JUDGMENT P K Palli, J.—As both these appeals involved common question of law and fact, the same are proposed to be disposed of by a common judgment. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Court have also decided these matters by a common judgment. 2. The appeals arise out of two applications filed by respondent Sita Ram under Order 34. Rule 8 of the Cod? of Civil Procedure, wherein prayed for the passing of a final decree against the appellants, which were dismissed by the trial Court as time barred, but on appeal the decision arrived at by the trial Court was set aside and the applications stand allowed These appeals have been filed by Munshi Ram and others, who were respondents before the trial Court The case has a chequered history One Diwana was the original mortgagor and he obtained two preliminary decrees for possession on July 31, Iv62 by way of redemption Both these decrees were against the mortgagees, ie9 the present appellants An appeal is said to have been filed by these mortgagees and proceedings were ordered to be stayed The appeals were dismissed by the then District Judge on January 17, 1965 and second appeal tiled before the learned Judicial Commissioner was also dismissed on December 6, 1965. Review petition is also said to have been filed, but with no fruitful result, ft would be very relevant at this stage to make a mention of the fact that respondent had moved two petitions before the trial Court for the passing of final decree on May 6, 1963 But as said above, the proceeding were ordered to be stayed by the then District Judge in appeals having been filed by the mortgagees. It was on June 2, 1969 that the original mortgagor moved two applications under Order 34, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the trial Court for passing the final decree As the original mortgagor had died, his widow was brought on record and she also died soon thereafter and Sita Ram moved and application under Order 22, Rule 3 of tae Code of Civil Procedure claiming himself to be the legel representative on the basis of a gift executed by Diwana, the original mortgagor, as well as legal representative of Parwati on the basis of a ‘Will alleged to have been executed by her. The application was allowed, as per detailed order dated November 24, 1980 and thereafter, the parties were asked to lead evidence on issue No 1 in respect of limitation The trial Court passed final decree and the applications stood allowed. The appeal filed by the mortgagees was accepted and the case was remanded back for fresh decision that some applications on record had not been disposed of and these required leading of evidence. The applications were dismissed in default as nobody appeared on behalf of the mortgagors. The application for restoration was made and allowed on May 23, 1985 The morgagor went in appeal, which was allowed on April 17, 1986 and the case was again sent back for deciding the main applications on merits in view of certain observations made by the Additional District Judge 3. On remand the case was taken up again and it was found that the applications mentioned in the judgment of the appellate Court already stood dismissed, as not pressed and the question of limitation was again gone into and decision was arrived at afresh on the issue. On appreciation of the material placed on record and on the basis of certain decided cases the trial Court held that limitation for the filing of the applications could at best start running maximum from the date, ie9 January 17, 1965, when the appeal filed by the mortgagees was dismissed by the District Judge It was further held that the time spent in appeal as well as in review petition before the learned Judicial Commissioner could not be excluded while computing the time which is prescribed, i.e , three years, The applications were, consequently, held as time barred” 4. On the other issue, it was noticed that Sita Ram did not press the application moved by him and the mortgagor had already moved another application seeking substitution for the original mortgagee being the legal representative of the latter and the issue was disposed of in detail on November 24, 1980 and as he had been held to be the legal representative of original mortgagor, no challenge having been made, the order became final. It was in this situation that the applications for impleading them as necessary party were not pressed. The issue was accordingly decided 5. It was in this situation that the applications for impleading them as necessary party were not pressed. The issue was accordingly decided 5. As both the applications were disposed of by a common judgment, two separate appeals were filed by Sita Ram before the first appellate Court, which have been accepted and, consequently, resulting in setting aside the decision made by the trial Court and the applications have been allowed, resulting in the passing of the final decree in each case. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-mortgagees contends that in the given set of circumstances it will be Article 13/ of the Limitation Act which would come into operation and the applications having been filed beyond the prescribed period of three years were rightly held time barred by the trial Court and the appellate Court has gone wrong in reversing that decision It is next contended that Sita Ram has been wrongly held to be the legal representative of the deceased mortgagor. There is no valid gift in his favour nor he can be said to be the legal representative of Smt Parwati, the widow of the original mortgagor, who executed a Will’ in his favour The third argument raised is that Sita Ram has further transferred his right, title and interest in favour of certain other persons, who are complete strangers and they cannot be held to have succeeded to the right, title and interest of the original mortgagor and hence no relief could be allowed to them. 7. Learned Counsel appearing for the mortgagor-respondents, in reply, has adopted the same line of reasonings, which have been projected by the first appellate Court in the impugned judgment 8 After hearing the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and after going through the impugned judgment and the record, 1 find that there is no merit in these appeals 9. It is quite painful to observe that despite the preliminary decree have been passed in favour of the mortgagor way back on July 31, 1962, it has taken 35 years in the passing of the final decree and the delay has been occasioned on account of filing the appeals and review, as has been noticed above in the earlier part of this judgment, It is an admitted case of the parties that the redemption of the mortgaged land in both the cases was ordered without payment of any money. A direction was given to the mortgagees to bring documents in respect of the property so that this may be delivered to the plaintiff, i e , the original mortgagor on or before December 30, 1962. A further direction was given that the defendants, e.f mortgagees in the civil suit of redemption would re-transfer the suit property to the mortgagor free from the said mortgage and all encumbrances created by them, They were also directed to deliver possession to the plaintiff peacefully, 10. It may be noticed here at this stag, that Diwana, who was the original mortgagor, filed two applications separately praying for the preparation of the final decree in each of the case and these applications, as per impugned judgment, were registered on May 6, 1963, 11. In the meantime, mortgagees laid challenge by way of appeals which were dismissed by the District Judge on January 16, 1965 and January 17, 1965 and regular second appeal came to be dismissed by the learned Judicial Commissioner on December 6, 1965. The review petition against the judgment dated December 6, I9o5, was dismissed by the learned Judicial Commissioner on December 2, 1966 12. It has been pointed out by the first appellate Court that proceedings in respect of the preparation of the final decree in each of the cases were stayed by the District Judge daring the pendency of appeals filed by the by the mortgagees It was in this situation that the applications were consigned to the record by the trial Court on August 20, 1963. 13. It is not disputed that Diwana again filed two separate applications for the passing of the final decree in June, 1969 These applications had been resisted by the mortgagees by pleading that no final decree can be passed as both these applications are barred by time has also been noticed by the first appellate Court that the present respondent succeeded to the property left behind by Diwana on the basis of a gift, though the mortgagees had contested the plea, but he was accepted as legal representative and the decision reached in the proceedings had attained finality. 14. In this view of the situation, the argument raised by the learned Counsel that the respondents have no right, title and interest in the property in question, has no merit and is rejected. 15. 14. In this view of the situation, the argument raised by the learned Counsel that the respondents have no right, title and interest in the property in question, has no merit and is rejected. 15. The only issue that survived for determination before the Courts below, was, thus, pertaining to limitation. 16 As I look at the matter, the cause of action for securing final decree accrued to the decree-holder and mortgagor on July 31, 1962, on which date the preliminary decree was passed I also cannot refrain from observing that it is on account of the fault of the trial Court that the matter has lingered on for all these 35 years. As the land was ordered to be redeemed without any payment to the mortgagees, the trial Court could have straight away passed final decree in the suit, 17.. One thing which has to be kept in mind while determining the present controversy involved in these appeals, is—that in a mortgage suit the proceedings are in continuity till it results in the passing of the final decree. If an application has been made for the passing of the final decree within three years from the date of the preliminary decree passed by the District Judge, —the decree passed by trial Court merged into one which is ultimately passed by the Appeal Court, in that situation the date could be extended to December 6, 1965, ie the date on which the second appeal came to be dismissed by the learned Judicial Commissioner, or at best till December 2, 1966, when the review petition was dismissed. This would be the position in vie of the provisions contained under Order 34, Rule 8 (i) of the Code of Civil Procedure The application has to be filed within three years, ft is also too well known that where a preliminary decree for redemption of usufructuary mortgage is passed, the limitation does not begin to run till the deposit is made. It is undisputed that the mortgage in respect of the present controversy was created somewhere in the year 1937 and the suit for redemption was filed to the year 1959. It is undisputed that the mortgage in respect of the present controversy was created somewhere in the year 1937 and the suit for redemption was filed to the year 1959. In the given set of circumstances, it was the old Limitation Act, which was applicable and it prescribed a period of 60 years for redeeming the mortgage This period has now—been reduced to 30 years under the new Limitation Act (Act No. 6 of 1963)- A further period of seven years has been provided for under section 30 of the new Act for a suit which may be filed after commencement of the Act, in respect of the suits where limitation period had expired earlier. 18. The mortgagor. admittedly, moved applications in the year 1969 praying for the passing of the final decree and the right to redeem the given set of circumstances stood extended to 1971.the applications when passed by the learned Judicial Commissioner and the start point of limitation would be from the date the decree so passed by Ked Judicial Commissioner. The first appellate Court was absolutely in appreciating this point that as there was application praying for stay of the proceedings decree-holder inferred that the stay had been grimed No evidence has been placed on record to show that no such stay was" granted On the question of merger of the decree, it is wholly immaterial to see whether the appeal Court has affirmed, modified or reversed he decree passed by the trial Court This proposition would further lead to the analogy that it would also be immaterial whether there was any stay order or not. 19. Learned Counsel has also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in K Parameswaran Pillai v. K. Sumathi alias Jesis Jessis Jasquiline and another, AIR 1 94 SC 191, in further support of his contention. Para No 8 of the said judgment on which the learned Counsel heavily relies upon runs as under : "Under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 181 of Schedule II of old Act) three years period began to run when the right to apply accrued which began on May 7, 1970 The preliminary decree was drafted in Form No. 7-C (preliminary for redemption where on default of payment by mortgagor a decree for sale is passed). The preliminary decree since fixed the outer limit for deposit of the redemption money as on May 6, 1970 and the same was not extended by an order of the Court and I A. No 549 of 1979 was filed for passing the final decree on April 5, 1979 by which time the remedy to pa«s final decree has been barred by limitation” 20. In my view with utmost respect, the judgment has no application to the given facts and circumstances of this case It is really unfortunate to find that inspite of the decree having been passed in favour of the mortgagor way back in the year 1962, the mortgagee/appellants have succeeded in denying its benefit on account of one proceedings or the other despite the fact that the preliminary decree attained finality on December 2, 1966. There are no equities in favour of the mortgagees, 21.. In view of what has been said above, there is no merit in these appeals and the same are ordered to be dismissed with costs throughout, Counsel fee in this Court is assessed at Rs. 3,000 in each appeal. Appeals dismissed.