JUDGMENT 1. - Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Bhawani Mandl, the appellant in all these appeals, is a body corporate constituted as a marketing committee under section 6 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, (the Act), to supervise and control the transactions of sale and purchase of agricultural produce by the 5 traders from the agriculturists in order to prevent exploitation of the farmers in the market area of Bhawani Mandi, declared as such Under section 4 of the Act. Section 17 of the Act empowers the appellant to collect market fees from the licensees in the prescribed manner on agricultural produce brought or sold by them in the market area at such rate as may he specified by the State Government, by to notification in the Official Gazette, subject to a maximum of Re. 1/- per rupees one hundred worth of agricultural produce. The respondents in these appeals are the licence traders, carrying on the transactions of purchase and sale of agricultural produce in the said market area. 2. Sometimes in the year 1981 the appellant filed complaints against the respondents, in all these appeals, for their having contravened the provisions of Section 17 of the Act in as much as that during the periods, as mentioned in the respective complaints, the respondents though carried on transactions of sale and purchase of agricultural commodities in the market area, controlled and supervised by the appellant, yet they did not pay the required market fee Under section 17 of the Act on such transactions and thus committed an offence, punishable Under section 29 of the Act. It appears that the learned Magistrate, before proceeding further in the matter, chose to hear the parties on the question of applicability of Section 17 of the Act to the agricultural commodities wherein the respondents had undisputedly transacted during the periods, mentioned in the respective complaints. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Magistrate came to hold the opinion that on the data of transactions in question 'Rui' (Ginned cotton) was not included in the schedule to the Act as an agricultural produce, liable to charge of market fee Under section 17 of the Act. The learned Magistrate, therefore, dismissed the complaints against the respondents and discharged them of the offence Under section 29 r.w. Section 17 of the Act. The learned Magistrate, therefore, dismissed the complaints against the respondents and discharged them of the offence Under section 29 r.w. Section 17 of the Act. Hence all these appeals by the appellants, involving the same common point. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently urged that 'Rui' (ginned cotton), in which the respondents had dealt in during the periods, mentioned in their respective complaints, fell within the purview of an agricultural produce, liable to charge of market fee Under section 17 of the Act and mentioned in Schedule to the Act at serial No. 1. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned Magistrate committed an error in not appreciating the definition of the word 'cotton' as was explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Chiman Lal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 96 . It was submitted that since the learned Magistrate committed an error in discharging the respondents at that stage of the proceedings, the impugned orders are required to be vacated. 4. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, invited my attention to the amendments, made by the State Govt. in the Schedule to the Act from time to time and submitted that since the State Government had chosen not to charge any market fee in respect of transactions of sale and purchase of ginned cotton, the learned Magistrate has committed no error in dismissing the appellant's complaints. In this behalf reference was made to certain notifications, issued by the State Government, amending the Schedule to the Act in exercise of its powers Under section 40 of the Act. Reliance was also made on the Supreme Court decision in the case of State of Raj. & Ors. v. Raj. Agricultural Input Dealers Association & Ors., 1996 (5) SCC 479 wherein the definition of agricultural produce, as given in Section 2(1)(i) and the Schedule to the Act were interpreted and construed. 5. For disposal of the present appeals it is necessary to point out that the offence under section 28 of the Act is punishable with three months imprisonment and with fine. For continuing offences fine of Rs. 500/- per day is leviable. 5. For disposal of the present appeals it is necessary to point out that the offence under section 28 of the Act is punishable with three months imprisonment and with fine. For continuing offences fine of Rs. 500/- per day is leviable. As would appear on subsequent discussion the offence, alleged to have been committed in all these appeals was not a "continuing offence" within the meaning of the term used in Section 472 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the period of limitation of one year's as prescribed in Section 468(2)(b) subject to the applicability of the provisions contained in Sections 469, 470 and 471' Cr.P.C. would be applicable to all these cases.The offences in all the present cases are stated to have been committed in the year 1981 and we are now in 1997. In none of the cases any proceeding, except hearing the parties at the preliminary stage, were taken by the time the impugned orders were passed. In view of such state of affairs the directions issued by the Supreme Court in the case of Common Cause, A Registered Society v. U.O.I., AIR 1996 SC 1619 apply to all these cases, for the obvious reason that the offence complained of is not a continuing offence. 6. A criminal liability arises out of an act of commission or act of omission when such act amounts to an offence. A wrongful act or failure to perform an act which is required by law to be done is complete as soon as the wrongful act is committed, or is omitted to be done within the period of limitation prescribed by law for doing it. When the wrongful act of commission or of omission is so completed the criminal liability gets attracted. It would be a case of completed offence. With the completion of the wrongful act, either of commission or of omission the very source of injury caused by such act ceases to continue and the criminal liability, created by such act, starts attracting the period of limitation, prescribed by law for redressal of the injury caused by the wrongful act of commission or omission. 7. In a continuing wrong the injury caused by the wrongful act itself continues to subsist and gives rise to a cause of action at every moment of its existence and subsistence. In the case of completed wrong the effect ensuing therefrom determines the quantum of punishment. 7. In a continuing wrong the injury caused by the wrongful act itself continues to subsist and gives rise to a cause of action at every moment of its existence and subsistence. In the case of completed wrong the effect ensuing therefrom determines the quantum of punishment. In continuing wrong the punishment has reference to the period of continuance of the wrong and is ordinarily determined and computed with reference to such period. The measurement of the damage or punishment with reference to the period, prescribed for redressal of the wrong does not necessarily make a completed wrong as a continuing wrong. 8. In the case of Lalakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare & Ors. v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan & Ors., AIR 1959 SC 798 it was held that: "It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury." 9. In the instant cases the offence of not paying the market fee on a transaction of sale or purchase of agricultural produce is complete as soon as such transaction takes place and the period of limitation, as prescribed Under section 468(2) Cr.P.C., commences to run. Merely because the fine leviable had a reference to the period of non payment of fees and thus the computation of fine was to be made with reference to the period during which the amount of fee was not paid the offence Under section 28 of the Act did not become a "Continuing offence" within the meaning of the terms Under section 472 Cr.P.C. Computation of amount of fine @ Rs. 500/- per day Under section 28(2) simply has a reference to the period of non-payment of the market fee and helps to measure the effect of the wrongful act which stood completed on non-payment of the market fee at a prescribed point of time and does not make the offence under that provision a continuing offence. 10. For all the above reasons I am of the view that the offence Under section 28 of the Act was not a continuing offence so as to take out the present cases from the purview of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Common Cause (supra). 11. However, coming to the merits of the cases also it may he pointed out that in the case of Chiman Lal (supra) the Apex Court had declared that: "Cotton, ginned or unginned, continues to he cotton till its identity by some chemical or industrial process. So long as the identity is not lost, the fact that it is pressed into hales or packed otherwise does not make it any the less cotton specified in the Schedule to the Act. In this view, the pressed cotton in bales is an agricultural produce as defined in Section 2(l)(i) of the Act, and, therefore, a person doing business in the said produce without licence contravenes R. 95 of the Rules." 12. The learned Magistrate was right when he pointed out that in the above cases the Supreme Court was not concerned with the levy of market fee Under section 17 of the Act. Lavy of fee has reference to the services rendered and is, though different in meanings from 'cess' and 'tax', yet even then it attracts pecuniary as well as penal liability on the subject and, therefore, its levy should attract strict interpretation. 13. At this stage it may he pointed out that in the case of Kishan Lal & Ors. v. State of Raj., 1990 (Suppl.) SCC 742 the Supreme Court held that: "Sugar produced in mills or factories is deemed to be agricultural produce. The definition of the word 'agricultural produce' in the Act includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule. v. State of Raj., 1990 (Suppl.) SCC 742 the Supreme Court held that: "Sugar produced in mills or factories is deemed to be agricultural produce. The definition of the word 'agricultural produce' in the Act includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule. The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced in mill or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil. Further the expanse of the expression 'or otherwise as specified in the Schedule' cannot also he overlooked." 14. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered over the si me issue in the case of State of Raj. v. Raj. Agriculture Input Dealers' Association (supra) and held that: "The definition of 'agricultural produce' in Section 2(1)(1) of the Act is wide and inclusive. But that does not mean that in interpreting the items mentioned in the Schedule, mention of a particular item would ipso facto mean inclusion of all its method. The Schedule applicable on the relevant dates discloses that Item 2 is titled as 'Dhanya' (foodgrains). The scheme of serialising processed items is reflective of a positive application of mind that not only the original foodgrains which are foodgrains per se included, but their products and derivatives too are mentioned specifically as agricultural produce due to its wide definition." Their Lordships further observed that: "The Schedule is not meant to he filled by inferences. What is mean) to contain therein shall be explicit and categoric. Nothings slops the Slate Government to add suitable words therein to convey that foodgrain, as processed for seeds, would also he agricultural produce within the meaning of the expression 'or otherwise' occurring in Section 2(1 )(1) of the Act. Since no such exercise has been taken, the Starr Government cannot be permitted to achieve indirectly which it could have achieved directly, by being specific in that regard. It must, therefore, he concluded that bajra seeds are not 'agricultural produce' within the meaning of Section 2(l)(i) and the Schedule to the Act." 15. In the instant cases it may he pointed out that in the schedule as was originally attached to the Act the entry made Al serial No. I ran as under 1. Fibre: Cotton - ginned and unpinned. In the instant cases it may he pointed out that in the schedule as was originally attached to the Act the entry made Al serial No. I ran as under 1. Fibre: Cotton - ginned and unpinned. The schedule appears to have been amended by the State Govt. vide S.O. No. 288, Dated March 29, 1975 and the entry at serial No. I to the schedule was amended in the following manner: 1- rUrq %& dikl vkSj :bZ] esLrk] luA 16. The schedule was further amended vide notification No. F. 10(2) Krishi Group-2175, dated May 16, 1975 in the following manner: 1- rUrq %& dikl vkSj :bZ] esLrk] luA 17. The schedule was further amended vide S.O. No. 22. dated April 23. 1977 and entry at serial No. I began to read as under: 1- rUrq %& diklA 18. It is thus clear that by repeatedly amending entry at serial No. 1 in the Schedule to the Act the State Govt. appears to have treated different items of agricultural produce differently for the purposes of bringing them within the ambit of agricultural produce and possibly making them subject to the levy of market fee. In such state of affairs the learned Magistrate could have reasonably taken the view what he has taken in his impugned orders. 19. In view of the above, the impugned orders cannot be declared as invalid or illegal. I find no force in any of these appeals and the same are hereby dismissed. 20. This order shall, however, not come in the way of the appellant seeking its civil remedy to the wrong allegedly committed against it. 21. A copy of this order shall be forwarded to all the judicial courts and all the Krishi Upaj Mandis in the State for information.Appeal dismissed. *******