Honble SINGH, J.–Nations interest is supreme. Technicalities of law will have to bend before the larger interest of the country. Growing population is the greatest problem which the country is facing today. In the case of Air India vs. Negesh Meerza & Others (1), while considering the danger of growing population, the Supreme Court observed :– ``.... it will not only be desirable but absolutely essential for every country to see that the family planning programme is not only whipped up but maintained at sufficient levles so as to meet the danger of over-population which, if not controlled,may lead to serious social and economic problems throughout the world. (2). No enactment which promotes the social and economic justice can be held to be ultra vires. Social justice is a recognition of a greater good to a larger number of persons of a country. The expression ``social and economic justice involves the concept of distributive justice which concerns with the removal of economic inequalities. But this concept of justice becomes unthinkable withoutcontrolling the population growth. (3). No doubt, every citizen has a right to live with human dignity. But, how one can expect citizens of this country to have the human dignity and social equality when the population goes on increasing by leaps and bounds. (4). If the existing rate of growth of population is allowed to continue it is bound to take the country to a very dangerous stage where persons may die of hunger and may not have a roof over their heads to live. Our resources are limited and the population is increasing alarmingly. What would be the result? It is for the country men to think over seriously and answer to themselves more seriously. (5). The population explosion has to be controlled. But how? There are onlytwo ways :– 1. By self restraint and control; 2. By intervention of the legislature. (6). When the first method has failed, the legislature has come forward by imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest of the State. It has enacted laws tocurb the menace of population growth by imposing certain restrictions, in the shape of disqualifications on the members of the local bodies such as Panchayati Raj and Municipalities, to hold the office. These provisions have been challenged through large number of writ petitions which have come before us. (7). It has enacted laws tocurb the menace of population growth by imposing certain restrictions, in the shape of disqualifications on the members of the local bodies such as Panchayati Raj and Municipalities, to hold the office. These provisions have been challenged through large number of writ petitions which have come before us. (7). The entire bunch of writ petitions can be devided in two schedules :– 1. Schedule - A :- It consists of the writ petitions dealing with the constitutional validity of Section 19(l) of the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (In short - `1994 Act); 2. Schedule - B :- It consists the writ petitions challenging the validity of Section 26(xiv) proviso (e) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act (In short - `Municipalities Act). Section 19 of the Panchayati Raj runs as follows :- ``19. Qualifications for election as a Panch or a member.–Every persons registered as a voter in the list of voters of a Panchayati Raj Institution shall be qualified for election as a Panch or, as the case may be, a member of such Panchayati Raj Institution unless, duch person - (a) is disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purpose of election to the Legislature of the State of Rajasthan: Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than 25 years of age if he has attained the age of 21 years. (b) holds a salaried whole-time or part-time appointment under a local authority; (c) has been dismissed from State Government service for miscon- nduct involving moral turpitude and has been declared to be disqualified for employment in the public service; (d) holds any salaried post or place or profit under any Panchayati Raj Institution; (e) has directly or indirectly by himself or by his partner employer or employees, any share or interest in any contract with, by or on behalf of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned while owning such share or interest in any work done for; (f) is a leper or is suffering from any other bodily or mental defect or disease rendering him incapable for work; (g) has been convicted by a competent court or an offence involving moral turpitude; (h) is for the time being ineligible for election under Section 38; (i) has not paid, for two months from the date of the presentation of the notice of demand therefor, the amount of any tax or fees imposed by the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned; (j) is employed as a legal practitioner on behalf of or against the Pan- chayati Raj Institution concerned; (k) has been convicted of an offence punishable under the Rajasthan Prevention of Mrityu Bhoj Act, 1960; or (l) has more than two children:- PROVIDED THAT - (i) a person shall not, by reason only of his being a share- holder in or a member of any incorporated company or a co- operative society registered under the law for the time being in force in the State of Rajasthan, be held to be interested in any contract entered between the Company or co-operative society and the Panchayati Raj Institution; (ii) for the purpose of clauses (c), (g) and (k) any person shall become eligible for election after a lapse of six years from the date of his dismissal or conviction, as the case may be, or earlier if he is declared eligible for election by a general or special order of the State Government in this behalf; (iii) for the purpose of clause (i), a person shall not be deemed to be disqualified if he has paid the amount of the tax or fee due from him before the date of filing his nomination papers; (iv) for the purpose of clause (1), a person having more than two children shall not be deemed to be disqualified for so long as the num- ber of children he has on the date of commencement of this Act does not increase. EXPLANATION :- For the purpose of Clause (1) Section 19, where the couple has only one child from the earlier delivery or deliveries on the date of com- mencement of this Act and thereafter, any number of children born out of a single subsequent delivery shall be deemed to be one equity. (8). Members of the Panchayati Raj Institutions are aggrieved against imposition of the restriction on having more than two children which is primarily incorporated in Section 19(l) of the 1994 Act. (9). On the basis of this provision in some cases only notices have been issued to the concerned members to show cause as to why they may not be declared as disqualified from continuing as member on account of giving birth to an additional child in the family raising the number of children to more than two; In some cases orders have been passed by the Chief Executive Officer declaring a particular mem- ber as disqualified to hold the office on account of having more than two children. Facts of each and every case are not necessary to be mentioned in the order. (10). Challenging the validity of Section 19(l) read with Section 39 of the 1994 Act, it was contended that the order of the Chief Executive Officer declaring a member as disqualified, was passed in violation of the principle of natural justice. In those cases where the petitioners have not admitted the allegations made against them mentioned in the notice it was mandatory on the part of the compe-tent authority to have referred the matter to judicial officer to determine the disqualification. The Chief Executive Officer had no authority to decide it. The disqualification envisaged under Section 19 of the Act, deals with the qualification at the time of election and not at any subsequent stage. The disqualification could be challenged within 30 days by filing an election petition in a ccordance with theSection 43 of the Act read with Rule 80 of the Rules and it could not be challenged in other proceedings. The provisions of Section 19(l) read with Section 39 are ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution of India and there was no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved in enacting these provisions. (11). Almost identical restrictions have been imposed by Section 26 of the Municipalities Act. The provisions of Section 19(l) read with Section 39 are ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution of India and there was no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved in enacting these provisions. (11). Almost identical restrictions have been imposed by Section 26 of the Municipalities Act. It is quoted below :- ``Sec. 26.–A person, notwithstanding that he is otherwise qualified, shall be disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Board :– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (e) the birth within three years from the date of the commencement of the Rajasthan Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1992 (Rajasthan Act No.32 of 1992) hereinafter in this Clause referred to as the date of such commencement, of an additional child shall not be taken into consideration for the purpose of disqualification mentioned in Clause (xiv) and a person having more than two children (excluding the child, if any, born within three years from the date of such commencement) shall not be disqualified under that Clause for so long as the number of the children he had on the date of such commencement, does not increase. (12). The validity of Section 26(xiv) proviso-(e) has been challenged on the ground of being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. It is contrary to the mandate given by the Constitution. This provision is against the basic human dignity and basic institution of marriage and human behaviour. There is no co-relation of these provisions with the object sought to be achieved. It has also beencontended that neither the Parliament has enacted similar laws nor the State Legislature of other States have incorporated the same and, as such, it is discriminatory. (13). The validity of Section 19(l) of Section 39 of the 1994 Act has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 2340/1996(Mukesh Kumar Ajmera vs. State of Rajasthan), decided on 4th April, 1997 (2), alongwith large number of writ petitions wherein it has been held that the provisions of Section 19(l) and Section 39 of the 1994 Act are not hit by any provisions of the Constitution and they are constitutionally valid. Reference was made to the directive principles of the State Policy and also to the new provisions inserted inthe Constitution as Article 243 to 243(O). (14). Reference was made to the directive principles of the State Policy and also to the new provisions inserted inthe Constitution as Article 243 to 243(O). (14). Section 39 dealing with the cessation of membership in subject to the provisions of Section 40 of the Act, in other words it is dependent on Section 40. Section 40 provides that whenever it is alleged that any member of the Panchayati Raj Institution is or has become disqualified and such member does not admit the allegations or whenever any member, if in doubt, whether or not he is or has become disqualified for being a member such member or the competent authority or any member of the Panchayati Raj concerned may apply to the District Judge having jurisdiction for the decision on the allegations or doubt. Such applications could be disposed of only by the District Judge by a reasoned order. It is only he who can exercising the power under Section 40 and determine the question of disqualification as contained in Section 19(l). (15). A harmonious construction of the provisions of Section 39 and 40 wouldindicate that the Chief Executive Officer has no jurisdiction to hold any inquiry and to declare a member as being disqualified to hold the office. (16). The inquiry regarding disqualification falls within the exclusive discretion of the judicial authority where there is a denial of allegation. The Chief Executive Officer can pass an order under Section 39 only in those cases wherethere is no denial of allegation and the facts mentioned in the notice are admitted by the member. On the point of incurring disqualification the decision of the judicial authority exercising the power under Section 40 is final. Thereafter the Chief Executive Officer can declare the person concerned to have become ineligible to hold the office. (17). The disqualification enumerated under Section 19(l) are to be considered subsequent to the election and, as such, it is beyond the provisions of Section 43 and Rule 80 of the Rules. They relate to calling in question the election of any candidate by presenting an election petition on the prescribed grounds and within the prescribed period. The grounds would be confined to only those which existedat the time of filing the nomination and holding the election. They relate to calling in question the election of any candidate by presenting an election petition on the prescribed grounds and within the prescribed period. The grounds would be confined to only those which existedat the time of filing the nomination and holding the election. If any member incurs disqualification subsequent to his election as envisaged under Section 19(l) then the action can be taken against that member only under Section 39 and 40 and under no provision. (18). Much emphasis has been laid on Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitutionwhile challenging the validity of the provisions, but it has also been repelled by the Division Bench in the case of Mukesh Kumar Ajmera (supra). This Court has considered very elaborately the scope of these two provisions by referring to the two cases of the Supreme Court reported State of Madhya Pradesh vs. G.C. Mandawar (3) and Shanti Lal Bharti vs. State of Punjab (4), wherein it was held :– ``Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of law of the State on the ground that it contrasts with a law of another State on the same subject, these provisions are neither discriminatory; nor does it contemplate a law of the Centre or State dealing with similar subject being held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions of the two enactments. The source of authority for two statutes being different, Article 14 can have no application. (19). The Court has held that the provisions are not hit by Article 14 and the provisions of Section 19(l) could not be declared arbitrary or discriminatory even if no similar enactments have been made with respect to the Members of Parlia-ment, Members of State Legislature, Members of Cooperative Societies or similarly situate persons of other States. (20). In another case reported in Lalit Narain Mishra Institution of Economic Development and Social Changes Patna vs. State of Bihar (5), it was held :– ``There can be no doubt that when nationalisation has to be done in a phased manner, all the institutions cannot be taken over at a time. The nationalisation in a phased manner contemplates that by and by the subject of nationalisation will be taken over. Therefore, in implementing the nationalisation of private institutions in a phased manner, the Legislature has started with the Institute. The nationalisation in a phased manner contemplates that by and by the subject of nationalisation will be taken over. Therefore, in implementing the nationalisation of private institutions in a phased manner, the Legislature has started with the Institute. Therefore, the ques- tion of singling out the Institute or treating it as a class by itself does not arise, for as the provisions of the Act and Ordinance go, all the private educational institutions, as defined in Section 2(a) of the Act, will be nationalised in a phased manner. (21). It was further found in the case of Mukesh Kumar Ajmera (supra) that Article 14 does not prevent the Legislature for the gradual introduction of restriction. Any single institution could be chosen for the purpose of implementation of the policy. Implementation of the policy in the phased manner was not prohibited by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The object sought to be achieved by theseenactments is to implement the restriction in the growth of population. (22). After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and adopting the reasoning given in the case of Ajmera (supra) we hold that the provisions of Section 19(l) and 39 are valid and do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. The restrictions imposed are quite reasonable. (23). Now we come to the constitutional validity of Section 26(xiv) proviso-(e) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. The counsel appearing for the petitioners of writ petitions mentioned in Schedule-B have raised similar arguments as in the earlier bunch mentioned in Schedule-A dealing with Section 19(l) of 1994 Act. (24). The validity of Section 26(xiv) proviso-(e) of the Municipalities Act hasalready been considered by a Division Bench in Smt. Saroj Chotiya vs. State of Rajasthan (6), decided on 2.7.1997. Relying upon the reasoning given in the case of Mukesh Sharma Ajmera (supra) the validity of this provision has already been upheld. Nothing special has been pointed out by the learned counsel to take a contrary view to the reasons given in the case of Smt. Saroj Chotiya (supra) and werespectfully agree and adopt the same and hold that Section 26(xiv) proviso(e) are also valid. (25). For the reasons given above, we hold that the provisions of Section 26(xiv) proviso-(e) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act are not violative of any provision of the Constitution of India. They are valid. (26). (25). For the reasons given above, we hold that the provisions of Section 26(xiv) proviso-(e) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act are not violative of any provision of the Constitution of India. They are valid. (26). Writ Petitions of Schedule-A where allegations of notice have been denied and orders have been passed by the Chief Executive Officer holding the member having become disqualified, stand allowed partly. The order of Chief Executive Officer stand set aside. The District Judge is free to hold fresh enquiry under section 40 and then the consequential order can be passed. Writ Petitionsfiled only against issuance of notices stand dismissed. (27). Writ Petitions of Schedule-B challenging the validity of Section 26(xiv) Proviso-(e) are dismissed as the said provisions have been held to be constitutionally valid.