Judgment :- 1. The unsuccessful defendants before the Courts below are the appellants in the Second Appeal. The suit O.S. No. 563/90 was filed before the District Munsif Court, Mayiladuthurai by the respondents herein for recovery of possession and mesne profits from the date of suit till delivery and for costs. 2. Their case in the plaint is that the suit properly belonged to them and that it was let out to the first and the second defendants for running a lodge on the monthly rent of Rs. 900/-, that the third defendant as mandate holder had executed a lease in favour of the plaintiffs on 31.1.1976, that the said lease deed would bind defendants 1 and 2, that they filed an eviction petition before the Rent Controller, Mayiladuthurai in R.S.O.P. No. 22/81, that the defendants contended that they were not liable to be evicted, that it was a composite lease and the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was not applicable to the lease arrangement, and that the present suit has therefore, been filed. The claim for mesne profits was demanded at Rs. 2,500/-. 3. The third defendant, the mandate holder, remained ex parte and defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement contending inter alia as follows: There was no lease between the defendants 1 and 2 and the plaintiffs; any proceedings initiated against the third defendant would not bind them; the mandate had been given only for operating bank account; the third defendant had not given any power; the learned District Munsif, Mayiladuthurai has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit; the plaintiffs had cut off the water supply to the property; defendants 1 and 2 had filed O.S. No. 571/80 and the suit was liable to be dismissed. 4. Both the Courts have concurrently found that the defendants were liable to be thrown out and decreed the suit. The present Second 24 Appeal has been filed challenging the decision of the Court below. 5. Mr. A. Subramanya Aiyar, learned counsel for the appellants submits as follows: The lease was executed by the third defendant in his personal capacity and it would not bind defendants 1 and 2. The notice to quit does not satisfy the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act There is a decree against the defendants and they are bound to pay at the rate of Rs. The notice to quit does not satisfy the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act There is a decree against the defendants and they are bound to pay at the rate of Rs. 750/- per month from 1990 upto date. 6. Let us how examine the question whether there is proper notice to quit it is submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents that as per the terms of the lease Ex. A-4 between the parties dated 31.1.1976. the defendants through their mandate holder had waived issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Clause 12 of Ex. A-4 clearly says that after expiry of the lease period viz., 31.12.1980, the defendants 1 and 2 represented by their mandate holder, the third defendant would surrender possession to the plaintiffs without insisting on any notice to quit. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the respondents relies on the following decisions. 1. Nasir Basha v. Turukkam Chatram Charities ( 1976 (1) M.L.J 156 =89 L.W. 18 S.N.; 2. Shanti Devi v. Amai Kumar ( AIR 1981 SC 1550 ); 3. Provash Chandra Dalui v. Biswanath Banerjee ( AIR 1989 SC 1834 ): Learned counsel submitted that it is not open to the appellants to contend that there was any need for issue of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the first of the three decisions, a learned Judge of this Court had occasion to consider the question of waiver and validity of the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judge held that where there is contract as to giving notice or waiving notice the parties are governed by the terms of the contract and the law enacted in Section 106, cannot apply Where the contract was that the tenant should surrender the property whenever required, the provisions as to notice in Section 106 cannot apply to it. On the facts of that case, the learned Judge held that the notice to quit was valid. In the second decision cited above, the Supreme Court held that before deciding the validity of notice under Section 106, the Court should first decide whether Section 106 was applicable or not. It cannot assume that the lease was from month to month. On the facts of that case, the learned Judge held that the notice to quit was valid. In the second decision cited above, the Supreme Court held that before deciding the validity of notice under Section 106, the Court should first decide whether Section 106 was applicable or not. It cannot assume that the lease was from month to month. Thus, where a lease is for a fixed term, the Court cannot take the pleadings of the parties for determining the nature of lease. The parties cannot by their pleadings alter intrinsic character of lease. Where the lease was for a definite term and it expired by efflux of time by reason of Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, the service of a notice under Section 106 was not necessary for determination of the lease. In the third decision cited supra, the Supreme Court held that where the terms of the lease were clear, they must be accepted. The Supreme Court also referred to the distinction between waiver and estoppel and observed that intentional relinquishment of a known right or such conduct as warrants aforesaid inference is an essential element of waiver while in estoopel intent is immaterial. 7. In the instant case, it is clear that under Ex. A-4 the parties had agreed that on the expiry of the term of lease the lessee would surrender possession without waiting for a notice to quit. As regards the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants regarding the right of the third defendant to represent defendants 1 and 2 as mandate holder, learned counsel for the respondents drew my attention to the oral evidence of the third defendant as D.F. 1 Tamil 8. Admittedly the third defendant is the husband of the second defendant and the defendants 1 and 2 are the partners of New Colombo Stores against which the present suit was filed. It is, therefore, not open to the appellants to contend that proper notice has been issued to proper persons and that the notice does not satisfy the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned counsel on this aspect is rejected. Even otherwise, if we examine the notice Ex. A-2 dated 13.4.1969/18.4.1989, there is nothing to suggest that the termination is defective. The sentence in Ex. The contention of the learned counsel on this aspect is rejected. Even otherwise, if we examine the notice Ex. A-2 dated 13.4.1969/18.4.1989, there is nothing to suggest that the termination is defective. The sentence in Ex. A-2 reads as follows: “Hence my clients are issuing a notice terminating your tenancy and calling upon you to vacate the premises at the end of the tenancy month which would expire next after 15 days of the receipt of this notice, failing which suitable legal action will be initiated against you in the Court of law.” It could have been in a much simpler language but it conveys the meaning alright. The termination was to take effect on the expiry of the next calendar month and defendants 1 and 2 were to quit and deliver vacant possession on the next day after the last date of the calendar month. 9. The other contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that notice had not been issued to the third defendant is also without substance. Notice was issued to defendants 1 and 2 who were the partners of New Colombo Stores and the third defendant had been made a party to the proceeding, who chose to remain ex-parte, but gave evidence for defendants 1 and 2. The defendants have successfully dodged vacating the property right from 1981 though the period fixed under the lease expired even in 1980. 10. There is no question of law, much less substantial question of law involved in the Second Appeal, and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs, Consequently, C.M.P. No. 6740/97 is also dismissed. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants at the end of the arguments submitted that in case the Court were to hold against the appellants, the appellants should be given a reasonable time for vacating the property. Learned counsel for the respondent had no objection for granting a reasonable time provided the appellants paid the arrears of rent uptodate and also paid the future rent as and when it became due. Learned counsel for the respondent had no objection for granting a reasonable time provided the appellants paid the arrears of rent uptodate and also paid the future rent as and when it became due. The appellants are granted four months time to vacate the property subject to their paying the entire arrears within a period of four weeks from today and continuing to pay the future rent as and when it became due and also filing the affidavit to that effect and undertaking to vacate the property on the expiry of the time of four months granted. Time to file affidavit two weeks.