preventive detention relate to the maximum period of detention, the provisions of any Advisory Board to consider and report on the sufficiency of the cause for detention in certain cases, the right to be informed the grounds of detention and the right to have the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence while the criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. It is resorted to when the Executive, is convinced that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the person detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects, which are specified by the law. The action of Executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authority. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct, the failure to conform to which should lead to detention. The satisfaction of the detaining authority, therefore, is a purely subjective affair. The detaining authority may act on any material and on any information that it may have before it. Such material and information may merely afford basis for a sufficiently strong suspicion to take action but may not satisfy the tests of legal proof on which alone a conviction for offence will be tenable. In case of preventive detention of citizen, Article 22 (5) of the Constitution enjoins the obligation of the appropriate Government or of the detaining authority to accord the detenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation and to consider that representation speedily. The right to make a representation implies right of making an effective representation. It is the constitutional right of the detenu to get all the grounds on which the order has been made. As has been said by Benjamin Cardozo, A Constitution states or ought to state not rules for the passing hour but the principles for an expanding future. The right to make a representation implies right of making an effective representation. It is the constitutional right of the detenu to get all the grounds on which the order has been made. As has been said by Benjamin Cardozo, A Constitution states or ought to state not rules for the passing hour but the principles for an expanding future. The concept of groundst used in the context of detention in Article 22 (5) has to receive an interpretation, which will keep it meaningfully in tune with temporary notions of the realities of the society, and the purpose of the Act in the light of concepts of liberty, and fundamental freedoms. While the expression Tgrounds for that matter includes not only conclusion of fact but also all the basic facts on which those conclusions were founded; they are different from subsidiary facts or further particulars or the basic facts. The detenu is entitled to obtain particulars of the grounds, which will enable him to make an effective representation against the order of detention. ( 7 ) SO far as the question whether there was delay in disposal of the representation is concerned same has to be considered in the background of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. A Constitutional protection is given to every detenu, which mandates the grant of liberty to the detenu to make a representation against detention, as imperated in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. It also imperates, the authority to whom the representation is addressed to deal with the same with utmost expedition. The representation is to be considered in its right perspective keeping in view the fact that the detention of the detenu is based on subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned, and infringement of the constitutional right conferred under Article 22 (5) invalidates the detention order. Personal liberty protected under. Article 21 is so sacrosanct and so high in the scale of constitutional values that it is the obligation of the detaining authority to show that the impugned detention meticulously accords with the procedure established by law. The stringency and concern of the judicial vigilance that is needed was aptly described in the following words in Thomas Pacham Dales case: Then comes the question upon the habeas corpus. The stringency and concern of the judicial vigilance that is needed was aptly described in the following words in Thomas Pacham Dales case: Then comes the question upon the habeas corpus. It is a general rule, which has always been acted upon by the Courts of England, that if any person procures the imprisonment of another he must take care to do so by steps, all of which are entirely regular, and that if he fails to follow every step in the process with extreme regularity the Court will not allow the imprisonment to continue. Whenever there is executive invasion on personal liberty, the court has to weigh in golden scales whether the personal liberty is to be placed at a high pedestal regardless of the social cost involved in the release of a possible renegade. Observations to similar effect were made by the Supreme Court in Ichhudevi v. Union of India. Judged in this background, the question is whether the detention as directed in the instant case is one where the procedural sinews suffered from any weakness to warrant interference. ( 8 ) A few dates need to be noticed here. The order of detention is dated 3-7-1996. The State Government approved the order of detention on 11-7-1996. It is within the statutory period of ten days as provided in Section 3 (4) of the Act. On 15-7-1996, the State Government referred the case to the Advisory Board together with the order of detention, and the documents in support of the grounds of detention for opinion and report. On 9-8-1996, the Advisory Board considered the order of detention along with the records of the proceeding. On that date the order of detention was confirmed by the Board. Representation was submitted by the detenu on 1-8-1996. The District Magistrate submitted para-wise comments to the Home Department with comments on the representation of the detenu on 18-9-1996. The District Magistrate had not sent the representation of the detenu when he submitted his comments, and the Home Department directed the District Magistrate to despatch the representation. The representation was sent on 23-9-1996, which was received in the Home Department on the same day, and was rejected on 27-9-1996. The order of rejection was communicated to the detenu on 28-9-1996 through the District Magistrate; Sam balpur. The representation was sent on 23-9-1996, which was received in the Home Department on the same day, and was rejected on 27-9-1996. The order of rejection was communicated to the detenu on 28-9-1996 through the District Magistrate; Sam balpur. ( 9 ) STAND of the State is that the detenu has to be granted opportunity of making an effective representation and if a representation is made same has to be dealt with expeditiously. In the instant case, the detenu chose to remain silent for a period of about one month after passing of the order of detention. He even did not choose to make a representation before the matter was considered by the Advisory Board. It is submitted that the State is mandated to send the documents along with the representation of the detenu if any, to the Advisory Board within a stipulated time. Consequentially, it is urged that the representation has to be make before expiry of the period prescribed for placing the records before the Advisory Board. Reference is made to Section 10 of the Act in this regard. Said provision reads as follows: ( 10 ) REFERENCE to Advisory Boards.- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, in every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under Section 9 the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 3 also the report by such officer under sub-section (4) of that section. It is urged that since the detenu did not act with promptitude, he cannot make a grievance that his representation was not dealt with expeditiously. It is stated that appropriate Government is obligated to send representation, if any, made along with grounds etc. It is therefore, an invariable requirement to make the representation before the period indicated in Section 10 of the Act. 10. The plea raised on behalf of the State is absolutely untenable. It is stated that appropriate Government is obligated to send representation, if any, made along with grounds etc. It is therefore, an invariable requirement to make the representation before the period indicated in Section 10 of the Act. 10. The plea raised on behalf of the State is absolutely untenable. Even if the detenu chose not to make a representation for consideration by the Advisory Board within the time prescribed for placing the matter before the Advisory Board, the representation made subsequently cannot be kept in cold storage, with the fallacious plea that he did not act with utmost promptitude to make a representation. The obligation of the appropriate Government to consider the detenus representation is separate from and independent of the consideration of the detenuts case by the Advisory Board. (See Smt. Gracy v. State of Kerala and another Sk. Sekawat v. The State of West Bengal, and Vimal Chand Jawantraj Jam v. Pradhan and others. The period of inaction is without justifiable reason, thereby infringing requirement of acting with utmost expedition. ( 11 ) THE inevitable conclusion is that the concerned authorities did not act with promptitude in dealing with representation of the detenu. That invalidates the order of detention (Annxure-1), which is liable to be quashed, which we direct. The detenu be released forthwith, unless he is required to be in custody in connection with any other case or proceeding. The writ application is allowed. No cost. S. N. Phukan, C. J.- I agree. Petition allowed. .