JUDGMENT 1. -The common question involved in ail these four petitions under section 482 Cr.PC. is whether a Magistrate has the discretionary power under section 457 Cr.PC. to release a property which is "liable to confiscation" under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 (the "Customs Act") when such property is initially seized by a police officer but the custody, control and possession thereof has subsequently been delivered by such police officer to the proper officer (a Customs Officer) under the Customs Act. 2. The learned counsel for the Union of India and the Customs Department have vehemently urged that the Customs Act which makes provisions for the arrest and detention of the offenders against that Act and search and seizure of properties, liable to confiscation, being a special law over rides the provisions of the Code Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC ), which is a general law, in regard to the disposal of properties seized and liable to confiscation. The learned counsel placed reliance on a number of decisions of this Court as well as of other High Courts and the Apex Court namely : 1. Asstt. Customs Collector v. Tilak Raj, AIR 1969 Delhi 301 2. Superintendent, Customs & Central Excise v. Ram Chand, AIR 1970 SC 1065 3. lllias v. Collector of Customs, Madras, AIR 1970 SC 1065 4. Susanta Kumar Adhikari & others v. State of West Bengal, 1983 Cr.LJ 772 (Cal.) 5. RO. Thomas & Ors. v. U.O.I., 1990 Cr.LJ 1028 (Ker.) 6. Sup. of Customs & Central Excise Nagercoil v. R. Sunder, 1993 Cr.LJ 956 (Mad.) 7. Bhana Bhai Khalpa Bhai v. Collector of Customs & Anr., 1994(1) Crimes 941 (SC) 8. Asstt. Collector, Customs v. Surajmal, 1974 RLW 15 (Raj.) 9. Ghanshyam Soni v. V/s. U.O.I., (S.B. Cr. Misc. Pet. No. 614/91) Raj. decided on 12.7.91. 3. The learned counsel for Sukhdev Singh Ayub Ali and Satyanarain Respondents, on the other hand, urged with same industry and vehemence that once a property, may be it is liable to confiscation under the provisions of the Customs Act, has been seized by the police in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.PC. and, for that matter, even by a Customs Officer under the provisions of the Customs Act, a Magistrate has the power to entrust its supardgi under section 457 Cr.PC. for the period prior to inquiry or trial and under section 451 Cr.PC. and, for that matter, even by a Customs Officer under the provisions of the Customs Act, a Magistrate has the power to entrust its supardgi under section 457 Cr.PC. for the period prior to inquiry or trial and under section 451 Cr.PC. during the period of the pendency of the inquiry or trial and the final disposal thereof under section 452 Cr.PC. at conclusion of trial. The learned counsel submitted that the provisions of the Customs Act do not at all come in the way of the Magistrate in the exercise of his discretionary powers under sections 457, 451 & 452 Cr.PC. and since the learned Magistrate had, in the present cases, exercised his discretionary power under section 457 Cr.PC. in a judicial manner this court should not interfere with his order. In support of their arguments the learned counsel relied upon several decisions including the followings : 1. Gyan Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 496 2. Asstt. Collector Customs v. M. Ibrahim Peerzada, 1970 Cr.LJ 1305 (Guj.) 3. Misrimal Hans Raj v. U.O.I., 1975 Cr.LJ 1617 (Mad.) 4. Union of India v. Karambhai Umer Bhai Qureshi, 1979 Cr.LJ 1172 (Goa, Daman & Dieu) 5. Asstt. Collector Customs v. Sheikh Abdul Karim, 1990(47) ELT 505 (Bom.) 6. Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan. 1994(70) E.L.T. 12 (SC) 7. Ganeshi Bhai Soni v. State of Raj. & Ors. (afore- mentioned) 8 Rahim Khan v. U.O.I (SB Cri. Misc. Pet. No. 169/91 decided by Raj. High Court on 14.2.91) 9. Ramzan Khan v. State of Raj. & Ors., (SB Cri. Misc. Pet. No. 282/92 decided by Raj. High Court on 10.4.92) 10. Ramzan Khan v. State of Raj. & Ors., (SB Cr. Misc. Pet No. 744/92 decided by Raj. High Court on 4.6.92 in SB Cr. Misc. Pet. No. 282/92). I studied the cases, cited at Bar before me, in the light of the relevant provisions in the Customs Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 4. On examination of the material placed before me it was noticed that in Ayub's case (SB Cri. Misc. Pet. Nos. 195/9b and 140/97) an adjudication order of confiscation of the seized vehicle in that case has already been made on 5.6.1997 under section 122 of the Customs Act and adjudication proceedings in respect of the seized vehicles in rest of the two petitions are also in progress. Misc. Pet. Nos. 195/9b and 140/97) an adjudication order of confiscation of the seized vehicle in that case has already been made on 5.6.1997 under section 122 of the Customs Act and adjudication proceedings in respect of the seized vehicles in rest of the two petitions are also in progress. This position of facts was in fact sufficient to dispose off these petitions by making appropriate orders under section 482 Cr.PC. However, with a view to explain the approach of this court in the case of Ganesh Bhai Soni's case (supra), which has been relied upon by both sides, in the light of the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases of Gyan Chand, lllias, Bhanabhai Khalpa Bhai & Director of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, noted above, I would like to add a few lines to the discussion. 5. Need it be added that the Customs Act is a 'Special Law' within the meaning of the then defined in S. 41 IPC and for the purposes of S. 5 of the Cr.PC. It was brought on the Statute Book with the object of preventing smuggling activities by facilitating the detection and confiscation of goods being smuggled into and out of the country, which activities adversely affected the trade and industry and caused erosion in the national economy. Therefore, to meet the challenge, effectively & expeditiously, posed by the ever-in-creasing smuggling activities, Customs (Amendment) Ordinance, 1969, issued on 3rd January, 1969 was replaced by the present Customs Act by making certain additional provisions. A study of the scheme underlying this Act informs that the main thrust was given to discouraging smuggling activities by facilitating the detection of and also confiscation of smuggled goods alongwith the means of carriage, movement and transportation of such goods in addition to imposition of penalties for evasion of Customs duty and for adopting the means of carriage, movement and transportation of smuggled goods. The chief characteristic of this enactment is the conferment of a peculiar and unique status on the officer of customs engaged in the execution of the Act and judicious treatment of the goods and other property seized in the course of such execution. The chief characteristic of this enactment is the conferment of a peculiar and unique status on the officer of customs engaged in the execution of the Act and judicious treatment of the goods and other property seized in the course of such execution. Powers of search, seizure and arrest were conferred upon such officers of Customs who were assigned those functions by the Central Board of Excise and Customs or the Collector of Customs and detailed provisions for exercising such powers by them were made in Chapter XIII of the Customs Act. In the matter of exercise of such powers by the officer of Customs the provisions of general law, as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and the Evidence Act 1872 were either excluded or were made applicable to the proceedings under the Customs Act with suitable modifications. An offence committed against the Customs Act was though made punishable with seven years imprisonment and fine maximum with one year imprisonment minimum [S. 135(1)(i)] yet, notwithstanding Schedule II to the Cr.PC. the offences under the Act were declared "non cognisable" [S. 104(4)] and cognisance thereof by a court was made dependent upon grant of previous sanction of the Collector of Customs (Sec. 137), All offences, save those falling within the purview of Section 135(1)(i) and (2), were made triable in a summary way (Sec. 138). Armed with the power to take preventive action against the commission of a cognisable offence (Chapter XI Cr.PC.) and to effect arrest of an offender without warrant (Sec. 41 Cr.PC.) and to seize "any property" which might be found under circumstances which created suspicion of any offence (Sec. 102)1) Cr.PC.), as an officer of police was but the offences under the Customs Act were non-cognisable, he was statutorily empowered and required, like officers of certain other departments, to assist the officers of Customs in the execution of the Customs Act (Sec. 151 Customs Act). The law of evidence was also suitably modified in matters relating to the execution of the Customs Act. Doctrines of presumptions, relevancy and admissibility of statements by the arresties & other persons admissibility of certain documentary evidence were also suitably relaxed and modified (Ss. 138B to 139) to, effectively and expeditiously, administer and execute of the Customs Act. The law of evidence was also suitably modified in matters relating to the execution of the Customs Act. Doctrines of presumptions, relevancy and admissibility of statements by the arresties & other persons admissibility of certain documentary evidence were also suitably relaxed and modified (Ss. 138B to 139) to, effectively and expeditiously, administer and execute of the Customs Act. Similarly, a fair deal was also given in the matter of confiscation of goods and conveyances, attracting the provisions of the Customs Act, after their seizure. The proper officer, seizing any goods which is liable to confiscation, was statutorily required to prepare an inventory of such goods and make an application to a Magistrate for the purposes of (a) certifying the correctness of the inventory so prepared, (b) laking photographs of such goods in the presence of the Magistrate and (c) to allow him to draw representative samples in his presence (Sec. 110). Confiscation of the seized goods and other properties was made subject to mandatory compliance of issue of show cause notice under section 124 failing which the seized goods was required to be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized, after the expiry of six months of their seizure or subject to the extension granted by the Collector of Customs, 12 months maximum (Sec. 110(2) Customs Act). The possessor or owner of the goods seized was given right of hearing in the adjudication proceedings under section 122, option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation under section 125, a right of appeal to Collector (Appeals) under section 128, a further right to appeal to the Appellate Tribunal (Sec. 129A). Powers of revision were conferred upon the Collector of Customs & the Board, the Central Govt, and of reference to the High Court and the Supreme Court on a question of law & also an appeal to the Supreme Court in exceptional & suitable cases (Secs. 129D. 129DA, 129DD. 130, 130A, 130B, 130E of the Customs Act). 6. In the above scheme of the Act it remains no more difficult to understand the correct position of the powers of the officer of the police to arrest a suspected offender of the Customs Act and to effect search of his person and seize the property which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of "any offence". The offences under the Customs Act being non-cognisable, the officer of the police cannot arrest the offender under section 41 Cr.PC. without a warrant. But he is required not only to take action for prevention of the commission of offences as per Chapter XI Cr.PC. but also to assist the officer of Customs in the execution of the Customs Act, as required by Section 151 of that Act. What should he then do The officer of the police may detain the offender and hand him over to the proper officer of the Customs. Here it may be remembered that though a proper officer under the customs Act has the power to arrest a person under section 104 and also has the same powers in the matter of release of the arrested person on bail as an officer- in-charge of a police station has and is also under the same restrictions & limitation under the Cr.PC. a is a police officer yet he is not a police officer for the purposes of Sections 24, 25 of the Evidence Act. Similarly, though a person who may be reasonably believed to have been guilty of an offence punishable under Section 135 of the Customs Act, may be arrested as an accused by an officer of Customs and is required to be taken to a Magistrate without unnecessary delay and may or may not be released on bail by the officer of Custom yet he is not to be regarded as an accused for the purposes of Sections 24 & 25 of the Evidence Act, though he may make a statement incriminating himself under sections 107 & 108 of the Customs Act and the statement made by him under section 108 may be used as substantive evidence in any prosecution for an offence under the Customs Act in the circumstances contemplated by Section 138B(l)(b). It would thus appear that though an officer of Customs has, almost all the attributes of an officer of police yet he is not a police officer and, similarity, the person arrested under Section 104 has practically all the attributes of an accused yet he is not an accused for the purposes of Section 24 and 25 of the Evidence Act. It may thus be appreciated that the Customs Act makes some specific and exhaustive provisions to deal with certain aspects of the subject which fall within its purview. It may thus be appreciated that the Customs Act makes some specific and exhaustive provisions to deal with certain aspects of the subject which fall within its purview. It, being a special law, is saved by Section 5 Cr.PC. in its operation and execution in relation to these matters for which specific and quite exhaustive provisions are made therein and, therefore, on such matters it would exclude the application and operation of the relevant provisions in the general law namely the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 7. Once the very scheme underlying the Customs Act is appreciated in the manner stated above, it is not much difficult to appreciate that a police officer does not have much role to play, with his powers under Cr.PC., in the execution of the Customs Act. No doubt, as a police officer acting under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, he is empowered to seize any property under section 102 which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. Such suspicious circumstances may lead him to seize a property liable to confiscation under the Customs Act as well. Here it may be pointed out that if he unknowingly comes to seize a property which is later found liable to confiscation the seizure by him would be under section 102 Cr.PC. and the provisions relating to the disposal of such property like those mentioned in Sections 457, 451, 452 Cr.PC. would come into play. But if he has the information that an offence against the Customs Act is likely to be committed and if he seizes such property with such knowledge of the same being liable to confiscation under Customs Act, then the police officer would be simply assisting the officers of Customs as directed by Section 151 of that Act. Under such circumstances the provisions of Customs Act relating to the disposal of the seized property, which may be by way of adjudication proceedings, would come into play and a Magistrate would not be justified in making orders under section 457 Cr.PC. with regard to the interim supardgi of the seized property. 8. It is true that if a property liable to confiscation has been seized by an officer of the police under section 102 Cr.PC. with regard to the interim supardgi of the seized property. 8. It is true that if a property liable to confiscation has been seized by an officer of the police under section 102 Cr.PC. and then handed over to the officer of the customs it would not be a seizure under section 110 by the Customs officer. But that would be so far the purposes of Section 123 of the Customs Act only and such a seizure of the property by the Customs officer would not amount to the "goods seized" so as to raise the rebuttable presumption, contemplated by Section 123, of such goods being smuggled goods. Such a seizure by the officers of Custom would not check the operation of other provisions under the Customs Act and would not make the provisions of general law applicable to the matter of disposal of such property. 9. In fact the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction of the Magistrate under section 457 Cr.PC. depends upon police officers reporting to him of the seizure of the property under section 102 Cr.PC. If before making such a report the police officer has already handed over the seized property to the officer of customs, as is required to be done under the customs Act, it becomes the duty of the officer of the custom himself under section 110 (1-B) to report to the Magistrate the inventory of the goods seized by him. Had the legislature intended to empower the Magistrate on interim supardgi of a person till the initiation of the adjudication proceedings or during such proceedings it might have been provided in the Customs Act itself in or near about Section 110 (1-B). The scheme of the Customs Act, however, speak that after the seizure of the property under section 110 provisions regarding confiscation of goods and conveyances & imposition of penalties were made in Sections 111 to 127 in Chapter XIV of the Customs Act. Under such circumstances there was no occasion for Section 457 Cr.PC. to come into play. 10. Here I may point out that the powers of the High Court under section 482 Cr.PC. in the matter of interim supardgi of the goods or conveyances seized or to pass other similar orders for their safe custody are not conferred by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. to come into play. 10. Here I may point out that the powers of the High Court under section 482 Cr.PC. in the matter of interim supardgi of the goods or conveyances seized or to pass other similar orders for their safe custody are not conferred by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. These are inherent powers of this Court by virtue of it being the highest court in the State. If it comes to the notice of this court that despite having powers to initiate proceedings for confiscation of the seized conveyances the officers of the Customs have been unduly delaying or have unreasonably delayed such initiation, this Court, with a view to prevent the abuse of the process of law/court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice to the party concerned, can always pass appropriate orders for the safe interim custody of the seized good and conveyances. Viewed thus the orders passed by this court in different cases including the case of Ghanshyam Soni, were passed on the merits of those cases. They do not lay down any proposition contrary to the above discussion and observations which, I think, are fortified by the decision of the Apex Court in the cases relied upon by the parties. 11. Now coming to the merits of the present cases it is not, as stated above, in dispute that conveyances seized therein, either by the officers of the police or by the officers of the customs, have already faced or are still facing the adjudication proceedings under section 115 of Customs Act for their confiscation with this established position the impugned order, if allowed to remain in force would not only create confusion and create complications in giving effect to the orders passed in those proceedings & by the appellate and revisional authorities under various provisions of the Customs Act, as referred to above. That would lead to the abuse of the process of law generated from the abuse of the process of the court by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, in order to prevent such abuse of the process of law/court and to secure the ends of justice it is necessary that the impugned orders be set aside. 12. That would lead to the abuse of the process of law generated from the abuse of the process of the court by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, in order to prevent such abuse of the process of law/court and to secure the ends of justice it is necessary that the impugned orders be set aside. 12. In the result, therefore, the impugned orders passed by the learned Magistrate in the cases of all the three respondents namely, Sukhdev Singh, Ayub Ali and Satya Narain Soni & which have been challenged by them in SB Cr. Misc. Pet. Nos. 703/95, 195/96 & 557/96 respectively are hereby set aside and all the above-mentioned petitions allowed. 13. Ayub Ali had preferred S.B. Cri. Misc. Pet. No. 140/97 against the order of stay granted in SB Cri. Misc. Pet. No. 195/96. Since the main petition has been accepted and the rule made absolute, Ayub Ali's said petition fails and is hereby dismissed. In fact, that had wrongly been registered as a separate Cr. Misc. Petition under section 482 Cr.P.C.Petition allowed accordingly. *******